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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
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Андрей Викторович Нехаев
Andrei V. Nekhaev
What Does It Mean to Be Bald and a Liar?
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In his article, Vsevolod Ladov poses an important question – might paradoxes admit of a uniform solution? As an answer, I propose looking at an approach in which it is argued that we must recognize the truth predicate as merely analogous to a vague predicate. The proponents of this approach (V. McGee, J. Tappenden, H. Field, G. Priest and D. Hyde) insist that there is a structural relation between sorites paradoxes and self-reference paradoxes and that they should have a unified solution.
In his article, Vsevolod Ladov poses an important question – might paradoxes admit of a uniform solution? As an answer, I propose looking at an approach in which it is argued that we must recognize the truth predicate as merely analogous to a vague predicate. The proponents of this approach (V. McGee, J. Tappenden, H. Field, G. Priest and D. Hyde) insist that there is a structural relation between sorites paradoxes and self-reference paradoxes and that they should have a unified solution.
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Полина Ивановна Олейник
Polina I. Oleinik
On the Role of the Existence of Paradoxes in the Program of the Philosophy of Mathematics of Neologicism
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The article discusses aspects of the philosophy of mathematics of neologiсism related to the existence of paradoxes. The problem of paradoxes is not sufficiently themed in the neologism programme. However, the use of the methodology of introducing concepts by abstraction principles is limited by the existence of abstraction principles that lead to a contradiction. The main problem of neologicism, The Bad Company Objection relates with the discussion of such principles. The author of the article shows that the search for a uniform criterion for the demarcation of acceptable and unacceptable principles of abstraction did not lead to the necessary result.
The article discusses aspects of the philosophy of mathematics of neologiсism related to the existence of paradoxes. The problem of paradoxes is not sufficiently themed in the neologism programme. However, the use of the methodology of introducing concepts by abstraction principles is limited by the existence of abstraction principles that lead to a contradiction. The main problem of neologicism, The Bad Company Objection relates with the discussion of such principles. The author of the article shows that the search for a uniform criterion for the demarcation of acceptable and unacceptable principles of abstraction did not lead to the necessary result.
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Александр Геннадьевич Андрушкевич
Alexandr G. Andrushkevich
Is the Ban on Self-Reference Really Necessary?
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The article is a critical reaction to the approach considered by V.A. Ladov in his work “On the principle of uniform solution of paradoxes”. It is assumed that the consideration of some of the eight classical logical-semantic paradoxes in the light of type theory eliminates the situation of contradiction, while maintaining the prospect of automatic references. It is also assumed that, based on this perspective, a unified idea of the essence of paradoxes and the mechanism for their solution is not sufficiently thorough.
The article is a critical reaction to the approach considered by V.A. Ladov in his work “On the principle of uniform solution of paradoxes”. It is assumed that the consideration of some of the eight classical logical-semantic paradoxes in the light of type theory eliminates the situation of contradiction, while maintaining the prospect of automatic references. It is also assumed that, based on this perspective, a unified idea of the essence of paradoxes and the mechanism for their solution is not sufficiently thorough.
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Всеволод Адольфович Ладов
Vsevolod A. Ladov
On Paradoxes: Reply to Critics
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The author presents answers to opponents to his article “On the principle of uniform solution of paradoxes” which was discussed within the framework of this discussion. The discussion was attended by both very authoritative domestic philosophers working within the framework of this problem, and young scientists. It should be noted that a significant role in the very initiation of the discussion of this topic was played by the recent translation into Russian of the monograph by the modern philosopher Graham Priest [Priest, 2020], carried out by V.V. Tselishchev. This is the first major work on the paradoxes of a famous modern philosopher that has appeared in Russian in recent years.
The author presents answers to opponents to his article “On the principle of uniform solution of paradoxes” which was discussed within the framework of this discussion. The discussion was attended by both very authoritative domestic philosophers working within the framework of this problem, and young scientists. It should be noted that a significant role in the very initiation of the discussion of this topic was played by the recent translation into Russian of the monograph by the modern philosopher Graham Priest [Priest, 2020], carried out by V.V. Tselishchev. This is the first major work on the paradoxes of a famous modern philosopher that has appeared in Russian in recent years.
