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Sententiae:
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38 >
Issue: 2
Якоб Бьоме
Jakob Böhme
Zum Abschluss Auszüge aus einem Gespräch zwischen der himmlischen Jungfrau Sophia und der Seele
Zum Abschluss Auszüge aus einem Gespräch zwischen der himmlischen Jungfrau Sophia und der Seele
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Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy:
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21 >
Issue: 41
Bernd Kast
Die Gesetzlosigkeit und Eigengesetzlichkeit Stirners ud Simmels Individuelles Gesetz:
Stirners Einfluss auf Simmel und Dessen Stirner-Rezeption
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In most of his published works, Georg Simmel dealt with themes which were also motives of concem for Stimer, such as the One and society, the individual and genre, social formations and domination, the problem of duty, egoism versus communism. Contradictions and parallelisms to Stimerian motifs can be found in Simmel’s thought since its early stages. Starting with an analysis of whether or not these are direct references to Stimer, this paper intends to show the relation between these thinkers and the possibility of a direct influence on Simmel by Stimer, namely in regards to their common idea of “individual law”.
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Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy:
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Issue: 41
Frank Hansel
“Wie Hast Du’s Mit der Religion?” Religionstheorie Und -Kritik Nach Stirner
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Well before Friedrich Nietzsche had Max Stirner with great Gestus shouted (spelled) out the death of God and pulled away the veil of the realm of spirits. Religion critique after Stirner, which follows a clarified Enlightenment, can thereafter for all intents and purposes be only of two sorts: On the one hand, to explain how mankind (has) created its’ Religion and its’ Gods: Gunnar Heinsohn settles this. And on the other hand to point out: Which functional equivalents are themselves found as (religious) beliefs of humankind - freely adapted from Feuerbach: The truth of Religion is the need for it. The free self after Stirner, that knows rationally of the non-existence of God, chooses for itself its’ own respective God, or, it being strong enough, can leave it also as is.
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Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy:
Volume >
20 >
Issue: 39
Fernando Manuel Ferreira da Silva
Das Gespräch Zwischen Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling Über Kants Antinomien
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«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit vereiniget, scheint mir eigentlich den ganzen Geist seines Systems zu enthalten»; This quotation, which originated the present essay, is solely extracted from a letter sent by Hölderlin to Hegel, and yet, it condensates three different approaches from the three Tübingen friends to the problem of Kant’s philosophy of religion and to its possible resolution between 1795 and 1796. From this epistolary dialogue emerges a simultaneous study of Kant, originated by the growing dissension towards the orthodox thought of the Stift. The tuming point - or the maximum cumulative point - of this discordance happens precisely with the discovery of the «spirit of Kant’s System», as a combined explanation of the religious and philosophical phenomena [«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmässigkeit vereiniget»]. This, I think, is something which the three friends discover gradually and not independently from the concept of «providence», which Kant himself, according to Hölderlin, had used to «attenuate his antinomies», which Hegel uses in his first religious writings and the initial formation of his own philosophy and which Schelling will later explore in his System of Transcendental Idealism. In a word, providence is consensually the comprehension axis between man, God and nature and, thus, the explanatory link between the antinomical poles which regulate human existence. On the other hand, however - this being the aspect I would like to stress - , this decisive moment for a whole generation, for the history of philosophy itself, means the consummation of a new revolutionary perspective born in Kant, a new vision of the absolute and the divine and, therefore, a new way to write philosophy about philosophy, less philosophical than before, to the extent that the new situation of man and his reflection within the problem ultimately destined them - as is the case in the three young philosophers - to silence and death. The final aim of this essay is, therefore, to know what this «last step of philosophy» is and what dies along with it, what such a step may have meant and what it already foretold in terms of the development of philosophy.
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Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy:
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22 >
Issue: 44
Dirk Michael Hennrich
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens Ästhetik und die Desastres de la Guerra des Francisco de Goya:
Ein Beitrag zu Einer Ästhetik des Schattens
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Als ein Beitrag zu einer Ästhetik des Schattens deutet der vorliegende Artikel auf die Verwandtschaft zwischen dem ästhetischen Schatten bei Alexander G. Baumgarten und den Gravuren von Francisco de Goya. Der Schatten zeigt sich dabei, nach einer kurzen Einführung in den Begriff, als der grundlegende Modus der Darstellung und der Möglichkeit der Erkenntnis im Allgemeinen. Ohne den Schatten, als das Dritte zwischen Licht und Finsternis, ist weder die Vernunft noch die Unvernunft einsehbar. Auch diese Einsicht gehört in die Epoche der Aufklärung.
