Chôra

The book by Magali Année, Tyrtee et Kallinos (Paris, 2017), claims to establish new and ambitious grounds on which to found an interpretation of Tyrtaeus’ and Kallinos’ works. By analysing the underlining networks of phonic‑syllabic repetitions in the available fragments, she studies how those two poets have elaborated a paroenetic‑incantatory diction to make the audience accept the content of the exhortation as an already‑lived experience. For instance, she argues that any item in the phonic sequence ‑μεν/μην/μον/μν‑, even as a palindrome, refers to the action denoted by the verb μένειν, “to resist”. Année elaborates the conditions for the plausibility of her original interpretation through a re‑evaluation of the frameworks through which archaic poems are usually interpreted, and she proposes a new edition of the testimonies and fragments on the ground of radical textual conservatism. After summarising the author’s arguments in detail, I conclude that, in spite of their merits, they fail to meet the author’s objectives completely. I discuss in turn : how the author arranges the new edition of the testimonies and fragments ; how she argues for her central view about phonic‑syllabic repetitions and the elaboration of the secondary layer of meaning ; and how she analyses meter, which she presents as one of the bases for phonic‑pragmatic constructs ; and how she conceives of her hermeneutical approach. On this last point, I specifically address the author’s view on the relationship between testimonies and fragments, the type of meaning she focuses on, the deconstruction of pre‑interpretations, and textual conservatism. I argue that the Année’s proposed underlying network of meaning comes at the expense of “meaning” in the more usual sense ; we could however have expected her to elaborate on how her proposed layer of meaning enriches or enhances our understanding of the more usual layer. Tyrtee et Kallinos therefore represents an alternative to traditional interpretative approaches, with limits of its own, rather than a re‑founding.

Die Identifizierung eines fragmentarisch erhaltenen Textes aus dem Speculum Historiale, das von Vincent de Beauvais um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts zusammengestellt wurde – eine im Mittelalter überall sehr geschätzte historiographische Arbeit – könnte eine Diskussion über den Wert der Geschichtsschreibung innerhalb der Lesepraxis im vormodernen Siebenbürgen anregen. In vorliegendem Aufsatz wird versucht, auf verschiedene Aspekte einzugehen, in erster Linie auf Fragen der Datierung und der Lokalisierung dieses Fragments. Es wird dann weiter argumentiert, dass die beiden noch vorhandenen Blätter ursprünglich Teil einer Handschrift waren, bislang die östlichste Rezeption des Textes in dieser Form darstellt ; die Handschrift war bereits um 1500 im Besitz eines Siebenbürgers.

La discussione sull’idea del buono (to agathon) occupa uno spazio marginale nel libro VI della Repubblica, ma comporta un eccezionale impegno teorico : di qui la vastita della letteratura esegetica che contrasta con la brevita del testo platonico. Il problema cruciale e questo : in Repubblica VI 504a‑509c to agathon non e piu solo un principio di valorizzazione e un criterio di valutazione di cose e condotte – com’e consueto in Platone – ma assume il ruolo di principio ontologico ed epistemologico. Questa posizione ha spesso suggerito interpretazioni di tipo “teologico” dell’idea del buono (identificata a volte con l’Uno neoplatonico, altre con il Demiurgo del Timeo). Quello che si puo affermare sulla base del testo, e che Platone ha conferito in queste pagine della Repubblica un primato al vertice etico del triangolo i cui altri vertici sono quello ontologico e quello epistemologico ; l’intento e quello di offrire una fondazione etica assoluta (antiprotagorea), mediante la connessione della sfera del valore con quelle dell’essere e della verita (quindi anche in ambito politico una giustificazione ultimativa al diritto dei filosofi a governare).L’unificazione delle dimensioni etica, ontologica ed epistemologica sarebbe parsa teoricamente insostenibile ad Aristotele, cui si deve una critica devastante alla teoria platonica del buono.

