Roczniki Filozoficzne

Izydora Dąmbska presented her views on the semiotics of proper names in her two studies: O bezimienności [On Namelessness] and Filozofia imion własnych [Philosophy of Proper Names]. The author refers mainly to the second work. I. Dąmbska begins with a syntactic definition of proper name, then she attempts to define the basic semantic function of proper name, that is, the function of naming. She emphasises the essential difference between this function of proper names and the function of denotation played by descriptive names. The difference consists in the fact that a descriptive name denotes an individual object as a representative of a respective class, whereas a proper name names an individual person without any class references. A name represents an individual by way of universaliter, i.e. in its many aspects and as one despite differences in the course of his whole life. As such, the proper name represents a conscious object of knowledge and agency. It mediates in personal relations between people and is the material of legends and history, affirms the unity of its bearer, and ensures his duration beyond death and grave. Its secondary meaning is that it plays the function of naming and representing also fictionary literary figures.

This paper analyses the concept of the relation of alternativity between possible worlds, the primary concept for relational semantics. We have focused only on epistemic and doxastic logics. The paper presents two approaches to these logics: J. Hintikka’s position and R. Stalnaker’s position.

This paper addresses the question of the relationship between the object of formal logic and the object of ontology. The history of logic and philosophy shows a kinship and overlapping between the two sciences. The analyses were conducted on the basis of three approaches to formal logic, i.e. Aristotle’s logic Rus-sell’s and Whitehead’s logic, and Leśniewski’s logic. At the same time, it sought to grasp its material and formal object. Now with regard to ontology mainly Aristotelian and Leibnizean understanding of ontology was taken into account as an instance of philosophical ontology and set theory ontology as an example of ontology constructed with a view to play the role of a semantic background for the formulas of logical calculi. The considerations under study allow us to state that even if material objects in the two sciences overlap, especially in the case when the formulas of logic are interpreted by way of ontology, their formal objects seem to be different. Logic does not focus on the question of the categorisation of reality; the essences belonging to respective ontological categories are only “truthmaking” factors for the statements formulated by formal logic.

This paper depicts my conception of the philosophy of religion. I think that there nothing like religion in general. The world of what is customarily called religion is a very different and analogous reality. I make Catholic Christianity the starting point of this philosophy of religion. I treat it as the main analogy to the world of religion. The objective aim of the philosophy of religion is threefold:1) description of religion,2) justification of religion,3) epistemology of religious beliefs.In the philosophy of religion understood in this manner I use methods proper to general metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, and theory of knowledge.

Leibniz suggested that deontic modalities can be defined in terms of the alethic modalities; according to him, the permitted (licitum) is what possible for a good man to do and the obligatory (debitum) is what is necessary for a good man to do. The paper starts from specifying a connection of deontic concepts with the moral values. The connection comes down to define an isomorphism of two Boolean algebras: from deontic one onto axiological one. The work presents theories of two algebras of deontic notions: the algebra of sets and the Boolean algebra.The theory of deontic set is based on the two axioms: x∈V (an act x is an element of the set of acts subordinated to some norm or law) and x′′=x (an act x is identical with double denial of x). By means of definitions following notions are introduced: Λ (the empty set of acts), N (the set of ordered acts), Z (the set of forbidden acts), P (the set of obligatory acts), F (the set of optional acts), D (the set of permitted acts), I (the set of indifferent acts).The calculus is structured by rules of the Słupecki-Borkowski’s suppositional deduction. Forty five theorems are proven in this calculus.The second theory presented in the paper, is a Boolean algebra of deontic notions. Added to the theory of equality, it takes axioms from the theory of Boolean algebras with addition of a specific axiom for the deontic system i.e., N = N∩D. Sixty four theorems are proven in this calculus.

The authors of mediaeval treatises on the modi significandi (often entitled De modis significandi, or Summa grammatica, or Summa modorum significandi, or Grammatica speculativa) have come to be known as the Modistae who taught in the late Sixties of the 13th till the Thirties of the 14th centuries. The present study is an account of the grammatical theories of this group of mediaeval scholars (mostly the work of Thomas of Erfurt), set in the appropriate context of situation and seen in terms of the part they played in mediaeval semiotic theory, since their theory rests on the study of words and the properties of these words as signs of things. At the end of the present study the influence of the speculative grammar on present linguistic theories is announced. Some influence of the speculative grammar one could discover in many contemporary linguistic theories like those of Noam Chomsky, Ronald Langacker, Robin Lakoff and even Ray Jackendoff.

The concepts of space are great inventions of the mind to help it comprehend the world. These notes provide an overview of this saga. The article covers the development of the current scientific and philosophical concepts of space through history, emphasizing the newest developments and ideas. The various concepts will be introduced in a historical order, this provides a measure of understanding as to how the ideas on which the modern theory of space is based were developed.

In this article the most important theistic arguments formulated by virtue of the achievements of contemporary cosmology are presented and critically discussed. In general, these are the socalled aposterioric arguments, i.e. those that descend from commonly accepted scientific facts in cosmology. In view of these facts an attempt is made to show that a theistic explanation is the best one among all the possible ones.Taking into consideration the fundamental essence of cosmological data, two the most important genera of formulated arguments are pointed out. The first one refers to the Big Bang widely affirmed in cosmology. It assumes the shape of the previous argument from the beginning of the time of the Universe. The main difficulty of this argument is the fact of its groundless attribute of the Big Bang with the character of the absolute beginning of time forewent only by nothingness.The second genera of the argumentation refers to the so-called cosmic coincidences affirmed in cosmology. Depending on philosophical interpretations of these coincidences, one may speak about the argumentation from the plan, rationality, mathematicality, teleology, subtlety or contingency of the Universe. The cognitive value of these arguments on the one hand depends on the legitimacy of the interpretations of cosmic coincidences and on the other hand it depends on the possibility of demonstrating that the theistic interpretation of philosophically interpreted scientific facts is the best possible explanation. Because there is no easy way to demonstrate the validity and correctness of both ways of ratiocination, therefore the evidential strength of all these arguments evokes many questions.

