Epistemology & Philosophy of Science

The article raises the problem of functionality and rational explanation of large arrays of communicative and unclaimed scientific knowledge. To solve the problem and explain this phenomenon, the resources of the system-communicative theory of scientific communication and social-evolutionist approaches are involved. The ability of the system-communicative theory itself to explain this phenomenon is considered as a possibility of its verification. In conclusion, a working hypothesis is proposed linking the existence of a class of unclaimed research and researchers with the function of meta-observation: through their online network reactions on appropriate electronic platforms (downloads, citations, readings, reviews, recommendations, etc.), the distribution of scientific reputations of science leaders and selection of the best scientific knowledge is ensured. This function, according to the author, compensates for the lack of an external audience or public capable of understanding and adequately evaluating scientific achievements in the scientific communication system. It is concluded that the past “collegial and deliberative” assessment of scientific achievements, the appropriate distribution of reputations and support for research projects is incompatible with the dynamic conditions of the “publication market”.

Philosophy is an abstract theoretical discipline. However, a new trend that develops experimental methods in philosophical research has recently been gaining popularity extending to the fields of philosophical research that have not seen experimental methods earlier. This article addresses the question of whether it is possible to investigate philosophical questions with empirical methods. Two areas of research are considered – philosophy of language and semantics and epistemology. In these subfields of philosophy, the application of experimental methods has recently lead to a noticeable progress. Empirical methods are justified in those disciplines in which arguments in favor of a particular theory are based on the study of our intuitions. Experiments only serve to obtain more objective representations of our intuitions, and philosophical argumentation is built further based on these intuitions. The authors argue that the use of experimental methods in semantics is compatible with anti-psychologism about meaning. The latter point is particularly controversial because linguistic intuitions or intuitions about the meaning have often been viewed as something that speakers have clear cognitive access to. However, when experimental research (even when it is a collection of controlled judgments) shows results that are different from what the field has been previously assuming, a revision is called for. The authors review several cases of such refutations calling for further revisions and argue that such experimental work helps arguments in philosophy of language and epistemology gain more sound ground with respect to the empirical data that they build on. In philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, the cases explored in this article relate to the differences between languages with and without articles and to the predictions about the availability of certain interpretations of such expressions or lack thereof. It is further shown how a similar method of identifying the existent or non-existent interpretations was used in the studies of the meaning of “most”. In epistemology, the article discusses the results of some recent experimental work relating to the knowledge ascriptions. The speakers’ intuitions about the famous Barn-examples have recently been shown to diverge from what philosophers have claimed, building their far-reaching arguments on the data that was arguably incorrect.

Modern analytical metaphysics contains many theories and approaches regarding the problem of personal identity. This diversity inevitably leads to the emergence of various classifications, the authors of which are trying to develop a compact way of typologizing existing views. Most of the classifications involve a significant simplification of the theories and approaches under consideration, and some of them are not taken into account at all. As such global classifications, one can single out an approach based on the identity criterion used in the theory (psychological, biological, narrative views). However, numerous local classifications allow one to point out potential differences in theories, even if formally they use a common criterion of identity. Other possible classifications are the division into endurantism and perdurantism, as well as simple (non-reductionist) and complex (reductionist) theories of identity. Special attention is paid to M. Shechtman‘s approach, which offers a local classification of narrative theories. Its main classification is the presentation of the views of researchers in the form of a possible spectrum. The place of a particular philosopher on this spectrum characterizes his views in relation to other supporters of the narrative approach. The purpose of this article is, based on the classification of narrative theories proposed by Shechtman, to propose a classification option for all theories and approaches to the problem of personal identity, which would be sensitive to conceptual details and differences that are important to them.

This paper analyzes Kent Bach’s representational theory of action, one of the causal theories of action. Bach’s theory sets requirements not only for the cause of an action, but also for how it unfolds in time and transitions into another action. These requirements suggest a sequential emergence of two components of the agent’s action awareness: the representation of the prepared movement and the perception of its sensory consequences. Bach introduces the concepts of “effective representation” (ER) and “receptive representation” (RR) to denote these components of awareness. According to representational theory, action has a cyclic three-step causal structure, where ER is the cause of a movement, the movement is the cause of RR, and RR is the cause of ER of subsequent movement. In constructing his theory, Bach tries to take into account the problem of deviant causal chains and to introduce the so-called minimal actions into the purview of the philosophy of action. Relying on the behavioral data on blindfolded deafferentated patients, in this paper I argue that RRs are not a necessary element of action. I also analyze Bach’s distinction between ER and RR and compare it with J. Searle’s approach, placing Bach’s theory within the context of studies of the structure of intentional states. I show that Bach’s theory occupies a unique position among views on the structure of action awareness. At the same time, I conclude that the frameworks of Bach and Searle are insufficient for describing the metaphysical difference between the two kinds of intentional states, and I also point out the difficulties facing the notion of ER. Based on this reasoning and the data on deafferentated patients, I propose a modification of the causal structure of action proposed by Bach, making a remark about the inadequate definition of ER. In the proposed modification, RR and the agent’s prior intention serve as alternative components of action awareness.

