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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Tran Van Doan
陳艾團
Asian Marxism or The Dialectic of Violence
亞洲馬克思主義一一暴力辯證法
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在本篇論文中,我們將論述那些所謂的亞洲馬克思主義者,言之鑿鑿奉行的「主義J '在事實上,只不過是一個口號。這些 亞洲共產主義的領導者並不是真正採取馬克思的觀點,而是向列 寧或史達林那邊靠攏。對他們來說,辯證法不意謂著無產階級的 發展邏輯,而是用來摧毀反對力量(包括保守主義、反對主義、或修正主義等等)的有效工其。因此, 「揚棄」 (Aufhebung) (不論以普遍階級或無產階級作為形式)只存在烏托邦論者的空 想中。這樣的一種「揚棄」是不能被實現的。因為,在亞洲所企 盼的任何實現,不論其外在或內在條件都是不充足和不成熟的。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
關永中
Wing- chung KWAN
從形上學講授進路談歷史還原、與超驗法
Historical Reduction and Transcendental Method----An Approach to the Course on Metaphysics
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In giving lectures on the course of metaphysics, we can make use of the combined use of the Historical Reduction and the Transcendental Method as an effective approach.The Historical Reduction as introduced by Edmund Husserl is an investigstion into the various sets of metaphysics as appeared in history in different periods so as to evaluate their rationalities as well as their irrationalities. Whereas, the Transcendental Method as expounded by Transcendental Thomism is a method based on Kantian transcendental reflection into one's cognitional structure so as to determine how far our study in metaphysics can go.If we combine the use of the Historical Reduction and the Transcendental Method, we can have a deeper insight into the achievements as well as the weaknesses of various great metaphysicians in history such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Kant, Marechal, Whitehead, Heidegger, and Coreth. And, we can be in a better position to retain the good points as handed down by our predecessors while avoiding the pitfalls they had traversed before.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Wing-wah Chan
陳榮華
Is the Mind in Mencius' Philosophy Self-sufficient for Moral Cultivation?
孟子哲學的心概念在這德實踐中是否自足?
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本文要指出, <孟子〉在討論道德實踐時,心不是最後的存有 學基礎,它尚需莫基於天,因此本文認為,心在道德實踐時不是 自足的。但是,當代的孟子哲學詮釋者大都認為心是自足的。對 於這種主張,我稱為心靈自足論。本文首先介紹這種理論的源 起,再提出三個論証來指,出它在理論上的困難。跟著,我提出以 天為道德實踐的存有學基礎,並嘗試以這個主張來詮釋孟子的道 德實踐理論。對於這種詮釋,我稱之為「以天為基礎的詮釋」 。 最後,我發現這種詮釋能避免心靈自足論所導致的困難,且又一 致於〈孟子〉的語吉。所以,我認為這種詮釋是更妥當的。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
林火旺
Huo- wang Lin
族萃差異與社會正義
Group Differences and Social Justice
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This article presents the arguments for and against liberalism concerning the justice and differences of cultures or social groups.Contemporary liberalism has been criticized by many theorists on its insensitivity to differences between cultures. and social groups. The topic concerning the demand for recognition by minority cultures and disadvantaged groups is one of the major concerns of both liberal and anti-liberal camps. According to anti-liberal theorists (mainly Marion Young in this article), the liberal conception of justice is inadequate in dealing with cultural minorities and marginalized groups. In order to accommdate non-liberal ways of life, some special rights attached to cultures or groups collectively should be recognized in addition to the equal rights accorded to each individual in a liberal state. To meet this challenge, many liberals (Joseph Raz, William Galston, and Will Kymlicka) try to argue that the so-called collective rights can be justified within a modified liberal theory of justice. Liberalism, therefore, can accommodate cultural minorities fully. Liberals' answer, however, does not satisfy Nancy Fraser. She tries to find a new way to solve the problem posed by the politics of recognition.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
張旺山
Wahng- shan Chang
韋伯的科學觀
Max Weber's View of Science
