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Displaying: 41-49 of 49 documents


discussion papers

41. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Tim Hayward

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A major problem that skeptical critics have identified with the project of environmental ethics as it is often conceived is that it involves the search for a criterion of moral considerability, and some claim that this search has not only been unsuccessful, but it is in principle mistaken. Birch has recently argued that this whole problem can be avoided through his proposal of universal consideration in a “root sense,” which applies to all beings, with no exceptions marked by any of the criteria proposed by others. I argue that the strengths of this proposal are its openness to new value discoveries and its focus on agents’ practices. Its flaw is its failure to account convincingly for how values are ever formulated or obligations generated. Hence, it does not represent a viable alternative to the approach he rejects. However, rather than return to that approach, I suggest that Birch’s own line of argument could be developed more consistently if, from his starting point of “deontic experience,” one were to develop an explicitly deontological ethic that focuses more decisively on moral consideration as opposed to moral considerability.

news and notes

42. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1

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discussion papers

43. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Mohammed H. I. Dore

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In this paper I argue that the criterion of valuation in neoclassical economics is flawed because it is not an invariant measure of value. It is invariant only when unrealistically restrictive conditions are imposed on the class of admissible utility functions, which in fact makes it a special case. The only sensible alternative is to turn to classical value theory based on real sacrifices or opportunity costs.
44. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Douglas J. Buege

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The stereotype of the “ecologically noble savage” is still prevalent in European-American discourses. I examine the empirical justifications offered for this stereotype, concluding that we lack sound empirical grounds for believing in “ecological nobility.” I argue that the stereotype should be abandoned because it has negative consequences for native peoples. Instead of accepting questionable stereotypes, philosophers and others should focus on the lives of particular peoples in order to understand their philosophies as well as the relationships that they maintain with their homelands.

book reviews

45. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Jim Cheney

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46. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Greta Gaard Orcid-ID

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47. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Ned Hettinger

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48. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
H. Sterling Burnett

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49. Environmental Ethics: Volume > 18 > Issue: 1
Robert Frodeman

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