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Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy:
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27 >
Issue: 53
Gerd Hammer
Georg Simmel, Stefan George und der Erste Weltkrieg
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Initially, the Great War was received euphorically by many writers and philosophers, including Max Weber, Martin Buber and Max Scheler along with Georg Simmel. For Simmel, the war was synonimous with a greater pace of life, a form of dealing with / overcoming the levelling of society caused by the worshipping of money (´Mammonismus`). This exaltation of the war on the part of intellectuals was not common to all – the harsh criticisms of Simmel´s enthusiasm for the war on the part of Georg Lucácz and Ernst Bloch are well-known. Regarding Stefan George, in 1901 Simmel had written: ´His art has been known since its beginning for the wish to act exclusively like an art (...) the fundamental change is complete: that on the contrary, all content is merely the means for forming values that are purely aesthetics.` Therefore, in the aesthetic of Stefan George, Simmel acknowledges the reason that George will reject the war – contrary to many members of George´s circle (George-Kreis) and has its expression in the poem ´The War`, first published in 1917. This contribution seeks to demonstrate the philosophical and aesthetical reasons for enthusiasm for the war and its rejection by Simmel and George, attitudes that are not able to be explained by the opposition to militarism/pacifism that is normally deployed to distinguish between supporters and critics of the war.
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Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy:
Volume >
23 >
Issue: 46
Dirk Michael Hennrich
Tragische Dispositionen der Moderne. Stimmung und Aura im Wandel des Landschaftsbegriffs
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The present text deals with the relation between the consolidation and the development of landscape-painting and the concept of landscape during the 19th century and the catabasis of a certain economy of disposition until our days. The process of the transformation and overcoming of landscape-painting reflects the decadence of an entire epoch, influencing the introduction of the dispositions into philosophy, as well the initiation of a new philosophical discipline, the Philosophy of Landscape.
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Studia Philosophica:
Volume >
56 >
Issue: 1/2
Břetislav Horyna
Břetislav Horyna
Hegels Ausspruch „Gott ist tot“ in Hinsicht auf Kant und Fichte
Hegel’s Statement “God is dead” with Respect to Kant’s and Fichte’s Philosophies
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The proclamation of God’s death is commonly ascribed to Fridrich Nietzsche and the cultural nihilism of the turn of 19th and 20th centuries. The work on Hegel’s statement of God’s death shows that this is a much older cultural topos, appearing frequently in German (as well as British and French) literature, poetry and philosophy as early as in 18th century and especially in the era of Romanticism. The differences are not only temporal, but especially contextual; while late usage with Nietzschian cultural relativists generally has a diagnostic character, earlier occurrences of the statement relate to different cultural phenomena (old and modern mythology, modern poetry, revolutionary political and religious changes after the French Revolution of 1789, character of transcendental philosophy, and others). Hegel used this statement in his very early polemic with Kant’s and Fichte’s philosophies. He criticized both of them that in their philosophical subjectivism they were promoting the notion that God had died and man had assumed his position. This work shows some relatively little known dimensions of that polemic including the role played by F. H. Jacobi’s critical anti-Kantian position.
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Studia Philosophica:
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57 >
Issue: 2
Hans-Georg Bensch
Hans-Georg Bensch
Von zwei Welten zu zwei Begriffen von Natur:
Anmerkungen zur Kantischen Kritik der teleologischen Urteilskraft
FromTwo Worlds to Two Concepts of Nature
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The author analyzes Kant’s Critique of Judgment and the concept of judgment and comes to the conclusion that nature in Kant’s work cannot only be understood as the empirical world (the world of phenomena), but that the empirical world must be taken as a specification of active (creative) nature including both sensory and non-empirical world. It is only that concept of nature which presents us with examples of conduct, which, being examples uniting chance and necessity, lead beyond the sensory world. It is only that concept of nature that can accommodate man. The two worlds – the empirical world of the Critique of Pure Reason and the completely different intelligible world of the Critique of Practical Reason unite in the necessary concept of “one nature”. One specification of the united nature is the world of phenomena in space and time, including the concept of chance; another specification is the imperative moral law, which is the basis of the knowledge of man’s freedom as part of extra-sensory nature.
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Studia Philosophica:
Volume >
57 >
Issue: 2
Karl-Friedrich Kiesow
Karl-Friedrich Kiesow
Mythen der Heimkehr. Versuch über Dichtung und ontologische Erfahrung
Mýty návratu
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Obrat k ontologické otázce je pro filosofii trvalým pokušením. Ve 20. století se objevila Heideggerova existenciální analytika „existence“ a „bytí“ jako jeho východiska a zároveň se toto století stalo svědkem Heideggerova obratu („Kehre“) i vzniku dalších tzv. „nových ontologií“ v dílech N. Hartmanna nebo Th. Litta, jež vzbudily dočasnou pozornost. Jistou zvláštnost v tomto vývoji představuje skutečnost, že si různí interpreti zkušenosti s bytím slibovali větší úspěch od básnické imaginace než od samotné filosofie. Již Heidegger se odvolával na Hölderlina, Georga a Trakla. Karl Albert se vztahuje k Hermannu Brochovi a Saint-Johnu Persemu, zatímco oblíbenými autory pro F. Kaufmanna byli Hofmannsthal, Rilke a romanopisec Thomas Mann. Ve své studii vykládá autor dva tematické komplexy z celkové souvislosti „básnické imaginace a ontologické zkušenosti“, a to Heideggerovu interpretaci básně Slovo od St. George, v souvislosti s ontologií amerického filosofa P. Weisse pak báseň Slovo jako meditace od W. Stevense. Oba tyto lyrické útvary jsou literárním zpracováním „mýtu návratu“, a tím odrážejí podle autorova názoru rovněž situaci filosofie.