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Александр Михайлович Дорожкин, Анастасия Валерьевна Голубинская
Alexander M. Dorozhkin
Ignorance as an Epistemological Problem
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The article explores the controversial concept of “epistemology of ignorance”, defined as an oxymoron. The use of this term in philosophical literature is primarily associated with research on the distribution of information in group-to-group interaction (L. Alkoff, E. Malewski, N. Jaramillo, C. Mills). Nevertheless, authors of this article suppose that such interpretation narrows the epistemological content of the problem of ignorance. One of the goals of this work is an attempt to give a conceptual load to the mentioned phrase. To do this we consider, first of all, the question of the meaning of the concept of ignorance, and then the rationale for the possibility of a harmonious combination of the concepts of “ignorance” and “epistemology”. The article reviews four theses that show the close relationship between ignorance and knowledge, which is in our opinion the primary justification of the epistemological nature of a problem. The first thesis is widely known in the history of philosophy and science and states that ignorance can be a condition of knowledge. The second thesis protects feedback: ignorance is realized through knowledge. The third and fourth theses address states that combine the properties of knowledge and ignorance: the first may have signs of the second, and the second may have signs of the first. This indicates the need to give the well-known concept of “epistemology” some additional aspects necessary for such a relationship; after all, it must be recognized that such a form as an oxymoron is not often found in epistemological studies. Based on this, a conclusion is made about what images epistemological analysis can be carried out. The authors see here two possible research tasks, namely, the analysis of the non – production of knowledge and the analysis of the production of ignorance.
The article explores the controversial concept of “epistemology of ignorance”, defined as an oxymoron. The use of this term in philosophical literature is primarily associated with research on the distribution of information in group-to-group interaction (L. Alkoff, E. Malewski, N. Jaramillo, C. Mills). Nevertheless, authors of this article suppose that such interpretation narrows the epistemological content of the problem of ignorance. One of the goals of this work is an attempt to give a conceptual load to the mentioned phrase. To do this we consider, first of all, the question of the meaning of the concept of ignorance, and then the rationale for the possibility of a harmonious combination of the concepts of “ignorance” and “epistemology”. The article reviews four theses that show the close relationship between ignorance and knowledge, which is in our opinion the primary justification of the epistemological nature of a problem. The first thesis is widely known in the history of philosophy and science and states that ignorance can be a condition of knowledge. The second thesis protects feedback: ignorance is realized through knowledge. The third and fourth theses address states that combine the properties of knowledge and ignorance: the first may have signs of the second, and the second may have signs of the first. This indicates the need to give the well-known concept of “epistemology” some additional aspects necessary for such a relationship; after all, it must be recognized that such a form as an oxymoron is not often found in epistemological studies. Based on this, a conclusion is made about what images epistemological analysis can be carried out. The authors see here two possible research tasks, namely, the analysis of the non – production of knowledge and the analysis of the production of ignorance.
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Даниил Борисович Тискин
Daniel B. Tiskin
The Medium Is the Message? Tancredi and Sharvit on the Semantics of Attitude Reports
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Among the ambiguities found in propositional attitude reports, some have to do with the possibility to interpret an expression either in the common idiom or in the idiolect of the attitude holder. Although this fact has been known for about two decades by now, apparently the first analysis where it is made central for the whole theory of interpreting attitude reports is that of [Tancredi, Sharvit, 2022]. It demonstrates impressive flexibility in generating interpretations, which results from treating the material of the subordinate clause as a linguistic object rather than a proposition, so that its interpretation within the scope of an attitude predicate may differ from its interpretation as a separate sentence not only denotationally (i.e. the denotations might be different in the attitude worlds vs. in the actual world) but also significationally – as regards the content of its subexpressions. The present paper, apart from giving a historical overview (§1) and introducing Tancredi and Sharvit’s theory briefly (§2), provides criticisms of some of its features, such as its lack of direct reference to possible worlds (§3) and the necessity of syntactic movement in order for certain interpretations to be ruled out (§4). Furthermore, we demonstrate how a theory in which the denotational and significational aspects are both manipulable but kept separate can be used to develop a doctrine of scales related to attitude reports and, correspondingly, of scalar implicatures triggered by them (§5).
Among the ambiguities found in propositional attitude reports, some have to do with the possibility to interpret an expression either in the common idiom or in the idiolect of the attitude holder. Although this fact has been known for about two decades by now, apparently the first analysis where it is made central for the whole theory of interpreting attitude reports is that of [Tancredi, Sharvit, 2022]. It demonstrates impressive flexibility in generating interpretations, which results from treating the material of the subordinate clause as a linguistic object rather than a proposition, so that its interpretation within the scope of an attitude predicate may differ from its interpretation as a separate sentence not only denotationally (i.e. the denotations might be different in the attitude worlds vs. in the actual world) but also significationally – as regards the content of its subexpressions. The present paper, apart from giving a historical overview (§1) and introducing Tancredi and Sharvit’s theory briefly (§2), provides criticisms of some of its features, such as its lack of direct reference to possible worlds (§3) and the necessity of syntactic movement in order for certain interpretations to be ruled out (§4). Furthermore, we demonstrate how a theory in which the denotational and significational aspects are both manipulable but kept separate can be used to develop a doctrine of scales related to attitude reports and, correspondingly, of scalar implicatures triggered by them (§5).