The article draws a conceptual distinction the (French) structuralism of the 50’s–60’s and the post-structuralism of the 70’s, which are discussed as overlapping in their intellectual paths; their mutual dynamics is defined as a reaction of the intelligence to the pressure of depersonalized unified schemes within the logic of structuralism against free improvisation and loose interpretation instead of total explanations in the post-structuralism interpretation. The article establishes a conceptual identity of the paradoxical nature between post-structuralism (and deconstructionism, which is homogeneous and identical thereto in a number of aspects), on the one hand, and constructionism with its specific process of language dismantling – social/ideological languages, social group dialects, on the other hand, which naturally leads the authors to the analysis of the paradoxicality principles, defined by post-structuralism (five principles of paradoxicality of Gilles Deleuze – paradox of regress, paradox of sterile reiteration, paradox of neutrality, paradox of absurd, paradox of Levi-Strauss); poststructuralists’ paralogisms are examined through paradoxical denotation; the late Roland Barthes’ phenomenon of paradoxicality, becoming a plot-forming principle of narration, is analyzed. Poststructuralism is conceptualized in the article as the first decisive step of post-modernism; the affinity of post-structuralist and postmodernist commitment to parody, game and irony is stated; the theory of language games in post-modern interpretation is explored; one of those games – a game of carnival – is explored within the diachronic retrospective; the affinity of parody and carnival tradition of post-structuralism and post-modernism to the romantic irony of the XIXth century and its inconsistency with the popular culture of laugh is established. The genesis of poststructuralism and post-modernism is connected with the ideological restart of the Western society before the “very end” of the Resistance ideas and the disappointment of the left European intellectuals in the “great legends” and illusions of Marxism. The blurred concepts of relativism are connected with the mutual disproportion of different layers of historical experience.

Mandelstam’s criticism of the Rayleigh theory of the blue color of the sky (1907) and his polemic with M. Planck (1907–1908) did not become notable events in the history of physics. However, the method of their coverage in the Soviet and in the post-Soviet physics literature is remarkable. Most of Soviet physicists and historians of physics supported Mandelstam's point of view in his criticism of both Raleigh and Planck. The situation changed only at the beginning of the 21st century: in the Russian literature the publications appeared emphasizing that in the Raleigh–Mandelstam and Planck–Mandelstam controversies Mandelstam was not right, Raleigh and Planck were closer to the truth. Which presumptions of this trend can be noted? This was patriotism of the scientific school peculiar to Mandelstam’s graduate students and the former graduate students, the patriotism connected with solidarity which helped Mandelstam’s community to survive in the Soviet totalitarian regime and in the totalitarian organization of science. This was also progressionism which was popular among academics and among men in the street. The phenomenon of common knowledge, mutual knowledge among the members of a scientific community should be taken under consideration. Common knowledge is connected with the non-thematized anonymous inclusion of the ideological terminology into scientific discourse.

Economics as a science emerged during the Enlightenment, but the impact of the specific general scientific environment of that era on the transformation of pre-scientific economic knowledge into scientific knowledge has not been adequately covered in the historiography of economic thought. The formation of economic science took place in the period of the scientific revolution of the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries. These were two interrelated but different processes. First of all, the transformation of economic knowledge followed fundamental changes in the economy itself – the formation of a market-type economy. At the same time, the emergence of a new discipline in the structure of scientific knowledge could not help but be guided by established standards of scholarship. However, at the time of the scientific revolution, science was in a state of turbulence: the old medieval norms of scholarship were losing their legitimacy, and the new ideals of scholarship had not yet attained the status of an accepted standard. The scientific programs associated with the names of Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz and Newton, as well as the new socio-philosophical doctrines, played different roles in different countries and at different stages of the scientific revolution. The article analyzes the peculiarities of the intellectual environment, in which scientific economic knowledge was shaped, and shows that it was much more diverse than the standard versions of the history of economic thought and earlier attempts (M. Foucault, F. Mirowski) to identify the influence of scientific ideals on its first schools of science suggest. Thus, the prerequisites for the formation of an alternative picture of the emergence of economic science as a result of the rivalry between its various concepts are created.