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Max Weber is, as Leo Strauss puts it, “the greatest social scientist of our century". Regardless whethere he thought himself primarily as a politician or a scientist, he was at any rate a scientist in the modern meaning of the word. That Max Weber is a Scientist par excellence is no question. What is nowadays still controversial is his conception of science (Wissenschaft), especially his conception of the so-called “verstehende Sociologie".“Modern Science" is for Max Weber a product of modern cultural epoch. It can be properly characterized as the “disenchanted science in a disenchanted world". But he wasobviously against the widespread “positivist view of social sciences" and endeavoured to develop an alternative called “verstehende Sociologie". Why he must do that? What “more" can such a conception achieve than the positivist conception of social sciences? Is his conception of “verstehende Sociologie" a “science of man" (Wissenschaft vom Menschen)? And finally, what can such a conception mean for a scientist like Max Weber and for the “total life of mankind"? These questions should be discussed systematically.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
Tim Lane
藍亭
Quiet Qualia, Unsensed Sensa
無感覺的感知
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In C. I. Lewis's epistemology, qualia are taken to be directly intuited and inherently recognizable. He distinguishes sharply between qualia and that which C. D. Broad and Bertrand Russell refer to as “sensa" or “sense-data." Where Broad and Russell appear to allow for the possibility of unsensed, incompletely sensed, or inaccurately sensed sensa, Lewis regards qualia as given--to be is to be sensed and certain. Lewis finds the Broad-Russell view to be incredible and says of sensa so construed that they are “neither fish, flesh, nor good red herring."I argue that the Broad-Russell view is at least as plausible as Lewis's and, indeed, that to adequately describe and explain mental phenomena, it may be necessary to distinguish the phenomenal aspect of consciousness (sensa or qualia) from the accessing function of consciousness. In arguing the pIausibilityof this distinction, I draw upon work from both cognitive science and phenomenology. I also argue that, in principIe, experimental evidence could be adduced to decide the issue between the Broad-Russell and the Lewis views. In a concluding section I suggest implications of the view developed here for Lewis's epistemology.
在路易斯 (C.I. Lewis) 的知識論中,感知 (qualia) 被視 為直接的直覺及與生俱來的察覺O他非常明確的區分感知及布洛 得 (C.D. Broad) 和羅素 (Bertrand Russell) 所認為的感覺材料 (Sensa-data) 對於布洛得和羅素顯然容許的「未 感覺到」、「未完全感覺到J '或「不正確感覺到」之感覺材料 (Sense-data) 的可能性, 路易斯卻視感知 (qualia) 為必定會被感覺到、且不可能感覺錯的。他認為布洛得一羅素的觀點不可 思議,並說如此解說感覺材料是荒謬的。我論證布洛得一羅素的觀點至少是與路易斯的同樣合理。事 實上,要適切的描繪及解說心理現象,去區分意識的現象層面 (phenomenal aspect of consciousness) 和意識的進入使用功 能 (accessing function of consciousness) 或許是需要的。在論 證此區分的合理性中,我援用了認知科學及現象學的研究。我還 論證原則上,由實驗而得的證據可以決定布洛得一羅素和路易斯 的觀點何者正確。在結論部分,我提出了這一觀點對路易斯的知 識論發展之影響的看法。
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1998 >
Issue: 21
吳瑞援
Ruey-yuan Wu
無意識的意向性:評廷、爾闖進原則
Unconscious Intentionality: Evaluating Searle's Connection Principle
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In the last two decades, Searle has mounted two fronts of attack upon cognitive science. In the 80' s, Searle contended with his well-known “Chinese Room Argument" that a computer capable of producing the right answers to questions in Chinese did not really understand Chinese, whereas in the 90's, he took issue with the alleged mental reality of “unconscious rules of inference," the description of which is thought to define the main task of cognitive scientists. Suspecting that cognitive scientists borrow the idea of unconscious mentality only to saveguard the mental status of those rules of cognition, Searle imposes a constraint upon the notion of unconscious mentality, namely that unconscious mentality must be potentially conscious. This is the so-called “connection principle." The aim of this paper is to analyze and evaluate this constraint for unconscious mentality.In the paper, I contend that the connection principle is poorly argued for the following two reasons. First, it assumes implicitly a more fundamental principle, what I call the “intentionality/ consciousness principle" (IC), which implies that occurrent intentional states are necessarily conscious and which thereby excludes the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious. However, Searle does not provide any explicit argument for this key premise at all. Second, as far as the notion of the unconscious it explicitly preserves, i.e. the rather uninteresting case of unconscious dispositions such as the sleeping believer's belief about God , the alleged connection between