Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy

Epicurus observed nature with the aim to achieve serenity and a blissful life. This article discusses current knowledge, regarding the human brain in comparison to Epicurus’ understanding of human nature. The human brain actually consists of three interconnected brains that arose during evolution: the ‘reptilian brain’ (instincts), the ‘mammalian brain’ (emotions) and ‘the primate brain’ (cognitive functions). The philosopher emphasized on the fact that the basic needs of humans lay in instincts, and he determined the purpose of human life on emotional grounds and considered prudence as the supreme agent of selection of physical needs and of satisfaction and preserva-tion of emotional balance through virtue and friendship.

La diferenciación entre entidades observables e inobservables y su diversa caracterización ontológica es una de las cuestiones principales relacionadas con la comprensión del papel y alcance de las teorías científicas con las que analizamos y explicamos el mundo. Una gran parte de la teorización que la filosofía de la ciencia ha llevado a cabo sobre estas cuestiones se debe a la inevitable participación de entidades demasiado pequeñas (o grandes) para ser apreciadas por los sentidos humanos en casi todas las teorías fundamentales de la mayoría de las ciencias. El objetivo de esta ponencia es señalar el papel que este tipo de entidades tiene en la teoría del conocimiento propia de la filosofía de Epicuro, expuesta en la Carta a Heródoto. Para ello, trataremos de poner en relación este tipo de entidades con la tercera de las clases de validación del conocimiento, la no-refutación (οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις), que la teoría epicúrea distingue, a la luz del esquema de los modos de conocimiento que Sexto Empírico ofrece en HP, II, 97-99.

El presente trabajo es un intento por mostrar la importancia del oráculo délfico “transmuta la moneda”, dictado a Diógenes de Sínope y que servirá de fundamento a la llamada escuela cínica. Primero, se plantean las siguientes preguntas, ¿Qué quiere decir el oráculo referido al filósofo griego Diógenes? ¿Qué implica este revaluar la moneda? Y, finalmente, siguiendo el oráculo al igual que en la antigua Grecia ¿Existe hoy la posibilidad de esta filosofía cínica? Para dar respuesta a estas interrogantes, se establecen algunos rasgos importantes del cinismo antiguo y, sobre todo, se realiza un marcado énfasis en la practicidad vital del cinismo, para concluir que hoy, resulta menester la aparición, como en la antigua época helenística, de nuevos cínicos capaces de construir una ética práctica, vitalista y pensante.

In relation with Aristotle’s quotation, this paper takes a view over imaginary of polis, civilization and citizen in Classical Athens and the anecdotes of Diogenes the Cynic gives us a contrast with this imaginary about social and political concepts. The paper assumes that Diogenes performs in public, space the negation of the social practices which defines the human being.

Η επικούρεια θεολογία υποστηρίζει ότι, όταν ο άνθρωπος απελευθερωθεί από τις ανησυχίες και τους φόβους του προς τους θεούς («ἄφοβον ὁ θεός») θα μπορέσει να οδηγηθεί στην ηδονή και στην αταραξία που είναι το υπέρτατο αγαθό. Ο Eπίκουρος, ενώ παραδέχεται την ύπαρξη των θεών, δεν τους φοβάται. Αντίθετα τους σέβεται και τους τοποθετεί στα μετακόσμια. Κατά το φιλόσοφο οι θεοί είναι «μακάριοι, αθάνατοι και ανθρωπόμορφοι». Δεν συμμετέχουν στα συμβεβηκότα του κόσμου, οι δε εικόνες τους προέρχονται από συνεχόμενες απορροές και η συνήθης γνώση τους προέρχεται από πρωταρχικές προλήψεις. Ο «αθάνατος μάκαρ θεός» είναι ένας αντικειμενικοποιημένος επικούρειος σοφός. Η διαδικασία ακολουθεί την εξής πορεία: δεν προσπαθεί ο θεός να γίνει άνθρωπος, αλλά ο άνθρωπος να γίνει θεός («ὁμοίωσις θεῷ»). Ο Επίκουρος στην ουσία εναντιώνεται προς τους υπάρχοντες θεούς, οι οποίοι με την αυθαίρετη παρέμβασή τους υποβαθμίζουν την ανθρώπινη ζωή και την οδηγούν στην αμάθεια και στην υποτέλεια, ενώ στην πραγματικότητα ο άνθρωπος είναι το ενεργό υποκείμενο που καταλύει τον προσωπικό φόβο. Έτσι o φιλόσοφος αντιτάσσει στο υπερβατικό στοιχείο του σύμπαντος και της θρησκείας τις ανθρωπολογικές σταθερές της αυτονομίας. Εν τέλει η θεολογία του Επικούρου καθίσταται οιονεί πόλος έλξης και αναζήτησης νοήματος, ενώ αποτελεί παράλληλα «αίρεσιν βίου».

