Die ersten vier von Brentanos 25 Habilitationsthesen fordern eine Erneuerung der Philosophie - worauf diese Forderung jedoch abzielt, ist nicht so klar. Vielfach wird behauptet, daß dieses Ziel eng verwandt mit der Konzeption einer wissenschaftlichen Philosophie im Sinne Russells und des Logischen Empirismus sei. Diese insbesondere auch von Rudolf Haller vertretene Auffassung setzt aber voraus, daß der katholisch-klerikale Kontext, in den der junge Priester Brentano eingebunden war, nur die unwesentliche Hülle eines eigentlichen Kernes bildet. Dagegen wird gezeigt, daß dieser Kontext nicht so ablösbar, sondern vielmehr für das Verständnis der Habilitationsthesen unabdingbar ist. Es ergibt sich, daß das, worauf die vier ersten Thesen abzielen, eine Erneuerung der philosophia perennis aus dem Geiste des Thomas von Aquin und im Rahmen der Vorgaben der Kirchenlehre ist.

This paper surveys the main attitudes toward intentional explanation in recent psychology. Specifically, the positions of reductionistic behaviorism, materialism and replacement behaviorism are critically examined. Finally, an assessment of the current state of the controversy is presented.

I argue for modal realism from the following principles:(R1) p just in case there are truth-makers for the proposition that p.(R2) If there are truth-makers for the proposition that p and the proposition that p relevantly entails the proposition that q, then there are truthrmakers for the proposition that q.(M) The proposition that p relevantly entails the proposition that possibly p.(R3) I f there are truth-makers for the proposition that q, then necessarily, if q, there are truth-makers for the proposition that q.All of the above principles are to be read as necessary truths. Also, the propositional variable 'p' is restricted to propositions that necessarily satisfy R1. 'q' is not so restricted.The argument is ontological because I argue that the possibility of modal reaUsm together with R3 entails that modal realism is true. The possibility of modal realism follows from R1, R2 and M.

We experience evidence, but experienced evidence does not entail objective validity of the evident content. There are different kinds of intuitive evidence: logical and analytical evidence, the presuppositions of realism etc.; there is intuitive evidence in the cognitive field as well as in the practical realm. Intuitive evidence is linked with the basic framework of the respective field. Intuition may be replaced by deeper intuition on the basis of new views that evoke a reconstruction of the framework. Value intuition is characterized as an established opinion which seems undubitable. All persons, all groups and all institutions have actually some practical convictions on which they found their practical evaluation.

How are we to understand the intentionality of mental acts which lack existing objects? Two alternatives present themselves: the Meinongian, which would involve the postulation of special nonexistent objects; and the adverbial, which would appeal instead to special qualities of the acts themselves. The present paper, which draws on the hitherto neglected aesthetic writings of the Meinong school, is concerned with certain psychological and aesthetic implications of the adverbial approach. The 'substitution theory' of the title consists in the view that our experience of works of art can best be conceived in terms of special sorts of'modified' psychic phenomena which may be said to substitute or stand proxy for our normal emotional experiences. The job of the work of art, on this view, is precisely to bring about such proxy emotions within the psychic subject. This idea is shown to have imphcations for the treatment of aesthetic pleasure, as also for our understanding of the nature of artistic traditions and of the value of works of art.

