Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

According to James Van Cleve, the principle with which Kant is concerned in the first analogy follows from the view that existence statements are properly made only with quantifiers and have to be expressible in the form ‘∃ xFx’. This thesis is extremely surprising and of great potential importance. It rests on the conviction that two more basic principles can be derived from the relevant view about existence statements. The first of these more basic principles is that there can be no coming to exist ex nihilo or ceasing to exist in nihilo; the second is that there cannot be a series of modes not grounded in an ultimate subject. This paper outlines the relevant view about existence statements, traces the argument provided by Van Cleve in support of his thesis, and concludes that the argument rests on adubious assumption that ‘Everything exists’ either means or entails ‘Everything always exists’.

1) Gaukroger estimates that there exist two irreconcilable theses in the Cartesian method in the Rules. The first thesis concerns the problem of the cognitive grasp of inference, the other the problem of the method of discovery. Descartes, by integrating deduction as a simple object of intuition, rejects the psychologicalinterpretation of inference, and elevates deduction to the status of a necessary condition of knowledge. On the other hand, the problem of the method of discovery requires that inference produces a new truth as its conclusion. Descartes takes the algebraic solution of equations as the model of this method. But this orientation leads Descartes to deny all cognitive function operating in the inference of synthetic form. Thus, according to Gaukroger, these two theses tendto be opposed, calling into question the unity of the method. 2) We admit the cognitive analysis of Gaukroger on the Cartesian inference. However, Gaukroger does not see the importance of “the natural power of the mind” in the Rules. Indeed, the cognitive role of inference is always understood by Descartes, in light of this natural power. Thus, the main role of the method is to teach ways of increasing this power. Descartes tries to pose, by the algebraic treatment of questions, an analogy between the mathematical order and the order of the operations of the mind, enabling him to discover pure schemes of these operations. And, It is by theses schemes that the mind exercise itself in order to increase its natural power. For this reason, we must reconsider Gaukroger’s thesis that Descartesassimilates literally the method of discovery and algebraic solution, as well as his thesis of the inconsistency of the Cartesian method.

Hegel’s critique of traditional metaphysics is well-known. The first half of the Phenomenology, in particular, attempts to expose the faults underlying the metaphysics of the thing, and the subject-object dualism that arises out of it. This section in the Phenomenology aligns Hegel with Modern Philosophy, thematizing the tensions between thing-in-itself and appearance, the one and its properties, and substance and accidents. For Hegel, the thing is exposed as Spirit, albeit Spirit frozen and isolated from itself. By bringing up Locke in this context, I show how Locke’s own conclusions confirm Hegel’s. A close reading of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding shows that Hegel’s conclusions about the thing is immanent to the empiricist’s very own formulations of the problem. The theme of the presentation is both an apology for Hegel and a critique of Locke.

Nothing is as complex as the world – but soon we must master this complexity to be able to live in it. Our means to do so are the languages. However, they are so manifold and so differently in vocabulary, structure and in the way linked with the world that it is difficult to ascribe to them a common relation. Noam Chomsky’s empirical search for a deep structure grammar had no success. For Leibniz our actual world is infinitely complex, beginning with the monad and its subordinated “worlds in the worlds”. Thus exactly our problem constellation of today can already be found there–namely how to master infinite complexity by languages. But what connects these languages? This will be discussed from (1) the representational function of signs concerning the connection between res / signum / notio / idea, via (2) the Ars characteristica and its formal-linguistic sign systems; the next step counts (3) for the natural languages and their functions, marked above all by an adaptation to new problems. The last step deals with the functions of languages, finally leading to the unity of reason.

The problem of subjectivity, based on the generalizing substantification of the predicate subiective occurs first in the discussions of the postulates of Kant’s theory of knowledge. At issue is that a human being has focused on a matter, and that his subjectivity has the responsibility of isolating a determinate domain.In fact, it is up to the human subject to focus on objects and to thematize them according to his operative conditions, which is how it expresses different epistemic standpoints. Kant’s philosophy provides the most adequate answers to the question about the anthropological conditioning of philosophy. My thesis is thattranscendental subjectivity includes an epistemic approach, which does not imply any kind of subjective conceptualism as opposed to forms of realism supported and structured by categories, it implies instead that without considering the epistemic standpoint, the question of the supposed primacy of transcendental over general logic or vice versa is irresoluble.