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Иван Борисович Микиртумов
Ivan B. Mikirtumov
Acquaintance with a Fictional Object
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In this article, I try to consider the most general semantic and pragmatic conditions for the meaningfulness of using in the natural language empty terms de re. To do this, I touch upon the relationship of the universe of possible worlds with the most general ideas about objects, consider the semantic and pragmatic conditions for acquaintance with a fictional object, and draw on the analysis of statements about fictional objects. I come to the following conclusions. First, for the interpretation of fictitious names used in the mode of the imaginative de re, structures of possible worlds formed by chronologically ordered sequences of worlds (stories) are convenient, among which the so-called Leibniz stories correspond to some “naive” theory of the object. It ensures the reducibility or irreducibility of stories to each other, as well as the distribution of objects among stories that are, to varying degrees, distant from the actualized world. This allows you to define different kinds of stories. Secondly, the semantics of the term in imaginative de re must operate with the agent’s psychological states, in particular, non-cognitive ones. They are designed to certify the transparency of history and the world in order to get to know a fictional object in it. Such states, however, play the role of external data. This allows us to describe the following pragmatic rules of the use of terms in the mode of imaginative de re: imaginative clarity, transparency, and retention of agency. Thirdly, singular terms and, in some situations, index expressions, depending on the context, can be used de re to designate both a referent in the actual world and a specific sign object called transparentia. This actual world object is the token of a fictional object in the alternate history world. Its communicative significance lies in the possibility of describing the discourse of the unfolding of such a story. The pragmatic obligations of the speaker are preserved here too: the object given by the transparency must be located on this side of the transparency threshold.
In this article, I try to consider the most general semantic and pragmatic conditions for the meaningfulness of using in the natural language empty terms de re. To do this, I touch upon the relationship of the universe of possible worlds with the most general ideas about objects, consider the semantic and pragmatic conditions for acquaintance with a fictional object, and draw on the analysis of statements about fictional objects. I come to the following conclusions. First, for the interpretation of fictitious names used in the mode of the imaginative de re, structures of possible worlds formed by chronologically ordered sequences of worlds (stories) are convenient, among which the so-called Leibniz stories correspond to some “naive” theory of the object. It ensures the reducibility or irreducibility of stories to each other, as well as the distribution of objects among stories that are, to varying degrees, distant from the actualized world. This allows you to define different kinds of stories. Secondly, the semantics of the term in imaginative de re must operate with the agent’s psychological states, in particular, non-cognitive ones. They are designed to certify the transparency of history and the world in order to get to know a fictional object in it. Such states, however, play the role of external data. This allows us to describe the following pragmatic rules of the use of terms in the mode of imaginative de re: imaginative clarity, transparency, and retention of agency. Thirdly, singular terms and, in some situations, index expressions, depending on the context, can be used de re to designate both a referent in the actual world and a specific sign object called transparentia. This actual world object is the token of a fictional object in the alternate history world. Its communicative significance lies in the possibility of describing the discourse of the unfolding of such a story. The pragmatic obligations of the speaker are preserved here too: the object given by the transparency must be located on this side of the transparency threshold.
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Nico Stehr
Нико Штер
Социальное Научное Знание О Знании И Информации
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Knowledge does not exist as an isolated “piece” of knowledge. Knowledge exists in an aggregated collective state. I define knowledge as a capacity for social action and as a model for reality, as the possibility to set “something in motion”, for example, to solve a task, to produce a material object such as a semiconductor chip or to be competent to prevent something from occurring, for example, the onset of an illness. In this sense, knowledge is a universal human phenomenon, or an anthropological constant. This definition of the term “knowledge” is indebted to Francis Bacon’s famous observation that knowledge is power, a somewhat misleading translation of Bacon’s Latin phrase: scientia potential est. A basic assumption should be that knowledge is not a priori practical. The transformation of knowledge as an ability to act into practical knowledge requires congenial circumstances, such as power or authority that dictates the concrete conditions for action. In this con text, it is helpful to ask about the increasingly prominent role of algorithms (intellectual technology) in relation to knowledge such as ChatGPT software as well as contentious issue of the relation/difference between knowledge and information.
Знание не существует в виде отдельных изолированных частей. Знание существует в агрегированном коллективном состоянии. Я определяю знание как способность к социальному действию и как модель реальности, как возможность привести «чтото в движение» – например, решить задачу, произвести материальный объект (такой, как полупроводниковый чип) или быть способным предотвратить что-либо (например, начало болезни). В этом смысле знание есть общечеловеческий феномен, или антропологическая константа. Этим определением термина «знание» мы обязаны знаменитому наблюдению Фрэнсиса Бэкона о том, что «знание – это сила» (немного вводящий в заблуждение перевод латинской фразы Бэкона: scientia potentia est). Основное предположение должно заключаться в том, что знание не является практическим априори. Превращение знания как способности действовать в практическое знание требует благоприятных обстоятельств, таких как власть или авторитет, которые определяют конкретные условия действия. В этом контексте полезно задаться вопросом о все более заметной роли алгоритмов (интеллектуальных технологий) в отношении таких знаний, как программное обеспечение ChatGPT, а также о спорном вопросе об отношении/различии между знанием и информацией.
