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陳林
Lin Chen
Intrinsic Development Clue on Chu Hsi’s Gong-fu Thought
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朱子的工夫思想有著內在的發展理路。在「中和舊說」時期,朱子以體 用思維來處理已發未發問題,認為未發是體,是性;已發是用,是心。與此 心性論相對應,朱子提出了「先察識後涵養」的為學工夫思想。在「中和新 說」時期,朱子則以經驗現象中的時間先後和空間動靜來區分已發未發,把 未發理解為心之「思慮未萌、事物未至」的狀態、已發理解為心之「思慮已 萌、事物交至」的狀態,並認為「性為心之體、情為心之用,心統性情」。 與這種心性論相對應,朱子提出了「未發涵養,已發省察,敬貫通已發未發」 的為學工夫。而在晚年,朱子則以心在應事接物時是否順理而為來區分已發 未發,進而把已發未發融合貫通起來,不再執著已發未發之間的時間先後和 空間動靜的界限。由是,朱子晚年試圖打通涵養主敬工夫與格物窮理工夫,使之融合為一,強調涵養主敬與格物窮理相互滲透、相互發明,其工夫思想 也走向了更圓融之境。
Chu Hsi’s Gong-fu Thought has its intrinsic development clue. During the period of his ‘early doctrine of Mean,’ Chu Hsi dealt with the stirring and not stirring problems by thinking of entity and function; he considered that not stirring was entity and nature, while stirring was function and mind. Corresponding to the theory of mind and nature, Chu Hsi proposed the Studying Gong-fu Thought which means ‘first identifying the source of consciousness then cultivating with Heart.’ During the period of his ‘later doctrine of Mean,’ Chu Hsi made the distinction between the stirring and not stirring through chronological arrangement and motion and still in space in empirical phenomena, through which not stirring was interpreted as the state of ‘thinking no sprout and things without realizing,’ while stirring was interpreted as the state of ‘thinking sprout and things realized.’ He also considered that ‘nature’ was the entity of mind, and Qing was the function of mind, man's spiritual mentality consists of sense and sensibility. Corresponding to such theory of mind and nature, Chu Hsi proposed the Studying Gong-fu Thought which means that ‘self-restrain when not stirring, self-examinate when stirring, and respectfulness exists through stirring and not stirring.’ In his later years, Zhu Hsi made the distinction between the stirring and not stirring through minds responding thing following Li or not, and thus made possible the interaction between the stirring and not stirring. He did not insist on figuring out the boundary of chronological arrangement and motion and still in space between stirring and not stirring. Therefore, Zhu Hsi tried to unite respectfulness and Ge-Wu-Qiong-Li as a whole and emphasized that respectfulness and Ge-Wu-Qiong-Li should be interpenetrative, which makes his Gong-fu Thought be more harmonious.
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嚴瑋泓
Wei-Hung Yen
How to Comprehend the Types of Ethical Theories of The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch?
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中國佛教倫理思維的特色,在於將戒律的規範性轉移到對心性的重視,其道德實踐的終極目的乃透過排除遮蔽心性的煩惱與顯露清淨本性等進路而完成的。此種主張以禪宗為最,《六祖壇經》中「心平何勞持戒?行直何用修禪?」、「心地無非,自性戒」等說法,特別顯露了中國佛教倫理思維的特色。本文以《壇經》作為探究以禪宗為基礎的倫理學理路。首先從戒律與心性論的視角思考《壇經》的道德思考屬於哪種類型的倫理學?再者,反思《壇經》獨特的倫理思想型態是否與西方倫理學之理論有對話的可能性?一方面從《壇經》內在倫理型態思考其與德行倫理學的相似性,並論述其是否可能為某種形式的德行倫理學;二方面從禪宗哲學明心見性、解脫成佛之終極目的,思考是否可將《壇經》的倫理型態視為某種形式的結果主義?本文的研究成果顯示,《壇經》的倫理學型態包含了返回自性的理路與從緣起與無常所構築的世界觀所引發的「無所住」視角,據此產生一種認識的超越性而指向涅槃解脫。如是般從「認識」而「解脫」的理路提示著一種自律的倫理學型態,在此種型態中,道德主體藉著實踐智慧自發地出於善、完成善。若從理論的相似性來理解《壇經》的倫理學型態,我們最多只能謹慎地作出如下的結論:若從理論的相似性來看,《壇經》的倫理學型態約略可將其類比於德行倫理學與結果主義,甚至是義務論的主張,但若從其理論的內在理路看來,在理論的相似性之外,還必須從差異性來把握其倫理學型態。
This paper uses The Platform Sutra as the theoretical background for probing the ethics on which Chan Buddhism built its foundations. First of all, I analyze the type of ethics that the content of the The Platform Sutra can be said to display from the perspective of the view on precepts and mind-nature and subsequently offer my opinion on the similarities between virtue ethics and the type of ethics displayed in The Platform Sutra. Next, I give consideration to whether The Platform Sutra can be classified as a type of consequentialism when viewed in terms of the Chan Buddhist notion of instant revelation, along with the ultimate Buddhist aim of liberation from suffering and the attainment of Buddhahood. The outcome of this paper suggests that, The Platform Sutra offers a transcendental cognition aiming at Nirvāna and that its central theme of “non-abiding,” derived from the ethical perspective of this text which in turn is based upon both the theoretical journey of returning to mind-nature and a world view constructed around Dependent Origination and Impermanence. The theoretical journey that starts with “cognition” and culminates in “liberation” prompts an ethical pattern of autonomy, whereas the moral subject spontaneously perfects all virtues through the practical wisdom of proper conduct. When considering the ethics of The Platform Sutra it would be prudent to conclude only the following: when seen purely from the aspect of theoretical similarity, the ethical pattern of The Platform Sutra can be said to be roughly analogous to virtue ethics and consequentialism, and perhaps even to deontology. However, when the intrinsic theory of The Platform Sutra is taken into account, it is evident that apart from theoretical similarity, the view of differentiation still needs to be incorporated into the ethical equation of this text.
