Aristotle claims that sensible substance is composed of form and matter, while he insists that it is a unity in the strictest sense, that is, the same and one, rather than a heap. However, in what sense a composite thing can be a unity? He takes pains to give an answer in Metaphysics. The key solution lies in his account of matter as potentiality and form as actuality. But many scholars are bewildered by his laconic expressions of the solution, and there are mainly two approaches of interpretations. One is ‘projective’, which takes substance as a basically unified concept; matter and form are two derived aspects of the unity. Another approach is ‘explanatory’, which takes form and matter as the real components and attempts to explain how they can constitute a unitary substance in a time and across a time. The main tasks of this paper are to reexamine the problem and the two approaches and to argue that the manner that a substance is unified should be understood in the light of its coming to be; a sensible substance is a diachronic composite and a functional unity.

Advaita metaphysics is founded upon the theory of non-duality. In order to establish non-duality, the diversity in the mundane world has to be criticized. The Jaina theory of Anekāntavāda, or the theory of ‘multifoldness,’ is supported epistemologically by Saptabhaṅgīnaya, their theory of ‘seven ways to prove the validity of knowledge’. Ācārya Rāmādvaya (1400 CE), in his text the Vedānta Kaumudī, finds Saptabhaṅgīnaya to be an extreme challenge to Advaita theory and knowledge, so he profoundly criticizes the Jaina theory of Saptabhaṅgīnaya. The present paper is the study of Rāmādvayācārya’s arguments from the Vedānta Kaumudi. In this paper, Ācārya Rāmādvaya’s ideas and arguments are consolidated and systematized to present them before modern academia, as his arguments are an important contribution to the tradition of Advaita Vedānta, which majorly influenced the succeeding thinkers of Advaita tradition.

The present paper undertakes a comparison between Heidegger’s and Aristotle’s understandings in view of the relation between philosophizing and living. First, a relevance of the contemplative life for philosophy in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is considered. After such a consideration Heidegger’s understanding of the relation between philosophizing and living is illustrated, which substantially differs from Aristotle’s. This illustration is based on Heidegger’s lecture ‘The fundamental concepts of metaphysics’ (‘Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik’). The present paper concludes with a reflection on the importance of reintegrating philosophizing into living for the modern society.

Following Aristotle’s statement, introducing the Book Z of his Metaphysics, that is “Being has many senses”, which is also so important to Heidegger, this paper will develop the hypothesis that Being, as we find it addressed in Heidegger, can be considered as a radical re-articulation of the question of limitation in its most general sense. This re-statement is to be conceived: A) as radical in the sense of bringing the question of limitation into the center of philosophical inquiry or rather to consider it the center of inquiry; B) as radical in the sense of a return to what we will consider the fundamental question of limitation - the question of the aporia of limitation; and C) as radical in the sense of a re-articulating the metaphysical interpretation of limitation.

The question addressed here is how Aristotle can characterize the ‘unmoved mover’ that is the ‘first ousia’ and first principle of his metaphysics not only as being alive, but as a model for the best kind of human life. The first step towards understanding this characterization is the distinction between ‘motion’ (kinêsis) and ‘activity’ (energeia) that Aristotle develops in 6th chapter of Metaphysics (book 9). Only on the basis of this distinction can we understand how the unmoved mover can be active without being in motion. The second is the argument in De Anima that the soul as principle of life is not any kind of motion, being unmoved even by itself. The soul indeed ‘moves’ in the sense of causing motion, but while remaining itself unmoved. On this basis we see that the meaning of ‘life’ in us is not fundamentally different from its meaning in the divine, and that therefore we can indeed find in the ultimate object of metaphysics a model for how we ourselves are to live.