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Олег Игоревич Ананьин
Oleg I. Ananyin
The Fruits of Enlightenment
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The article offers a new view on the formation of economics as a science, based on the hypothesis of a coexistence in XVII–XVIII centuries of a range of projects of scientific economic knowledge reflecting the relevant scientific programs of the scientific revolution in that era. Five such projects are analyzed: James Stuart’s project of conservative transformation of economic knowledge; the Baconian projects: William Petty’s statistical project and John Law’s engineering project; D. Hume’s socio-philosophical project; and Richard Cantillon’s theoretical project. Each project is examined both in the context of its origin and through the prism of the subsequent fate of its main idea. It is concluded that the recognition of economics in the XIX century as a science in the form of classical political economy was a victory for Cantillon’s project, which was later developed in the works of F. Quesnay and Adam Smith. This theoretical project met the scientific standards established in the second half of the XVIII century, consolidated economic knowledge of that period around the universal ontological scheme of economy as the subject of the new science, and met the ideological demands of the era. However, the rationalist trajectory of economic science also had its price. The sophistication of the theoretical apparatus was often achieved by abstracting from features of reality that were difficult to measure or model, while the forms of economic knowledge represented in alternative projects remained on the margins of attention.
The article offers a new view on the formation of economics as a science, based on the hypothesis of a coexistence in XVII–XVIII centuries of a range of projects of scientific economic knowledge reflecting the relevant scientific programs of the scientific revolution in that era. Five such projects are analyzed: James Stuart’s project of conservative transformation of economic knowledge; the Baconian projects: William Petty’s statistical project and John Law’s engineering project; D. Hume’s socio-philosophical project; and Richard Cantillon’s theoretical project. Each project is examined both in the context of its origin and through the prism of the subsequent fate of its main idea. It is concluded that the recognition of economics in the XIX century as a science in the form of classical political economy was a victory for Cantillon’s project, which was later developed in the works of F. Quesnay and Adam Smith. This theoretical project met the scientific standards established in the second half of the XVIII century, consolidated economic knowledge of that period around the universal ontological scheme of economy as the subject of the new science, and met the ideological demands of the era. However, the rationalist trajectory of economic science also had its price. The sophistication of the theoretical apparatus was often achieved by abstracting from features of reality that were difficult to measure or model, while the forms of economic knowledge represented in alternative projects remained on the margins of attention.
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Дмитрий Валерьевич Иванов
Dmitry V. Ivanov
Is Epistemological Disjunctivism the Holy Grail of Epistemology?
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The paper explores a variant of such contemporary theory of perception as disjunctivism. This theory is a version of direct realism. Its essence lies in the fact that perceptual states, usually attributed to one kind, are proposed to be considered as a disjunction of two types of experiences: veridical and illusory (hallucinatory). In the case of veridical perception, the content of the perceptual state is the state of affairs to which it is directed. Illusory perception has no such content. There are two versions of disjunctivism – metaphysical and epistemological. The article analyzes epistemological disjunctivism, primarily Pritchard's thesis that this theory allows resolving the dispute between internalists and externalists regarding the justification of knowledge. That is why Pritchard calls this approach the Holy Grail of epistemology. In order to accept epistemological disjunctivism as a theory that allows us to resolve this dispute, it is necessary to answer the objections of the skeptic and solve the problem of distinguishability of veridical and illusory perceptual experiences. The first part of the work analyzes the variant of epistemological disjunctivism proposed by McDowell, and notes that the quietist approach used by the philosopher, although it allows to overcome Cartesian skepticism, nevertheless, does not provide a constructive solution to the problem of distinguishability. In the second part of the article, the solution to this problem, proposed by Pritchard, is reconstructed, which consists in preserving the principle of epistemic closure, abandoning the strategy of relevant alternatives and replacing in justification of perceptual knowledge the principle of discrimination with the principle of favouring. Pritchard refers to his approach as Neo-Mooreanism. In the final part of the study, the refutation of skepticism proposed by Moore and Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moorean strategy are analyzed, and it is also pointed out that this criticism can be directed against Pritchard’s solution to the problem of distinguishability.
