Linguistic convention (samaya/saṃketa) is one of the central notions of Indian philosophy of language. I present a new classification of traditions of Indian thought based on their view of linguistic convention. This classification is to be verified and expanded in further studies. 1) Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, and later classical Yoga of the Tattvavaiśāradī accept samaya/saṃketa as an agreement initiating the relationship between words and their previously unrelated meanings. 2) Bhartṛhari the Grammarian and the continuators of his thought acknowledge samaya/saṃketa as the established usage of words that is rooted in the natural relationship between words and their meanings; the convention manifests (makes known) the relationship. This view was probably also shared by Mīmāṃsakas and Advaitins. 3) Classical Yoga of the Yogasūtrabhāṣya and probably also earlier Grammar thought of the Mahābhāṣya accept linguistic convention as the established usage of words, but this usage, though having neither a beginning nor an end, is not based on any natural and necessary word–meaning relationship. In this view, linguistic convention not only manifests the word–meaning relationship but also keeps it in existence. Finally, I also explain why the same Sanskrit term samaya/saṃketa was applied to the different ways of understanding linguistic convention. I explain this through the common aspects of all three kinds of samaya/saṃketa. The first aspect is the content of all these kinds of samaya/saṃketa. Irrespective of how linguistic convention is understood, its content is the same: “such and such a word has such and such a meaning”. The second aspect is the crucial role of linguistic convention in language acquisition, communication, and transmission.

In this paper the philosophical problematics of the ontological dimension of suffering in the Buddhist philosophy is raised. Many modern scholars are inclined to think that a more adequate translation for the Sanskrit term duḥkha is “unsatisfactoriness”. However, from the material presented in the article it follows that this rendering does not underlie the sense of the notion of duḥkha when it is examined in the ontological plane, and thus the traditional translation “suffering” in this sense remains more adequate. It is also shown that the etymology of the Sanskrit term duḥkha as a «improperly installed» axle of the wheel of a cart has strong connotations with the metaphor of the wheel and the symbol of swastika in the Buddhist cultural tradition (wheel of being, three turnings of the Wheel of Dharma etc.). In this paper the main causes of suffering (self, body, ignorance, desire and other afflictions) exposed in Buddhist texts and scholarship are revised, and on the example of the Cūḷasuññata-sutta it is demonstrated that the real final cause of suffering in the Early Buddhism is our body and not our “self” and ignorance. While in the Mahayana Buddhism based on the philosophy of emptiness and the principle of nonduality, the dichotomy of soul and body is removed, the attainment of nirvana becomes possible in this body and the real cause and source of suffering becomes the ignorance. On the other hand, the paper argues that just the ontological view on the problem of suffering (under the angle of the principle of nonduality) provides us with understanding of the fact that the suffering can be overcome despite its indestructible ontological status.

In the article, referring to the method of rational reconstruction described by R. Rorty, an analysis of some works of J. Locke has been made in order to identify new prospects in John Locke's philosophy researches. As a result, it’s been demonstrated the presence of silence as an argument and a manifestation of respect J. Locke’s research of realms of cognition, political philosophy and philosophy of education. This is not covered in modern John Locke's philosophy researches. The authors emphasize that J. Locke, although not directly exploring silence as an argument, however, describes the argument ad ignorantiam, the wording of which in the work «An Essay Concerning Human Understanding» and his understanding of tacit consent in the work «Two Treatises of Government» are related to silence as an argument and a manifestation of respect. The position that silence as an argument is present in all four arguments (argumentum ad verecundiam, argumentum ad ignorantiam, argumentum ad hominem, argumentum ad judicium) described by J. Locke is substantiated. Additionally, the argument ad ignorantiam can be considered both as an argument from silence (ex silentio argument) and as a kind of argument to silence. Considered arguments can serve as an argument to silence for the proponent and/or the third party, that is, anyone who is not directly involved in the dispute. Basing on J. Locke's explanation of the characteristic feature of tacit consent, that is, the absence of the expressed consent/disagreement, the possibility of distinguishing the indirect connection between tacit consent and the argument ad ignorantiam is demonstrated, since both tacit consent and the argument ad ignorantiam in J. Locke's works rely on the absence of expressed statements on the consent or disagreement of the opponent. It is established that the ideas of the education of children described by J. Locke also correlate with silence as an argument and a manifestation of respect. Applying the classification of the types of respect proposed by S. Hudson and complemented by R. Dillon to the use of the term «respect» to the various texts of J. Locke, it is substantiated that described by him respect covered almost all kinds of this classification.