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楊植勝
Chih-Sheng Yang
Love Becoming Reason
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本文論證黑格爾哲學的理性概念是基督宗教博愛誡命的理性化。基督宗 教的博愛誡命是《聖經》的「新約」最重要的誡命;它超越卻實現「舊約」 裡的法律。它具有矛盾的特性,尤以「愛仇人」的命令為典型。但是它也因 此把有限的人提升到無限。黑格爾的理性概念在這些方面都與它相同:揚棄 律則,對人類知性表現為矛盾,並且被把握為屬於無限的領域。
This paper argues that the concept of reason in Hegel’s philosophy is the rationalization of the commandment of love in Christianity. The commandment of love is the greatest one in the New Testament of the Bible. Love surpasses but also fulfils the law of the Old Testament. There is contradiction in the commandment, which is most evident in the command ‘love for enemies.’ Nevertheless, only by love is the mortal raised to the divine and the infinite. Hegel’s reason has all of these characteristics: it sublates the law; it appears as something contradictory to human understanding; and it is comprehended as belonging to the infinite.
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64.
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劉作
Zuo Liu
Living Hegel: Comment on Prof. Chong-Fuk Lau's A New Interpretation of Hegel
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65.
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王志輝
Zhi-Hue Wang
Aristotle’s Criticism of the Platonic Division of the Soul
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亞理斯多德在《論靈魂》第三書第九章,對柏拉圖的靈魂劃分作出相當 嚴厲的批判。他指出,無論是柏拉圖的靈魂三分(「理性」、「意氣」、「慾 望」),還是柏拉圖主義者所抱持,一般流行的靈魂二分(擁有理性」與「缺 乏理性」兩部分),都有相當大的問題。因為,首先,按照柏拉圖的靈魂劃 分方式,靈魂可以是無限被劃分的。其次,柏拉圖的靈魂劃分,完全忽略了 「吸收養分」的能力,其實是一種獨立的靈魂能力,而不能與其它靈魂部分 或能力混為一談。再者,按照靈魂二分的方式,知覺該歸類為「擁有理性」還是「缺乏理性」的部分,也不清楚。最後,亞理斯多德認為,柏拉圖靈魂 劃分的最不合理之處,在於將原本單一的「欲求能力」分割開,以致於在理 性部分中出現了「希求」,在「缺乏理性」部分中又出現了「慾望」與「意 氣」等,以致於在靈魂三部份中,每一部份都會有欲求。本文打算依次檢視這些批判。此外,本文打算提出的一個觀點是,亞理 斯多德對柏拉圖靈魂劃分之批判,符合他一般對柏拉圖哲學的批判方式:J. Annas 與G. Fine 皆指出,亞理斯多德在批評柏拉圖理型論時,通常會相當 嚴格地堅持柏拉圖文本上的文字意義,但不肯從柏拉圖的角度與哲學立場, 寬大、善意地解讀這些文字;反之,亞理斯多德經常會根據自己的一些預設 與哲學見解,嚴格地檢驗柏拉圖文本中的字句,有時他甚至會將柏拉圖的說 法脫離原有的脈絡來解讀。當然,亞理斯多德這麼作的理由,並非是為了刻 意刁難柏拉圖,而是為了從柏拉圖哲學中得出某些重要的哲學意涵,並藉此 顯示自身哲學立場的合理性。本文將顯示,亞理斯多德對柏拉圖靈魂劃分的 批判,充分展現了這種批判方式的特點。
In De Anima III 9, Aristotle raises a series of criticisms against the Platonic division of the soul. He firstly indicates that the parts of the soul seem to be infinite, and not confined to the calculative, spirited, and the appetitive part, as Plato describes. Secondly, Plato’s tripartition of the soul almost neglects the nutritive part as an independent capacity of the soul. Moreover, although the Platonists simplifies Plato’s tripartition and transformed it into a bipartition, it is not easy to assign the perceptive part either to therational or the irrational part. Finally, Aristotle thinks that it is totally unreasonable for the Platonic soul-division to split the desiderative part up, which should be one and single capacity of the soul; for then there would be wish in the calculative, appetite and spirit in the irrational part, such that in each part of the soul there would be desire.In this article I shall explain these criticisms respectively. However, I will not treat them as though they were isolated, but will show that they belong to Aristotle’s overall criticism against Platonism. J. Annas and G. Fine have suggested that in criticizing Plato’s theory of forms, Aristotle usually finds fault with this theory in an uncharitable and even arrow way. Sometimes he takes an inexact and vague Platonic claim, and provides one literal and natural reading of it on which he then proceeds to attack. Sometimes he reads a Platonic claim not in a way Plato would accept, but in a way which derives from the assumptions of his own metaphysics or from his own understandings about Platonism. Sometimes he criticizes a Platonic argument even in isolation from the original context in Plato’s dialogues. In so doing, however, Aristotle does not intend to misinterpret Plato; his aim is not to record Plato’s arguments straightforwardly, but rather to reconstruct them in a way that will provide philosophical illumination, so that we can learnsomething important about Platonism and the plausibility of Aristotle’s alternative. This article will show that in principle, Aristotle’s criticisms of the Platonic soul-division are compatible with his general mode of criticism against Platonism.