The paper explores a variant of such contemporary theory of perception as disjunctivism. This theory is a version of direct realism. Its essence lies in the fact that perceptual states, usually attributed to one kind, are proposed to be considered as a disjunction of two types of experiences: veridical and illusory (hallucinatory). In the case of veridical perception, the content of the perceptual state is the state of affairs to which it is directed. Illusory perception has no such content. There are two versions of disjunctivism – metaphysical and epistemological. The article analyzes epistemological disjunctivism, primarily Pritchard's thesis that this theory allows resolving the dispute between internalists and externalists regarding the justification of knowledge. That is why Pritchard calls this approach the Holy Grail of epistemology. In order to accept epistemological disjunctivism as a theory that allows us to resolve this dispute, it is necessary to answer the objections of the skeptic and solve the problem of distinguishability of veridical and illusory perceptual experiences. The first part of the work analyzes the variant of epistemological disjunctivism proposed by McDowell, and notes that the quietist approach used by the philosopher, although it allows to overcome Cartesian skepticism, nevertheless, does not provide a constructive solution to the problem of distinguishability. In the second part of the article, the solution to this problem, proposed by Pritchard, is reconstructed, which consists in preserving the principle of epistemic closure, abandoning the strategy of relevant alternatives and replacing in justification of perceptual knowledge the principle of discrimination with the principle of favouring. Pritchard refers to his approach as Neo-Mooreanism. In the final part of the study, the refutation of skepticism proposed by Moore and Wittgenstein’s criticism of Moorean strategy are analyzed, and it is also pointed out that this criticism can be directed against Pritchard’s solution to the problem of distinguishability.
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Петр Сергеевич Куслий
Petr S. Kusliy
The Fateful Copula
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The paper criticizes the semantic component in the conception of A.V. Smirnov presented in the monograph “The Logic of Sense as a Philosophy of Mind: An Invitation to Reflection” (Moscow, 2021) as a recent variant of an argument for linguistic relativity. The author presents arguments showing that the proposed conception is based on a false thesis about the absence of the copula in Arabic. Further conclusions made by A.V. Smirnov as well as the structure of his arguments are also critically assessed.
The paper criticizes the semantic component in the conception of A.V. Smirnov presented in the monograph “The Logic of Sense as a Philosophy of Mind: An Invitation to Reflection” (Moscow, 2021) as a recent variant of an argument for linguistic relativity. The author presents arguments showing that the proposed conception is based on a false thesis about the absence of the copula in Arabic. Further conclusions made by A.V. Smirnov as well as the structure of his arguments are also critically assessed.
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Андрей Вадимович Смирнов
Andrey V. Smirnov
Consciousness and Language: Reply to Petr S. Kusliy
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The article responds to the critical review by P. Kusliy [Kusliy, 2023] of my latest book [Smirnov, 2021]. In order to show the false and unscientific nature of my position, P. Kusliy puts forward three basic theses: I proceed from the Sapir – Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity; I assert that the Arabic literary language (ALA) lacks a copula; ALA has no native speakers in the modern world, which means that ALA is not relevant for discussing the relationship between language and thought. Those three theses of P. Kusliy are fake assersions having zero correspondence in my theoretical texts and language situation in the Arab-speaking world, therefore his statements cannot be considered as justified at least to some extent and serving to eliminate the shortcomings of my theoretical position. I argue that a single metalanguage is impossible for European languages and ALA: their analysis and description should be done in two different (meta)languages having diverse logical basis and content and therefore directly untranslatable into each other. The inadequacy of P. Kusliy’s interpretation of my position is caused by his non-reflective acceptance of the collective cognitive unconscious of the European big culture as having no alternative and, consequently, as universal.
The article responds to the critical review by P. Kusliy [Kusliy, 2023] of my latest book [Smirnov, 2021]. In order to show the false and unscientific nature of my position, P. Kusliy puts forward three basic theses: I proceed from the Sapir – Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity; I assert that the Arabic literary language (ALA) lacks a copula; ALA has no native speakers in the modern world, which means that ALA is not relevant for discussing the relationship between language and thought. Those three theses of P. Kusliy are fake assersions having zero correspondence in my theoretical texts and language situation in the Arab-speaking world, therefore his statements cannot be considered as justified at least to some extent and serving to eliminate the shortcomings of my theoretical position. I argue that a single metalanguage is impossible for European languages and ALA: their analysis and description should be done in two different (meta)languages having diverse logical basis and content and therefore directly untranslatable into each other. The inadequacy of P. Kusliy’s interpretation of my position is caused by his non-reflective acceptance of the collective cognitive unconscious of the European big culture as having no alternative and, consequently, as universal.