Die Entwicklung der Philosophie in Österreich unterscheidet sich in markanter Weise von der Hauptlinie der philosophischen Entwicklung in Deutschland. Dabei fällt bei der österreichischen Philosophie vor allem die konsequente Orientierung an den Wissenschaften auf. In der philosophiegeschichtlichen Forschung sind für diese Besonderheit der österreichischen Philosophie z. B. von Otto Neurath, Rudolf Haller, Friedrich Stadier und J.C. Nyiri verschiedene Erklärungen vorgeschlagen worden. In diesen spielen in jeweils unterschiedlicher Weise Faktoren der spezifisch österreichischen Entwicklungen in historischer, institutioneller, politischer und religiöser Hinsicht eine Rolle. Der vorliegende Aufsatz kritisiert demgegenüber bereits die diese Erklärungsversuche tragende Fragestellung: Die philosophischen Entwicklungen in Österreich bedürfen - so lautet die neue These - gar nicht einer besonderen Erklärung; denn sie stellen den geistesgeschichtlichen Normalfall dar. Vielmehr ist eine Erklärung dafür notwendig, daß sich die wissenschaftliche Philosophie und die mit ihr verbundenen Charakterzüge stilistischer Klarheit, technischer Kompetenz, systematischer Orientierung, Spezialisierung und Professionalisierung im gleichen Zeitraum nicht auch in Deutschland entwickelt haben. Eine solche Erklärung läßt sich - so eine weitere These des Aufsatzes - ziemlich leicht aus der besonderen Rolle der (traditionellen idealistischen) Philosophie im deutschen Nationalbewußtsein herleiten.

Mit dem Konzept des kategorialen Rahmens hat Stephan Körner eine Möglichkeit geschaffen, metaphysische Systeme zu vergleichen. Da kein metaphysisches System auf Modalbegriffe verzichten kann, wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit am Beispiel der Kritik Kants an der Wolffschen Schule gezeigt, daß Körners Konzept zu ergänzen ist um die jeweilige modale Kennzeichnung auf den Ebenen der ontologischen, logischen und epistemischen Modalitäten. So muß die Kantische Kopernikanische Wende als eine Kritik an der Wolffschen Modaltheorie gesehen werden, verbunden mit dem Entwurf einer eigenen Modalkonzeption, die als neue Elemente erstens die Begründung der ontologischen Modalitäten auf epistemische statt auf logische Modalitäten und zweitens die Einführung der Wirklichkeit als gleichberechtigten Modus enthält. Der Weg dieser Kritik führt über eine Verwerfung des Wolffschen complementum possibilitatis und des ontologischen Gottesbeweises und zeigt, wie schrittweise eine Reflexion auf die Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis zu einer Umkehr des tradierten modaltheoretischen Begründungszusammenhangs führt.

Sentences such as "Holmes believes that the leader of the London gang is about to be incriminated" are commonly understood to have two readings: de re and de diclo. On the basis of the way which the de relde dicto distinction is customarily conveyed, it is shown that such sentences have not just two but eight readings. It is suggested that intensional entities - such as senses, guises or denoting concepts - are the most natural way to account for this variety of readings.

In Garvers Aufsatz soll gezeigt werden, daß in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen der Begriff der Lebensform dem Begriff der gemeinsamen menschlichen Handlungsweise synonym ist. Demgegenüber verteidigt die vorliegenden kritische Betrachtung Wittgensteins Auffassung, nämlich die Möglichkeit der Vielfalt möglicher Lebensformen. Auch wenn man gegen eine Inflation von Lebensformen polemisiert, braucht man nicht zu behaupten, es gebe nur eine menschliche Lebensform. Das ist falsch. Einige historische Hinweise dienen der weiteren Aufklärung der Bedeutung des Ausdrucks "Lebensformen".

Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the surface grammar of the regimented sentences.

This paper pursues the suggestion of St. Anselm that action expressions can be parsed by saying that the agent makes a certain proposition true. Using the model syntax of Pörn and the relatedness logic of Epstein, it is shown how St. Anselm's approach can reveal the logical form of some common action locutions.

What primitive concepts does formal ontology require? Forsaking as too indirect the linguistic way of discerning the categories of being, this paper considers what primitives might be required for representing things in themselves (noumena) and representations of them in a thoroughly crafted large autonomous multi-purpose database. Leaving logical concepts and material ontology aside, the resulting 32 categories in 13 families range from the obvious (identity/difference, existence/non-existence) through the fairly obvious (part/whole, one/many, sequential order) and the surprisingly familiar (illocutionary modes, mass/count, indexical/descriptive) to the controversial (moment/fundament, transparent/opaque) and the arcane (modes of class delimitation, taxonomic rank, aspects of designators). Any such list is speculative and tentative, but the test of this one will be in its implementation, a new departure for philosophical category theories.