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Hua-kuei Ho
何畫瑰
理性的慾望:柏拉圖對慾望的看法 與《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯「愛的醫療」
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Confronted with the stereotype of a rationalistic Plato, the paper argues for the value of desire at its own right in Plato. To explore the relation between desire and rationality in Plato, I choose Eryximachus’ medicine in the Symposium as an object of comparison. Eryximachus’ τέχνη, representing the Hippocratic medical knowledge, is in conformity with Plato’s earlier requirement of knowledge, that is, giving a rational account. The medicine achieves the harmony by balancing the good and bad desires. Plato’s philosophy, however, goes beyond the epistemic model of rational science or τέχνη. On the treatment of desire, he does not follow the discrimination of good and bad desires in medicine, nor does he even out the different desire, because as the doctor. Plato’s philosophy needs the strength of desire, because—though desire sometimes becomes irrational—it is the vital strength of the soul to pursue philosophy.
面對一般對柏拉圖「理性主義」的刻板印象,這篇論文試圖論述:對柏 拉圖而言,「慾望」本身具有價值。為進一步探討柏拉圖哲學中慾望和理性 的關係,文中將以《饗宴》裡厄律克希馬可斯的醫學談話,作為比較的對象。 厄律克希馬可斯的「技藝」(τέχνη),即,希波克拉底派的醫學,符合柏拉 圖早期對知識的要求,也就是:知識必須要能提出合理的說明;此外,當時 的醫學是在藉由好慾望與壞慾望之間的平衡,而使人內在各成分達致健康與 和諧。然而,這裡提出的解釋是:柏拉圖的哲學超出了理性科學或技藝的知 識範本;在對慾望的處理上,他不依循醫學對慾望好壞的區分,他的和諧概 念也保留了理性與非理性慾望並存的差異。柏拉圖哲學需要慾望的力量,慾望雖然可能變成非理性,卻也是靈魂追求哲學不可缺少的力量。
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67.
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林明照
Ming-Chao Lin
The Ethical Meaning of “Helping Heaven” in Wang Chuanshan’s Interpretation
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船山透過詮解《莊子》,提出了許多深刻的哲學問題及理論。其中對《莊 子》「相天」說的詮解,尤其值得關注。原因大致有二:首先,船山認為內 篇最能直接表現莊子的思想,而其精髓正可歸結於《莊子》中的相天之說; 其次,船山在將《莊子》哲學的核心論點歸結為相天說時,又據之作為分判 《莊子》與儒、釋、玄等其他哲學家派理論優劣的標準。本文在於對船山《莊 子解》中「相天」說的倫理意義進行討論,全文的討論主要包括三個部分, 首先將指出在船山的理解下,《莊子》的「相天」說在於回答一根本問題:我們有什麼理由認為生比死更有價值?以及由此引生的另一個問題:為什麼 不是每一種人格品質或行為特質都具同等價值?其次,將從相天說所關涉的 生死形上意義,來說明在船山的詮解中,《莊子》透過相天說對於前述問題 的基本回答。接著,本文將對船山所詮解的相天說的倫理意義作出探討。
Chuanshan presents lots of philosophical questions and theories via his interpretation on Zhuangzi, and the one about the concept of “Helping Heaven” especially deserves our attention. There are at least two reasons for this. First, in Chuanshan’s mind, the Inner Chapters is the representative of Zhuangzi’s thought, and the core in it is the concept, “Helping Heaven”. Second, Chuanshan regards “Helping Heaven” not only as the core theory in Zhuangzi but also as the standard to evaluate different theories in ancient Chinese philosophy.The discussion of this paper is divided into three parts. First, in Chuanshan’s interptretation, Zhuangzi’s “Helping Heaven” tells us why living is more valuable than death. From this viewpoint, we can ask further why not all personalities or behaviors have the same value. In the second part, we according to Chuanshan’s interpretation, figure out the answer to the question above from the metaphysical meaning of Zhuangzi’s “Helping Heaven”. In the end, the paper discusses the ethical meaning of “Helping Heaven” in Chuanshan’s interpretation.