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Vladimir P. Filatov
Владимир Петрович Филатов
От объяснения к пониманию
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Understanding has usually been seen as a method of hermeneutics. Until recently, philosophers of science paid little attention to the topic of scientific understanding because they came to the conclusion that understanding can be nothing more than a psychological by-product of scientific activity. However, many scientists believed that understanding was an important aim of science. The article states that understanding is a universal cognitive phenomenon applicable to the knowledge of not only cultural and historical phenomena, but also natural objects and processes. Understanding does not oppose explanation; some types of the latter produce scientific understanding. In the course of criticism of the standard model of scientific explanation, the first concepts of “scientific understanding” arose – unifying and causal-mechanistic. A pragmatic approach to scientific understanding is also considered, linking it to the cognitive skills of a scientist or a group of scientists.
Понимание обычно рассматривалось как метод герменевтики. До недавнего времени философы науки обращали мало внимания теме научного понимания, поскольку пришли к выводу, что понимание может быть не более, чем психологическим побочным продуктом научной деятельности. Однако многие ученые считали, что понимание является важной целью науки. В статье утверждается, что понимание является универсальным когнитивным феноменом, применимым к познанию не только культурно-исторических явлений, но и природных объектов и процессов. Понимание не противостоит объяснению, некоторые виды последнего продуцируют научное понимание. В ходе критики стандартной модели научного объяснения возникли первые концепции «научного понимания» – унифицирующая и каузально-механистическая. Рассматривается также прагматический подход к научному пониманию, связывающий его с когнитивными навыками ученого или группы ученых.
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Tatiana D. Sokolova
Татьяна Дмитриевна Соколова
Концептуализация научного прогресса
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Overcoming disciplinary separation, organizing and conducting successful inter- and transdisciplinary research is a growing trend in contemporary scientific practices, which is viewed as a necessary condition for the progress of scientific knowledge, and therefore requires philosophical reflection. If it is the growing scientific specialization that has been considered as a constant identification of the progress of science since the 19th century, it is a disciplinary separation that has become an obstacle for the study of complex objects since the end of the XX century. As an epistemological platform for overcoming disciplinary separation, one can consider historical epistemology in its French version. The classical approach within historical epistemology, proposed by Gaston Bachelard, considers progress as an integral property of scientific knowledge, arising from the very essence of science. Scientific progress is due to the historicity of which, which means a rejection of the interpretation of scientific truths as timeless, absolute and universal. In this article, I discuss (1) disciplinary separation as a philosophical problem; (2) approaches to the conceptualization of scientific progress; and (3) French historical epistemology as a possible philosophical setting for resolving disciplinary separation.
Преодоление дисциплинарной сепарации, организация и проведение успешных меж- и трансдисциплинарных исследований – нарастающий тренд современных научных практик, который рассматривается как необходимое условие прогресса научного познания, а потому требует философского осмысления. Если именно нарастающая научная специализация с XIX в. рассматривалась как безусловное свидетельство прогресса науки, то уже с конца ХХ в. дисциплинарная сепарация становится препятствием для изучения сложных и комплексных объектов. В качестве эпистемологической платформы для преодоления дисциплинарной сепарации можно рассмотреть историческую эпистемологию в ее французской версии. Классический подход исторической эпистемологии, предложенный Гастоном Башляром, предполагает рассматривать прогресс как неотъемлемое свойство научного познания, вытекающее из самого функционирования науки. Научный прогресс обусловлен историчностью науки, т.е. отказом от трактовки научных истин как вневременных, абсолютных и универсальных. В статье я рассматриваю: (1) дисциплинарную сепарацию в качестве философской проблемы; (2) подходы к концептуализации научного прогресса; и (3) французскую историческую эпистемологию как возможную философскую платформу для преодоления дисциплинарной сепарации.
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
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Issue: 2
Ilya T. Kasavin
Илья Теодорович Касавин
Метафизика прогресса и дисциплинарная структура науки
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This text represents comments to the article by T.D. Sokolova “Conceptualization of scientific progress. A Case of Historical Epistemology”. Her article combines the concepts of differentiation and integration of scientific knowledge, on the one hand, and the concept of the progress of science interpreted by the historical epistemology of G. Bachelard, on the other, which ultimately is designed to solve the “paradox of interdisciplinarity” and the problem of disciplinary separation of scientific knowledge. The problem posed is highly significant for understanding modern science. At the same time, its formulation can be elaborated and even reformulated, and its premises clarified, since they themselves are the subject of extensive discussions. To do this, it is necessary to revise the widely known definitions of interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity in such a way as to detect the value-worldview content relevant to science as a socio-cultural system that includes the idea of progress.
Данный текст представляет собой реплику на статью Т.Д. Соколовой «Концептуализация научного прогресса. Случай исторической эпистемологии». В ее статье сопрягаются понятия дифференциации и интеграции научного знания, с одной стороны, и понятие прогресса науки в трактовке исторической эпистемологии Г. Башляра, с другой, что в итоге призвано разрешить «парадокс междисциплинарности» и проблему дисциплинарной сепарации научного знания. Поставленная проблема весьма важна для понимания современной науки. Одновременно ее постановка может быть уточнена и даже переформулирована, а ее предпосылки прояснены, поскольку сами являются предметом широких дискуссий. Для этого необходимо пересмотреть известные определения междисциплинарности и трансдисциплинарности так, чтобы обнаружить ценностно-мировоззренческое содержание, релевантное науке как социокультурной системе, включающей идею прогресса.
