The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy

The questions suggested by the term "multiculturalism" range far and wide, embracing: questions of inclusion; questions of criteria; questions of self-identity; and questions of the meaning of multiculturalism. In this essay I provide a framework: (i) that allows us to begin a discussion that might answer such questions; (ii) that illuminates why it is that such a modest aim is the most we can hope for at this time; and (iii) that provides an understanding of what we can do in a multicultural world in order to illuminate what we should do. This framework will reject both the idea of toleration as found in Berlin’s conception of human choice and will speak of as maximal multiculturalism, an orientation that is found in John Milton’s idea of truth as variegated and that sees multiculturalism as a great good. These views are plagued by at least three paradoxes that are really inconsistencies. In their place I develop the idea of a mitigated multiculturalism based on fear rather than on any ideal or vision, and with this a distinction between positive and negative toleration. Negative toleration proves to parallel a classic Hobbesianism, which while an unwelcome result, paradoxically, provides further direction and reason for hope that mitigated multiculturalism can and must be surpassed.

This paper deals with the characteristic features of Rawls’ property-owning democracy, and whether a liberal democratic socialism can be compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism. I argue that a property-owning democracy can be compatible with Rawlsian justice while liberal socialism cannot. I understand the choice between property-owning democracy and liberal socialism as the problem of which kind of regime is more compatible with the pluralism of modern democracies. Property-owning democracy is more compatible with Rawls’ political liberalism since it permits a wider variety of the conceptions of the good than liberal socialism while at the same time permitting worker-managed firms; thus I argue that it can be understood as a "mixed" regime.

Partant du principe que l’idéal démocratique est une norme universelle, la discussion au coeur de ce travail soulève une série de questions causuistiques liées à la mise en oeuvre concrète des démocratiques dans toute société humain, quels que soient ses particularismes socio-historiques et culturels. Cette démarche découle entièrement de l’hypothèse suivant laquelle le problème fondamental de la démocratisation, autrement dit de la domiciliation de l’idéal démocratique, se ramène à celui de son ap-propriation, d l’adaption du principle universal aux structures de base d’une société donnée, produit de conditions socio-culturelles, religieuses, politiques et économiques. Dans le but de dévoiler l’enjeu primordial qui polarise les différents aspects de la question, nous tentons, en premier temps, de mettre en évidence la ‘particularité culturelle’ du modèle de la démocratie libérale. Cette tenative débouche, en fin de compte, sur une remise en question de la prétention universaliste de la démocratie occidentale. Nous discutons ensuite des difficult ensuite des difficultés practiques qu’entraînent l’exigence traditionnelle du multipartisme et la définition des droits et libertés de base dans tout processus de démocratisation. Notre objectif, en abordant ces différentes questions, est de faire ressortir, avant tout, le caractére inextricable, voire insoluble, des problèmes practiques que soulève l’appropriation socio-culturelle de l’idéal démocratique, lesquels problèmes imposent de recourir à une méthode d’analyse cauistique des processus de démocratisation et de ne plus se satisfaire de l’universalisme abstrait et dogmatique.

The thought of Montaigne and Pascal on political order holds considerable interest for current debates over theories of justice and the deconstruction of justice. This particularly holds true when the focus shifts toward the experience of the political, toward a phenomenology of the political order in which appearance is the central category. The Essais and the Pensées offer two strategies for educating readers with respect to appearance qua essence of the political order. In both, political order is demystified through a well-known critique of natural law. Order is then rehabilitated in the name of true justice. This paper attempts to define and contrast the moral and religious significance of this rehabilitation in the philosophies of Montaigne and Pascal.

Within the liberal framework, policies designed to rectify inequality generally take two forms: the formal equality option of equal treatment for everyone or the substantive equality option of "special" treatment for those whose difference continues to matter. Martha Minow argues that the framework creates a "dilemma of difference" because each option risks creating or perpetuating further disadvantages for members of oppressed groups. This paper examines the framework and the dilemma by highlighting the relational features of the language of equality and of people who make determinations of equality. Relational insights are used to reexamine feminist work on care ethics, work considered to be hostile to equality analysis and justice theory. By providing a relational critique both of care ethics and of justice theory, I attempt to bring the two closer together by highlighting various connections. Care and justice are not entirely or always in opposition, but they inevitably interact and intertwine in ways that allow new possibilities and ways of being in social relations to emerge.

National sovereignty presents a puzzle. On the one hand, this notion continues to figure importantly in our descriptions of global political change. On the other hand, factors such as the accelerating pace of international economic integration seem to have made the notion anachronistic. This paper is an attempt to resolve this puzzle. Distinguishing between internal sovereignty or supremacy and external sovereignty or independence, I investigate whether some insights from the discussion of the former can be applied to our puzzle concerning the latter. One response to the objection that the notion of internal sovereignty is inapplicable because no group in society holds unlimited political power is to distinguish between different types of internal sovereignty, such as legal and electoral sovereignty. The resolution of the puzzle lies in applying this response strategy to the objection that the notion of external sovereignty is inapplicable because no state is completely independent.