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張忠宏
Chung-Hung Chang
On Zhu Xi’s Criticisms of Cheng Yi’s Understanding of the Book of Changes
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朱熹對程頤的批評表面上看起來駁雜而不一致,但深入分析他的論點,可以看出他的批評有一致而深刻的重要性。簡言之,朱熹認為《程氏易傳》 脫離了《易》之筮法與象數,不能說明做人做事的道理、天地自然之數、宇 宙及存有架構等天地之理,如何透過筮法及《易》的表象系統整合在六十四 卦的變化裏。《程氏易傳》之所以有這個問題,是因為程頤缺乏整合義理、 象數與筮法的問題意識,並且輕忽邵雍的先天易學的重要性。對朱熹來說, 唯有邵雍的先天易學可以統合象數、義理與筮法;程頤不能、也不應拒絕先 天易學。
Zhu Xi’s criticisms of Cheng-Shi-Yi-Zhuan seem to be diverse and inconsistent. Further analyses, however, show the contrary. To put it very briefly, Zhu Xi’s complaints were mainly due to Cheng Yi’s failure to bring about a coherent theory that can integrate xiang-shu, yi-li, and shi-fa, as well as his lack of awareness of the significance of such an integration. The reason why Cheng Yi failed in both regards was in turn due to his ignorance of the theoretical roles Shao Yong’s xian-tien-yi-xue can play. By demonstratingwhat those theoretical roles are and why they are so important to Zhu Xi, this paper explicates Zhu Xi’s own understanding of the Book of Changes.
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丁福寧
Paschal Fu-Ning Ting
The Metaphysical Foundation of Aquinas’ Anthropology
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人的完整統一性及靈魂不朽是中世紀時期人學最為困擾,也是爭議最多的 兩個問題。哲學家以二元論及普遍形質論來解釋人的完整性。如此二元論的人學思想以不同的方式成為中世紀時期主流的人學思想。多瑪斯反對任何形式的 二元論,他為人學尋找形上的統一基礎。為多瑪斯,人的完整統一性要求實體形式的統一性,靈魂是人的實體形式 及在自身的實體。唯人的靈魂是受造的,它的存有是分享自存有本身(Ipsum esse)。理性靈魂的本性是精神的,它是人的本質,唯非人的完整的種(species)。 精神的靈魂被賦予存有,它是自立的實體,但不在自身分開地存在,理性的精 神靈魂以其存有統一人的靈魂與身體,如此人具有完整的統一性。存有為現 實,是統一性的基礎,它具絕對的優先性。多瑪斯的存有為現實的概念超越亞 理斯多德形式為現實的概念,如此他為精神的理性奠定形上基礎。故在人的本 體結構上有雙重的潛能與現實的組合;在形上層次是存有-現實與本質-潛能 的組合。在物理層次是靈魂-形式(現實)與身體-質料(潛能)的組合。但 理性靈魂因是自立的實體,它是內在地獨立於身體。理性靈魂因其有存有,具 不朽的形上條件。
During the Middle Ages, the two problems which philosophers concern the most are the holistic unity of man and the immortality of soul. In order to explain these basic Christian beliefs, philosophers adopt the dualism and universal hylomorphism. The reason to take such a stance is to ensure the immortality of soul.For Aquinas, the human rational soul is both the substantial form of body and the substance in its own right, and the holistic unity of man requires the unity of the substantial form. Since the rational soul is created by God, its esse (being) participates in Ipsum Esse. Rational soul is the essence of humans, but not its complete species. It needs to be united with a body. It is spiritual by nature. Once the rational soul is created, it has being, it is a subsistent substance, but not exists separately by itself. The being of therational soul then unites the composit man’s soul and body. Being is the unifying principle. It has absolute priority. There are double composition of potency and act in man’s ontological structure. On metaphysical level, the composition of being-act (or actus essendi) and essence-potency. On physical level, the soul (act-form) and body (potency-matter), yet the rational soul is essentially independent from body. The being of the rational soul is its metaphysical foundation of immortality.