The answer to the question “How is metaphysics possible?” can be obtained with the help of Kant’s transcendental method. Discussing the possibility of metaphysics, Kant distinguishes two modes of it: metaphysica naturalis and metaphysics as a science. Therefore, the possibility of metaphysics is divided into two sub-questions. Postulated by Kant, metaphysica naturalis, which underlies philosophy, associated with active “Kraft” of mind (imagination and understanding) and roots in metaphysics of the language connected with the sense of language (conceptual and categorial) and its formal–structural nature. Thereby the man is homo metaphysicus. Before discussing the possibility of a “scientific” metaphysics it is necessary to consider, first of all, that metaphysics per se consists of metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis, and secondly, the development of it includes three historical modes: antiquity meta-physics (ontology), meta-psychology (epistemology) of modern era, contemporary (post-Kantian) metaphysics. The possibility of metaphysica generalis (or transcendental ontology) is manifested by specific ontological (transcendental) predicates, i.e. categories in the Kantian sense, which exist in our language. The possibility of metaphysica specialis (or transcendental metaphysics) is manifested by impredicative wholeness, or encompassing totalities (comp. with the Encompassing (das Umgreifende of K. Jaspers), which determine the appropriate regional ontology (Husserl).

Matter is accepted as something unknown in itself, but that does not mean you cannot talk about it. Aristotle believed you can give the description of matter by using analogies. We first come up with the term ‘matter’ in Physics I.7. Aristotle uses it in relation with the problems of change and movement; then in metaphysics it is used in connection with form. Matter and form are accepted as the aspects of the one and same being, in a different level of being though. Because matter is usually associated with potentiality and form is with activity. Therefore, our main problem in this paper is how to make a definition of something and regarding what, that is, to matter or form? Aristotle’s answer for that question will be form because he thought that form is always prior to, and a more real being than matter. We have lots of potentialities throughout our lives, but only some of them are actualized. Thus, if someone wants to make a definition of us, he has to make it in virtue of considering our form.

There are several forms of four-dimensionalism. In this paper, I propose a version of four-dimensionalism called four-dimensional mereology (4DM). To investigate ontological problems, it is important to clarify epistemological problems that are closely related to ontological positions. According to the static view of time, change takes place within time, but time itself doesn’t change, and time merely separates events temporally, as space separates them spatially. However, according to the dynamic view of time, time really does pass, and the world is caught up in a process of purely temporal change. In this paper, I show that the static view of time is right from the ontological viewpoint (i.e. the external viewpoint), whereas the dynamic view of time is right from the epistemological viewpoint (i. e. the internal viewpoint). You may ask which of these two views are real. However, this question is misleading. The universe can be described from several different viewpoints. The internal and the external description give important information about certain parts of the universe and these two descriptions can be correlated and combined. They do not conflict each other, when we compare them in a proper manner. Both descriptions help us to understand the reality of the universe and to interpret ourselves as parts of the universe.

Ontokinethics is an ontology of movement and becoming that inverts western metaphysics of identity by generating an understanding of movement as incipient (virtual) and relational: movement not as activity of the already given, but as generative of all that is, within a metahumanist conception of the world as immanent field of forces. Amorphogenesis is a process where priority lies in the permanent formation of potentials that exceed their actualisations, inverting the traditional account of nihilism, that appears now related to the fixation of identity and form, which negates the creative forces of becoming. Ontokintehics thus interprets the nihilistic or creative wills implicit in movement according tendencies to replication and homogenisation, or emergence and differentiation.

In this paper, I will show how the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness can clarify Locke’s doctrine of personal identity in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and help us to better respond to Reid’s “brave officer” objection in Inquiry and Essays. We will see how Reid has misunderstood Locke and made wrong assumptions that undermine the credibility of his objection. Firstly, Locke differentiates between the terms ‘man’ and ‘person’ but Reid uses them interchangeably in his criticism of Locke. Secondly, Reid thinks that consciousness is equivalent to memory and that Locke’s theory of personal identity will result in contradictory conclusions. On one hand, the general is not the same person as the child because he cannot remember what he did as a child. But on the other hand, transitivity means they are in fact the same person. Reid fails to realize that Locke is in fact talking about self-consciousness in his Essay and the difference between consciousness and self-consciousness is grounded on the difference between a non-rational being like an animal, which can only have identity, and rational beings like us, who have personal identity. Also, to say that memory is equivalent to self-consciousness is wrong because memory is only a subset of self-consciousness.

