Dialogue and Universalism

Whereas at the roots of the Western way of thinking, in particular, at the roots of philosophy and epistemology lies a notion of the one/over/many, in Asiatic cultures, it is an idea of one/and/many, represented by Japanese (Chinese) Ma. In the paper it is argued that Japanese Ma is not only broader than epistemological reality (the world) but also more basic. To overcome Wittgenstein’s skepticism we have to return to a noncognitive idea of the ontic presence. Our thinking and cognition is deeply rooted in the imperceptible and indiscernible ontic flexibility and generality which is not conceptual or linguistic. This essay presents another interesting aspect of my metaphysical project showing that we cannot infer cognition either from the object level or from a meta-level.

The question of [metaphysical logic] is how cogitatio is possible in the first place (Überhaupt – Kant) as it constitutes reaction to the real (whatever that may be) by the Ego (a subject possessed of cognitive potential). Is that reaction dependable?Ego can only react to the World. All systems of thought/cognition come from this only impact of reality.The question is its own reliability and legitimacy. The first can deliver reliably something quite illegitimate (the whole art of propaganda (advertising) is based on this simple fact).The ability to cognize/think, at least at the level of [modern Ego] assumes the technique/capacity’s independence from that come from [categorical truisms]. To manipulate this is to think/cognize. Possible just when, the (shape of) the real resonates with Ego’s cognitive sensitivity. This needs to be shown to obtain.(Assuming per impossibile that the contrary obtains at the [archetypal] beginning our thinking could not find an adequate basis so it could not occur—which supposition is absurd.)

Jan Srzednicki’s metaphysical conception of epistemology lies in radical opposition to the whole epistemological tradition. The main problem of his new epistemology is to find a non-linguistic (non-cognitive) idea of reference to an ontological presence.Srzednicki finds the prototype of such a completely new, non-linguistic perspective in Brentano’s Doppelurteile. Brentano’s idea cannot be mechanically adopted, however, because on the whole it still remains within the traditional theory. To avoid the problemsrevealed by Wittgenstein we need a more sophisticated strategy. Srzednicki achieves this goal by scripting the epistemological scenario for two dimensions: theoretical and pre-theoretical. The first one represents the logical space of observer, the second one, the theoretically discernible logical requirements of cognition (called cognitive potential, pre-Ego or arche of the possibility of cognition).Srzednicki’s idea was born in the space of three theoretical challenges: Brentano’s, Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s. He begins where each of these three theorists broke off, which is to say, entangling his endeavors at he end in dilemmas which cannot be resolved by means available from his perspectives.

The paper tries to show that the theory of Srzednicki and Żurkowska can be viewed as an new and interesting solution of the classical problem: Can we cognize the objective reality? The theory discussed here conquer the cognitive skepticism on the condition, that there is not a impassable gap between the pre-ego experiencing without the notions and the subject cognizing by using the notions.

I analyze only few elements of Srzednicki’s “new epistemology”. I especially appreciate the thesis of transcendentalism and of demanding of the depersonalization of epistemology. In my opinion, the trial of founding cognition on non-cognitive factors is an irrelevant. It leads to irrationalism, as in the case of praxism, Marxism, psychoanalysis, or cognitive sociology. In this lies a critical difficulty of Srzednicki’s “new epistemology”. The main difficulty was acceptance the narrow, analytical idea of knowledge. It implicates the acceptance of a field of evidence (intuition, experience) as a noncognitive one. Another problem with “new epistemology” is propositionalism, and idea that all cognition is external to its object.

The article concerns the metaphysical dimension of Jan Srzednicki’s epistemology. It is claimed that the metaphysical perspective of cognitive “normatives” (e. g. norm, form and presence) does not remove paradoxes of self-reference. It is especially difficult to separate the ontic and the cognitive dimensions.

The paper offers a critical analysis of the skeptic’s conviction that his doubts about the truth of thought on existence of the world outside the mind are not equivalent to real the doubts about existence of the world alone, but they are only a theoretical and speculative problem of knowledge. The main case of this criticism is based on the Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s philosophy, precisely, on his theory of truth.