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鄧克 銘
Keh-Ming Deng
An Analysis of Fang Yizhi’s View on Zhuangzi’s Xiaoyaoyou
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莊子在〈逍遙遊〉以寓言的方式表達高遠的精神世界,其意境及途徑引起 後人不斷地探索。方以智收集大量的古今註解,會通儒釋道三家思想,以獨特 的寫作方法詮解該篇蘊藏的豐富內容。本文從三個層面說明方以智詮釋的重要觀念。第一:關於莊子「小大之辨」 的問題,方以智強調小與大之無差別性與相異性,以消除片面的執著。第二: 方以智從「有」與「無」之對立的觀念,說明兩者相互否定、相互成立的關係; 並主張「不落有無」又「不離有無」,才能在現實生活中得到自在。第三:方 以智會通儒釋道,說明逍遙遊之途徑與形態,正是其自身生活經歷的反映。經 由本文的分析,可以了解方以智主張去除偏執以得心靈自由的詮釋方法與理論 依據。
In his writing, “Xiaoyaoyou” (逍遙遊), Zhuangzi uses parables to express his profound and innermost spiritual world. His artistic conception and approach inspire ongoing research by subsequent generations. Fang Yizhi analyzes numerous ancient and modern interpretations of Zhuangzi’s piece, applies Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist thinking, and uses his unique writing method to interpret the rich content in Zhuangzi’s writing.In the present article, important concepts of Fang Yizhi’s interpretation are analyzed from three different angles. First, regarding Zhuangzi’s argument of “the distinction between micro and macro” (小大之辨), Fang Yizhi intends to eliminate this persistent polarized view by emphasizing that micro and macro are indistinguishable. Second, Fang Yizhi uses the conflict between the concepts of “existence” (有) and “nonexistence” (無) to illustrate the relationship between mutual negation and mutual confirmation. He also advocates that if we “are not biased by or do not insist on either existence or nonexistence” and “do not break away from the confronting phenomena of existence andnonexistence”, then we shall be at ease in our real life. Third, Fang Yizhi applies Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism to illustrate the approach and structure of Xiaoyaoyou. This is precisely the reflection of his own life experiences. Through the analysis of the present article, one can understand the interpretation methods and theoretical basis Fang Yizhi advocates to remove any polarized view in order to obtain freedom of the soul.
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張忠 宏
Chung-Hung Chang
Dao, Technê and Cultivating Life: Following Cook Ding’s Lead
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本文主張,莊子的「養生」是涵養生命之意,因此它的養生觀包含養親 的要求。「庖丁解牛」不是寓言,而是莊子舉例說明技藝在生命之涵養中扮 演了什麼樣的角色。技藝的重要性,不在於它能帶來心流經驗,而在於它能 將世界揭露為豐富多元、且可悠遊徜徉的場域。欲得養生,就必須擁有良好 的技藝,包括與父母相處、將父母揭露為相互成全、攜手共遊的養親技藝。 基於這樣一種養生觀,莊子雖然高度重視人倫的要求,認為得道者必能養 親,卻並未進一步進行倫理學與政治哲學思考。
According to Zhuangzi, the meaning of Yang-Sheng is all about life-cultivation. This can be seen from the fact that it is one of Yang-Sheng’s requirements to keep good company with one’s parents. The story of Cook Ding, as presented in the book by Zhuangzi, is meant to provide an insight into the importance of technê in life. To put it briefly, technê is important not because it can bring about flow experience, but because it can reveal the world as one in which one can wander about and be playful with valuable things in multiple dimensions. Thus, it is a necessary condition for anyone who wants to cultivate the meaning of life to be able to master at least some skills, especially the ones involved in keeping good company with one’s parents. As a consequence, Zhuangzi is quite successful at giving a daoist twist to filial obedience, though he confineshimself not to pursue further ethical and/or political theorizations.
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Hsiu-Lin Ku
古秀 鈴
語意理論與可及原則
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This paper aims to defend François Recanati’s Availability Principle approach to semantics by illuminating and responding to two major challenges from minimalists, in particular from Emma Borg: the first concerns the notion of intuitive content and “awareness-of” presupposed in the Availability Principle, and the second concerns whether the principle makes a semantic theory unfit with normativity and compositionality. I lead the discussion toward the kernel question--the bearer of the semantic content--and show that the Availability Principle is appropriate if we respect the empirical basis of meaning.
本文試圖替François Recanati 回應以Emma Borg 為主的兩面向批評,而 得以闡明並辯護其所主張的可及原則:其一面向是關於可及原則所預設的 「直覺內容」與「意識到」兩概念,其二面向是關於是否滿足可及原則會使 的語意理論無法滿足語言的規範性與組構性。我將引導此爭論至問題核心 ─即語意內容的承載者─重新審視何以一般咸認為語句本身有其客觀、不受脈絡影響而改變的語意內容,並論證若我們顧及意義的經驗基礎,則可及原則是恰當的。
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Tzu-Wei Hung
洪子 偉
心智模組的酵素模型及其困難
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The enzyme model (EM), inspired by biological enzyme catalysis, is a computational-functional description of information processing and distribution in modular cognitive systems. It has been argued that EM offers advantages in solving both the allocation problem and global computation and thus may play a role in upholding the massive modularity hypothesis (MMH). This paper, however, argues that EM solutions are untenable, as EM avoids the infinite regress of allocation problem only at a high cost and with several critical drawbacks. Moreover, to clarify global processes, EM needs to satisfy two necessary conditions: first to demonstrate that the EM allows cross module communication, and second to be sensitive to not only the syntax but also the semantics of representations. I argue that EM only satisfies the first condition and thus fails to hold.