Bolzano's theory of collections (Inbegriffe) has usually been taken as a rudimentary set theory. More recently, Frank Krickel has claimed it is a mereology. I find both interpretations wanting. Bolzano's theory is, as I show, extremely broad in scope; it is in fact a general theory of collective entities, including the concrete wholes of mereology, classes-as-many, and many empirical collections. By extending Bolzano's ideas to embrace the three factors of kind, components and mode of combination, one may develop a coherent general account of collections. But it is most difficult to take Bolzano's view to fit modern set theory. So while Krickel's positive thesis is rejected, his negative thesis is confirmed.

The relations between philosophy, science and religion preoccupied S.H. Bergman for many years. He wanted to corroborate, by belief, a personal God to whom, and not only about whom, one can speak. This should follow from authentic religious experience, making it independent from philosophy. Furthermore, according to Bergman, religion can do what philosophical reasoning is incapable of doing since he considers belief to be stronger than knowledge. A criticalscrutiny of these assumptions involves some interesting implications concerning toleration, freedom-of-thought and dogmatism. The final conclusion consists in that belief cannot refute philosophical knowledge but can reject it while philosophy can refute belief but cannot reject it.

This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology" — the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Außersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.

In der Wissenschaftslehre Bolzanos (1837) spielt der Begriff der Auslegung eine nicht unwesentliche Rolle. Seine Hauptfunktion besteht in der Explikation der logischen Elemente im Satz und in der Reduktion der sprachlichen Sätze auf das Grundmuster ,,A hat b". Die Herausbildung und die Behandlung der Auslegungsproblematik bei Bolzano sind stark vom neuzeitlichen Gedankengut, aber auch von der mittelalterlichen Philosophie und Logik beeinflußt. Obwohl sein Auslegungsbegriff der logischen Tradition weitgehend verpflichtet bleibt, weist er doch andererseits tiefgehende Parallelen mit der von Frege und Wittgenstein entwickelten Methode der logischen Analyse auf, sodaß Bolzano auch in diesem Punkt als ein Vorläufer der analytischen Philosophie gelten kann.

Natural languages differ from most formal languages in having a partial, rather than a total, semantic interpretation function; e.g., some noun phrases don't refer. The usual semantics for handling such noun phrases (e.g., Russell, Quine) require syntactic reform. The alternative presented here is semantic expansion, viz., enlarging the range of the interpretaion function to make it total. A specific ontology based on Meinong's Theory of Objects, which can serve as domain on interpretation, is suggested, and related to the work of Castaneda, Frege, Katz and Fodor, Parsons, and Scott.

Apart from Aristotle it is Comte who most influenced Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, especially with regard to methodological questions. Brentano follows Comte not only in his attack on 'metaphysical' sciences and in his claim that sciences in their positive stage deal with phenomena; he also takes over Comte's encyclopedic law, replacing, however, sociology with psychology. In order to lay the foundations of psychology, Brentano recommends all the scientific methods suggested by Comte, but states that psychology employs as its genuine method inner perception, the neglect of which had led Comte to deny the autonomous status of psychology as a science.

Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848) was an original and independent thinker, who left a lasting legacy in several areas of philosophy. Four such areas are singled for special attention: political philosophy, ethics and theology, logics and semantics, and mathematics. In all these areas he was far ahead of his time. He had pioneering ideas in political philosophy and in ethics and philosophy of religion, and he argued for them in a brilliantly clear way. In logic and semantics he anticipated Frege, Carnap and Quine on important points, and he had intriguing, yet to be explored, ideas on intuition and other fundamental philosophical notions. In the foundations of mathematical analysis and the theory of infinite sets he anticipated Weierstrass and Cantor.