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
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Ivan B. Mikirtumov
Иван Борисович Микиртумов
Прогресс науки и интерфейсы мира
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In this article, I want to show that the concept “rationality”, which is important for the French school of epistemology of science, has a dual content and is not very successful. This is the main point of my polemic with Tatyana Sokolova. On the one hand, there seems to be general rationality in it, understood as a preference (in the broad sense) for benefits over costs. Benefits include true knowledge. On the other hand, there is a historical socio-cultural context in which scientific knowledge arises and in which the parameters of practice are determined, which serves as the final instance for testing knowledge. At the same time, there are many such contexts in society, which I call human interfaces. The world, for its part, offers many of its interfaces as collections of interaction tools. When some interface of a person and some interface of the world assimilate each other, knowledge arises, that is confirmed by practice. It can be considered rational. But with a change in the sociocultural context, the human interface also changes, so that a search for new assimilation takes place. It is carried out by science. I agree with Tatyana Sokolova’s characterization of the progress of science, but I suggest at least differentiating the levels of rationality. One operates in the historical sociocultural locus, the other ensures the change of such loci and the adaptation of knowledge to them. I consider the progress of science to be an evaluative characteristic; no objectively recorded phenomenon corresponds to it. The disciplinary distinction of science is derived from the concepts of “object” and “method”, which have a performative content.
В статье я хочу показать, что важное для французской школы эпистемологии науки понятие «рациональность» обладает двойственным содержанием и не очень удачно. В этом главный пункт моей полемики с Татьяной Соколовой. С одной стороны, по-видимому, в нем присутствует обычная рациональность, понимаемая как предпочтение (в широком смысле) выгод издержкам. К выгодам относится и истинное знание. С другой стороны в нем присутствует исторический социокультурный контекст, в котором возникает научное знание и в котором определяются параметры практики, которая служит конечной инстанцией для проверки знания. Одновременно в социуме существует множество таких контекстов, которые я называю интерфейсами человека. Мир, со своей стороны, предлагает множество своих интерфейсов как наборов средств взаимодействия. Когда какой-то интерфейс человека и какой-то интерфейс мира ассимилируют друг друга, возникает знание, подтверждаемое практикой. Его можно считать рациональным. Но с изменением социокультурного контекста меняется и интерфейс человека, так что происходит поиск новой ассимиляции. Осуществляет его наука. Я согласен с характеристикой прогресса науки, которую дает Татьяна Соколова, но предлагаю по меньшей мере дифференцировать уровни рациональности. Одна действует в историческом социокультурном локусе, другая обеспечивает смену таких локусов и адаптацию к ним знания. Прогресс науки я считаю оценочной характеристикой, ему не соответствует никакое объективно фиксируемое явление. Дисциплинарное разграничение науки производно от понятий «объект» и «метод», которые имеют перформативное содержание.
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
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Andrey I. Mikhailov
Andrey I. Mikhailov
Прогресс науки
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A study of the relationship of trends towards specialization and universalization of scientific knowledge is most fruitful when sociological and epistemological methods are compared. Sociological methods describe the growth of scientific knowledge quantitatively as an increase in volume, whereas epistemological methods do it qualitatively in terms of an increase in the level of generalization. The sociological explanation of the specialization of researchers is based on the limited resources of the study time, the epistemological explanation of the differentiation of disciplines is in the ontological differences of the objects of research. On the contrary, epistemological universalization – the formulation of generalizing theories is conditioned by the social need to ensure the connectivity of the network of technical practices. The history of the development of natural sciences shows a tendency towards absorption of the less developed paradigms by more developed ones. In other words, scientific knowledge increases cumulatively both in quantitative and qualitative terms.
Исследование взаимосвязи тенденций к специализации и универсализации научного знания наиболее плодотворно при сопоставлении социологических и эпистемологических методов. Социологические методы описывают рост научного знания количественно как рост объема, эпистемологически качественно как рост уровня обобщения. Социологическое объяснение специализации исследователей основано на ограниченности ресурсов времени обучения, эпистемологическое объяснение дифференциации дисциплин – в онтологических различиях объектов исследования. Напротив, эпистемологическая универсализация – формулирование обобщающих теорий – обусловлена социальной потребностью в обеспечении связности сети технических практик. История развития естественных наук демонстрирует тенденцию к поглощению более развитыми парадигмами менее развитых, иными словами, научное знание возрастает кумулятивно как в количественном, так и качественном смысле.