The article presents a detailed consideration of the arguments from the symposium “Verifiability”, which was held on July 14, 1945 in London, proposed by Scottish philosopher and theologian Donald MacKinnon, Austrian logician and mathematician Friedrich Waismann and English logician and philosopher of science William Kneale. MacKinnon’s approach to verifiability was based on the metaphysics of fact, while Waismann and Kneale’s approach was based on the semantic specificity of empirical concepts (“open texture” and context of use) and on the truth-values of empirical propositions. The symposium in question is interesting primarily because it is the last meaningful discussion on the concept of verifiability in the form in which it was understood by the Vienna Circle. Despite the fact that, in the coming years, this concept received a completely different interpretation, which stands away from the original source, the 1945 symposium could be rightfully treated as a canonical discussion on verifiability in the sense that nothing like this has ever happened in the philosophy after.

The author considers the Digital Humanities as a tendency towards a constructive synthesis of computer technology and humanitarian science in the context of their claim to make a paradigm shift in the humanities. As part of this review, the author raises a question about the role of interactive multimedia tools in the humanities, and tried to evaluate the novelty and content that scientific and educational projects receive with their help. The author develops and justifies the principle of systematization of Digital Humanities projects, based on the priority of distinguishing projects by the nature of the relationship between their humanitarian and computer (technological) components. Considering both the actual digital projects and the academic publications devoted to them in the context of their systematization, the author observes that many projects are largely experimental in nature due to the use of ever new multimedia tools, so it is premature to talk about a meaningful transformation of humanitarian science. Focusing on the issue of a successful synthesis of digital technologies and the humanities, the author notes that new technological tools (multimedia, AI or neural networks, etc) allow raising new questions, updating additional objects of research and creating new methods. However, new tools do not always set the completeness of the new content, only supplementing it, and the acquired interactivity does not always directly work for scientific character. In this case, we face with the reverse situation, when the claims of technologically determined disciplines to be scientific are intertwined with the claims of disciplinary science to manufacturability. As a result, the author concludes that the direction of Digital Humanities is significantly influenced by technoscience with its dissolution of the boundaries between fundamental and applied research and the desire for new technologies that transform the processes under study, which makes McLuhan’s concept especially relevant.

The author analyzes the phenomenon of denialism (denial of scientific consensus out of the normative boundaries of scientific discussion). The intellectual origins (including connection with P. Feyerabend’s post-positivism), sociocultural characteristics and political aspects of this phenomenon are discussed. The author defends the thesis that denialism is associated with scientism – non-reflexive trust in science, which is used for unscrupulous manipulations for the purpose of political influence. As an example, she considers the South African expert case related to HIV denial in the early 2000s. The author believes that denialism needs a comprehensive analysis that takes into account the interdependence of its intellectual and socio-political foundations.

This article attempts to comprehend the problem within the methodology of science. The authors compare the concepts of creativity and heuristics and suggest a semantic differentiation between them, and also offer their own viewpoint on the main types of activity corresponding to these concepts. The problem of creativity is associated with the characteristics that a person must have in order to solve tasks and problems. The authors consider the relationship between the problem and the task, as well as some major techniques to tackle them. Here they substantiate the idea of a wider adaptation of randomization as a special tactic, that is, going beyond the narrow framework of mathematical statistics and empirical research. In this context, the authors introduce the notion of “epistemological randomization”, designed to denote the following of open rationality without abandoning the rational way of solving scientific problems. This technique is viewed as a phenomenon related to the counterfactual thinking. The last part of the article proposes a typology of personalities as problem and task solvers – adaptive, heuristic and creative personalities. It is assumed that the “heuristic” personality aims to complete tasks, which, unlike problems, have a final solution, while the “creative” personality aims to expand the problem field. The latter type is characterized as capable and inclined to use the “epistemological randomization”, the techniques of lateral thinking and other techniques that suggest several methods of solving problems and tasks at once.