unconscious mentality and consciousness wouldn't hold either unless we assumed (IC) beforeha:td. Hence, the key factor lies in (IC). I thereby take up the hidden issue and introduce the psychoanalytic notion of the unconscious as a counter-exarnple against (IC). In the end, I return to Searle's original concern with cognitive science and conclude that the connection principle can't succeed in excluding the “cognitive unconscious," which may have to find further support in a somewhat controversial notion of “subdoxastic intentionality."Though sympathetic with Searle's intuition about the specialness of human mind, I find his notion of consciousness too narrow to capture a wide variety of “consciousness." Perhaps, the attempt to preserve the specialness of human mind can only be realized when we can successfully disentangle various notions of consciousness, intentionality, and subjectivity.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
劉福增
Fu-Tseng Liu
〈老子〉書中的引言與喻言(下)
The Directives and Metaphors in Lao Tzu
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The Lao Tzu has the distinction of having lots of directives and metaphors. This paper will make some modern analyses of these directives and metaphors. I will use theory of speech acts and modern theory of metaphors to do this study. I hope these analyses will help us a better understanding to the Lao Tzu.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
傅佩榮
Pei Jung Fu
解析孔子的價值觀
On Confucius' Value System
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Based on the comprehensive reading of the Analects, the paesentarticle tries to reconstruct the value system of Confucius.A brief desciption of this value system runs as follows. The sytem has a structure of three stages , each of which includes two levels of value respectively. We have then (l) the ego-centred stage with the values of living and development in the sense of worldly success; (2) the human interactive stage with the values of socialorder (maintained by laws and ritials) and human feelings (that is, human affections and moral virtues); and (3) the idealized stage with the values of non-selfishness (or non-selfishness) and the supreme good (or the sagehood).
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
黃懿梅特
Yih-Mei Huang
對“女性主義知識論"的哲學反省
A Philosophical Reflection on “Feminist Epistemology"
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Some feminists assume that there are distinctively female ways of knowing, and the oppressed, marginalized people (unquestionably including women) are epistemically privileged. Therefore there should be a different women's epistemology. The first part of this essay summarizes some important assumptions and the content of “Feminist Epistemology", while in the second part we argue that there are no reasons to consider these assumptions are warranted, and because of these assumptions the feministepistemology is even self-defeating. We also point out that another theoretical difficulty of feminist epistemology, the “ bias paradox", was not successfully solved by Louise M. Antony, therefore, we conclude that the feminist epistemology is incongruous and not a legitimate subfield of analytic philosophy.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
林義正
Yih-Jing Lin
論列子之「虛」
On Concept of "Shue" (Emptiness) in Lieh-Tzu
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This paper divided into four parts: (i) preface; (ii) the conception of "shue" in Lieh-Tzu; (iii) The conception in Toaistic school in the Pre-Chin; (iv) conclusion. The author deals with this concept based upon the recent studies - the book of Lieh-Tzu is not an apocrypha. Lieh-Tzu conceived that the saint is the highest stage of human life. The issue is how do one achieve it. His answer is “shue." It has two denotations --“kung-fu" (drill) and the mental stage. “Shue" is not only in the realm of language and conceptual, but also in that of practice. The method of practice is by intellectual reflection and meditation from the concentration of consciousness to that of spirit. Finally, it can unify his spirit with nothing. Nothing is “ tao" from the Taoistic point of view. Lieh: Tzu followed the method of the ancient Taoism in practice. But author contends that the method is derived from Lao-Tzu's “shue" of imitating “heaven" which is different from Kuan-Yin-Tzu's interpretation of it, that is, “chin" (stillness) of imitating “earth." From historical viewpoint, Lieh-Tzu dealed with the notion of “shue" in order to provide an answer to the meaninglessness of life of the people and disturbance of the society in the warring states period. The author believes that it is the right prescription for it.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