The teaching of John Paul II clearly articulates the strain of human rights. The Pope initiates a dialogue with the Enlightenment tradition and develops the theological and philosophical foundations of the culture of human rights. Karola Wojtyła’s personalistic thought appears to be a very coherent and reliable key to understand the doctrine of human rights. Wojtyła stresses subjectivity and non-reducibility of the person as a concrete human „I.” It is both autonomy and transcendence that constitute dignity of the person towards other personal and impersonal beings.

The problem of causality is presented in the context of the research devoted to biogenesis. The significant works concerning the philosophy of biogenesis and scientific theories of abiogenesis have been reviewed. Special attention is paid to: (i) the role of the non-equilibrium thermodynamics and quantum mechanics in the explaining of causal relations involved the origins of life, (ii) the need of constructing of a quantum logic of life. It is suggested that the causal connection is established by an information channel between a cause and its result.

This paper is devoted to analysis of co-called paradox of confirmation formulated by C. G. Hempel in the 1930s. In particular, the author proposes a solution of this puzzle. The proposal consists in refining the concept of confirmation by adding a clause that if A confirms a hypothesis h, the former must be a logical consequence of a latter, eventually derived with the help of additional assumptions. This leads to an additional constraint requiring that confirmations act relatively to sets of reference. Finally, if h and h’ are logically equivalent, a sentence A confirms both to the same degree if and only if related sets of reference are the same.

The author discusses the question whether an alternative version of cosmological and biological evolution could have been actualized to eliminate negative phenomena specific for evolutionary processes in our universe. Specifically, one tries to answer whether the omnipotent God could have created quite different world with different logical principles and diverse laws of nature. Maybe such a world would be better than our universe regarded by Leibniz as the best of all possible universes.In trying to solve this problem, one has to remember that the process of evolution co-directs the created world to Divine ideals, values, and purposes; it does not, however, destroy by a logic of necessity or by a determinism of events, which would limit the freedom of creation. It does not eliminate pain and it does not change suffering into joy; it only shows the deepest meaning of the struggles thanks to which biological pain manifests its creative role.

In the course of the development of physics until the beginning of the twentieth century there was an evolutionary progress within its ontological frameworks. Its continuity was violated by A. Einstein’s works of 1905 and his so-called „quantum and relativistic revolution.” In its course people gave up a series of results they had achieved, and replaced them by some radical solutions that differed from common sense intuitions. In particular, in the context of the theory of relativity the concept of electromagnetic ether was rejected. Then the concept of absolute time and absolute geometry of space were removed, facts that eliminated the „flow” of time and change of the ontology of physics from the substantialist one into the eventist one. The changes turned out unnecessary, they resulted not from the very theory of relativity, but from some arbitrary solutions within the frameworks of its philosophical interpretation. On the other hand, they clash with clear ontological intuitions and make an explanation of the „flow” of time impossible. What is more, they are also not beneficial for a further progress in the development of physics, especially in the context of seeking a quantum theory of gravitation. It seems right to return to pre-relativistic concepts, starting from ether. For it is the elimination of the latter that had started the „revolution.”

Borden Parker Bowne was the founder of the School of Philosophy in Boston, taught there for more than a generation, and made a lasting impression on American philosophy. During Bowne’s career at Boston University (from 1876 until his death 1910), many of his students, who later also became professors in different areas, were inspired by his thinking and his person.His basic conviction is that it is the human person that is at the basis of Ontology and Ethics : the person that preserves its identity within change thanks to memory; the person that is active in knowing and choosing; the person that acts deliberately towards values; the person that thinks – all these at least potentially.The purpose of the article is to examine Bowne’s metaphysics, i.e. the roots of his view of Personalism. What emerges is his idea of existence in general and of human existence in particular. This is done also historically, by examining some earlier views of man and reality in general, which were the background for Bowne’s specific ideas.He begins from his idea of existence as active and self-determining, and of nature as activated by the intellect and will of God, the Most-High Person. That is why the human person has the attributes of awareness and self-awareness, freedom and the ability to act, and self-control.The connection of Bowne’s Personalism with idealism also presents the problem of how do we come to discover the notion of person, which is not from simple experience of reality, but is rather developed or postulated. For Bowne the model for the notion of person is the Person of God. If we look at reality from the perspective of God-Person (Person par excellence), there is the danger of theologizing Philosophical Anthropology, and a reality of Bowne’s metaphysics, which wasn’t very popular among many philosophers.Nonetheless Bowne’s ideas were positively received by the Church in America, and were used for many years as the model for defending the Christian world-view against the attacks of naturalism. In that context, his Personalism effectively fulfilled its role, showing the human person to be a spiritual being, ultimately coming from God, the Most-High Person.

Ludwik Borkowski has constructed a quantifier-less calculus of names (BRN1), which is regarded as a base system here. The system can be extended with the use of the deductive power of rules of introduction and omission of functors π and σ (BRN2), which serve here as the substitutes of quantifiers. If we adopt the extensionality rule for the functor of singular inclusion (REε), we obtain yet another extending of the system (BRN3) accompanied by simultaneous considerable reduction of the primary rules. The interpretation of the last system in elementary ontology is included.