This is a reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin, S.V. Shibarshina “Epistemological Randomization, or On Creativity in Science”. The comprehension of the general philosophical problems of scientific rationality is inextricably linked with the creative development of the world. An actual philosophical position can be formed on the basis of the intersection of several alternative approaches. The first is connected with the understanding of rationality as a special style of thinking of the epoch, in which the coordinate system of the worldview is set. Such rationality sets general ideas about the cognizability of the world, and forms methodological and theoretical scientific strategies. Rationality outlines the boundaries of a scientist’s creative thought. Addressing the problem of the rationality of scientific creativity involves the use of a second approach, on the basis of which we can talk about the use of a variety of logics in describing the world. At the same time, confidence in their connection with reality allows us to hope for the formation of a holistic description of the problem in the future. In this case, we are dealing with an act of cognitive activity, as a result of which our consciousness throws a rational construct as a network on a situation of uncertainty, explaining and mastering it – the picture of the world is ordered. According to the third position, the evaluation of scientific results is flexible, plastic in nature: what is perceived as methodologically erroneous today may turn out to be a scientific discovery tomorrow. Thus, it can be stated that the creative thinking of the researcher is inscribed in certain cultural conditions of understanding reality, and this situation has a rationally given meaning. At the same time, the human mind always strives beyond the limits of the definable and categorically set, with the help of rationality, progressively groping the boundaries of the unknown and going beyond the limits of the possible.

The article considers the concept of serendipity (the ability to make unexpected discoveries) in comparison with the concept of “epistemological randomization” introduced by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina. The genesis and content of the concept of “serendipity” in the interpretation of American sociologists R. Merton and E. Barber are revealed. The division of serendipity into three types is considered depending on the source and result of an unexpected scientific discovery. The first type of serendipity refers to a situation of random observation, when neither the observation itself nor the conclusions drawn from it are part of the research already being carried out. The second type of serendipity is associated with the process of finding a solution to one problem, which suddenly leads to a solution to another. A third type of serendipity can arise when investigating a familiar problem, when the solution comes from an unexpected source. It is concluded that epistemological randomization, which is introduced into an existing study, is similar to the second and third types of serendipity, where the randomness factor is limited. In conclusion, it is emphasized that, in contrast to the principle of epistemological randomization, serendipity is an emergent phenomenon and cannot be caused consciously. Serendipity is manifested where an unexpected phenomenon meets a special type of subject who is able to notice and fruitfully interpret an unusual phenomenon.

The article offers a socio-historical approach to the problem of creative personality in polemic with the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina. Creative activity is considered not as a psychological process or an expression of cognitive abilities, but as a result evaluated by the professional scientific community and even by the entire society. The distinction between the psychological, historical and historical-epistemological interpretation of creativity is discussed. The authors argue that although the proposed approach has an explanatory potential for creativity as a socio-historical phenomenon, it reduces the nature of individual personalities and their role in scientific research to a public response to a new result. The personality of an author is getting vanished in this result, becoming only a label of some social achievement. Using the terminology of J.-P. Sartre, the essence of the author as a unique individual is reduced to his social existence as a scientist. The purpose of this existence is not the fulfillment of a vocation, but the implementation of a professional mission to promote science as a public good, which consists, among other things, in creating a field of intellectual tension. The scientist ensures the objective increase of public awareness of the painful points of history and modernity; critically analyzes global risks from ecology to security; and presents images of a possible and required future. Thus, creative science acts as a source for development through problematization, a factor of cognitive dissonance, a troublemaker, a potential violator of social stability.

In this reply to the article by A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, the question of the creative nature of the randomization technique is considered, which is understood as a rejection of logically obvious ways to solve scientific problems, and involves the inclusion of an element of randomness, or uncertainty, in the scientific search procedure. Some doubt is expressed about the consequences of introducing the technique of epistemological randomization into the tactics of solving scientific problems. The author of the article emphasizes the fact that an attempt to solve scientific problems by an inclusion of other, non-scientific elements in the area of science may be a case of randomization. The author determines the areas which are subject to an uncertainty factor. Art and culture are regarded as such non-science areas. However, the appeal to uncertainty is an indication of a fundamental inability to describe in quantitative terms the origin of creativity. This position can be characterized as “misterianism” in the interpretation of creativity, by analogy with misterianism in the understanding of consciousness by K. McGinn. In this case, the randomization technique is nothing more than one of the possible conditions for creativity, which cannot guarantee the appearance of an original result.

In their article, A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina focus on the concepts of problem, task, and features of a creative personality as a single isolated agent. To a certain extent, such view is “opposed” by the socio-epistemic approach, since today it is extremely difficult to consider a person outside the socio-cultural context. In my paper, I discuss the distinctive features of the concepts of tasks and problems in connection with the fields of science and education. As an example of a kind of creative adaptation practice, to which modern scientists are forced to resort (taking into account difficult socio-economic realities), I consider “tayloring” – a type of activity of “creative” written justification of the importance and usefulness of basic research (J. Calvert). The collective and institutional aspects of modern science, which play a role in the possible limitation of the process of generating new (creative) ideas in science, are discussed (P. Stanford). I agree with A.M. Dorozhkin and S.V. Shibarshina, that the method of epistemological randomization is most specific for the field of philosophy. Following C. Rovelli, it is emphasized that philosophy can serve as an important “creative resource” for scientific activity.

