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81. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Dionysios A. Anapolitanos

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82. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Erjus Mezini

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Plato’s account of justice in the Republic has been questioned by David Sachs, who charges Plato for committing a fallacy of irrelevance. Sachs’ objection is built on the assumption that Plato has employed two accounts of justice: a vulgar one, and a Platonic one. Insofar as Socrates’ interlocutors hold a vulgar conception, then Socrates should prove to them that being vulgarly just will be benefi cial to them. But Socrates, according to Sachs, never does that. Through emphasizing the dialogues of Socrates with his interlocutors, this essay shows incorrect the assumption that Plato is holding two accounts of justice. The dialogues in the Republic demonstrate that there are vulgar confusions, rather than a vulgar ideology. Furthermore, through defi ning justice as the dominance of reason over humans and politics, and through relating reason to the Good, Plato leaves open the possibility that some vulgar actions conform to his account of justice.

appendix i

83. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Raphael Demos

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appendix ii

84. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 3/4
Raphael Demos

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85. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Alexander Nehamas

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86. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
David Keyt

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87. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Odysseus Makridis

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88. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Theodore Scaltsas

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89. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Gianluigi Segalerba

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The essay consists in the analysis of the problem of the evil in the man and in the analysis of the remedies which the man can find against the evil. Plato affirms the presence of an active principle of evil in the soul of every man, which coincides with some instincts of the appetitive soul; the opposite principle to the evil is the reason, which needs, though, a correct education in order to be able to fight efficiently against the evil in us. The man can be seen as a battle field of these opposite forces. Plato describes the presence of the evil in us in some passages of Republic Book 9, where he compares the appetitive part of the soul with a monster. The destiny of every person in her earthly existence consists in the continuing control of the appetitive part of the soul, if the status of ethical education is to be reached and maintained. The man who remains in the realm of the opinion, that is, in the realm of the doxa is an individual who only disposes of unstable opinions and who as a consequence do not have authentic remedies against the appetitive part. On the contrary, the individual who can ascend to the realm of being through the hard education represented by arithmetic, geometry, stereometry, astronomy, harmony and, finally, dialectic is really able to contrast the force of the evil within the individual. Ethics is really possible only through the complete education which passes through these disciplines: the more the individuals is theoretically educated, the more the individual is ethically educated. The knowledge of ideas is the only authentic therapy against the evil in us.

90. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Nicholas D. Smith

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91. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Stefania Giombini

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92. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Jiyuan Yu

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93. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 40 > Issue: 1/2
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos

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94. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3/4
Alexander P. D. Mourelatos

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95. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3/4
Gerasimos Santas

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96. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3/4
Allan Silverman

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97. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3/4
George Vassilacopoulos

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98. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3/4
Elizabeth Jelinek

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99. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3/4
Paul Woodruff

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The joy he took in Plato’s early dialogues was contagious. Gregory Vlastos introduced me to philosophy when I was nineteen and his example inspired me to continue on the road to scholarship. He loved Socrates and was fascinated by this controversial dialogue, the Hippias Major, which became the subject of my fi rst book. For Vlastos, Plato’s Socrates was a fi gure of almost biblical importance, an example of a life well lived in search of wisdom. Although he was an accomplished academic, Vlastos’ passions always went beyond the academic to fundamental questions of personal and political morality. Socrates’ questions mattered to him deeply, as they do to me.

100. Philosophical Inquiry: Volume > 39 > Issue: 3/4
Sandra Peterson

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