The article analyses the explication of the infinity in the philosophical courses taught at Kyiv- Mohyla Academy at the 17th and 18th centuries. It examines 12 philosophical courses – since 1645 (the course by Inokentii Gizel) until 1751 (the course by Georgii Konyskyi). In general, all the professors, as well as other scholastic philosophers, agree that categorematic infinity exists only in God, but syncategorematic is present in the created world. Regarding the question of whether God, being omnipotent, can create a categorematic infinity in the world, the Mogilyans are divided into several camps: (1) Inokentii Gizel, Stefan Yavorskyi, Inokentii Popovskyi, Sylvestr Pinovskyi, Platon Malynovskyi gave a positive answer to the question; (2) Yosyf Volchanskyi, Ilarion Levyt-skyi, Amvrosii Dubnevych, Sylvestr Kulabka believed that this kind of infinity is in principle im-possible, hence God cannot create it; (3) Theophan Prokopovych and Georgii Konyskyi took a skeptical stand and considered that the human mind as such could not solve this problem. The article analyses which arguments were offered by each camp, and gives essential suggestion: most probably, Mohylian philosophers who supported the possibility of actual infinity in the created world were influenced by nominalistically oriented Jesuit philosophers, like Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza and Rodrigo Arriaga. The other Mohylians backed a more traditional idea, supported by Thomas Aquinas, that only one actual infinity can exist and it is God.

The article analyzes the main directions and cases of research and reception of the creative heritage of Hryhorii Skovoroda in Germany. Even though Dmytro Chyzhevskyi introduced German scientists to Skovoroda’s work back in the 1930s, its actual reception, according to the author, began only in the 1980s. The article analyzes the research of three authors who carry out such a reception today. First, Elizabeth von Erdmann examines Skovoroda’s work in the context of philosophia perennis. Instead, Roland Pietsch began his study of Skovoroda’s work by translating his works into German and later focused on demonstrating the unity of mysticism and metaphysics in Skovoroda’s philosophy, according to how this unity was ensured in his doctrine of self- knowledge. Pietsch demon strated this unity in his interpretation of the Narcissus dialogue. Another essential aspect of Skovoroda’s work, explored by Pietsch, is the philosopher’s symbolic metaphysics. Pietsch’s latest works are devoted to another important issue — establishing Skovoroda’s place in European intellectual history, in particular, based on a comparative analysis of the concepts of Hryhorii Sko voroda, Johann Georg Hamann, and Franz von Baa der. Another German researcher who studies Skovoroda’s work today is Slavologist and theologian Günter Kollert, who has been engaged in the philosophy of Skovoroda and Pamfil Yurkevich for several years and has translated the works of Skovoroda and Mykhailo Ko valyn skyi into German. The author of the article concludes that new interesting independent studies of Sko vo roda’s work will appear in Germany, which will make it possible to more accurately define Skovoroda’s place in the historical-philosophical process, to think more profoundly and describe this process, as well as to pave the way to possible abandonings and comparisons of Ukrainian works thinker with other famous figures in the history of philosophical thought.

The article conducts a comparative analysis of the teaching on the term by the professors of Kyiv-Mohyla academy in the 17th-18th centuries. There were studied 29 (out of 30) philosophi-cal courses. Discussing the term, Mohylian professors primarily concentrated on its definition and different divisions. The term, according to their understanding, has certain ambiguity. On the one hand, it was considered as part of the proposition, i.e. the subject or the predicate. This meaning was clearly exposed in the definition of the term. On the other, examining different (about 20) divisions of the term, Mohylian professors transcended this Aristotelian understand-ing, and here the term became a basic semantic unit in logic. The article studies the differences among the courses in the explication of the main divisions of the term. It pays, moreover, some attention to several professors’ (Theophan Prokopovich, Ambrosii Dubnevych et al.) attempts at systematizing those divisions. The article concludes that Mohylian teaching on the term was influenced by the early modern scholastic tradition. The divergences of opinions among pro-fessors were mainly affected by different factions in this tradition.

Teofan Prokopovych and Georgiy Konyskyi are the most prominent professors of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in the 18th century. Their courses (1707-09 and 1749/51) are well regarded among the researchers and translated into Ukrainian in 1980 and 1990 respectively. Both texts generally have been considered as original. However, after a careful examination, it possible to notice a strong influ-ence of Prokopovych on Konyskyi. This publication provides a comparative critical edition of a sec-tion from both courses on the same topic, on the infinity. The section is published together with the available Ukrainian translations. The four text are synchronized, so it is easy to track the same passage in all the texts. Since the texts of both authors are based on several manuscripts, the publication is accompanied with the apparatus criticus. Because there is no tradition of publishing critical editions of Latin texts in Ukraine, a detailed explanation of the rules of apparatus criticus is provided here. At this stage, it is too early to give a full account of the connection between Konyskyi’s and Prokopovych’ courses; nevertheless, based on the published section, it possible to say that Konyskyi used Prokopovych text mostly verbatim. He made some structural rearrangements, added some comments and clarifications. His text sounds more logical and more easily to apprehend. Considering the main goal of teaching activity – to pass a common knowledge, clarity of explanation is a higher value, than originality.