It is no doubt that philosophy is the important way of discourse of modernity and modernity is the contemporary context of philosophy. By examining the relationship between philosophy and modernity, we will discover that philosophy enables the complete establishment of modernity, and philosophy is theimportant driving force of the gradual evolution of modernity; Contemporary philosophy is the outcome of the crisis of modernity; The important mission of the contemporary Chinese philosophy is to answer the question that how it is possible to adopt modernity in China.

We know the history of philosophy as Arabian, English, American, Greece, Indian, Chinese, Korean, German, Russian, French, Japanese… But it is surprisingly that we do not use more common concept as "national philosophy", which may be included in notions "regional" and "world" philosophy. The other words common to all mankind. As the President of Independent Republic of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov emphasized, "It is important to understand the life giving, deep sources of national culture, East philosophy which serve at vigorous stimulus of rapid progress and renovation". We suppose that the main part of philosophy is human life, man's coming to be and evolution as a subject of interaction with the world. Any philosophy is the philosophy of a man, His life. A man belongs tosome nationality, nation and mankind. The nature is definite geographic midst for a man. Each nationality, nation has its own history and specific outlines – style of life, way of life, traditions, nation interests, psychology, ideas, values, culture. It is common and typical for all nations and it imposes an imprint at all sides of realityas well as philosophy.

This paper is an introduction to micro-epistemology, philosophical reflection of "quantum wealth" as well as an anthropological analysis of the nature of human cognition in the scale of quantum. It covers the problems of the observation in and the trueness of micro-cognition, the perception of quantum phenomena, the relations between micro-cognition and practice as well as between macro-subject and micro-object, the descriptological turn in micro-cognition, the description of micro-world and some special descriptological problems in micro-cognition, etc. Micro-cognition, just as quantum theory shows, relates to a scale out ofordinary for human being. Quantum theory means a farther clarification of the background of human person’s existence and the human-world relation. It means an enormous extending of the framework of scientific theory, and thereby the rebuilding of the foundation of philosophy. It also means the refining and therationalization of our conceptual tools and, in a certain extent, the reconstruction of the foundation of epistemology.

The association of passion with desire has a long history, from Aristotle to contemporary philosophers. The Aristotelian conception of passion as involving desire has exerted a considerable influence on modern philosophers. I shall take this idea to be the thesis that emotion implies desire. In order to elaborate this thesis, in this paper, I shall focus on Hume’s theory of passion in Book 2 of Treatise. To this end, I first of all present an interpretation of Hume that relies on an account of desire as such that I have developed. Secondly, I demonstrate what kinds of authority, if any, desires have in Hume’s view of the explanation of action.

The paper investigates Kant's usage of the legal-political symbolism of war and peace in his self-interpretation of the historical role of the critical philosophy. The focus is on Kant's late essay, "Announcement of the Imminent Conclusion of a Treatise on Perpetual Peace in Philosophy" from 1796. The essay is placed in thecontemporary context of Kant's controversy with the historian and publicist, Johann Georg Schlosser, who had reduced Kant's transcendental philosophy to the mechanical operations of a "manufacturing industry for the production of mere form" and had misread Kant's moral philosophy as requiring complete cognition ofnature for arriving at the formation of the categorical imperative. Kant's reply to Schlosser places the refutation of the latter's charges into the broader context of the cultural function of philosophy as an area for intellectual warfare. On Kant's view, neither dogmatic pseudo-victories nor skeptical pseudo-truces are able to assure a lasting peace in philosophical debates. Only the critical balance between the theoretical restriction of reason to possible experience and its practical enlargement to unconditional principles of action is able to pacify the world of thought into a peace of mind armed with strong arguments.

