1.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 1
Brian Ribeiro
Sextus, Montaigne, Hume:
Exercises in Skeptical Cartography
|
|
|
2.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 1
Roland J. Teske
William of Auvergne on Virtues
|
|
|
3.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 1
Christopher B. Kulp
Dewey, the Spectator Theory of Knowledge, and Internalism/Externalism
|
|
|
4.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 1
Robert E. Wood
Being Human and the Question of Being:
The Unitary Ground of Individual and Cultural Pluralism
|
|
|
5.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 2
Tianyue Wu
Rethinking Augustine’s Adaptation of ‘First Movements’ of Affection
|
|
|
6.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 2
David Scott
Leibniz and the Knowledge Argument
|
|
|
7.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 2
Andrew Beards
Aesthetics:
Insights from Eldridge, Aquinas, and Lonergan
|
|
|
8.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
Wendy S. Parker
Scientific Models and Adequacy-for-Purpose
|
|
|
9.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
P. Kyle Stanford
Getting Real:
The Hypothesis of Organic Fossil Origins
|
|
|
10.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
Kent W. Staley
Special Editor’s Introduction to Experimental and Theoretical Knowledge
|
|
|
11.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
Derek Turner
Comments on P. Kyle Stanford’s “Getting Real” The Hypothesis of Organic Fossil Origins”
|
|
|
12.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
Deborah Mayo
Learning from Error:
The Theoretical Significance of Experimental Knowledge
|
|
|
13.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
Anna Alexandrova
Adequacy for Purpose:
The Best Deal a Model Can Get
|
|
|
14.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
Kent W. Staley
Comments on William Harper’s “ISaac Newton’s Scientific Method”
|
|
|
15.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
Isabelle Peschard
Target Systems, Phenomena and the Problem of Relevance
|
|
|
16.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
William Harper
Response to Kent Staley’s Comments on William Harper’s “Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method”
|
|
|
17.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
87 >
Issue: 3/4
Michael Weisberg
Target Directed Modeling
|
|
|
18.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
88 >
Issue: 1/2
Andrei A. Buckareff
How Does Agent-Causal Power Work?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Agent-causalism or the agency theory is the thesis that agents qua objects/substances cause at least some of their decisions (or at least their coming to have an intention that is constitutive of a decision). In this paper, I examine the tenability of an attractive agent-causal account of the metaphysics of the springs of free action developed and defended in the recent work of Timothy O’Connor. Against the backdrop of recent work on causal powers in ontology, I argue that, however attractive the account, O’Connor’s agent-causal theory of free agency is ultimately untenable.
|
|
|
19.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
88 >
Issue: 1/2
Randolph Clarke
Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack isn’t required for them to be responsible for doing what they do. Differences between actions and omissions, and between the requirements for responsibility for these two, are also discussed.
|
|
|
20.
|
The Modern Schoolman:
Volume >
88 >
Issue: 1/2
Rebekah L. H. Rice
What is a Causal Theorist to Do about Omissions?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
Most philosophers concede that one can properly be held morally responsible for intentionally omitting to do something. If one maintains that omissions are actions (negative actions, perhaps), then assuming the requisite conditions regarding voluntariness are met, one can tell a familiar story about how/why this is. In particular, causal theorists can explain the etiology of an intentionalal omission in causal terms. However, if one denies that omissions are actions of any kind,then the familiar story is no longer available. Some have suggested that this poses a special problem for causal theorists of action. I argue that it does not and, even more interestingly, that it renders a more nuanced understanding of voluntariness (since it no longer applies strictly to actions) and moral responsibility (since you might be to blame, but not for anything you’ve done).
|
|
|