Report on the first session of the seminar “Philosophia perennis” (“Evolution of the concept of consciousness in modern philosophy”), organized by the journal Sententiae in collaboration with the Union of Researchers of Modern Philosophy (Pascal Society) and the Kant Society of Ukraine (August 10 -12, 2021, Odesa).

This article reveals the critical content of the idea of scientific revolution in Wolff's philosophy and shows Leibniz's contribution to its formation. Although Wolff's goal was to reform the method of philosophizing on the model of Euclid's geometry, which was based on the Cartesian idea of achieving certainty by clarifying concepts, the clarification that Wolff (in the sense of Leibniz) sees in such an analysis of concepts establishes a connection between them and show the possibility of the object expressed by each concept. Wolff sees the critical meaning of his method in the fact that by analyzing the concepts to link all concepts and statements into a single system, which was based on consistent grounds and would not contain unproven propositions. This would, according to Wolf, remove from philosophy all the con-cepts, the objects of which were not possible, and statements that could not be proved. Leibniz's idea of concept analysis also formed the basis of his notion of philosophy as the science of the possible. The critical meaning of this concept of philosophy in Wolff, as in Leibniz, was to limit the subject of philosophy only to the realm of the possible. Although the main critical ideas underlying Wolff's philosophical system were formulated by Leibniz, Wolf's system was still the fruit of his own genius. Many of his critical ideas were groundbreaking and had a marked influence on the further development of philosophy. These include the requirement to preface the construction of a system of philosophy with research into the cognitive abilities of the human mind. However, his attempts to build a universal system of knowledge led to the leveling of the critical content of some of Leibniz's demands, which led to the accusation against him, and Leibniz, of atheism and fatalism.

The paper provides a comparative analysis of the programs of reforms of philosophy developed by Christian Wolff and the members of the Eclecticist school. It reveals the critical foundations of the concepts of the system by both schools and assesses the prospects of their further development. Although Wolff is often inconsistent, he is nevertheless closer to Descartes and Leibniz, and therefore to the Platonic tradition. The Eclecticists, on the other hand, are closer to the Peripatetic tradition, and therefore to empiricism. From the point of view of the history of philosophical methodology, Wolff’s program combines Cartesianism and the German tradition of methodical thinking (J. Jung, E. Weigel and Leibniz), which both were oriented towards mathematics. The Eclecticists, on the other hand, used the dialectical model, which they modernized by introducing the principle of historicism and applying it to the history of philosophy. When the program of the Eclecticists was guided by the critical selection of knowledge by members of the "scientific community" and the concept of an open system, Wolff’s synthesis of knowledge is carried out on the basis of a rigorous method. He puts forward a fundamentally new idea of a universal system based on new normative requirements for the system-forming principle - it must be fundamental, generally valid and immanent in the system of knowledge. Wolff does not reject the critical program of the Eclecticists; he tries to prove that the successful implementation of their program is possible only if there is a basic system of truths and a reliable method. In his treatise On the Difference Between Systematic and Non-systematic Intellect, Wolff laid the foundation of “systematic eclecticism” and “speculative criticism”, which was substantiated in the works by "classics of German idealism", primarily by C. L. Reinhold and Hegel.

The article supplements the publication of the introduction to Theophan Prokopovych’s phil-osophical course (taught at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1707-09). It analyses characteristics of Prokopovych’s manuscript in comparison with the manuscript of Georgiy Konyskyi’s philo-sophical course (taught in 1747-1749). The latter turns out to be a copy of the former, as it does not contain significant differences. The article describes the editorial principles of Prokop-ovych’s Prooemium and the significance of the text as well as gives short exposition of the content with the analysis of references by Prokopovych. It explains some codicological and tex-tological characteristics of both manuscripts. The analysis of textual relation between the two manuscripts shows that Konyskyi’s manuscript contains much more mistakes than Prokop-ovych’s manuscript. Most of more than a hundred variations between the manuscripts are mis-takes in Konyskyi’s manuscript. The author supposes that the student, the scribe of Konyskyi’s manuscript, not completely understood rather complicated style of Prokopovych. Prokop-ovych’s position about the style of exposition shows balancing between humanistic and scho-lastic ideas. It states that Prokopovych refers usually to ancient authors. The references in the text are quite detailed, but not enough accurate. Almost half of them (6 out of 12) happen to be incorrect. It is probable that Prokopovych made references from memory.