Σκοπός του παρόντος άρθρου είναι να εστιάσει στις κύριες διαστάσεις της επικούρειας φιλοσοφίας, ώστε να μπορεί να διαγνώσει, εάν παρέχει κάποιο δίδαγμα για τη σύγχρονη κοινωνία ή όχι. Αφού μια τέτοια φιλοσοφία στην εποχή του αρχαίου φιλόσοφου δείχνει ότι δεν ήταν μονάχα μια επιστήμη, αλλά κι ένας τρόπος ζωής, θεωρείται άκρως αναγκαίο να διερευνηθεί ο τρόπος εκείνος ζωής ή η επιστήμη εκείνη κι αν πέρασε σε άλλες γενιές ή χώρες. Είχε ως τρόπος ζωής συνέχεια ή διαχρονικότητα ή όχι και τί μπόρεσε ή μπορεί να μας διδάξει σήμερα; Ως εκ τούτου δίδεται έμφαση στις θεματικές που απασχόλησαν την επικούρεια σκέψη, όπως στις επιθυμίες, στις αρετές και στον σοφό. Ο Έλληνας φιλόσοφος έδιδε μεγάλη σημασία στον σοφό, πράγμα που σημαίνει ότι διά του σώφρονος και του ενάρετου σοφού μπορεί να επιτευχθεί ο σκοπός της δικής του φιλοσοφίας καλύτερα. Έτσι, όταν γνωρίζουμε τα πλεονεκτήματα ή τις αρετές του σοφού, μας παρέχεται πολύτιμη γνώση και ικανότητα κατάλληλης ανταπόκρισης, εδραιώνοντας σταθερότητα σε εποχές που χαρακτηρίζονται από ρευστότητα και ανασφάλεια όπως ο αβέβαιος κόσμος του σήμερα. Η ρευστότητα αυτή διακρίνεται αρκετά έντονα στις μέρες μας μιας και βιώνουμε καθημερινά λεπτές και εύθραυστες διεθνείς ισορροπίες όπου η διδασκαλία για τις αρετές κυρίως του σοφού κρίνεται άκρως αναγκαία.

Η στωική θεωρία περί των αρετών αποτέλεσε την πιο ολοκληρωμένη και συστηματική προσπάθεια συγκρότησης ενός ερμηνευτικού προτύπου για όλες τις λειτουργίες και τις ιδιότητες που σχετίζονταν με την ψυχολογία του ανθρώπου κατά την εμπλοκή του στις καταστάσεις του κοινωνικοπολιτικού βίου. Στη στωική διανόηση η σωστή ερμηνεία των συγκεκριμένων λειτουργιών και ιδιοτήτων συνδέεται με μία εκτεταμένη προσπάθεια παιδαγωγικής παρέμβασης στα διάφορα στάδια της ψυχολογικής και της νοητικής ωρίμασης του ανθρώπου. Η παιδαγωγική αυτή προσπάθεια είχε ως κύριο στόχο αφενός τη θέσπιση κριτηρίων για τον τρόπο αξιολόγησης των καταστάσεων του βίου και της έλλογης δράσης και αφετέρου την επίτευξη της ατομικής και της κοινωνικής ευδαιμονίας. Στο παρόν άρθρο θα επιχειρήσουμε να παρουσιάσουμε τα κυριότερα σημεία της στωικής θεωρίας περί των αρετών αναφορικώς προς: α) τη φύση και τη λειτουργία των αρετών ως γνώσεων και έξεων που δύνανται σταδιακά να εξελιχθούν σε επιστήμες και διαθέσεις της ψυχής του ανθρώπου, και β) την κατηγοριοποίηση των αρετών κατά την ορθόδοξη παράδοση της αρχαίας στοάς καθώς και το ειδικό περιεχόμενο και τη λειτουργία των αρετών που υπάγονται σε διάφορες γενικές κατηγορίες.

Reflection was the only optical phenomenon known in ancient Greek science and its quantitative law was soon discovered. The phenomenon, as we understand it today, is related to some sort of motion. In the present paper, we discuss the compatibility of the explanations of the phenomenon of reflection with the Aristotelian theory of visual perception in which no movement is involved. First, we describe Aristotle’s theory of vision, then we will examine the role, if any, of reflection in the Aristotelian theory of vision, and, finally, we propose a way to explain how the phenomenon of reflection can be accommodated into the Aristotelian theory of visual perception.