This paper aims to show how the Hegelian philosophy can contribute to the conceptual discussions between the two strains of contemporary ethical-political philosophy. I argue that the Hegelian political theory is of central import to the discussion between communitarians and libertarians, both in the communitarian criticism of the libertarian — mainly in Michael Sandel's criticism of Rawls — and in the Rawlsian project of a society founded in justice as equality. For if the communitarians' theoretical basis is the living of a community in terms of historical-social values, and the individualists' deontological rationality is the basis for the libertarians, Hegel's pointing to a synthetic resolution of the two positions provides a moral foundation for their harmonious coexistence. This does not, however, mean that there is one simple ideological solution that can unite the universal and the particular, the community and the individual, through artificial dialectics, as the critics of Hegelian thought would affirm following the Frankfurt School.

Chez Rousseau, la fonction du législateur qui crée les états se ressemble, parfois, á celle de l'écrivain politique. Les deux tâches se développent, toutefois, dans des niveaux différents. Le premier fonde les états particuliers, tandis que le deuxième élabore les principes du droit politique, condition de possibilité de la légitimité de tous les états empiriquement donnés. Ainsi, la tâche de l'érivain politique nous indique, chez Rousseau, la place destinée à la philosophie politique, qui ne peut être confondue avec un programme concret d'action, mais comme un code de principes auxquels les hommes d'action devront se tourner, afin de bien conduire les affaires de l'état. Outre cela, il faut penser aussi au precepteur qui, quand il s'agit de l'éducation publique, aura un rôle bien défini pour promouvoir une transformation radicale de l'homme, d'un tout parfait, indépendant, dans l'état de nature, en une partie du corps colectif, pour faire de l'homme un citoyen. Ce que Rousseau nous montre c'est que le législateur, aussi bien que l'écrivain politique, devront agir sur l'opinion publique, voir, sur les moeurs, sans violence, car l'art d'agir sur l'opinion publique ne tient point à la violence.

Der folgenden Beitrag stellt eine historische Rekonstruktion der Debatte um die platonische Paideia in Deutschland dar, die ihren Höhepunkt mit dem Aufkommen des Nationalsozialismus erreicht.(2) Der erste Teil ist ein Rückblick auf die Transformation des Platonbildes in der Weimarer Republik. Es folgt eine Skizze der Resonanzverhältnisse um das Thema ‘Platon’ 1933. Im schlußteil diskutiere ich einige Thesen zur hermeneutischen Leistung der Platodeutung und ihrere Wirksamkeit für den Nationalsozialismus.

I take up the "What is equality?" controversy begun by Amartya Sen in 1979 by critically considering utility (J. S. Mill), primary goods (John Rawls), property rights (John Roemer) and basic capabilities in terms of what is to be distributed according to principles and theories of social justice. I then consider the four most general principles designed to answer issues raised by the Equality of Welfare principle, Equality of Opportunity for Welfare principle, Equality of Resources principle and Equality of Opportunity for Resources principle. I consider each with respect to the more general normative principle that whatever theory of social or distributive justice we accept should be as ambition sensitive and endowment insensitive as feasible in real world circumstances. In this context I take up the problems of expensive tastes, expensive disabilities, lowered or manipulated preferences or ‘needs,’ and differential needs versus differential talents and abilities. I argue that the best solution is to adopt a modified version of Rawls’ theory which takes primary social goods as that which is to be distributed but which demands a Basic Rights principle that insures basic subsistent rights (as well as basic security rights) as the most fundamental principle of morality (and social justice), and then demands that Rawls’ Difference Principle be applied lexically to the ‘material’ goods of income, wealth, and leisure time, but done so that the social basis of self-respect is never undermined.

Les communautés humaines se sont organisées à l’origine autour de règles morales envisageant leur propre survie. Les règles morales existent parce que les êtres humains sont violents, en tant qu’êtres naturels, et raisonnables, en tant qu’êtres capables de choisir la raison. Le choix de la raison, au moment de créer un domaine d’exclusion et de reconnaissance, est ce qui constitue le monde humain comme monde sensé. La violence, concrétisée sous les plus différentes formes d’exclusion, est la négation du sens. Ainsi, l’élimination progressive de la violence est, en même temps, le secret des morales et le critère de toute action politique qui se veut morale.

This paper will examine some of the epistemological issues that emerge in the context of discussing the relationship between knowledge, control and power. These concerns raise questions about self-authenticating intuition and about who should control knowledge and how it should be disseminated. The importance of Plato as a key contributor to this debate will be discussed and it will be suggested that his writings provide a basic frame of reference for subsequent thinkers whose concerns also lie in this area. The political importance of philosophy, the centrality of education, the use of language and the function of censorship are issues in Platonic epistemology that merit some discussion. The medieval views of Averroes, Maimonides and Aquinas will be examined for their contributions to the literature on this subject in the context of the respective theological frameworks, and something will be said about the implications of their conclusions for a theocratic society. Finally, I suggest that there is a need for a contemporary reappraisal of how an adequate balance between the individual's right to know and the socio-political implications of knowledge might be achieved.