The article deals with the analysis of Kyiv-Mohyla (the 17th-18th centuries) conceptions of intellectual cognition in the context of the European scholastic tradition. There were analysed Traktat o duszy [The Treatise on Mind] by Kasian Sakovych (Cracow, 1625), and handwritten philosophical courses by Inokentiy Gizel (1645-47), Theophan Prokopvych (1706-08) and Georgiy Konyskyi (1749-51).The article shows that Sakovych, Gizel and Prokopovych supported a typical scholastic di-vision of intellectual powers into the active and passive (or possible) intellect, although Prokopovych expressed doubts about the necessity of this division. Unlike them, Konysky in 1749-51 totally denied the division of the intellect. The article argues that Prokopovych’s and Konyskyi’s change in the interpretation of intellectual powers was influenced by modern philosophy, mainly by Cartesianism. In general, the views of Mohylian authors on the problem of intellectual cognition are marked by some eclecticism, combining elements of different scho-lastic schools. They followed Francisco Suarez and Scotists defining creative power of the possible intellect and the formal difference between two kinds of intellectual powers. However, they, especially Inokenitiy Gizel, went by Thomistic interpretation of verbum mentis. At the same time, the professors of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, like other scholastic philosophers, recog-nised the necessary connection between cognitive powers of different levels. In their view, cognitive powers belong to the human being as a complex substantial system. The article proves that Kyiv-Mohyla concepts of intellectual cognition express a range of clearly modern ideas; nevertheless, they are also oriented to the ideas that modern philosophy denied.

The article focuses on the formation of Kant's table of judgments. The author proves the dependence of Kant's table of judgments on the doctrine of judgment in German 17th century logic. The author proves the influence of George Meier’s «Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre » on formation of the Kantian doctrine of judgment and the table of judgments. This effect consists in the fact that (1) the starting point for Kant's search of the concept of judgment was Meier's definition of judgment in § 292 of «Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre », (2) Kant's table of judgments in «Critique of Pure Reason» appeared as a follow-up of twenty-five critical reflection at §§ 292-352 of Meier's treatise. However, Kant's table of judgments depends also on transcendental logic. The original forms of judgment in Kant's table of judgments contain functional unities, which create the subject of a judgment. Kant's table of judgments depends on both German tradition of 17th century logic and the theory of subject as a part of Kant's transcendental logic.

The author considers that for the correct solution of a question on Leibniz's relation to eclecticism it is necessary to differentiate accurately concepts of "philosophical ideology" and "philosophical system". Leibniz apprehended many principles of philosophical ideology of eclecticism and used them for creation of his system. He wasn't, however, eclectic thinker since he constructed his universal system of knowledge on the basis of uniform system of the normative principles. Nevertheless, it is possible to call Leibniz a syncretic thinker if to use this term for characteristic his religious position, but not a philosophical.

The article compares selected chapters devoted the problems of mind (anima) from two phil-osophical courses by Georgii Konyskyi, taught at Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in 1747-1749 and 1749-1751 academic years. As Konyskyi taught his first course using verbatim Teofan Prokop-ovych’s philosophical course of 1706-08 academic years, the article compares the doctrines on mind by these two Mohylian authors. It also shows the evolution of Konyskyi’s views. There are common elements between the philosophy of mind of Prokopovych and Konyskyi: their interpretations of Aristotle’s definition of the soul; the scholastic concept of the man as an integral mind-body entity; the problem of the unity and multiplicity of forms. It is shown that Prokopovych and Konsyskyi understood the three-level structure of a human soul in the same way as Francisco Suarez and Rodrigo de Arriaga. However, there are some differences between these two Mohylian professors. They inter-preted differently sensitive and intellectual cognition. Prokopovych upholds the scholastic doc-trine of species. Konyskyi, in his second course, abandons this doctrine and defends the doctrine of impressiones. They are developed by the phantasmata – not received from objects. The im-pressions are modifications of animal spirits by direct or indirect impact of objects on senses of a human being or any other animated being. In the doctrine on intellectual powers, Prokopovych upholds the scholastic distinction between active and passive intellect. Konyskyirejects this common for scholastic tradition distinction and considers that passive intellect can do full-scale intellectual activity. The influence of Early Modern philosophy, especially Cartesianism, was the reason why Konyskyi changed his position.