Kant points out the pleasure of the universal communicability of the judgment of taste in the 7th passage of § 9 in the Critique of Judgment. He promises to discuss the subject in a transcendental context further after discussing the Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments. However, he seems to limit his discussion only in an empirical context, neglecting his own commitment. I differentiate the kind of pleasure (which Kant mentioned in the 7th passage) from the intrinsic pleasure of the pure judgment of taste. The latter refers the pleasure in 'the harmonious play of the cognitive powers' stimulated by 'the merely formal purposiveness of a representation of an object'. It seems to have been overlooked that the pleasure of the universal communicability is independent from the intrinsic pleasure of the pure judgment of taste. My goal is to define the another feeling of pleasure by focusing on the analysis of the § 42 where Kant discussesthe possibility of one's interest combined with a pure judgment of taste. I come to the conclusion that another feeling of pleasure is a sort of practical pleasure. It is an interested pleasure in fulfilling the notion of generalizability of one’s state of mind, which is relevant to a moral judgment. Therefore, such pleasure is not actually common to everyone, as Kant insists in § 42, but restricted to those who have already developed the moral interest.

It is untrue that, as Hegel said in 1807 in the Phänomenologie, «the wounds of the spirit heal and leave no scar behind; what is done is not indelible, but is reassumed by the spirit» (GW 9, 360) since the ground of reality, that reality which, as indicated by Kant, seems to be submerged in evil (Ak. VI), refuses to be tamed by concepts. Disappearance without remnant, that dissolution (Verschwindung) mentioned by Hegel would suppose that there is no remnant of evil, thatits effects in history-such as the Jacobin terror with its macabre liturgy of severed heads referred to in the above passage of the Phänomenologieare nothing more than moments to be sublate (aufgehoben), part of a necessary process. There is no remnant to be explained. All is revealed: Offenbarung der Tiefe. The relationship between Hegel and Schelling has in this topic, the problem of evil and its meaning in history (Geschichte), one of its key points: in Schelling one can see a hollow which constitutes a pathway to the problem of finitude and evil, studied in depth in the Freiheitsschrift of 1809, partly as a response to the critics expressed by Hegel in the Phänomenologie. While Hegel reduced evil to an abstract negation, to be overcome through a determinated negation as a sign ofthe reason in history, in Schelling evil would remain a permanent possibility that can never be dissolved (verschwinden) or overcome (aufgehoben) any way.

En contraste d’avec la pensée de Spinoza, pour qui la foi n’est qu’un phénomène extérieur et étrange, une notable exception à sa théorie du salut par le control des passions et l’amour intellectuelle à Dieu et par Dieu que l’homme de connaissance peut atteindre seulement grâce à la véritable philosophie, on analyse ici très brièvement la compréhension que de la foi nous proposent, en ayant l’expérience intérieure, surtout Descartes mais aussi Pascal. Pour le premier la foi relève de la volonté, à qui la grâce incline d’embrasser le message révélé à peu près comme la perception claire et distincte incline au jugement dans l’acte deconnaissance. Pour Pascal la foi et la connaissance sont de l’ordre, toutes deux, du coeur, qui comme on sait a des raisons que la raison ne connait pas.

In this paper we will refer to the doctrine of attractive forces proposed by the Newtonian author John Keill, and the influence it had on Kant. The “Epistola ad Cl. virum Gulielmum Cockburn, Medicinæ Doctorem. In qua Leges Attractionis aliaque Physices Principia traduntur,” published by Keill in 1708, proposes a doctrine of the attractive forces of matter that exerted a considerable influence on the first Newtonian authors and was criticized by Leibniz and his followers, including Christian Wolff. Keill’s views were assimilated by the young Kant in his pre-critical doctrine of the elements, or physical monads, to which he attributed attractive forces and—under the influence of Newton—repulsive forces acting at a distance. This meant to take some distance from wolffian orthodoxy. By examining Kant’s points of view, we will show that the work of Newton and his followers, in particular John Keill, is an important part of the background of his ideas about thefundamental forces of matter, ideas that passed to the critical period of his thought, where they reappeared in the Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft of 1786.