關永中
Carlo KWAN (KWAN Wing Chung)
上與造物者遊與莊子對談神秘主義
A Dialogue with Chuang-Tzu On Mysticism
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Chuang-Tzu never deliberately emphasizes that he is a mystic. Yet , his writings are filled with mystical flavor. This motivates us to ask: Can the doctrine he puts forward be regarded as a type of Mysticism? Here , the meaning of the idea of “Yau/ Ecstatic Flowing" (遊) is investigated with the result of affirming his mystical tendency. Whereas , the notion of the “Creator " (造 物者) is also studied , and we draw the conclusion that Chuang-Tzu's mysticism is theistic in orientation , even though he also incorporates in his system the monistic and naturalistic elements which make his writings all the more spectacular.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
陳鼓應
Guu-Ying Chen
〈管子〉四篇的心學和氣論
The Teaching on Hsin and Discussion on Ch'i in the Four Chapters of the “kuan-tzu "
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While Lao-tzu in his discussion on tao gave evidence of unpreeedented originality, he did not make any contribution to the study of hsin. After the middle of the Warring States period, Chi-hsia Huang Lao daoism greatly promoted teachings and discussions on hsin and ch'i' thereby enriching ancient China's 'teachings of the inner sage'. Chi-hsia Huang Lao made the metaphysical tao concrete in the form of ching-ch'i, put it in relation to the human hsin and expressed the view that tao (ch'i) resides in the hsin('the lodging of ching-she'). This article expounds on the teachings of hsin-hsing, hsin-ch'i and hsin-hsing and furthermore explains the teaching of ching-ch'i and the method of concentrating ch'i.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
王曉波
Hsiao-Po Wang
論「歸本於黃老」韓非子論「道」
On 'Basing on Huang-Lao' Han Fei Tzu's Comments on 'Tao'
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The Historian Szu-ma Chien's comn1ents on Han Fei Zi:‘Emphasizing Xin Min Fa Shu, and basing his views on Huang-Lao.' Since Huang disappeared, and contents of two chapters of Han Fei Tzu, Interρretation of Lao and Analogy of Lao, were not quite the same of Lao Tzu, besides, a lot of his views of Xin Min Fa Shu were different from Lao Tzu, hence a lot of scholars suspected these comments on Tao and Te in Han Fei Tzu were actually the works of Taoists of Warring Era or West Han Dynasty. After Lao Tzu, according to my arguments, Taoists putted forward Zhuang Tzu and ‘Huang-Lao' (The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emρeror), both inherited and expanded the thoughts of Lao Tzu. Han Fei's thoughts inherited and expanded ‘Huang - Lao'. Interρretation of Lao and Analogy of Lao were inheritance and expansion of the thoughts of Lao Tzu too. His views of Xin Min Fa Shu may differ from thoughts of Lao Tzu and Zhuang Tzu, but were not far from thoughts of The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emperor of ‘Huang-Lao '. Therefore, Han Fei's arguments on Tao were in fact 'basing on Huang-Lao'. Scholars doubts arose from the disappearance of The Four Political Treatises of the Yellow Emρeror, and fromtheir misunderstanding of 'Huang-Lao'.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
何保中
Pau-Chung Ho
死亡問題在莊子思想中的意義與地位
The Essence and Significance of the “Death" Issue in the Thinking of Chuang-Tsu