The word and idea of a «national philosophy» come up against a seemingly insurmountable aporia between the demand for a universal wisdom (philosophia perennis) and the need to incarnate this pursuit in the manifold and varied cultures.This aporia is mythically revealed in the conflict between the unified, solid, senseless language of Babel and its redemption in the shared understanding by different peoples and idioms (Pentecost).This myth finds its effective incarnation in the multiplicity of human cultures along human history. But this history is marked by a double conflict:- a symbolic one in the competition between a «vertical» order (the rule of languages considered to be sacred) and a «horizontal» order challenged by the outcome of new secular idioms (Volgare in Italy of Renaissance);- a polemical one in the recurrence of the tension between the building of a «lingua universalis» (a logical one) and the fertility of «natural» idioms. (at the epicenter of this tension radiates thought of Leibniz).What emerges from these oppositions is the part played by language, in the diversity of its expressions. This diversity enables the emergence of a «nationalization» of philosophy. From then on, it seeks and coins itself in the midst of fundamentally peculiar cultures (nations) competing in an inventive, contrasting and vulnerable quest for meaning.

The article examines the metaphysical doctrine of being of the great Iranian philosopher and theologian Sadr ad-Din Shirazi, who fundamentally renewed philosophy in Islamic world. The following aspects of this doctrine are considered: (1) primacy and hierarchy of being; (2) the distinction between the concept of being and the reality of being; (3) the difference between being and entity; (4) the difference between being and quiddity. The article shows the similarity of Sadr ad-Din Shirazi’s doctrine and certain Thomas Aquinas’s conceptions, especially his doctrine of the act of being (actus essendi). Both philosophers elaborated the ontological difference between being and entity (Sein und Seienden). Therefore, they can not be included in the “oblivion of being” tradition (Seinsvergessenheit) which is the main feature of the history of European metaphysics, according to Martin Heidegger.

Mikhail Bakhtin’s philosophy of act is considered as an anti-metaphysical project, which arises in the course of self-refuting development of his original metaphysics. Bakhtin’s version of self-refuting transformation of initial metaphysics into further anti-metaphysics is explored in a wider context of similar projects in European philosophy of late 18 – late 19 centuries (Reid, Engels, Marx, Nietzsche). Bakhtin appears to be close to Marx in his gradual shift from “direct” metaphysics to “transformed forms” of philosophizing that grasp the original subject of their initial “first philosophy” at a more concrete level via tools of some “particular” science (political economy for Marx, “aesthetics of verbal creation” for Bakhtin). At the same time, Bakhtin’s “aesthetics of verbal creation” proves to be actually a kind of “meta-philology” somewhat close to the “philosophical philology” of early Nietzsche.

At First, the article analyses Hamann’s path to self-knowledge and self-love as a path of Socratic ignorance, which is indeed the highest form of knowledge. For Hamann Socrates is the predecessor of Christ, and Socratic ignorance (I know that I know nothing) is the path to divinization. Subsequently, it is pointed out, how Hryhorii Skovoroda explains the path of self-knowledge and self-love. To illustrate this thought, he makes use of the Ovidian Narcissus myth. Concerning the figure of Narcissus, Skovoroda distinguishes the following three aspects: 1. The Egyptian Narcissus, 2. The Hebraic Narcissus and 3. The Christian Narcissus, i.e. Jesus Christ. These three aspects and corresponding assertions of the Bible designate Skovoroda’s path to divinization. Finally, it points out similarities between Hamann’s and Skovoroda’s understanding of self-knowing and self-love and their fundamental impact for the philosophy of Franz von Baader and his criticism of modern subjectivism.

First Ukrainian translation of M. Fichan’s article "Perception, aperception" (Vocabulaire Européen des philosophies. Dictionnaire des intraduisibles. Paris: Seuil, & Le Robert, 2004, pp. 908-912).

The treatise of E.W. von Tschirnhaus «Medicina mentis»… is discussed in this article in the context of formation of Kant’s transcendental criticism. The study of theoretical sources of Tschirnhaus’s epistemology shows that, despite the strong influence of Spinoza and Leibniz, Tschirnhaus is closer to the Cartesian tradition. Trying to eliminate the metaphysical back-grounds from philosophy, he brings together empirical and rationalist traditions as close as possible. Such «critical convergence» results in the «subjective turn» that (partly through Ch. Wolff, but mainly through I.N. Tetens) leads to Kant's transcendental idealism.

If Wolff from the very beginning was strongly influenced by Cartesianism, and his concept of system was guided by the geometric model of scientific method, Leibniz relies on the German tradition of “methodological thinking”, originated by Joachim Jung. Leibniz’s conception of sys-tem focuses mainly on algebraic analysis. The application of the term “system” mainly to meta-physics can be explained by the fact that it is this science that deals with synthetic principles and is designed to develop a rational view of the world. Based on the idea of “real metaphysics”, Leibniz justifies these principles as such that make possible the laws of physics and rational discourse in general. Leibniz does not provide a system of philosophy in the sense of traditional school philos-ophy. He considers metaphysics as the most consistent expression of a systematic mind and indi-cates heuristic principles for the construction and improvement of reasonable hypotheses.