Die kritische Auseinandersetzung mit der Freudschen Psychoanalyse, die zuerst von Foucault und dann von Deleuze, Guattari, Lyotard und Baudrillard unternommen wurde, versucht den Mechanismus der ‘bürgerlichen Repressiontätigkeit,’ die die europäische Menschheit unter dem Joch der Familieninstitution hält, zu enthüllen und den Terror einer erdachten und simulativen Moral, in der Freud und seine Anhänger unwillkürlich einbezogen sind, blob zu stellen. Damit zeigt die postmoderne Lektüre von Freud, dab nur die Befreiung von diesem durch Terror-verderbten Bewubtsein im Stande wäre die wirkliche revolutionäre Kraft der psychoanalytischen Kritik der Vernunft hervorbringen und die Bedeutung ihrer zwei epochalen Erfindungen-die direkte Konfrontation zwischen den Triebproduktionen und der Repression, die die Gesellschaftsmaschine auf der Triebmaschine ausübt, und die dadurch folgende Verdrängung-zurück zu gewinnen.

This paper examines the general neutrality principle of Rawls’ liberalism and then tests that principle against accommodationist intuitions and sympathies in cases concerning the non-neutral effects of a system of compulsory education on particular social groups.

This paper argues that liberalism provides democracy with the experience of civic reformism. Without it, democracy loses any tie-argumentative or practical-to a coherent design of public policy endeavoring to provide the resources for the realization of democratic citizenship. The case for liberalism rests on an argumentative reconstruction of the function it performs before the rise of a world economic order and, more specifically, in the creation of the welfare state after the Second World War. Accordingly, liberalism defines a reformist political program: it is an emancipatory political project by virtue of its struggle for an egalitarian and universalist extension of citizenship rights. This is but a formulation of the modern idea of citizenship, conceived of as a universalizable contract of rights. At the same time, liberalism embraces a socioeconomic emancipatory project that endeavors to provide the conditions, within the institutional framework of modern societies, for the accomplishment of citizenship rights.

To overcome the gap between norms and facts, Habermas appeals to the medium of law which gives legitimacy to the political order and provides it with its binding force. Legitimate law-making itself is generated through a procedure of public opinion and will-formation that produces communicative power. Communicative power, in turn, influences the process of social institutionalization. I will argue that the revised notion of power as a positive influence that is produced in communicative space runs contrary to Habermas’ original concept of power in his theory of communicative action where power is understood as a coercive force that has to be avoided in order for the discursive situation to prevail. As such, I believe that the introduction of communicative power and its close tie to ‘legitimate law’ and political system greatly reduces our critical ability with respect to political systems as exercised in liberal-democratic states. In addition, I will argue that his revision alludes to a redrawing of the boundaries between the life-world and the system in favor of the latter, and consequently indicates a shift to the right in Habermas’ latest work.

A commonly accepted criticism of the social contract approach to justifying political authority targets the notion of hypothetical consent. Hypothetical contracts, it is argued, are not binding; therefore hypothetical consent cannot justify political authority. I argue that although hypothetical consent may not be capable of creating political obligation, it has the power to legitimate political arrangements.

The public life of political servants is characterized by other duties and obligations than private life. Conflicts can even arise between a person's public and private duties. The central point of this paper is to examine whether this difference of duties can be regarded as an effect of different forms of obligation. Can we speak of a particular form of political obligation in the same way in which Kant distinguishes between ethical and legal obligation, the former pertaining to intentions and the latter to external aspects of the action? Could political obligation be distinguished from both of them, for example by its relation towards ends? The first section develops the thesis that if there is such a thing as political necessity, it must be some kind of moral obligation. The second section focuses on the question of whether political obligation can be conceived of as different from legal and ethical obligation, the only two forms of moral obligation that Kant distinguishes. The last section is about a differentiated conception of political obligation and virtue, in democracies, for political leaders, for citizens, and for public servants.

One can learn a great deal about the relative priorities in any moral theory by understanding how these priorities are conveyed in the perpetually vexing challenge of moral education. Rousseau and Kant are two thinkers whose distinctly modern retrieval of classical virtue was animated by overlapping yet diverging grievances with classical philosophy. One common enemy of Rousseauian and Kantian virtue found in classical thought is the moral vice of envy. This essay argues that whereas Rousseau chastises the vice of envy, replacing it with the central virtue of pity, Kant redirects the vice of envy towards the more salutary virtue of magnanimity during adolescence and beneficence in the adult. The consideration of sympathy in its full moral and educational context in Kant-over and against Rousseau’s emphasis on pity as the central corrective to the vice of envy-underscores the extent of the differences between Rousseau and Kant on this issue. The common criticism of Rousseau and Kant on the problem of envy is animated by some common concerns, but their understandings of it as a problem require responses that are deceptively different in their substance.

This paper suggests a strategy for constructing a contemporary Humean theory of distributive justice which would serve to ground what I call an entrepreneurial welfare state. It is argued that blending David Hume's insights about the origins and purposes of justice with Ronald Dworkin's insurance-based reasoning supporting his equality of resources model of distributive justice will yield a state which, as a matter of justice, encourages its members to engage in entrepreneurial activities and which protects them from the worst extremes of market economies.