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Use quotations from Chuang-Tsu, this article argues that: (1) Chuang-Tsu considered “chi" the basic component of all tagible existences, an element that does not in itself consist of any driving force. The driving force behind the formation/ extinction of tangible existence is “tien" (or the creator). (2) Since “chi" is everlasting, there exists no absolute nihility in the universe. The formation of tangible existences is therefore not a process from “nothingness" to “existence". (3) We have no means to comprehendthe reason and purpose of existence. Consequently, we can not, and should not, define or criticize the meaning or value of any existence. Further, the existence of human beings, like all other tangible existences, is by no means significant. (4) Since there is no significance in human existence and it is not possible to create any meaning through the process of existence, the only purpose of life is not to impair the current existence. (5) However, as individual life, unlike “chi", is not eternal, death is inevitable.Chuang-Tsu hence attempted to ease the anxiety of nihilism through asserting that “chi" transforms among different existences. It is nevertheless doubtful that such reasoning can effectively unravel human anxiety over death.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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1999 >
Issue: 22
孫效智
Johannes Sun Hsiao-Chih
神律倫理與自律倫理
Theonomous Ethics and Autonomous Ethics
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Theonomous ethics, an important theory of religious ethics, has invited numerous attacks from modern religious critics. The paper begins with a scrutiny of the main ideas of theonomous ethics and of the five opposing.The second part of the paper deals with the main arguments of these religious critics. First of all, the problems of theodicy will be addressed from three aspects, namely, the general moral intuition, the basic position of teleological ethics, and the basic principIes of theories of definition and reference. The discussion is meant to illustrate that whereas the theory of theonomous ethics needs to be revised, the arguments given by the religious critics are not impeccable either. Some flaws in their arguments are listedand discussed in the paper.The following part is devoted to the assessment of the position of theonomous ethics in the traditions of Judaism, Islamism and Christianity. It is discovered that theonomous ethics not only does not belong to the main stream of the three religions, but also is criticized by dominating theologies. We can infer that taking theonomous ethics as the target of their attacking fires, the religious critics actually commit the mistake of “strawman argumentation." Basically the ethics of the three religions are rationalistic rather than theonomous in nature.The concluding part of the paper analyzes the autonomous characteristics of religious ethics with the focus on biblical ethics. The significance of the Ten Commandments, for example, can be fully understood in terms of rationality. As a conclusion the paper points out that autonomous rationality is the last criterion for biblical ethics.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
1999 >
Issue: 22
嚴靈宰
Ling-Feng Van
黃老道術源流
The Origin and Development of Huang-Lao Dao-Shu
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This paper discusses the central ideas of Huang-lao thought and inquires into its origin and development. At the time "Lietzu, false accusations and its main ideas" was being reprinted, the author rearrenged several important materials, resulting in this article. According to the Shi-chi, pre-Ch' in Huang-ti and Lao-tzu were not named together, the term 'taoism', originating in the early years of the Han dynasty, referred exclusively to Lao-tzu's ch'ing-ching wu-wei and combined the essentials of the yin-yangschool , confucianism, mohists, school of names and legalists. Afterwards, Liu Hsiang wrote that the Lei-tzu had its origins in Huang-ti and Lao-tzu; the work was subsequently also classified as ‘taoism.' The ancient saying that Huang-lao was based on the teachings of Huang-ti and Lao-tzu first appears in the Lie-tzu, which mentions the now lost Book of Huang-ti. The ancient saying that it was written by Huang-ti is clearly a hypothesis, but fragments are quoted in the Lie-tzu and Chuang-tzu and the figuresand historical facts mentioned can make up for what is left out in history.Huang-lao thought is extremely rich and deals with cosmology, the way of heaven, the way of man, psychology, nurture of life etc. The documents excavated in 1973 are extremely helpful in the author's understanding of Huang-lao dao-shu, provide new evidence for its relation with hsing-ming, but also leave open many questions.