The article provides a reply to critical remarks made during the discussion about creativity and scientific knowledge. The authors propose to consider their concept of creativity not as antagonistic or incommensurable with the alternative, but rather co-existing through the complementarity principle. Responding to a comment about the socio-cultural conditionality of a particular cognitive situation, the authors question whether globalization seriously influence this matter in science. They support the statement about the importance of the interaction between science and art, science and philosophy as an opportunity to consider scientific problems from the outside, in an unusual way. Regarding the comment about serendipity, the authors note that in certain cases we need exactly epistemological randomization, since we cannot consciously induce serendipity. In conclusion, thanks are expressed to all participants in the discussion.

The article is devoted to the consideration of the relationship of T. Kuhn (and his followers) with representatives of the school of internal realism. Theses of the article: Kuhn’s teaching does not contain an unambiguous understanding of the basis on which ideas within the paradigm are acceptable to a scientist; post-Kuhn discussions in the field of epistemology of scientific knowledge acquire not historical, but “human” character; they are conducted around the concept of “rational acceptability”; theoretical positions as epistemological anarchism, similarly, internalism can equally be deduced from Kuhn’s teaching; the essentialist program of internal realists is excessively focused on criticizing the relativistic consequences of the doctrine of the paradigm; the revealed contradictions of Kuhn’s relativistic and internalist receptions prompt rejection of both these receptions. It is shown that Kuhn’s theory initially disposes to its transformation into a more consistent one in two ways: either due to radical antirealism, or due to an internalist approach, when its own epistemology is built within the framework of the paradigm with a mandatory definition of what is considered real and objective. Rational acceptability regulates the “value” aspect, i.e. preference for a certain theoretical model. Conclusions of the study: in internalism, the idea of the intersubjective nature of scientific knowledge is not lost; rational acceptability in internalism plays a restraining role in relation to the individual wills of scientists, acting as a collective form of intentionality that precedes any private scientific research with epistemological prerequisites; the criterion of rational acceptability is conservative, since it allows us to restrain the tendency of any language to lock itself in its own context; rational acceptability in internalism successfully balances between dogmatism and skepticism; the realistic and rational nature of the concept of “acceptability” allows us to reject the relativistic thesis about the closeness of science within a particular paradigm and assume that there is always “not-paradigmatic” component, rooted in the philosophical understanding of science.

Modal constitution theory is one of the most influential solutions to the paradoxes of coincidence, and the problem of personal identity. It rests on three fundamental premises: common-sense objects exist; sometimes objects coincide in space; the coincidence of objects in space requires explanation. In this article, the author offers a critique of the modal theory of constitution. First, the definition of the constitution is examined and a new argument is offered that modal theory either does not provide asymmetry of the constitution or leads to an infinite series of constitutive objects, unsatisfactorily extending ontology. Also, the author demonstrates that possible additions to the constitutive definition, which can make the definition sufficient for asymmetric relation, lead to additional theoretical difficulties, leading to the logical impossibility of constitution relation. Second, the author demonstrates that the theory of constitution offers an unsatisfactory theory of identity because it faces three problems: the overpopulation problem, the epistemic problem, and the personal problem. All of these considerations lead the author to conclude that modal constitution theory is not metaphysically satisfactory.

This paper was motivated by reflections on what makes our argument convincing and persuasive. The substantive answer in my view suggests the examination of the cognitive grounds of argumentation. In the introductory section, I consider various approaches to identifying the cognitive component in argumentation. That way, I briefly observe recent relevant publications, which I classify into two groups: those directly addressing cognitive grounds of argumentation; and papers on formal models of argumentation that take cognitive nature of persuasion as a premise. In the second section, I argue for phenomenologicaly inspired approach to cognitive activity as one which provides an adequate cognitive interpretation of the latter. In so doing, I touch upon key some phenomenological concepts and focuses on an analogizing apperception (appresentation). The third section accumulates all the above. I proceed from the interpretation of the argumentation as discursive activity aimed at a deliberate change in an opposite party’s position, which may not be explicitly presented in the course of arguing. It makes us turn to cognitive procedure of appresentation as it was presented by Husserl for an adequate interpretation of transfer and grasping of argumentative message’s meaning.