In this article, a proposal for Christian theology is constructed in relation to racial injustice. This proposal involves "strategic essentialism," which is informed by feminist theory. This proposal will be explored in light of the views of John Cobb and James Cone.

Concepts of mutual interdependence, process, creative advance, and God occupy key areas in the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Process metaphysics lays emphasis on a naturalism of rigorous rational and empirical methodology with far-reaching implications. Process thinkers have compared Whiteheadian thought to Buddhism, Christianity, and many other religions. However, African religious beliefs have yet to be considered in this area of study. Based on the gap in the literature, this article attempts to reconcile such seemingly different spheres. First, I offer an account of Whitehead's process metaphysics regarding the concepts mentioned above. Second, I argue that nonconventional sources of African philosophy offer conceptual understandings of philosophies of African groups and their place in the metaphysical debate. Third, I discuss these key areas of process thought in Anlo traditional pragmatic philosophy. I illustrate their like-mindedness with process metaphysics through language, religious rites, and historical accounts. I conclude that, although process philosophy overlaps in prominent areas with Anlo belief systems, questions regarding the causal nature of God distinguish the Anlo conception of divinity from that of process philosophy.

This review article critically examines the anthology Resurrecting the Death of God: The Origins, Influence, and Return of Radical Theology, edited by Daniel Peterson and G. Michael Zbaraschuk (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2014). After making brief but largely appreciative summary comments on a number of essays, the article focuses attention on contributions by John Cobb on the theology of Altizer, John Roth on Levinas, and J. W. Robbins on the politics of de Tocqueville's concept of God. Suggestions are provided for inclusion of a wider swath of theologies that might be considered "radical," and the argument is made for more "dialectical exchange," including a revisitation of the basic rationale behind Tillich's notion of the "power of being" and the provision of outlines of a cumulative or "global" abductive argument for the existence of cosmic mind that is informed by recent arguments of Thomas Nagel as well as historical forms of process natural theology, especially as propounded by Hartshorne.

This article is an attempt to examine and clarify the truth theory of American pragmatism. Three central ideas of this truth theory will be considered in light of Whitehead's metaphysics: a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, a defense of fallibilism, and a recognition of the temporality of truth.

The association of God with eternity, and eternity with timelessness, harms Christian spiritual life. If eternity is superior to time, then God’s placement of human beings within time is ungenerous. Fortunately, the Christian concept of God as triune commends divine becoming through time. In particular, the social Trinitarian view that God is three persons united through love demands divine temporality. Relationality relies on change for its content. So, for God to be internally related, God must be internally timeful. Moreover, to assert that the Trinitarian persons relate through time places a high value on human relationships. Created in the image of God, we are called to create ever-closer community through time. This effort sanctifies time, rendering kairos of chronos. Kairos is the experience of time as sacred, whereas chronos is the experience of time as purposeless. For the three persons of the Trinity, all time is kairos. For us, every moment contains the potential for kairos because God sustains the universe continually. Through faith, the moment-by-moment progression of time can become the grace-by-grace gift of God.

The purpose of this article is to introduce, interpret, and develop two incompatible processontological theories of personal identity that have received little attention in analytic metaphysics. The first theory derives from the notion of personal identity proposed in Alfred North Whitehead’s metaphysics, but I interpret this notion differently from previous commentators. The Whiteheadian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but has nothing to do with diachronic objectual identity: the (putative) binary equivalence relation that every entity bears to itself, and only to itself, even after undergoing intrinsic change. The Whiteheadian theory may also find favor with those who, like Whitehead, reject the possibility of pure processes and hold that in every becoming, something—which need not be an object, thing, or individual substance—becomes. The second theory derives from the notion of recurrent dynamics presented in Johanna Seibt’s General Process Theory. The Seibtian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves not only an entity or entities that are essentially dynamic, but also the relation of diachronic objectual identity. The Seibtian theory may alsofind favor with those who, like Broad and Sellars, find reason to postulate pure processes.

The aim of the first part of this article is to highlight some of the historical roots of the affinities of Whitehead's philosophy with Gestalt psychology by identifying a number of physicists as well as philosopher-psychologists playing a relevant role in both the genesis of Whitehead's thought and that of Gestalt psychology. The article goes beyond identifying Faraday and Maxwell as well as James andBergson as relevant in this respect It also focuses on others who have influenced Whitehead: Lorentz as well as Lotze and Brentano, Ward and Stout The aim of the second part of this article is to introduce three of Whitehead's key ideas by means of a number of simple Gestalt experiments: his idea of what mathematics is all about, his idea of what is wrong with Einstein's interpretation of special and general relativity, and his idea of the role of recognition in the subjective form of feeling.