The article for the first time presents the powerful historical and philosophical potential of the collection of handwritten candidate works of Kyiv Theological Academy (КТА) students, which is kept at Manuscript Institute, V. I. Vernadskyi National Library of Ukraine. According to the analyzed manuscripts, despite the church-confessional and specialized theological orien-tation of the theological academies, as well as the system of rigid regulations and control by the Most Holy Synod in the subject matters and content of the final works, the students showed a persistent research interest in philosophy. The author identifies more than 150 candidate works of KTA students that are directly relevant to philosophical topics and issues. Most of them are research on the history of Western (from Classical antiquity to the beginning of the 20th century), Eastern and Russian philosophy. At the same time, the handwritten works available in the col-lection express the interest of students in the problems of epistemology, philosophy of history, social philosophy, axiology, ethics and aesthetics, philosophy of religion, as well as their attrac-tion to complex interdisciplinary studies, combining the issues of philosophy and history of phi-losophy with theology, psychology, pedagogy and literary studies.

The article is a translator’s commentary to the Ukrainian translation of E. Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. The task of this article is twofold: On the one hand, to reveal the historical context of the writing and publishing of Cartesian Meditations, on the other hand, to outline the strategic and terminological aspects of the Ukrainian translation of this work. The first part of the article is devoted to the history of creation of the text of Cartesian Medita-tions. In particular, the author answers the question of why the German text of Cartesian Medita-tions was not published until 1950, almost twenty years after the French translation of the book was released. The historico-philosophical investigation conducted in the article shows that Husserl considered the publication of Cartesian Meditations as an opportunity to systematically present his phenomenological philosophy and, eventually, recognized the impossibility of embracing the com-plexity of his doctrine within this work. The difficulty of this systematic presentation led to the enhancement of the role of Husserl’s assistant, Eigen Fink, in the editing of Cartesian Meditations and, ultimately, to the creation of Fink’s Sixth Meditation. The latter, as the author of the article demonstrates, puts previous developments in the phenomenology of static and genetic types into a new theoretical perspective, mainly by introducing the method of constructive phenomenology. In the second part of the article, the author offers one of the possible strategies for translating Husserlian texts that consists in structural simplification and stylistic improvement of the text. This strategy is proposed to be implemented by using simpler grammatical structures, by supplementing the text with translator’s comments, as well as by consistent usage of the Ukrainian phenomenological terminology. During the analysis of the terminological discourse of contemporary Ukrainian phenomenology, the author revises some of the established Ukrainian translations, such as the translation of the phenomenological terms Ausschaltung and Zeitbewusstsein and introduces the translation of new terms, such as Vergemeinschaftung, Person, reell and ideell.

The article examines the sources (visions and inspirations) of Boehme’s mysticism and theosophy. Subsequently, it offers an outline of the principles of his sophiology: God as the will of wisdom and wisdom as his revelation; the role of divine wisdom or the eternal wisdom on the noble Virgin Sophia in the creation of the world and man; and finally their participation in the salvation and rebirth of humankind.

The article analyses how the oral history of philosophy can be conceptualized as a genre and a discipline of the history of philosophy. The need for this kind of conceptualization arose due to recent spreading of interviews in the genre of the oral history of philosophy, which in turn became a subject for the special issue The Oral History of Philosophy in Filosofska Dumka. Analysing this issue, the author proves that the “dialoguing” nature of the interview builds inflated expectations about the oral history as well as its boundaries as an approach in a historical-philo-sophical study. He also suggests distinguishing the interview as a genre of oral philosophy – dialogue, which is a traditional philosophical literary form, from a tool in historical-philosophi-cal study. In the latter case, it is important to determine who will play a role of a historian: an author of historical narration, an interviewee or an interviewer. Depending on the answer to the previous question, the author distinguishes three possible perspectives of the oral history of philosophy development: an interview as a self-sufficient study in the history of philosophy, an interview as a self-sufficient source for historical-philosophical research and an interview as one of sources for historical-philosophical research. Each of them has its opportunities for a historian of philosophy and plays its role in recruiting students and doctoral students (who often are involved as interviewers) to research work.

On November 25, 2019, a scientific seminar organized by the Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy was held at the Department of the History of Philosophy of the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. The main topic of discussion was the status of the oral history of philosophy (OHF) as a scientific discipline: its research goals and place among research practices. There were two main points in the discussion: OHF as a set of empirical interview-based methods and OHF as a separate historico-philosophical discipline with its own area of research. Were also discussed the criteria of distinguishing between "philosophical" OHF and OHF, which is a simple application of oral history techniques in the realm of interviewing philosophers.