「酵素模型」指的是借用生物學中酵素催化機制的概念,來說明認知科 學中「大量模組假說」在計算與功能層次上有關資訊處理與分配之模型。酵 素模型的最大優點在於回應了「訊號配置」與「整體計算」兩難題,從而替 大量模組假說提供有利的辯護基礎。但本文之目的,在論證酵素模型的這兩 個回應並不成立。一方面,酵素模型在避免訊號配置的無限後退時會產生新 的困難。另一方面,要說明整體計算至少得滿足兩個必要條件:一是跨模組 的訊號交換是可能的、二在於模組能夠不只是針對輸入訊號的語法結構來處 理訊號。本文將論證酵素模型頂多說明如何滿足第一個必要條件,而沒有釐 清第二個必要條件如何在該模型中實現。換言之,酵素模型對兩難題的回應 不成立。因此,酵素模型無法用以支持大量模組假說。
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陳政 揚
Cheng-Yang Chen
A Study of Wang Zhi’s Criticisms of the Deification in the Commentary of the Zhengmeng by an Analysis of the Three Aspectsin the Idea of “Ultimate Voidness (Taixu 太虛)”
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設若研讀哲學家的代表著作,是吾人探究其思想的必要條件之一,則逐句 解析張載思想論述的明清《正蒙》注,顯然是研究橫渠思想在明清哲學之發展 時,所無可忽視的一環。尤其歷來注解《正蒙》者,不乏高攀龍,王夫之等望 重士林,或在哲學史上具有獨創見解者。然而在當代張載學研究中,相關議題 似乎仍較少引起學者間的討論興趣。基於此,本文以清代《正蒙》學研究為論 述起點,旨在澄清李光地在《注解正蒙》中對張載神化觀的詮釋,以及王植在 《正蒙初義》中如何由釐清「太虛」概念,批判李《注》之非。全文共分為四 項研究環節:首先,由於王植以澄清「太虛」概念為解讀《正蒙》與衡定諸注 之關鍵,本文先扼要說明「太虛」之三層義。其次,本文將指出李《注》對「太 虛」之詮釋,以及王植對李《注》太虛義之批判。再者,由於李《注》不僅嘗 試解消「太虛」之本體義,而且以理氣二分的理論架構,詮釋橫渠虛氣一體之 神化觀。本文將指出李《注》對橫渠神化觀之新詮。最後,本文將藉太虛三層 義,指出《正蒙初義》的洞見以及李《注》神化觀的侷限。
In order to understand the content and significance of Zhan Zai’ thought, commentarial works on the Zhengmeng during the Ming and Qing period areindispensable because these works present detailed explications on every conceptual terms. Compared to those commentarial works on the Zhang Zai’s thought by Gao Panlong and Wang Fuzhi who have been regarded as rather creative thinkers, other commentarial works during the Qing period have not drawn sufficient scholarly attention. Bearing this in mind, this article aims to explore the two topics: Firstly, it analyzes Li Guangdi’s interpretation on Zhang Zai’s idea of “deification” through Li’s Commentary of the Zhengmeng. And secondly, it also traces Wang Zhi’s elucidation of the concept of “Ultimate Voidness” (Taixu) in his commentarial work, the Basic Meanings of the Zhengmeng, as well as Wang’s correction of initial mistakes in aforementioned Li Guangdi’s commentary.The discussion of this article consists of the following four sub-topics: (1) Wang Zhi’s exposition of three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness”; (2) Li Guangdi’s interpretation of the term “Ultimate Voidness” and Wang Zhi’s repudiation against it; (3) Li’s argument that the ontological significance of the concept of “Ulitmate Voidness” should be dissolved, and that Zhang Zai’s idea of deification of continuity between vital breath and voidness should be understood by the dualistic framework between principle and vital breath; and (4) Highlighting of Wang’s insight and Li’s limitation of his conception of deification by means of our analysis of the three aspects in the concept of “Ultimate Voidness.”
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Cheng-Hung Tsai
蔡政 宏
技藝與理解
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How can we acquire understanding? Linda Zagzebski has long claimed that understanding is acquired through, or arises from, mastering a particular practicaltechnê. In this paper, I explicate Zagzebski’s claim and argue that the claim is problematic. Based on a critical examination of Zagzebski’s claim, I propose, inconclusion and in brief, a new claim regarding the acquisition of understanding.
