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1. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 5
Lukáš Novák Orcid-ID Být v či nebýt v?: Tomistické a scotistické pojetí konstituce kategoriálního vztahu
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The purpose of this article is to compare the Thomist and the Scotist theory of relations. The main feature of the Thomist theory is an effort to minimize the ontological import of the specific essential ratio of relation as such, called esse ad, and to reduce the ontological import of its other aspect, the esse in or inherence understood as a common feature of all accidents, to the esse in of its foundation. The Scotists, on the other hand, have no tendency to deflate the esse ad of a relation. Moreover, according to Malafossa of Barge’s theory (adopted by B. Mastri and B. Belluto), a relation involves two different instances of esse in. The one, called esse in velut in subiecto, is that generic inherence common to all accidents (which, therefore, does not occur in the substantial relations of divine persons). The other, esse in velut in fundamento, belongs specifically to relation as such and reflects the fact that very relation, even a substantial one, is not only a relation towards something, but necessarily also a relation of something towards something else. In spite of the fact, therefore, that the Thomist and Scotist doctrines are usually grouped together as mere subvariants of anti-reductive realism, they must be regarded as substantially different.
2. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 6
Filomathés čili o odbornosti: (z řečtiny přeložil Lukáš Novák)
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Poznámka překladatele - Čtenář si nepochybně klade otázku po původu a historickém kontextu nově objeveného sókratovského dialogu, jehož český překlad zde prezentujeme. Tomuto oprávněnému požadavku však bohužel zatím nelze dostát. Autorství a historická povaha textu jsou stále předmětem zkoumání a zásadní nejistota zatím panuje i ohledně zcela základních otázek. Prezentovat zde jakékoliv předběžné dohady by tudíž za této situace mohlo být velmi zavádějící; čekat s prezentací dialogu veřejnosti na vyřešení techto otázek se však zdálo škoda. Proto jsem se rozhodl – po poradě s redakcí časopisu – zdržet se prozatím všech vyjádření k historickým a textově kritickým otázkám spjatým s textem a předložit jej tímto způsobem v pracovním českém překladu bez jakéhokoliv dalšího komentáře. Překlad věnuji svým kolegům. - Lukáš Novák
3. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 19 > Issue: 3
Tomáš Edl Orcid-ID V čem je kouzlo neurčenosti: Příspěvek ke sporu o (i)racionalitu racionálního kompatibilismu
4. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Daniel Heider Úvod do metafyziky: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
5. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Nejeschleba Lutheránský aristotelismus – Philipp Melanchthon: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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This article summarises the basic features of Melanchthon’s approach to Aristotle’s philosophy in the areas of logic, ethics and natural philosophy. Although Melanchthon builds upon the humanistic ideal of purifying classical heritage, his Aristotelianism should not be viewed as ‘pure’. His conception of natural knowledge (notitiae naturales) could be regarded as a significant non-Aristotelian element of his philosophy. The view consequently penetrates his logic, ethics as well as epistemology. Primarily, however, the reason behind his reception of Aristotle is a defence of Luther’s views: the aims of logic and rhetoric lie in theexegesis of the Bible within the context of the principle of ‘ Sola Scriptura’; he rejects the medieval concept of felicity and puts antropology into the dialectics of Law and Gospel; the aim of natural philosophy is the exposition of the existence of God’s Providence. Melanchthon’s reception of Aristotle is thus influenced by the theology of the Reformation to such an extent, that we might refer to it as Lutheran Aristotelianism.
6. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Franz Schupp Odpovědí na Kanta všechno začalo Duchovně-dějinné místo teologie Karla Rahnera: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
7. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík Tomistické Pojetí Predikace (1) K příspěvku Lukáše Nováka: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
8. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Peter Volek, Lukáš Novák Na cestě ke scholastice. Klášterní škola v Le Bec – Lanfranc z Pavie a Anselm z Canterbury: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
9. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík (3) Ke stati Petra Dvořáka: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
10. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Pavel Materna Ontologie Vztahů (1) Poznámka k Sousedíkově kritice soudobé ontologie zztahů: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
11. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Pavel Materna (3) Závěrečné vyjádření: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
12. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Petr Dvořák Ke Gahérově analýze Tomášovy „druhé cesty“: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
13. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Pavel Blažek Kulturní styky a recepční procesy v teologii 12. A 13. století Zpráva z vědecké konference: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
14. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
M. J. Loux Nutné a možné (dokončení): A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
15. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Michal Chabada Duns Scotus, Metaphysician: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
16. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Stanislav Sousedík (2) Vyjádření k Maternově poznámce: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
17. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 2 > Issue: 1
Jan Palkoska „Corpus non est Substantia, sed modus tantum Entis“ leibniz o fenomenalitě látkového světa: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of this article is to present and analyze the argumentative structures which are decisive for Leibniz’s position regarding the issue of the ontological status of material things (or bodies) and matter. I reconstruct and thoroughly analyze (i) two different argumentative strategies of Leibniz’s – viz. an “epistemic” and a “realistic” one – for his general thesis that nothing material (and a fortiori no body) has rigore metaphysico the status of a substance, as well as (ii) the corresponding suggestions of his as to how the material world is to be construed out of substances and their modes. Throughout, I lay special emphasis onpinpointing the real key elements of Leibniz’s arguments and on articulating them in such terms that would allow for their direct confrontation with other paradigmatic positions regarding the issue in Leibniz’s times.
18. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Tomáš Marvan Putnamovy realismy a pojmová relativita: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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The aim of the paper is twofold. First, it expounds the thesis of ‘conceptual relativity’ propounded in a series of writings of the well-known philosopher Hilary Putnam and indicates the alleged manner in which the thesis, according to Putnam, undermines the foundations of metaphysical realism (understood in a peculiar way spelled out in the paper). Second, a critical examination of Putnam’s anti-metaphysical-realist argument is offered. It is argued that Putnam offers examples only of a trivial, so-called indexical relativity, and that his strategy leaves the foundations of metaphysical realism intact.
19. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Michal Chabada Abstraktívne poznanie podl'a Jána Dunsa Scota základné prístupy: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism
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According to Scotus, abstractive cognition is independent of the actual existence of its object, and must therefore rely on the intentional species. Scotus presents several arguments in favour of the necessity of the species intelligibilis for abstractive universal cognition. After discussing opinions that ascribed exclusive causality in the process of cognition either to the intellect or to the object, Scotus arrives at the conclusion that both the object and the intellect act as essentially ordered partial causes of cognition: the intelligible species is caused both by the phantasm and the active intellect. Thus results a new order of representation, in which the common nature is represented as universal. The process of cognition is described by Scotus as a dynamic succession of active and passive phases. On the basis of these and other characteristic features, Scotus’s epistemology can be described as departing from the Aristotelian tradition, and as the locus of the first appearance of the motives of modern epistemology.
20. Studia Neoaristotelica: Volume > 3 > Issue: 1
Josef Smolka Caramuelův List Markovi Marci Ještě Jednou: A Journal of Analytic Scholasticism