There are various reasons one might think that the semantic content of occurrences of sentences does not coincide with assertoric content –content of belief and assertion– corresponding to those sentences. But if a semantic theory exploiting such distinction is to play a role in explaining communication, there needs to be a tight connection between the two types of content. Drawing upon the considerations of McDowell (1991) and Evans (1979; 1982) concerning rigidity, Stanley (1997a, b, 2002) proposes to extend Lewis’ (1980) argument for the distinction between the two types of content –an argument concerning behavior of certain English language operators– to argue that modals do not operate on assertoric, but merely on semantic contents of sentences they embed. I argue that the Dummett-Evans-Stanley line of argument fails due to its inability to explain the connection between semantic and assertoric content. Unable to provide a plausible way of recovering assertoric content from semantic content, the theory renders successful communication mysterious. The moral of its failure is far-reaching –any theory that appeals to the distinction between these two types of content remains less than fully satisfactory unless the challenge of accounting for their connection is met.

In Aristotle’s Metaphysics K 8, in the part which is the parallel discussion of being as truth done in book Epsilon (chapter 4), the author, in defining being per se, uses the phrase τὸ ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν. This is not what Aristotle states in book E, namely that being as truth, along with being per accidens, is founded on the remaining kind of being and does not manifest - any nature outside of being (οὐκ ἔξω οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος). Through the analysis and comparison of the two expositions, I will try to highlight how this difference depends on the different conception in the author of book Kappa about the object of the philosophy. In fact, while in book E the object of philosophy is being qua being and in particular being per se, and the separate substance turns out to be the object of first philosophy as the cause and the principle (that is as the explanation of being qua being) in book K, on the con-trary, the separate substance, since it is identified tout court with being qua being (cf. K 7, 1064a29 - there is a science of being qua being and qua separate, τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν καὶ χωριστόν), is itself the true object of study of philosophy.

A correct understanding of experience (empeiría) is crucial for understanding the difference between human and non-human animals. Richard Sorabji interprets Aristotle to be affirming that experience in non-human animals is the same thing as a rudimentary universal, and that the individual who possesses experience achieves his goal by the application of low level univer-sals. I argue that this is neither a correct understanding of Aristotle’s statements in the Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics, nor is it true to the facts. Sorabji is misled, first, by the fact that experience can be regarded as a rudimentary universal (though not a true universal) in humans, and secondly by the fact that people of experience often possess universals that pertain to their actions. As to the latter, I show that people of experience do not succeed in virtue of possessing universals. As to the former, I point out that regarding experience as a rudimentary universal presupposes that the being that possesses them goes on to acquire true universals, something Sorabji fails to show. The presence of a modicum of experience in some non-human animals, thus, does not show that these beings share with us the capacity for knowledge of universals.

In the first part of “Force of Law”, Jacques Derrida has creatively linked and analyzed (among other) the concepts of law, justice, force and the à-venir. What is surprising though, and is argued below, is that for the first time he introduces an undeconstructible concept which he also identifies and equates with deconstruction: justice. The aim of this paper is to prove that Derrida has attempted in this way to lead his ethical theory towards a more positive direction and utter a demand for a justice “to come”, something which philosophically would grant the possibility of “improvementability” - if I am granted permission for the neologism - in a political level. Finally, the non-deconstructible and “to come” aspect and characteristic of justice are criticized in the paper, as they oppose in a peculiar way the very concept of différance -on which deconstructive theory rests- inherently threatening Derrida’s syllogism.

This paper argues that applying the mental files framework for singular thought to thoughts about specific times could produce an account of tensed thought with significant advantages over competing theories. After describing the framework (1) and motivating the paper (2), I discuss the possible make-up and function of a NOW indexical mental file (3-4). The last section argues that, if all ‘now’ thoughts can be coherently analyzed as thinking of a time under the NOW file, one would have a plausible explanation of the following issues: how the thought can refer to extended temporal intervals of various length; why reference to times is not destroyed by thought delays; and how a ‘now’ thought results in timely actions and relief.