A large amount of contemporary literature on Plato’s Republic deals with Glaucon’s speech as the major challenge Socrates is to face in his defense of justice, seeing in Adeimantus’ speech nothing but a restating of the matter. However, Plato is very clear in stating both that Glaucon’s argument was not enough and that he did not make the most relevant point to the matter (362d3-5). The aim of this paper is to present Adeimantus’ contribution to the problem in two general theses: first the objection to piety as a virtue, submitting it to justice; second the argument about the power of collective concealment as a device for breaking the cause/effect pattern that sustains the logic of retribution. The conclusion is that, while Glaucon presents an account that would grant justice to members of a community that obey its laws, Adeimantus considers this only an appearance of justice that would still produce collective unjust actions. By means of Glaucon’s challenge, Socrates is expected to prove that justice has a power in the soul besides its communitarian function, but by Adeimantus’ challenge, he is to demonstrate that it has a power in the soul despite the injustice that constitutes a community.

The aim of this paper is to defend that Plato’s philosophy, embodied in the hypothesis of forms that has in its scope an account of sense data and sensitivity. They do not have to be left out, as the secondary literature usually holds. In Theaetetus, Socrates analyses exhaustively the possibility of sensitivity be held as knowledge; In Phaedo, using the reminiscence argument, Plato admits that in order to have learning process and memory, it is necessary that we have two correlative and mutually necessary cognitive experiences, namely: a sensitive perception (aísthesis), which gives rise to anamneses, and the soul’s contact to the forms, which is prior to birth. This is so, because the individual can only have memory of what he knew beforehand. This paper holds therefore that there is a perception philosophy in Plato.

The idea of philosophy as a way of living is explicitly introduced by Plato, who illustrates it through the story of his teacher’s life and death. A most striking aspect of Plato’s account of philosophy as a way of living is that it also appears to involve the idea of philosophy as a preparation for, or even a pursuit of, dying: they that strive unceasingly for this release [sc. the release of soul from body] are, so we maintain, none other than those that pursue philosophy aright; indeed this and nothing else is the philosopher’s concern, the release and separation of soul from body (Phaedo 67d; trans. Hackforth, with modifications) The soul of the philosopher trains itself to die readily, by achieving, already during life, a state of purity: which is precisely what true philosophy consists in 80-81a.

In his Memoirs of Socrates at 3.11 Xenophon reports a dialogue of Socrates with Theodote, a high-ranking prostitute, which looks to be unique in the ancient Greek canon in representing a philosophical exchange of ideas between a man and woman. But what are we to make of the dialogue between them? The mere occurrence of the dialogue alone is surely not enough to make Xenophon’s Socrates out to be a feminist. In the attempt to understand the exchange between them I argue it is important to note that Theodote’s offer for Socrates to cross the line from the mind to the body makes literal and commercial sense, while Socrates’ description of his male followers as “girlfriends” does neither. Moreover, the biting irony of the dialogue’s conclusion suggests that he would not have wanted her to join his male followers, thus breaking with their established women-stay-at- home social conventions. Xenophon’s Theodote dialogue, I conclude, emphatically does not make Socrates out to be a feminist, at least not in the sense of being willing to accept female followers.

What does it mean when it is said that Aristotelian logic is an organon, an instrument? Does it mean that Aristotle’s logic is a method? I shall argue that the first meaning of organon is not that it is a method; at least that was not the intention of the ancient commentators, who began the tradition of an instrumental logic. Indeed, for them organon means what it is supposed to mean, i.e., means that lead to an end, even if we talk about logic or any other discipline; that do not imply that it should be a method, although does not rule this out also.

This paper looks at a hypothesis that for Plato politics is a field of ethical acts. The reason behind every truly political action is justice, in a way making justice a method of politics. According to Resp. 433a-c, it’s possible to interpret two meanings of justice: (a) the principle of differentiation by division of functions, and (b) something that provides δύναμις for virtues. Seeing justice as a creative energy, justice can be understood as a motivational force to counterbalance the force of desires. Republic is clear about “who has to do x?” (one who is fit for it, e.g. Resp. 370a-c, 433a) and “how to do x?” (with the ἀρετή of this τέχνη, e.g. Resp. 352e-353c). The question “why to do x” (because it is just) in all the cases concerning life in polis is the one, that could possibly link the motivational gap in politics and ethics of Plato’s Republic.