The purpose of this study is to discover, present and analyze the key ideas of Anselm of Canterbury concerning the notions of knowledge, will and mode of divine-human relations in the context of this “knowledge-will” framework which is important due to (a) somewhat insufficient attention to the medieval insights on the issue and (b) the peculiarity that Anselm’s intuitions have. More specifically, the object of the given paper is Anselmian understanding of relations between God’s foreknowledge and will, on the one side, and human free will, on the other side, as it is presented in the work entitled De Concordia. In this treatise Anselm of Canterbury partially uses and further elaborates some ideas of Augustine and Boethius, while integrating, updating and synthesizing them in a creative manner, and partially develops a number of thoughts of his own. As a result, there is a set of the well-formulated and comprehensive theses concerning (i) different types of (metaphysical) necessity, (ii) a proper definition of freedom of choice and will, (iii) the nature of will per se, and, finally, (iv) unique relation of “simultaneity” that exists between God’s knowledge, God’s will and the creature’s rational will. These ideas are presented and explicated in the article along with detailed exposition and analytical examination of the main line of argumentation found in the De Concordia.

The study is dedicated to the work of Crimean scholar Ahmad bin ‘Abdallah al-Qrimi, who was one of the most advanced interpreters of the Ibn Arabi’s and Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi’s Sufi philosophy. Ahmad al-Qrimi employed Ibn Sina’s views on division of essence and existence, as well as some concepts of Maturidi kalam. His manuscript work “Advise for the Perplexed and Key for the Exigent” shows main dimensions of Ahmad al-Qrimi’s thought as following: 1) The notion of Being in the works of Ibn Arabi and Sadr al-Din al-Qunawi is interpreted as the idea of necessary existence, as suggested by ibn Sina; 2) the conception of the identity of the absolute and necessary being is understood as the only right approach for the solution of polemics between adepts and critics of Sufism; 3) conception of “correlation” is considered as solution for the problem of relations between mind and reality.

The article focuses on the formation of Kant's table of judgments. The author proves the dependence of Kant's table of judgments on the doctrine of judgment in German 17th century logic. The author proves the influence of George Meier’s «Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre » on formation of the Kantian doctrine of judgment and the table of judgments. This effect consists in the fact that (1) the starting point for Kant's search of the concept of judgment was Meier's definition of judgment in § 292 of «Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre », (2) Kant's table of judgments in «Critique of Pure Reason» appeared as a follow-up of twenty-five critical reflection at §§ 292-352 of Meier's treatise. However, Kant's table of judgments depends also on transcendental logic. The original forms of judgment in Kant's table of judgments contain functional unities, which create the subject of a judgment. Kant's table of judgments depends on both German tradition of 17th century logic and the theory of subject as a part of Kant's transcendental logic.

The article deals with the origin and formation of debating positions in American criticism and philosophy. It analyzes “Intentional Fallacy” by W. Wimsatt and M. Beardsley. as well as E.D. Hirsch’s texts concerning the idea of objective interpretation which initiated this discussion. In fact, both positions are limited because of their normative and ahistorical character. Both sides try to regulate interpretation. Wimsatt and Beardsley lose the historical place of a text, whereas Hirsch reduces the historical place of an interpreter. Anti-intentionalism of Wimsatt and Beardsley relies on interpretative practice of American New Criticism with its principle of work’s autonomy. Despite the article’s empirical character, its important outcome is negation of subjectivity of meaning, and formulation of premises of its intersubjective understanding. Hirsch affirms the invariability of work’s meaning and with this purpose (1) identifies it with the author’s intention binding it with the notion of intentionality and author’s horizoncontext (based on Husserl and Dilthey), (2) introduces the distinction between meaning and significance (based on Frege and Saussure). Despite the contradictions of Hirsch’s positions both in understanding these ideas and in his own conclusions, his merit is the statement of the problem of meaning in general and extending the discussion into the territory of hermeneutics and philosophy of literature.

Analytical philosophy opens new perspectives of studies in the history of philosophy. There are (1) generalized history of analytical interpretations of Cartesian principle cogito ergo sum and (2) analysis of Cartesianism through the prism of contemporary philosophy of action, with special attention to performativity of the mentioned principle. The importance of such research necessarily goes beyond "pure" history of philosophy: it also contributes to revision of traditional approaches to justification of knowledge (foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism), which still remain problematic. Attention to performativism of cogito ergo sum thesis is the key to new convenient interpretation of knowledge justification problem, because it allows for justification as selfjustification in terms of accomplishment. Inevitable accomplishment, peculiar to evidfently performative knowledge (example of which is cogito ergo sum, a very good contender for the role of a sure foundation), suggests that fundamentalist strategy of knowledge justification, in the perspective of philosophy of action, amounts to a preferable interpretation compared to traditional epistemological approach.