1.Философская мысль ХХI века постепенно преодолевает часто встречающееся смешение двух понятий. С одной стороны,ЭстетическиЭпистемическое как феномен с ведущей ролью "Эпистемического" по отношению к "Эстетическому", что характерно, прежде всего, для традиционных представлений "Западной Культуры". А с другой, ЭпистемическиЭстетическому, соответственно, наоборот, присущ стиль,стимулирующий лишь “растущую варваризацию самого эмоционального состояния, становящегося чистым бурлением предоставленного самому себе чувства”. 2. На основе данного различия проводится сравнительное переосмысливание философских идей М.Хайдеггера и Ж.Бодрийяра с позиций сегодняшнего дня. На трёх разных для каждого, но сравнимых по основным достижениям, этапах творческой деятельности указанных ведущих мыслителей на грани ХХ и ХХI веков: Раннем, Среднем и Позднем. 3. Применительно к идеям модерна, постмодерна и постмодернизма в мире ХХI века сталкиваются два подхода, правда, амбивалентных, но всё же явно противостоящих друг другу. Для М.Хайдеггера главное – это «введение опоры на «эстетическое, но всё же при сохранении эпистемческого в качестве основы». Для Ж.Бодрийяра, наоборот, главное – это «введение в качестве основы «эстетического», но всё же при сохранении некоторой опоры на «Эпистемческое. 4. Появляется возможность выявить и философски переосмыслить с позиций XXI века проблему Интенсификации Эстетизации Эпистемического, или, в более решительной форме, неуклонного Наступления «ЭстетическиЭпистемологического » на « ЭпистемологическиЭстетическое ».

The Frankfort school philosophers also denied an industrial society and its labor ethics in their struggle against Americans future so called Fourths Reich. E. Fromms mistake was in his idea that drugs and sex counter-culture is a weapon against technotronic and non-tolerant western society. In reality Frankfort school philosophy organized a cybernetic project «Man - Machine» with an aim to reorganize humanity. It was obvious to authors that computer will soon replace human brain. Firstly, some classified military projects lead to cultural paradigm shift and the emergence of postindustrial society as an epoch of new dark ages. This society suggests global psychoprogrammating and total supervising. People are to live in the new world of electronic devices and a road to this world was opened by a cybernetic project «Man-Machine». The legalization of drugs is the final point of postindustrial society victory.

The challenges, resulting from modernity’s secularized results, to philosophy mainly present as the following three aspects. First, whether philosophy also undergoes a similar secularizing process? Whether metaphysics should be abandoned, and enters into a “post-philosophy age”? In such a transformingprocess, how philosophy can find a right position for itself? Second, the challenge from the issue of monistic /pluralistic in modernity studying is the most central one. In order to answer the issue philosophically, it needs us to reconsider deeply the concepts of “one and multiple”, “universal and particular” as well as theirrelations. This indicates not only that philosophy has to do explanations, but also that philosophy has to offer grounds for explanations. Thirdly, is philosophy of language able to become a paradigm for cognition? Can it have universality when the philosophical paradigm, abstracted from reflections on language,applies to explain things? Although the results of “linguistic turn” in 20th century enrich our understanding of language, but if philosophy wants to provide new grounds for knowledge, society and culture, then it ought to go out the circle of philosophy of language, and to find its new base.

The labor philosophy is a concept formatting by reflection on practical philosophy in contemporary China and a regression from the understanding of Marx’s philosophy foundation to Marx text. That Marx’s philosophy is explained to be practical philosophy by Italian Labriola, Gramsi and Yugoslavia practice school in 20 century produced great effect on research filed of Marx’s philosophy. Practical philosophy has been rising in the study of Marx’s philosophy in China mainland since more than 20 years ago, it is the mainstream discourse in philosophical circles of modern China mainland. In the study course of contemporary China practice philosophy, it general falls into four theoretical patterns: practice epistemology, practice ontology, communicative practical theory and practice materialism and they once promote the study of Chinese Marx’s philosophy effectively. Practice is the key category of Marx’s philosophy. But practice category presents gradually the trend of totalization in the study course of practice philosophy, That the practice form being presented diachronically such as material production labor, the activities of dealing with social relations and science experiment etc. is coordinated synchronically makes the historicity of practice be masked, thus the characteristic of Marx’s philosophy is weakened and the rationality problem of practice philosophy appears slowly: the practice category being totalized has not been a origin category of Marx’s philosophy. The basic connotation of practice in Marx’s philosophy is material production labor. Just on the base of labor category, Marx exploited existence theory in existentialism; Only let labor category be logic starting point can we clarify the basic characteristic of Marx’s philosophy in existentialism dimension. The paper refers to the concept of labor philosophy in order to emphasize that the labor category is the origin of Marx’s philosophy and the breakthrough of his philosophy revolution. With the logical development of labor category, we can give a new explanation on the system, contemporariness and cosmopolitism of Marx’s philosophy in order to reach a new realm of the study of Marx’s philosophy.