The article again treats the question of whether ≪the Idea of the Good is a Reality in the Universe, or beyond it. Is it immanent or transcendent ?≫ (Rufus Jones, 1863‑1948). Plato scholars such as Matthias Baltes (1940‑2003) and Luc Brisson have defended the thesis that Plato’s Idea of the Good is, on the one hand, beyond being (epekeina tes ousias) in dignity and power, but, on the other, is nevertheless not transcendent over being. The article delivers first (I) the most important arguments for the thesis of Baltes and Brisson. Then (II), it gives two counterarguments against the thesis. Third (III), it concludes with some general questions concerning the deflationist interpretation of Plato’s Republic 509b9‑10, and defends again the transcendence of the Idea of the Good.

Self‑sufficiency of the Good and dependency of Being ? From Republic to Sophist. Even thought Parmenides doesn’t use αὐτάρκης and any noun derived from this root, the Being is conceived by him as self‑sufficient (v. 8,33). Plato, for its part, never uses this term concerning the intelligible reality ; however, in the Sophist, he allusively challenges Parmenides self‑sufficiency of Being and outlines an ontology that is conflicting with it. On the other hand self‑sufficiency is explicitly ascribed by Plato to the human good (Philebus, 20d, 67a), to the divine world (Timaeus, 33d), and also to the virtuous man (Republic, 387d). This paper aims to demonstrate that these facets (theological or anthropological) of self‑sufficiency are consistent with the supremacy of the idea of the Good in the Republic, which can be understood as a structural kind of self‑sufficiency.

Un debat tres vif eut lieu parmi les commentateurs medioplatoniciens sur le rapport entre la forme du bien de la Republique et le demiurge du Timee. Certains d’entre eux, comme Plutarque et Atticus, parvinrent a identifier ces deux entites, d’autres, comme Numenius, a situer les deux principes dans une relation hierarchique, en attribuant au bien la qualification de ≪premier dieu≫ et de pere (pater) et au demiurge celle de ≪second dieu≫ et de producteur (poietes). Cet article se propose d’examiner la question de l’identite de la forme du bien avec le demiurge sur des bases nouvelles, en prenant comme point de depart une interpretation metaphorique de la figure du demiurge, qui ne se presente pas comme un principe metaphysique independant, mais comme une description metaphorique de l’element causal‑efficient du monde des formes, c’est a dire du vivant intelligible. Le demiurge coinciderait donc avec la totalite active et dynamique du monde intelligible (panteles zoon). Dans la seconde partie de l’article est prise en consideration l’hypothese que la superiorite de la forme du bien par rapport aux autres formes est du meme genre que celle du demiurge, dans la mesure ou le bien aussi peut etre compris comme la totalite du kosmos intelligible. Il s’agit d’une hypothese qui ne va pas sans difficultes, mais qui merite d’etre examinee jusqu’au bout.

Why does the Stoic demiurge cause the conflagration ? In this paper, I revisit some issues addressed in Salles 2005 and argue that the conflagration is the result of an incapacity in the demiurge for creating an everlasting and uninterrupted cosmic order. Also, I bring out in more detail (a) the parallel between the Stoics and Plato at Tim. 75a‑c (section 1), (b) why cosmic order is the ultimate end pursued by the demiurge (section 2), (c) what is the physical mechanism that leads up to the conflagration (section 3), and (d) why the conflagration is contrary to the cosmic order (sections 1 and 4).

Il y a chez Philon des expressions pour parler du bien qui sont apparemment contradictoires ou qui, au moins, font difficulte. Dans quelques passages l’Alexandrin parle de Dieu en termes de bien ; ailleurs il en parle comme de cause ou source du bien ; dans autres textes, enfin, Dieu est meilleur que le bien.Le theme de la possibilite de connaitre Dieu aussi pose des problemes : d’un cote nous avons le Dieu inconnaissable dont meme pas le nom ne peut etre dit, d’un autre, le Dieu demiurgique et providentiel dont quelques personnages parviennent a avoir une connaissance, au moins indirecte et partielle. Telle vision est proportionnelle au niveau du voyant. Cet article s’interroge a propos d’une solution similaire concernant la perception du bien, saisi par les hommes de facon differente selon leur niveau. Non pas, alors, Dieu comme bien, comme bon, comme meilleur que le bien, per se, mais en relation aux hommes qui n’arrivent pas a atteindre to agathon et cherchent vainement a lui attribuer un nom – quoique impropre –, de determiner ce qui est au dela de toute nomination, qualification, definition.

