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41.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Bradley N. Seeman
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Richard Brandt’s “Second Puzzle” for utilitarianism asks: What is meant to count as benefit or utility? In addressing this puzzle, Brandt dismisses “objective” theories of utility as prejudging substantive moral issues and opts for “subjective” theories of utility based either on desire-satisfaction or happiness, so as to welcome people with a variety of substantive moral commitments into his utilitarian system. However, subjective theories have difficulties finding principled grounds for elevating one desire over another. Brandt attempts to circumvent the difficulties through his “reformed definition” of rationality, a definition that hinges on his notion of cognitive psychotherapy. Cognitive psychotherapy asserts that a desire is rational only once it is vividly exposed to relevant, available information. I argue that Brandt’s notion of cognitive psychotherapy tacitly builds substantive metaphysical and ethical commitments into his reformed definition of rationality, thus rendering his theory of utility an objective theory. Answering Brandt’s “Second Puzzle” forces not only Brandt, but also utilitarians more generally, to take up substantive metaphysical and ethical commitments from the outset, commitments that substantially predetermine the outcomes generated by their utilitarian systems.
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Avery Fouts
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Based on an earlier analysis that tries to show that existence is a real predicate, I now argue that Descartes’s dream and malicious demon arguments are fallacious. An object that stands external to me (i.e., that exists) is the one thing that I cannot produce by my dreams, and, on phenomenological grounds, I am immediately experiencing an existing object right now. Therefore, in accepting that it is a logical possibility that I am dreaming, either I illicitly conflate an existing object and an object of a dream, or Descartes’s claimthat there are never any sure signs by which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep is a presupposed but unfounded premise. Similarly, Descartes’s malicious demon argument must also be rejected.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Thomas McLaughlin
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I argue that the Aristotelian definition of motion,“the act of what exists potentially insofar as it exists potentially,” and the mover causality principle,“whatever is moved is moved by another,” are compatible with Newton’s First Law of Motion, which treats inertialmotion as a state equivalent to rest and which requires no sustaining mover for such motion. Both traditions treat motion as such as requiring an initial, generating mover but not necessarily a sustaining motor. Through examining examples of motion as treated by Newtonian physics, and through arguing that potential energy is Aristotelian potentiality, I argue that the First Law is understandable according to the Aristotelian definition as an incomplete act with a twofold ordination of the same potentiality. I then propose that, through the notion of spacetime, Special and General Relativity instantiate motion as a unity of differentiated prior and posterior parts that do not coexist in reality.
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Raymond Dennehy
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45.
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Arthur Madigan
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46.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Christopher Daly
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Tom Rockmore
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48.
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David Owen
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49.
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Brian G. Henning
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Bernard G. Prusak
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51.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Daniel E. Flage
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Graham MacAleer
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Herbert Berg
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Ken Akiba
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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Peter B. Lewis
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Richard J. Regan
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57.
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Katrine Pilcher Keuneman
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58.
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Arianne Economos
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60.
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International Philosophical Quarterly:
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