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book reviews

21. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Joseph Runzo

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22. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Thomas V. Morris

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23. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Terry J. Christlieb

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24. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
David E. White

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25. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
C. Stephen Evans

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26. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 3
Edward L. Schoen

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articles

27. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Marilyn McCord Adams

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The argument that(1) God exists, and is omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly goodand(2) Evil existsare logically incompatible, can be construed aporetically (as generating a puzzle and posing the constructive challenge of finding a solution that displays their compatibility) or atheologically (as a positive proof of the non-existence of God). I note that analytic philosophers of religion over the last thirty years or so have focused on the atheological deployment of the argument from evil, and have met its onslaughts from the posture of defense. I take Nelson Pike (in his article “Hume on Evil”) and Alvin Plantinga (in The Nature of Necessity, “Self-Profile,” and other pieces) as paradigm defenders, analyse their approaches, and try to make explicit parameters and assumptions within which these defenses have been conducted. In particular, both writers seem to attempt a reply within the parameters of a religion-neutral value theory and on the assumption that God has obligations to do one thing rather than another in creation-both of which conspire to defend God as a producer of global goods and shift attention off the more pressing question of His agent-centered goodness. I then argue that value-theory pluralism explodes the myth of shared values, and so complicates the structure of fair-minded debate about the problem of evil as to significantly limit the utility of defense. I invite Christian philosophers to approach the problem aporetically, and to exhibit the compossibility of (1) and (2) by formulating their own beliefs about how God is solving the problem of evil using the valuables within a Christian value theory to defeat evils. After sketching a strategy for doing this, I answer the objection that my recommendation conflates Christian philosophy and theology, and try to show how it affords a continuity between the so-called philosophical and existential problems of evil.
28. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
James A. Keller

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In a recent article in FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY, Alvin Plantinga advised Christian philosophers to philosophize in light of their fundamental beliefs as Christians. Believing that his discussion does not give proper weight to the necessary role of secular beliefs in modifying our Christian beliefs, in this article I propose that Christian beliefs and secular beliefs should be related more dialectically than Plantinga suggests--i.e., that neither should always be given precedence. I defend this proposal with several examples on a variety of topics from the history of Christian thought and suggest how much weight to give to beliefs of each type.
29. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Alvin Plantinga

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30. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
James A. Keller

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31. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
John H. Whittaker

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Kierkegaard occasionally mentions a type of belief which he calls an “existence communication,” and his discussion of such beliefs parallels his discussion of subjective truths (in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript). Existence communications include religious beliefs. I suggest that it is less misleading to focus on this term than it is to wrestle with the difficult and overworked notion of subjective truths; ultimately, his view of religious beliefs can be seen more clearly.His view does not fully emerge, however, without the assistance of some other concepts. My thesis is that existence communications are comparable in their resistance to objective forms of adjudication to first principles, and comparable in their “self-involving” characteristics to teleological principles about the “raison d’etre of existence.This account not only helps to clarify Kierkegaard’s discussion, but it also offers two important hints about modern problems regarding religious belief. It suggest that religious claims may indeed be truth claims, and it suggests that there is more to the justification than comes out in a consideration of evidence.
32. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Richard L. Purtill

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In this paper I will show that the omnitemporality of truth does indeed imply fatalism if the past is unchangeable. I then argue that it is very likely indeed that the past is unchangeable and thus, since it is very likely that fatalism is false, it is very likely that the doctrine of the omnitemporality of truth is false. I argue that the rejection of the omnitemporality of truth has no undesirable consequences for either logic or theology, that in fact the logical and theological consequences of the rejection of the omnitemporality of truth are beneficial to both disciplines.
33. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Georges Dicker

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In William L. Rowe’s “The Ontological Argument,” an essay that appears in the most recent editions of Feinberg’s Reason and Responsibility and as a chapter in Rowe’s Philosophy of Religion, Rowe reconstructs Anselm’s Proslogium II argument for the existence of God, surveys critically several standard objections to it, and presents an original critique. Although Rowe’s reconstruction is perspicuous and his criticisms of the standard objections are judicious, his own critique, I argue, leaves Anselm’s argument unscathed. I conclude with some programmatic remarks about what a more adequate critique of Anselm’s argument should do.
34. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
William L. Rowe

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35. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Georges Dicker

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book reviews

36. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Huston Smith

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37. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
William J. Wainwright

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38. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Edward Wierenga

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articles

39. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Thomas B. Talbott

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In my paper, I defend a view that many would regard as self-evidently false: the view that God’s freedom, his power to act, is in no way limited by his essential properties. I divide the paper into five sections. In section i, I call attention to a special class of non-contingent propositions and try to identify an important feature of these propositions; in section ii, I provide some initial reasons. based in part upon the unique features of these special propositions, for thinking that God does have the power to perform actions which his essential properties entail he will never perform; in section iii, I call into question the assumption that a person has the power to do something only if it is logically possible that he will exercise that power; and, finally, in sections iv and v, I try to specify a sense in which divine freedom and the kind of human freedom required by the Free will Defense are in fact the same kind of freedom.
40. Faith and Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
C. Stephen Evans

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This paper compares the views and arguments of Alvin Plantinga and Søren Kierkegaard on the question of belief in God. Kierkegaard’s view of belief in God (which must be sharply distinguished from faith in the Absolute Paradox) is shown to be surprisinglysimilar to Plantinga’s claim that belief in God can be properly basic. Two of Plantinga’s arguments for taking belief in God as properly basic are shown to have analogues in Kierkegaard.Plantinga claims that though properly basic beliefs are not based on evidence they are nevertheless grounded. In the latter part of the paper I show how the Kierkegaardian notion of inwardness or subjectivity must be an essential element in any plausible account of the ground of such belief in God.