人是如何獲得「理解」?德性知識論的代表人物Linda Zagzebski 長久 來宣稱「理解的獲得來自於對技藝的掌握」。在本文中,作者闡釋Zagzebski 的宣稱,並指出這宣稱的問題。透過對Zagzebski 之宣稱的批判性檢視,作 者在文後提供另一修改自Zagzebski 的理解獲得觀點。
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傅皓 政
Hao-Cheng Fu
Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Defaults: On Rott’s Counterexamples
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此篇論文旨在以萊特於1980 年所提出的預建邏輯系統,消除洛特對 AGM 理論的單調性原則提出的反例。相較於古典邏輯,雖然AGM 理論主張 知識狀態具備均衡性,並建構基本函映的預設說明信念變遷,但是許多哲學 家認為該理論有某些基本原則值得質疑,洛特即指出AGM 理論主張原有知 識狀態的某個信念弱化之後,並不會影響原知識狀態的單調性並不成立。然 而,洛特的反例之所以成立,在於可能出現相同語句卻具有不同資訊價值的 情況,不過,洛特也並未提出適當的方式說明處理非單調的信念變遷過程。 因此,我在這篇論文中要以AGM 理論結合預建邏輯的方法消除洛特提出的 反例,亦即主張在AGM 理論中加入預建邏輯的推論規則,可以適當地處理 非單調的信念變遷過程。
This paper aims to dissolve Rott’s counterexamples in terms of default logic proposed by Reiter in 1980. In his counterexample, Rott pointed out that some fundamental principles in AGM theory which meet the property of monotonicity are implausible because it seems unable to handle the processes of nonmonotonic reasoning which are common in our ordinary reasoning. In contrast to classical logic, AGM theory indeed developed a prominent way to deal with belief change, whereas many philosophers still casted doubts on the fundamental principles in AGM theory. For example, there might be some sentences in one’s belief set which are of the same form but different in information value and AGM theory does not commit it. Nevertheless, Rott failed to suggest a plausible way to fix the defect of AGM theory, so I aim to propose a suitable way to dissolve the problem of the processes of nonmontonic reasoning in virtue of the association of AGM theory with default logic.
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Caleb Liang
梁益 堉
知覺的反個體主義與視覺科學
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I discuss the nature of visual perception from an interdisciplinary perspective. The target of investigation is Tyler Burge’s theory of perceptual anti-individualism, according to which perceptual states constitutively depend on relations between perceivers and the external world. Burge argues that this theory is presupposed by vision science. My goal is to argue that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only theoretical choice. First, I consider the notion of homeostasis and suggest how it may cast doubt on the perceptual norms in Burge’s theory. Second, I argue that many phenomena studied by vision science can be explained without positing Burge’s notions of veridicality and singular representation. Third, I consider some empirical theories and argue that vision science does not uniquely favor Burge’s theory. I conclude that perceptual anti-individualism is not the only framework for understanding visual perception.
本文從跨領域的角度探討視覺的根本性質,並以Tyler Burge 的「知覺 的反個體主義」(perceptual anti-individualism)為研究對象。根據這一理論,知覺狀態的本質乃是由知覺者與外在環境的互動關係而定。Burge 提出論證 主張:視覺科學(vision science)預設了這個理論。本文反對這個觀點,並 企圖從三方面來論證:「知覺的反個體主義」不是我們理解視覺的唯一理論 選項。首先,我討論「體內恆定」(homeostasis)的概念,並指出這概念會 使我們對Burge 理論中的「知覺規範」(perceptual norms)產生質疑。第二,我以論證指出:許多視覺科學所研究的現象,可以不必預設Burge 理論中的 「正確性」(veridicality)和「單一表徵」(singular representation)也能得到解釋。第三,我討論一些有關視覺的科學理論並論證:許多視覺科學領域中 的看法其實不支持Burge 的理論。本文的結論是:「知覺的反個體主義」並 不是瞭解視覺本質唯一可選的理論架構。
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丁 福 寧
Paschal Fu-Ning Ting
Stoics on Oikeiōsis
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視為己有(oikeiōsis)概念是斯多噶學派倫理學的特色。這一概念在它 的泛神物質一元論的本體基礎建立上,宇宙是由神、人和自然世界共同組成 的一個完整的神聖實體。神聖理性掌握和管理宇宙整體。物質是唯一真實 的。人是由靈魂與身體結構起的有組織的整全個體。視為己有具有發展的歷 程。在第一階段,所有具有靈魂的動物,當依照自然生活,將自己自然狀態 中所有的視為己有,努力地保存自己。這是來自動物的本能。人在出生之始,如同動物依照本能生活,及至成年,理性方發展出來。在第二階段人的依照 自然生活當是依照理性生活。第二階段的視為己有是人當意識和認識到依自身的自然狀態的生活亦即追求至善和渡德行的生活。在第三階段,鑒於所有的人具有相同的理性,同屬於一個人類大家族,oikeiōsis 因而具有社會面 向,人要將他人的善視為己有。人對他者有責任,要愛人如己。本論文旨在論證斯多噶學派的視為己有之所以建立在泛神物質一元 論,因它反對任何形式的二元論,特別是柏拉圖的二元論;非物質世界和物 質世界之間的二元對立,及人的靈魂與身體之間的二元對立,甚至理性與非 理性之間的二元對立。斯多噶學派的視為己有概念不僅從宇宙是一整體,且 從人是有組織的整全個體探討人與自己,與他人,與自然世界的關係。這種 整全的概念正是柏拉圖否認的。