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
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Vladimir N. Porus
Владимир Натанович Порус
О многомерности научной рациональности и научного прогресса
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In the polemic with T.D. Sokolova’s article the issue is discussed addressing the question whether there is anything new that we can get from the methodology of interdisciplinarity and trans-disciplinarity for determination of scientific rationality and scientific progress. The solution of this question is connected with the intensions of a historical and social-cultural epistemologies. These intentions consist in a complex or “multidimensional” approach to the creation of conceptual designs that define the application of these concepts. None of the "measurements” (methodological, psychological, social, etc.) provides them with a universal definition, but a “stereometric” image “restored” from them is capable to approximate to real use of these concepts of an epistemology and philosophy of science. It is necessary to remember that progress in science in one dimension can be regression in another just as the scientific rationality in a sociological dimension can be in no correspondence with the interpretation of rationality given to it by a certain methodological conception. Philosophy of science must avoid a dogmatic universalization of the criteria of rationality as well as the extremes of of relativism in this question.
В полемике со статьей Т.Д. Соколовой обсуждается вопрос: что нового дает методология междисциплинарности и трансдисциплинарности для определения научной рациональности и научного прогресса. Решение вопроса связано с интенциями исторической и социально-культурной эпистемологии. Они состоят в комплексном или «многомерном» подходе к построению «объемных» понятийных конструкций, определяющих применение этих понятий. Ни одно из «измерений» (методологическое, психологическое, социальное и др.) не дает их универсального определения, но «восстановленный» из них «стереометрический» образ способен аппроксимировать к реальному использованию этих понятий в эпистемологии и философии науки. Следует помнить, что прогресс науки в одном «измерении» может быть регрессом в ином измерении, подобно тому, как научная рациональность в социологическом «измерении» может не соответствовать тому, что понимает под рациональностью определенная методологическая концепция. Философия науки должна избегать, с одной стороны, догматической универсализации критериев рациональности и прогресса, а с другой стороны – крайностей релятивизма в этом вопросе.
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
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Evgenii G. Tsurkan
Евгений Геннадьевич Цуркан
Научный прогресс, рациональность и междисциплинарность
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The critical remark within the framework of the panel discussion problematizes three provisions of the article proposed for discussion. The first is the dual nature of the concept of “scientific progress”, which is both descriptive and normative. The remark criticizes the descriptive understanding of scientific progress and argues for the adequacy of the description of this concept exclusively in a normative way. The second provision concerns the possibility of accepting “rationality” as a universal criterion for scientific progress. The doubt about the applicability of this criterion to the assessment of the achievements of scientific knowledge in general is asserted and substantiated, at the same time, the application of this criterion to particular sciences seems possible. The third provision is the uniqueness of the historical situation in which science found itself at the end of the XX century, when disciplinary separation becomes an obstacle to the study of complex objects. The uniqueness of this historical situation is disputed, as an alternative view it is argued that the attitude to the phenomenon of specialization of science from the moment of its appearance was ambivalent. Separately, the need to consider the extensive historical experience of creating various epistemological platforms to overcome disciplinary separation is stipulated. A proposal is made to further study and clarification of the possible advantages of French historical epistemology as a platform for the formation of new interdisciplinary areas of research over competing platforms (ANT, STS, strong programme of SSK).
Критическая реплика в рамках панельной дискуссии направлена на проблематизацию трех положений предложенной к обсуждению статьи. Первое состоит в двойственном характере понятия «научного прогресса», являющегося одновременно дескриптивным и нормативным. В реплике проводится критика дескриптивного понимания научного прогресса и аргументируется адекватность описания данного понятия исключительно в нормативном ключе. Второе положение касается возможности принятия «рациональности» в качестве универсального критерия научного прогресса. Утверждается и обосновывается сомнение в применимости данного критерия к оценке достижений научного знания вообще, вместе с тем применение данного критерия к частным наукам представляется возможным. Третье положение заключается в уникальности исторической ситуации, в которой оказалась наука в конце ХХ в., когда дис - циплинарная сепарация становится препятствием для изучения комплексных объектов. Оспаривается уникальность данной исторической ситуации, в качестве альтернативного взгляда утверждается, что отношение к феномену специализации науки уже с момента его появления носило амбивалентный характер. Отдельно оговаривается необходимость учета обширного исторического опыта создания различных эпистемологических платформ для преодоления дисциплинарной сепарации. Вносится предложение дальнейшей проработки и прояснения возможных преимуществ французской исторической эпистемологии как площадки для образования новых междисциплинарных направлений исследований перед конкурирующими площадками (АСТ, СТС и сильной программы социологии научного знания).
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Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
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Tatiana D. Sokolova
Татьяна Дмитриевна Соколова
Ответ оппонентам
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