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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Steven L. Reynolds
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A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the direct realist view of perception still find these arguments plausible, although, according to this diagnosis, they shouldn’t. To avoid this objection, I argue that the Cartesian skeptical arguments exploit, not our representationalist tendencies, but our habits for evaluating causal explanatory justifications.
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David Hunter
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A natural view is that linguistic understanding is a source of justification or evidence: that beliefs about the meaning of a text or speech act are prima facie justified when based on states of understanding. Neglect of this view is largely due to the widely held assumption that understanding a text or speech act consists in knowledge or belief. It is argued that this assumption rests, in part, on confusing occurrent states of understanding and dispositions to understand. It is then argued that occurrent states of understanding are not states of belief of knowledge since a subject may fail to believe that a text or speech act means what she understands it to mean if she doubts the reliability or truthfulness of that understanding. States of understanding, it is maintained, belong in the same epistemic category as states of perception and memory.
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Steven Rieber
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Theories of personal identity try to explain what the identity of a person necessarily consists in, but frequently leave open what kind of necessity is at issue. This paper is concerned with conceptual necessity. It proposes an analysis of the concept of personal identity in terms of a definite description. The analysis coheres with out judgments about clear cases and explains why cases of division seem indeterminate. The apparent indeterminacy results from attempting to apply a definite description to a situation in which more than one object would satisfy the description. The definite description analysis also explains the strengths of the influential no-branching theory. while avoiding the problems with that view. The no-branching theory is in effect a second-order analysis, i.e., a combination of the definite description analysis of personal identity plus a Russellian analysis of the definite description.
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Akeel Bilgrami
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Williams
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Gary Ebbs
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Derk Pereboom
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Jeff Malpas
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Akeel Bilgrami
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Tye
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Frank Jackson
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Ned Block
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Sydney Shoemaker
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael Tye
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Bernard Berofsky
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Michael E. Bratman
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Frederick Stoutland
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Richard M. Gale
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Patrick Grim
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:
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Keith Butler
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