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Studia Philosophica:
Volume >
57 >
Issue: 2
Wolfgang Welsch
Wolfgang Welsch
Das Rätsel der menschlichen Besonderheit
Záhada zvláštnosti člověka
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Ve studii s tematikou kulturní a filosofické antropologie rozlišuje autor mezi třemi obdobími, v kterých se vytvářela specifika člověka jako živočišného rodu. Odlišuje první fázi 7–2,5 milionu let), která začíná oddělením linie hominidů a opolidí. V druhé fázi, kterou označuje jako protokulturní (2,5 mil.–40 tis. let), vstupuje do vývoje člověka prudká dynamika, která ústí v začátku kulturní evoluce. Biologická evoluce je dokončena, genová výbava člověka se nadále nemění, člověk nic nedostává zvenčí, ale vytváří celou svoji kulturu z prostředků vytvořených evolucí. Tím se vyznačuje třetí fáze, která sahá od mladšího paleolitu přes neolitickou revoluci, vznik městských kultur až po současnost. Autor se hlásí k darwinismu a zdůrazňuje, že největší zvláštností člověka je jeho vlastní schopnost, s níž oddělil svůj vývoj od závislosti na genetických změnách a nalezl řešení všech životních úkolů a situací v optimalizaci kulturně evolučních prostředků.
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Studia Philosophica:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 1
Klaus Vieweg
Morální světový názor. K Hegelově kritice praktického rozumu transcendentální filosofie
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The transition from morality to the morals involves the dissolution of the antagonism of the moral, the overcoming of the antinomy of constant obligation. In his Wissenschaft der Logik, Hegel focuses on the logical defect of endless progress “mostly in its application to morality“ (RPh, § 268). Pure will and the moral law on the one hand, and nature and empiricality on the other “presuppose each other as fully independent and mutually indifferent“, and thus the opposition is postulated as an axiom, which excludes its overcoming the antagonism. The antagonism “does not dissolve in infinite progress. It is, on the contrary, depicted as unsolved and unsolvable, and thus confirmed“. The result is “the very same antagonism that stood at the beginning“ (RPh, § 269 an.). The progress ad infinitum exhibits itself as antagonism that unjustly points to itself as a solution of what contradicts itself (WdL 5, p. 166). The real overcoming of this antinomy fails; the idea of the Judgment Day solution owes the answer and is only an expression of excessive gentleness towards the world. Antinomies and collisions in moral action in the end separate, which implies the persistence in insuperable antinomy. Another topic would be a detailed exposition of Hegel’s solution proposal. In any case, Hegel sees the naturalness of speculative thought in the necessity to think the ideality of both of the opposing sides, that is, to understand them beforehand as the moment of the concept of moral action, see them as opposing in their moving unity and think them as the transition from morality to the moral action, the morals, in which the antagonism of the moral is not abstractly lost, but elevated, guarded and overcome.
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Studia Philosophica:
Volume >
70 >
Issue: 2
Johannes Vorlaufer
Johannes Vorlaufer
„Mit der Hand hat es eine eigene Bewandtnis.“ Phänomenologische Zugänge zur Sprache der menschlichen Hand im Kontext des Denkens Martin Heideggers
„Ruka má svůj vlastní význam.“ Fenomenologické přístupy k jazyku lidské ruky v kontextu myšlení Martina Heideggera
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Ist die menschliche Hand adäquat als Organ bzw. als Instrument zu begreifen, oder ist sie, wie Martin Heidegger im Kontext seiner Frage nach der Leiblichkeit zeigen möchte, aus der „Gebärde“ zu verstehen? Im Beitrag soll diesem Gedanken Heideggers und der Erfahrung unseres Existierens als „Menschenwesen“, dies, dass wir ein Zeichen, ja Zeigende sind, interpretierend nachgedacht werden. Mit diesem Theorem wäre implizit auch gesagt, dass unsere Hand zureichend nicht ohne unser Miteinandersein verstanden werden kann: In der Frage nach der menschlichen Hand geht es um uns selbst und unsere Weise, miteinander in der Offenheit von Welt zu existieren und einander den Bezug zur Weite und Tiefe unseres Daseins zu erschließen.
Lze lidskou ruku adekvátně chápat jako orgán či nástroj, nebo je třeba jí rozumět z „gesta“, jak chce ukázat Martin Heidegger v kontextu své otázky tělesnosti? Text interpretačně promýšlí tuto Heideggerovu myšlenku a zkušenost naší existence jako „lidské bytosti“, tj. že jsme znakem, ba ukazatelem. Tím je také implicitně řečeno, že naší ruce nelze adekvátně porozumět bez našeho společného bytí: Otázka lidské ruky se týká nás samých a našeho způsobu vzájemného bytí v otevřenosti světa a vzájemného otevírání odkazu na rozlehlost a hloubku naší existence.
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