In Aristotle’s Metaphysics K 8, in the part which is the parallel discussion of being as truth done in book Epsilon (chapter 4), the author, in defining being per se, uses the phrase τὸ ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν. This is not what Aristotle states in book E, namely that being as truth, along with being per accidens, is founded on the remaining kind of being and does not manifest - any nature outside of being (οὐκ ἔξω οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος). Through the analysis and comparison of the two expositions, I will try to highlight how this difference depends on the different conception in the author of book Kappa about the object of the philosophy. In fact, while in book E the object of philosophy is being qua being and in particular being per se, and the separate substance turns out to be the object of first philosophy as the cause and the principle (that is as the explanation of being qua being) in book K, on the con-trary, the separate substance, since it is identified tout court with being qua being (cf. K 7, 1064a29 - there is a science of being qua being and qua separate, τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν καὶ χωριστόν), is itself the true object of study of philosophy.

This paper examines the metaphor of hunting as used in Plato’s dialogue, the Sophist. In it, we explore the idea that the example of the ‘angler’ given at the start of the dialogue is no throw-away example, but opens up the metaphor of hunting as an important element of understanding how to use the method of division introduced for coming to definitional knowledge. I argue that the use of the metaphor of hunting is a pedagogical tool that transforms the attentive student’s understanding of the method of division from a dry science of definition, to a manner of approaching the search for truth. Applied reflexively to the search for the definition of the sophist, it helps reveal that the search for knowledge is a non-linear, iterative process which requires passing-through, and abides no shortcuts. It leaves open the suggestion that the true image of knowledge and the philosopher may finally be found in a version of acquisitive rather than productive or seperative arts (as they are classified within the dialogue).

This paper discusses Aristotle’s description of philosophia in a way of how it should be understood? It seems like philosophy begins with wonder. In this sense, it consists of an inquiry. Hereby, inquiring about the “things” and “beings” and constantly pursuing knowledge indicates an endless process. And this process may not be sufficient for philosophical activity itself. Besides the inquiry process, philosophical activity consists of active thinking and the ability to practice active thinking in our daily lives. In this context, philosophy is not a debate of abstract concepts, or describing the concepts. For Aristotle, philosophia was a way of active living throughout our entire lives. That means that not only pursing knowledge is necessary to achieve that state, but also thinking about, and transforming that knowledge in our lives. This paper focuses on the active part of philosophy; which can be seen as an important part towards the understanding of philosophia.

Aristotle claims that sensible substance is composed of form and matter, while he insists that it is a unity in the strictest sense, that is, the same and one, rather than a heap. However, in what sense a composite thing can be a unity? He takes pains to give an answer in Metaphysics. The key solution lies in his account of matter as potentiality and form as actuality. But many scholars are bewildered by his laconic expressions of the solution, and there are mainly two approaches of interpretations. One is ‘projective’, which takes substance as a basically unified concept; matter and form are two derived aspects of the unity. Another approach is ‘explanatory’, which takes form and matter as the real components and attempts to explain how they can constitute a unitary substance in a time and across a time. The main tasks of this paper are to reexamine the problem and the two approaches and to argue that the manner that a substance is unified should be understood in the light of its coming to be; a sensible substance is a diachronic composite and a functional unity.

The aim of this paper is to elucidate the origin, development and nature of human beings as it is described in Plato’s Protagoras myth. My main claim is that, according to this story, the human is a multi-dimensional being with various aspects and dispositions. After the creation of mortals had been finished, the human dispositions were further developed and differentiated through time. The creation and further development of living beings is to be divided into four stages, out of which the pre-political and political are of particular significance for humans. I will attempt to show that each of these stages can be better accounted for by using the different hermeneutical models, or by finding out which theory underlines each of them.

Plato is often considered a founder of the humanist tradition, but I question this interpretation of Plato’s humanism via a return to the Neo-Platonic/Neo-Pythagorean interpretation of the “healthy city” (372e) of the Republic, which is more frequently (though infelicitously) referred to as the “city of pigs” (372d). Here, in the first city Socrates describes in Book II, we see a “vegetarian republic” in which humans and nonhumans live in mutual con-cord rather than as predator and prey. Neither hunting nor animal husbandry is practiced in this first regime, and while animals are used for labor-power, Socrates’ detailed description of the diet of the citizens of the huopolis makes it clear that animals are not consumed as food. Plato’s Socrates never retracts his praise of this first regime throughout the remainder of the Republic, which implies that this city and its human/animal comity retain their exemplary status in Plato’s political theory.