Among Plato’s dialogues, the Timaeus was the most authoritative for Middle Platonists. But alone it does not suffice to explain some of the most important tenets defended by these philosophers. A remarkable example is the doctrine of the three Principles (God, Ideas, matter), which characterizes imperial Platonism, and which cannot be stated on the basis of the Timaeus alone. In my paper I show that Numenius was influenced by the Republic as well : in the metaphor of the Sun he found the Good as first principle and an indication of a second principle which is further subdivided into an Intellect thinking the Ideas and a Demiurge ordering the universe. This interpretation provides him with some interesting solutions. But such an influence also raises difficulties insofar as the causal role of the first principle is concerned.

Mauro Bonazzi has shown how Numenius based his theology on his interpretation of Plato’s Timaios and Politeia. However, by giving the title On the Good (Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ) to his own dialogue, Numenius inserts it in the line of the teaching that, according to the tradition, Plato would have orally given on this topic. After focusing briefly on this teaching and its problems, the paper examines how Numenius appropriated it, as it reached him. It will appear that Numenius conceives of the oral tradition as the Pythagorean core of Plato’s teaching, a core that, according to him, its transmitters did not understand properly, and that he claims to find himself in a good interpretation of that which he has direct access to : the writings of the Master.

The anecdote recounted by Aristoxenus, who claims to be reporting Aristotle’s words, has been used by several interpreters to maintain the existence of a doctrine of the Good reserved for the members of the Academy, and transmitted orally, after the model of Pythagorean teaching. Yet a close analysis of these few lines shows that this interpretation has no basis : instead, what is at issue is a reading, for a broad audience, of a text corresponding to a doctrine of the good that can be found in the Republic and the Laws.

This paper focuses on the conclusion of Diotima’s speech : “Do you not reflect that it is there alone, when he sees the Beautiful […] that he will give birth not to mere images of virtue but to true virtue, because it is not an image that he is grasping but the truth. And when he has given birth to and nurtured true virtue it is possible for him to be loved by the gods and to become, if any human can, immortal himself ” (212a). It is not clear what exactly Diotima takes “true virtue” to be. Many interpreters (esp. F. Sheffield) argue that that virtue amounts to the exercise of the intellect, the moral, or political virtues being only “secondary” (as Aristotle would famously say) in the eudaimonia. Opposing this in fact Aristotelian reading, I contend that “true virtue” amounts to the moral‑cum‑political virtues once enlightened by the contemplation of the Form of Beauty. My main arguments come from a close reading of some passages of Alcibiades’s speech which should be read as a diptych to Diotima’s.

Une premisse majeure met en place les arguments les plus normatifs de la Republique : les caracteres des hommes sont la cause des caracteres des cites. Le gouvernement de Kallipolis est le meilleur de tous, explique Socrate, pour une raison tres simple : c’est le gouvernement des meilleurs (aristokratia). Dans une demokratia, en revanche, n’importe qui peut revetir un role de pouvoir par tirage au sort, et n’importe qui peut dire n’importe quoi. Tandis que les meilleurs des Gardiens se soucient du bien politique au superlatif, le peuple n’en a cure. Il foule aux pieds l’idee meme qu’il faudrait choisir et eduquer les magistrats. Le Peuple ne saurait être philosophe. Et pourtant, à Athènes, la parole politique et le langage à l’oeuvre dans l’administration de la cite (serments, decrets, eloges) montrent une quete acharnee du mieux possible. Le temoignage epigraphique nous devoile une citee pavee de bonnes intentions, engagee dans un perfectionnisme democratique que Platon refuse de reconnaitre.