I argue that there is a confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity inherent to the structure of average everydayness in Being and Time. I support this reading by recasting Heidegger’s notion of fallenness in Being and Time in terms of its precursor, ruinance, which he introduces in his 1921–22 lecture course, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research (ga 61). In this lecture course, Heidegger explains that ruinance is constituted by a dual movement of relucence and prestruction: the former, an intentional openness to the world; the latter, a securing that conceals that openness. While this dual movement is not expressed explicitly in these terms in Being and Time, I show that it is nevertheless tacitly operative in the structure of falling and that it grounds the duality of average everydayness. I frame this study around the debate on how Dasein can be authentic despite its fallenness, given that fallenness paradoxically renders Dasein essentially inauthentic.

I argue that staying with the movement of attention is the way to being. For attention moves in response to the appeal of being, which means that being shows itself in that movement. We are thus always already on the way to being, always already listening to its call. But something else is required, a special effort of attending to one’s own movement, a taking-heed (In-die-Acht-nehmen) that enables being to be made manifest in a more profound manner, which can transform our being in the world and associated ethical and political realities.

Heidegger develops his reading of a-lētheia as privative unconcealment (Unverborgenheit) in tandem with his early phenomenological theory of truth. He is not simply reinterpreting a word, but rather reading Greek philosophy as having a primordial understanding of truth which has itself been concealed in interpretation. After shedding medieval and modern presuppositions of truth as correspondence, the existential truth-experience shows itself, no longer left puzzlingly implicit in unsatisfactory conventional readings of Greek philosophy. In Sein und Zeit §44, Heidegger resolves interpretive difficulties in Parmenides through his interpretation of alētheia and philologically grounds this reading in Heraclitus’s description of the unconcealing logos. Although this primordial sense of the word has already been obscured in Plato and Aristotle, the structural gradation of their theories of truth conserves the primordial pre-Socratic sense of truth as the experience of unconcealment.

Translators of Heidegger’s interpretations of other thinkers face a challenge: they must contend not only with Heidegger’s distinctive choice of words, but also the terminology of his subject, whether it be Aristotle, Kant, or Schelling. The response by and large has been to focus on Heidegger’s turns of phrase, at the expense of the thinker he interprets. In this paper, I challenge this practice, using Heidegger’s interpretive works on Kant as a test case. If we overlook the terms of the author Heidegger interprets, we miss a major source of Heidegger’s phrasing, and lose the connotations that he invokes by using these terms. Further, such translations reinforce the damaging assumption that Heidegger’s interpretations venture far off-topic. I argue that when Heidegger references Kantian turns of phrase, these terms should be translated to match the standard English translation of Kant, and show how following this method of translation deepens our understanding of Heidegger’s Kant interpretation. In the appendix, I provide two passages exemplifying this method of translation.

Immersive art has been one of biggest trends in the artworld for the past few years. Yet, so far there has been little philosophical discussion on the nature and value of this immersive trend. In this article, I show how Heidegger’s meditations on art can provide a robust assessment of immersive art. On the one hand, immersive art can be taken to culminate in Heidegger’s views on the “machinational” character of modern art, where artworks turn into calculative experience machines, geared to provide “lived experiences” rather than experi­ences of truth. On the other hand, Heidegger’s thought also lends itself to a more positive assessment, where immersive art undermines machination from within and provides experiences of wonder, which are irreducible to and uncontrollable by calculative thinking.

I argue that Heidegger’s methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of Being and Time are the result of Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle’s philosophical method in his Physics and Nicomachean Ethics. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle’s method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philo­sophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of Being and Time, specifically das Man and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into endoxa.