The concept of oikeiōsis is the characteristic of Stoic ethics. The ontological foundation of the oikeiōsis is based on its pantheistic material monism. Thecosmos is constituted by god (gods), humans and natural world as a complete divine substance. The whole cosmos is controlled and directed by the divinelogos. For the stoics, matter is the only true reality. Man is joined by soul and body as a structured wholistic self. The oikeiōsis is in developing processes.Living in accordance with nature and making all those belong to oneself as one’s own is the first stage of oikeiōsis at the moment of the birth of all the animals,including humans. At this stage animals attain their oikeiōsis by their instincts. At the beginning of its birth, a baby lives in agreement with its nature just as theway animals do. When it grows up, as its reason develops, living in accordance with nature turns out to be living in accordance with reason. The second stage ofoikeiōsis is then to attain summum bonum, leading a virtuous life, since man as rational being is capable of recognizing what his constitution is. Because allmen possess the same reason and belong to the same human family, oikeiōsis by nature has social dimension. At the third stage, a man should take intoaccount of his fellow’s well-being as his own oikeiōsis. A man should love the others as he loves himself.This paper tries to argue why the Stoics’ oikeiōsis concept based on its pantheistic material monism. The reason is its objection to any forms of dualism, especially the Platonic dualism; the dualistic opposition between the immaterial and material worlds, that of the psyche and body, and even that of rational and irrational. The Stoics’ oikeiōsis is not only based on its idea of the wholistic cosmos, but also found on that of the structured wholistic self; i.e. the psychophysical whole and the relations between a human being with itself, with the others, and with the natural world. This kind of wholistic ideas of the cosmos and of humans are what Plato denied.
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王文 方
Wen-Fang Wang
Concrete Objects Distinction
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大多數當代哲學家認為,這個世界裡的事物可以被互相排斥而又共同窮 舉地區分成兩個類:一類是具體的事物類,另一類則是抽象的事物類。問題 在於:這兩類事物之間的區別究竟何在?Hoffman 與Rosenkrantz(2003)曾 經論證說,常見的、對於抽象/具體事物的區分方式存在著一些明顯的問 題,而他們主張以一種新穎的、在他們看來沒有問題的方式去作出這兩類事 物之間的區別。本論文旨在以他們批評其它區分時所使用的策略與標準而去 反對他們所提出的區分,並從而論證兩個要點。首先,本文論證說,抽象/ 具體事物之所以不容易(甚至不可能)找到一個可信的區分方式,原因相當 可能在於:我們對該區分所擁有的任何直覺都是許多不等價與/或混含的區 分互相混淆的結果。其次,本文論證說,抽象/具體事物的區分本身其實不 具有任何哲學上的重要性,因而是一個可以不必深究的問題。
Most contemporary philosophers believe that things in the world can be exhaustively and exclusively divided into two categories: abstract objects and concrete ones, and a main “problem” about this division is where exactly the line between these two categories should be drawn? Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2003) argued that every ordinary distinction between these two categories was subject to some serious problems and counterexamples, and they therefore proposed a novel distinction that they believed to be completely unproblematic. This paper argues against their proposal by appealing to the same strategy and criterion that they set up for other proposals. This paper also argues for two other points. First, it argues that the fundamental reason why it is so hard (even impossible) to find “the right” distinction between abstract and concrete objects is that philosophers’ “intuition” about the distinction is nothing but the result of conflation and confusion of several non-equivalent and/or vague distinctions. Second, it argues that the problem of the distinction between abstract and concrete objects is of no philosophical significance; it is, therefore, a pseudo problem that need not be investigated at all.
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鄭喜 恆
Hsi-Heng Cheng
The Community and the Individual: A Comparative Study of Peirce's Early and James's Pragmatic Views of Truth and Reality
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裴爾士與詹姆士通常被並列為實用主義的共同創建者,但是兩人的實用 主義哲學實有相當的差異。本文從「個人探究」與「社群探究」這兩個層次 的區分入手來比較裴爾士早期與詹姆士的實用主義實在觀與真理觀、以及兩 人對於經驗探究方法的刻畫,並且指出裴爾士認為「真理」、「實在」與「經 驗探究方法」必須在社群探究層次上才能獲得恰當的闡釋,然而詹姆士堅持 從個人探究層次來闡釋這些觀念,這也可以解釋為何詹姆士的實用主義真理 觀曾經遭受到如此多的質疑與誤解。
Peirce and James have been regarded as co-founders of pragmatism, but their pragmatisms differ significantly. This paper examines and compares, onthe basis of the distinction between the levels of community and individual inquiry, Peirce’s early and James’s pragmatic views of truth, reality, and methodof inquiry; and points out that Peirce argues that these three notions could be satisfactorily explicated only on the level of community inquiry, whereas Jamesinsists on characterizing them on the level of individual inquiry─this can explain why James’s pragmatic view of truth has suffered severe objections and misunderstandings.
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