W.V.O. Quine and A.N. Whitehead shared a dualistic ontology of concrete and abstract objects but differed sharply on the status of properties. In this essay, we explore Whitehead’s reasons for admitting properties into his ontology and Quine’s objections. In the course of examining Quine’s position we demonstrate some deficiencies in his position and conclude that in spite of his claims, neither space-time coordinate systems nor classes can do all the ontological work of properties.

It has often been noticed that Platos metaphysical view of being is dipolar. The purpose of the present article is to detail what it means to say that being is dipolar in Plato. Further, I will explore the extent to which dipolarity in Whitehead is indebted to Plato and the extent to which Whitehead's dipolarity is different from Platos. In this regard I will concentrate on Whitehead's recently published Harvard Lectures.

This article is an attempt to examine and clarify the truth theory of American pragmatism. Three central ideas of this truth theory will be considered in light of Whitehead's metaphysics: a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth, a defense of fallibilism, and a recognition of the temporality of truth.

I have argued elsewhere that the overall method that is required in liberal political philosophy is that of reflective equilibrium and that this method can be best understood in processual terms. In the present article I try to show how neoclassical (and other) theists can bring their convictions to bear in a politically liberal society, within the confines of this method, in a rational (rather than irrational or mad) manner.