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18.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2000 >
Issue: 23
陳鼓應
Guu-Ying Chen
〈管子〉四篇的道論
The Theory of Dao in the Four Chapters of the Guanzi
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〈管子〉四篇的哲學理論主要在於繼承老子的道論再加以獨 特的發展,表現出老學齊學化的特色。本文首先析論〈管子〉四篇在道論方面祖述老學的成份,其 次就道之特性暨「虛」與「無為」等觀念申論其對老學的發展: 〈管子〉四篇不但將老子原本作為空間義之「虛」提昇到宇宙論 的範疇,以「虛」來表達作為萬物之始的「道J '另方面也將老 子有關心境修養之「虛J轉化為認識論的概念,使「虛」的意義 延伸至知識論主客關係的層面,強調主體的認識應著重保持空明 靈覺的性能。以〈管子〉四篇為代表的稜下道家, -方面就道與主體之關 係進行申論,透過精氣說,將道其象化並落實於人身,乃提出 「道不遠人」、「道者充形」等說法,進而發展出「以心受道」 的觀點,如此使得「道」與人的聯繫'得以其體落實於「心」。 另方面則援禮法以入道,將道落實於政治社會之運作,提出 「道生法」之命題;認為禮、法出於道,並將形而上之道與形而 下之禮法貫通為一整體,如此使得稜下道家在有關道的具體施用 方面,重視「應時而變J '兼顧「情」與「理」的平衡。再者是將「因J字發展成為獨立的哲學概念,不僅提出「舍 己而以物為法」與「因其能者言其所用」這兩個界說,更在「道 貴因」的命題下表現出「因時應物」的原則,又將「因」的概念 與「刑名」相結合,發展成「因之術J '在此同時也提出「靜因 之道」這一認識論上的重要命題,對於苟子「虛壹而靜」的主張 有直接的影響。
The four chapters of the Guanzi embody the adaptation and further development of Laozi's theory of the dao by the Daoists in Qi. The paper first shows, where Guanzi builds on the theory of dao in the Laozi. Then the further development of this theory through the notions of “non action" and “emptiness" is analysed. The notion of emptiness is incorporated into the cosmological framework in such a way as to describe the origin of all things. In an epistemological context the “emptiness." describes a certain state in which the subject should be.The Jixia Daoists as presented in the four chapters of the Guanzi on one hand concretise the dao with the help of the notion jingqi. On the other hand they implement the dao in the social realm by the means ofthe rites (Ii) and the law (fa). Thus by the combination of the metaphysical dao with the empirical dao the Jixia Daoists are puttingthe dao into practice. Furthermore the concept of following (yin) is a major focal point in the four chapters of the Guanzi. Not only should one “Give up oneself and follow the things", but under the premise that “the dao values following" the principle of“following the times and reacting to the things" is put forward. In an epistemological context the concept of “following" as exemplified in “the dao of following quietly" also plays an important role. Xunzi later on is to adopt this concept into his thinking.