In general, the ultimate end is the end beyond which there can be no further end. However, almost all the ultimate ends considered so far— “a man’s ultimate end”, “humanity’s ultimate end”, “the ultimate end of the universe”, and so on—are relative, in that they can in fact have a further end. Additionally, many of the ideas are based on dubious presuppositions such as teleology. Can there, then, be a meaningful idea of the absolute ultimate end without dubious presuppositions, beyond which there can never be any further end? And if so, what will it be like? This paper, by raising such questions, suggests a possible study of the absolute ultimate end, which has never been attempted before, at least explicitly. At first, the classic ideas of the ultimate end (typically attributed to Aristotle and Aquinas) and modern criticisms of them (typically attributed to Anscombe and Geach) are surveyed; then, postulates for the concept of the absolute ultimate end are presented (in §1: Toward a concept of the absolute ultimate end). Next, a definition of the absolute ultimate end (hereafter AUE) is presented, and it is argued that the idea of AUE is not based on (at least clearly) dubious presuppositions, and that AUE is the strongest meaningful ultimate end. Further, it is suggested that a study of AUE would be highly metaphysical—or even mystical—in character (in §2: Toward a study of the absolute ultimate end). Lastly, the possible relationships between us human and AUE are suggested (in §3: Toward the absolute ultimate end as our ultimate end).

The Stoic theory of recurrence is founded on Stoic biological and cosmological doctrines. This paper argues that these connections are far more elaborate and well-determined than generally assumed. Evidence from the Stoic theory of the motion of pneuma is brought to bear and a rival geometric model of time is supported against the standard linear and circular models supported by Salles and Long. The new ‘torus model’ is inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias’ inquisitive questioning of what form the peculiar motion of pneuma may possibly have and based on the evidence in which the Stoics discuss the simultaneous inward/outward motion of pneuma. A new perspective is offered as to what form this motion may take, which ultimately offers an insight into the mechanics of recurrence as also some of the long-standing paradoxes of recurrence.

Whether in the field of metaphysics or in that of epistemology, Jaina thinkers outlined their views in a manner which can be seen to have parallels in thinking of modern and postmodern philosophers. Each particular line of thinking has its own peculiarities which make it somewhat unique. These peculiarities always constitute the points of disagreement between one view with the other. The present study is a trial to study two streams, i.e. Jainism and Sartre in the light of each other in terms of their similarities and differences regarding intentionality. After describing the concept of svaparaprakāśakatva (self and other revealing nature) of knowledge in Jainism and intentionality in Sartre’s philosophy and their analysis, of the major areas of differences and similarities between both the streams are speculated. The study concludes that Jaina philosophers have already broken new grounds in the field of epistemology through their conception of svaparaprakāśakatva long before Sartre; and further, despite of the basic underlying differences in concept of intentionality and Jain epistemology, the svaparaprakāśakatva can very well be shown to square with Sartres’s conception of positional and non-positional awareness.

This paper compares the trajectories and defining moments in the evolution of dialectic in Islamic and European civilizations in the early modern intellectual history. The paper begins with a discussion of the concept of contradiction in the history of dialectic, and traces the shifts in the meaning of contradiction in the pre- and post-Hegel periods by focusing on the works of Immanuel Kant, G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Marx to illuminate how Islamic intellectuals (philosophers, theologians and jurists) understood dialectic at the very moment in which a new form was being constructed in Europe. This paper aims to demonstrate that in Islamic civilization, dialectic was used as a tool for finding the truth whereas in Europe, especially in the post-Hegel period, dialectic was a tool for understanding the contradiction in nature and the world.

Chinese metaphysics and Western metaphysics share common resources, which are theoretical understandings on the contradiction between finiteness and eternity embedded in human beings, and the human reflections on the nature of their life. Nevertheless, the two kinds of metaphysics differ from each other concerning their constructing modes in the following two aspects. First, as to the establishing mode, Chinese metaphysics is in the ascending way, which is from the ethical world to the field of metaphysics; while Western metaphysics in the descending way, which starts from ontology, and arrives at ethics. Second, as to the methods of transcending the finiteness of human life, or the methods leading to eternity, the Chinese way is inner, while the Western one transcendent. The unity of these two aspects constitutes the difference between the constructing mode of Chinese metaphysics and that of Western metaphysics.