1. The definition of subjective materialism: Subjective materialism is not a simple definition, it is a new system of both the conception of the world and the methodology. The definition and the comprehension of the subjective materialism can be much many, but I can definite it with a simple definition after I have grasped it’s core guiding principle: actually, the subjective materialism is a system of both the conception of the world and the methodology which create and illumination the equation material (information)=idea (information) in a materialistic way. 2. The background and condition of subjective materialism come into being: The human society has developed in a information age, but the materialist philosophy still stay in the 19th century of industrial society, which has not fully reflected the spirits of our times and is more difficult to lead the development trend of world philosophy. Materialist philosophy needs to develop. 3. The theory sources of subjective materialism: First of all, subjective materialism is the result of the development of western philosophy, including the modern western philosophy theory. Second, subjective materialism is also undoubtedly a result of development of Marxist philosophy. Third, the subjective materialism is also the result of ancient oriental philosophy. If the subjective materialism must be a definition of western philosophy, then the thinking of “Rune” must be the product of oriental philosophy. 4. Meanings of the new philosophy: Subjective materialism philosophy must be different from modern west philosophy and postmodern philosophy. And it’s essential meaning is rebuild the philosophy and put the metaphysics in our view once again. So, both the conception of the world and the methodology of “Rune” structure are the completely subversion to all the monism philosophy, and are the completely new structure system of philosophy ontology.

It could be said that after Hegel’s, Philosophy in the world begun its downturn, falling in chaos during more than one hundred years. The Science study the specific thing replaced the philosophy as the King position in human’s knowledge. But, in fact, the science was born by philosophy. From 19th century, people could study the specific object by way of science, not philosophy. Of course, the best way to study the specific thing is the science. But, to study the onto, science does not work. The onto is the target object of philosophy. The specific object is not the target study object of philosophy! The object for philosophy is the onto. But, in 19th and 20th century, people did not know this very well, viewing all the specific thing was studied very well by science, the scholars of philosophy were very upset. this is because they did not know the target object of philosophy is the onto, not the specific object. If they want to get a kind of specific object in nature to be the object of philosophy, of course, they would get defeated by the science, which was really the history. Finally, some got a field, called the phenomena, then, the phenomenology begun, but the phenomenology is not philosophy. Now, the human have got very large achievement in study of nature object. as per ontology and cognition logic, the onto is the root basis of every object, but, to get to know the specific object is the correct way for to get to know the onto. Now, with theachievement of study various object, philosophy could get new progress in study the onto. Following is the abstract explain why the phenomenology is not philosophy. From the very beginning of philosophy, people know the reality, the onto is hided in the phenomena, philosophy’s task is to find out the essence, the reality hided in the phenomena. At the time about early 20th century, there came out a kind of philosophy, called Phenomenology, ever developed ardently during last century for several decades, even now, it is still there, continue split philosophy, bring confusion to philosophy. Philosophy was produced by study the essence of object, especially the onto of everything. but in Phenomenology, there is no essence or the onto hided in the nature, it regard the phenomena as the study object, it deny the onto exists. The onto is the target object of philosophy over the past 2000 more years, but the phenomenology deny the onto, then, how could the phenomenology still regard itself as “philosophy”? Obviously, the phenomenology is not philosophy. Of course, the onto is there, longlive with the nature, the sun, the space. To get to know the onto, is the long live study for human. So, the phenomenology is wrong, at least wrong in the regard of the philosophy. Because of phenomenology’s ridiculous study object and theme, it produced various kinds of ridiculous answer and explain, by its main study such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and latter, The structuralism, post structuralism and post modernism ect.. Finally, philosophy was split, falling apart in everything, it seemed any kind thing or phenomena could produce a kind of philosophy, what more ridiculous is any kind of phenomena ever expected to explain the nature the world the space by its several points of view about itself. this make philosophy look like garbage, loss the glory it ever had. Now, it is high time to say that the phenomenology, since it deny the essence and the onto in the nature, is not philosophy. It shall not be called as philosophy. philosophy’s target object is the onto, which is the root basis of everything, the root theory in the space.