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19.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2000 >
Issue: 23
林義正
Yih-Jing Lin
論〈列子 • 天瑞〉的易道思想
Discussing the yidao( 易道) thinking in the tianrui( 天瑞) chapter of the Liezi
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本論文共分六節,一、前言,二、易道思想的含義,三、〈列子﹒天瑞〉與〈易緯﹒乾鑿度〉的關係,四、〈天瑞〉的易 道思想,五、〈天瑞〉易道思想的特色,六、結論。本文乃續〈論列子之「虛˩ )之作,在前言裡已表明列子非偽書,基本上 認為〈列子〉乃出自先秦,至少〈天瑞〉便是如此,所以只要善 加揀擇,還是可以作為研究列子易道思想的依據。根據本文的研 究,以為易道思想本不限於〈周易〉才有, {列子﹒天瑞〉也 有,而且亦有它的特色。同時在論述〈天瑞〉篇時,也一並討論 它與〈易緯﹒乾鑿度〉的關係。本文舉出新證與解說,認為〈列 子﹒天瑞〉篇並不是抄〈易緯﹒乾鑿度> '反而是〈乾擊度〉的 作者抄〈天瑞〉以廣〈易〉說,同時提出新見,以為〈列子〉的 〈天瑞〉是〈天端〉的誤寫。針對易道思想,作者分析〈易 傳〉、〈老子〉與〈列子〉的主張,發現其中的論點有同有異, 今且置〈易傳〉在宋儒有不同的解說不論,如果把〈易傳〉當作 是歸屬先秦儒家借益明理之作,其主陰陽合德,剛柔並濟,但側 重生生、健動、積習,此與〈老子〉不言益、卦、交,但假象言理之作不同,彼實有取於〈易〉損、復之義,強調歸根、復命、 致虛守靜。作者可以肯定地說, <列子﹒天瑞〉的易道思想顯然 是睡〈老子〉之後,而又企圖超越〈老子〉。
The paper is divided into six sections. 1. Introduction, 2. The contents of the yidao thinking, 3. The relationship between the tianrui chapter and qianwei-chenzaodu, 4. The thinking ofthe tianrui chapter, 5. The distinctiveness of the yidao thinking in the tianrui chapter, 6. Conclusion.This paper builds on the essay “Emptiness in the Liezi" by the same author.There the author already argued that Liezi was written in Pre-Qin times. Thus we can use the tianrui chapter to discuss the thinking of Liezi. In this paper it is argued that then yidao thinking does not only exist in the Zhouyi, but also in the tianrui chapter ofthe Liezi.As far as the relationship between the tianrui chapter and the qianwei-chenzaodu is concerned, the paper advances new arguments that support the view that the qianwei-chenzaodu copied from the tianrui, not the other way around. At the same time it argues that tianrui should be read as tianduan.When tracing the yidao thinking through the Yizhuan, the Laozi and the Liezi the author finds differences and similarities. In the Yizhuan Confucianists use the hexagrams ofthe Yijing to express the notion ofthe mutuality of yin/yang and gang/rou. Although the Laozi does not refer to the hexagrams, the notions of “returning to the roots" and “being empty and quiet", as expressed in the sun and the fu hexagram in the Yij ing, are being adopted by the Laozi. Liezi builds on these notions in the Laozi and further develops them.
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20.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
Year >
2000 >
Issue: 23
關永中
Wing-Chung Kwan
邵雍易學的知識論向度 一一〈皇極經世〉﹒〈觀物篇〉之六十二所給予的提示
The Epistemological Perspective of Shao Jung's Reflection on I-Ching
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我們可從三個角度去窺視邵雍易學的知識論:A. 認知的三層面: r 觀之以目、以心、以理」B. 被知的視域: r 理、性、命」C.「 窮理、盡性、至命」的知識論五重面向一一思辯、逆覺、存在、冥契、德踐上述的角度,都在〈皇極經世〉、〈觀物篇〉之六十二中有 所提示,並從中凸顯人在認知時所憑藉的「認知結構」 '即「經 驗」、「理解」、「判斷」、「抉擇」。關鍵詞:觀物Contemplation of Beings以目With the Eye以J 心With Heart以理With Reωon窮理Exhaustive Investigation of the Principle盡性Fulfillment ofNature至命Reaching One's Destiny知識論Epistemology形上學Metaphysics德踐Moral Practice
The contents ofthis essay include: (A) Three Levels ofKnowing: by the Eye, by the Heart, and by Reason; (B)The Horizons Known : Heavenly Principle, Cosmic Nature, Human Destiny; (C) From “the Cosmic exhaustive investigation ofthe principle", to “the total fulfillment ofthe Cosmic Nature", to “the reaching of one's destiny". These were all embedded within Shao lung's Huang-chi ching-shih (The Grandest Ultimate Way of Ordering the World), Chapter 62, which further suggests that “experience", “understanding",“judgement", and “decision" constitute the main items of human cognitional structure.
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