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Dionysios A. Anapolitanos
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Demetra Christopoulou
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Τhis paper addresses the issue of the metaphysical status of sets and their interconnections. It discusses a foundational approach of the iterative set theoretic hierarchy comparatively to a regressive approach. Then it takes under consideration some naturalistic accounts of set theory and presents certain difficulties naturalism faces. It claims that the ontological status of sets should be dealt with in non-naturalistic terms and suggests that the issue in question could rather be placed in the context of a metaphysical discussion concerning abstract objects. So it investigates the operation ‘set of …’ as governed by necessary ontological dependence. After comparing some of the platonistic views S. Cowling (2017) has discussed, it proposes one of them as an appropriate account of sets as abstract objects with a modal status.
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Sanjit Chakraborty
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This paper discusses Kant’s prospect of ‘hope’ that entangles with interrelated epistemic terms like belief, faith, knowledge, etc. The first part of the paper illustrates the boundary of knowing in the light of a Platonic analysis to highlight the distinction between empiricism and rationalism. Kant’s notion of ‘transcendent metaphysical knowledge’, a path-breaking way to look at the metaphysical thought, can fit with the regulative principle that seems favourable to the experience-centric knowledge. The second part of the paper defines ‘hope’ as an interwoven part of belief, besides ‘hope’ as a component of ‘happiness’ can persuade the future behaviours of the individuals. Revisiting Kant’s three categorizations of hopes (eschatological hope, political hope, and hope for the kingdom of ends), the paper traces out Kant’s good will as a ‘hope’ and his conception of humanity.
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D. Z. Andriopoulos
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Michael Arvanitopoulos
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Heidegger claimed that world beings, existing or extant, including artworks, become intelligible in the preservation of perceptual determinations instigated by some extraordinary art that stands apart in being world-disclosive. In the lack of adequate premising scholarship has found this claim so incoherent, that it dismissed its seriousness and has treated all art Heidegger pointed to as equal. Besides being an issue in itself, this relinquishing leaves unanswered the biggest liability in Heidegger’s philosophy, the so-called “Münchhausen circularity” between Being and Dasein in the creation of world. But there is evidence to actually validate the exorbitant claim, evidence Heidegger himself did not see emerging as a potential from within his own conjectures. A phenomenological reduction that allows the implementation of suprasegmental theory of prosody suggests that Blonde Youth, an early fifth century Greek statue is the missing art through which all art, and with it all world constituency, has become intelligible.
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Emmanuel Perakis
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Pietro Pucci
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28.
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Gerasimos Santas
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29.
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Theodore Scaltsas
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30.
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Politeia:
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Dionysios A. Anapolitanos
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David Konstan
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Christos Ath. Terezis
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In this article, which considering the history of philosophy is an example of how Christianity meets Hellenism, we drew the following conclusions, relying on Leontius of Byzantium’s treatise entitled Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos:A) Throughout the entire approach, the Christian thinker uses both the philosophical concepts –such as “hypostasis”, “nature”, “universal”, “atom”, “form”, “subject”– and the arguments derived from the theoretical field of Logic in order to explain Christian questions, mostly related with Metaphysics. He is actually quite an eclecticist and that is why we may not allege that he follows a particular philosopher or that he expresses and applies an authentic philosophical theory with internal terms of justification.B) He attempts to implicitly show how necessary is both the syllogisms and the arguments to rely on particular methodological principles. There is a tendency in his work to define in clear terms his issues, mainly as regards how Logic is distinguished from Ontology, as well as how they combine one another. His theological direction, however, does not allow him to be completely consistent with the philosophical material that he uses. Either way, the goal of his research is not strictly philosophical.C) Although he applies analytical elaboration and explanation of the philosophical concepts that he uses with great accuracy, he does not actually insist on them. This is probably because either he has already elaborated them in other works of his or because his readers were familiar with them. Nevertheless, he constitutes a clear example to understand what could be defined as Byzantine Logic, which is influenced by Aristotle, Porphyry and Proclus, although they are not mentioned in his texts.
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Christos Evangeliou
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Phillip Mitsis
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35.
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Anastasia Marinopoulou
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Politeia:
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Nickolas Pappas
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37.
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Politeia:
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Theodore Scaltsas
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Meredith C. Drees
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Plato speaks of aesthetic experience in different works and in different enough ways that we are led to wonder how or even whether these can all be fit together consistently. In the Republic, Plato maintains that aesthetic education is required for justice in a city and in a person’s soul, and that proper exposure to beautiful art can teach a person to “become fine and good.” However, in the Symposium and Phaedrus, he discusses the relationship between beauty and morality by specifically focusing on erotic experiences of beautiful people. Thus, we are led to wonder: Are there two different kinds of experiences of beauty? If so, what distinguishes them from one another? How are they related to Plato’s general theory of moral progress? These questions, surprisingly underappreciated in Plato scholarship, are the focus of this essay.Ultimately, I argue that beauty plays two roles in Plato’s general theory of moral progress: (1) The experience of beauty via art, as described in the Republic, has the capacity to influence a person’s character and, hence, it can be used in moral training, and (2) The erotic experience of a beautiful person invokes an emotional response that has the capacity to facilitate moral growth, as is described in the Symposium and Phaedrus.
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Mostafa Younesie
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Aphrodite Alexandrakis
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This investigation aims at establishing a new understanding of Plato’s notion of artistic beauty. It will be argued that Plato’s theory of beauty is in perfect agreement with his metaphysical system, and is based on the Pythagorean notion of beauty, as this is reflected in the principles of proportion and harmony. Hence it will be shown that Plato’s ideas of κάλλος and καλὸν in the later books of the Republic and the Laws reflect the voice of a “Pythagorean Plato.” According to this view, the essence of what is intrinsically beautiful in art (τέχνη) is of an abstract and rational nature. It is the result of the combination and unity of the rational elements of symmetry, rhythm, and harmony.
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