Chiasmi International

In this paper, I will investigate the potential of what I term Merleau-Ponty’s ‘situated phenomenology’ for an investigation of normality from within and from without. First, I will argue that the concept of situation in the Phenomenology of Perception demarcates Merleau-Ponty’s turn from a mere epistemological to a concrete critical phenomenology. Second, I will apply Merleau-Ponty’s concept of situation as being situated and as being in situation to an investigation of normality. In doing so, I endeavor to differentiate between lived and represented normality, a difference which in turn corresponds to an operative (immanent) and established (external) normativity. A situated account of normality thereby combines a phenomenological and a genealogical perspective. My aim is to provide a toolkit to investigate the intertwinement of represented and lived normality, that is, of being situated and being in situation.

This article opens with a discussion of incarceration in the time of Covid 19. The story of one of the inmates in the high-security prison of Puente Grande (Mexico) leads us back to the beginning of the fifteen-year-long imprisonment of an innocent and, with it, to a complex narrative. The story concerns the use of the juridical concepts of delincuencia organizada (organized crime), racketeering, and kidnapping. As a charge it has been repeatedly implemented in what has come to be called la fabricaciόn de culpables (the “manufacture of the guilty”) in Mexico, Columbia, Argentina, and Brazil. Although the legal terminology changes, false incarceration is hardly limited to Central and South America. This is therefore a cautionary tale about how charges – and people – are framed, and how the latter are tried on social and corporate media, even before their official trials begin.

In this paper, I outline some key epistemic premises for a critical phenomenology of gestational experience, working through the analysis of pregnant embodiment in Merleau-Ponty’s Psychologie et pédagogie de l’enfant. The first part of my paper introduces Merleau-Ponty’s anti-essentialist position; in the second part, I focus on pregnant embodiment, and I highlight Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the gestating subject as a self in the world and of the gestational body as lived body. In the third and final part, I suggest how critical phenomenology might account philosophically for the situated experience of the gestating self by considering the intersection of pregnancy and disability as a case study. These findings may suggest a path for fruitful further analysis of pregnant lived experience, taking into account the axes of oppression and marginalisation which shape one’s subjectivity.

We examine here the evolution of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of history from Humanism and Terror to the 1955 course on “Institution in Personal and Public History” in order to explain what makes it “ambiguous.” This evolution is explained by the desire to understand history according to intersubjective praxis and the dialectical scheme of historical institution. The articulation of these two levels allows Merleau-Ponty to develop a philosophy of historical productivity, that is, a conception of history as a practical process that is open, unfinished, and continually “instituting” by virtue of the always revived and entangled taking up of human actions. Therefore, the more general challenge is to define the specificity of a thought of history that unfolds from the permanent and central concern for the achievement of human coexistence.

Always rich in heterogeneous suggestions, Merleau-Pontian reflection does not fail to address the status of oneiric experience, which is as complex as it is neglected or even trivialized in phenomenological studies. Although it is sometimes taken into consideration, notably in Sartrean analyses, this is only to reconduct it to the activity of the imagining consciousness. This contribution thus proposes to bring out the innovative character of Merleau-Ponty’ dream framework. After outlining the Sartrean considerations, Merleau-Ponty’s positions are briefly presented. Ultimately at stake is showing to what extent the advancement of a sincerely new conception of the dream, together with the rejection of the Sartrean positions, can only take place through reading the work of Ludwig Binswanger. Binswanger’s analyses of oneiric space allow an original approach to dreaming as an authentic experience that reveals a primary spatiality and a more originary mode of existence, thereby testifying to a form of passivity inherent in consciousness. Dreaming thus becomes fundamental for understanding our being-in-the-world in general and, consequently, also for understanding wakefulness.

In this text we try to develop some considerations starting from the readings that Jacques Garelli elaborates through a profound reflection on the theses expounded by Merleau-Ponty in his latest works. In particular we, after recalling some points of contact between the two thinkers, comment on two long essays by Jacques Garelli dedicated to Rimbaud and Artaud. Through these re-readings we aim to highlight the novel characteristics that the author of Rythmes et mondes has managed to outline through an ever-greater study of the theses on language presented by Merleau-Ponty in his latest works.

This article retraces the main instances at the root of Merleau-Ponty’s project of a « transcendental geology », a project announced in a working note of 1960. This project is linked to the complex intertwining of history and nature, which Merleau-Ponty thematizes as the two non-objectifiable dimensions that pose a challenge to reflexive thought. History and nature, both in their particular subjective manifestations as personal life or one’s own body, as well as in their broader sense as the history of peoples or nature as a domain of the unbuilt, are characterized as unavoidable, as quasi-objects that are the soil of existence. It is in this direction that Merleau-Ponty’s interest in the “ultra-things” of Henri Wallon, those entities that the child can neither conceive nor imagine, seems to be heading. I propose that ultra-things are linked to inhabiting: they are the uninhabitable (the past before my birth, a distant planet) and the dimensions that cannot be renounced (one’s own body, the Earth, the story of my life). This relationship with inhabiting restores the relational aspect of the problem of the unreflective in Merleau-Ponty and highlights the timeliness and urgency of the program of a transcendental geology as an ecology of thought and as an ecological philosophy.

This paper is one in a series of attempts on my part to think through one of the central challenges left to us by Merleau-Ponty’s sudden death in 1961: if we understand the turn, in his later writings, toward an ontology of the flesh as “a radical rethinking of the experience of belonging from within, [as] a phenomenology of being-of-the-world” (Landes 2020, 141), how are we to bear witness to such an experience? What modalities are called forth to do justice to this belonging? The task accrues existential and ethical weight when, at stake in our analyses, are historical and social structures like coloniality that normalize experience, perception, and sense-making while marginalizing others. It is my contention, in this article, that when the phenomenological inquiry becomes critical the question of modality becomes ethically central; how we bear witness to experiences of marginalization and the operations of power that produce them matters in that it risks reifying the same normative structures that predicate the oppression of many. With these questions and considerations in mind, in this article, I return to silence and propose that the mobilization of what I call “deep silences” can be a powerful tool for a critical phenomenology that bears witness without capitulating to the imperative of transparency norming the modern/colonial world system. Deep silence, in fact, designates signifying practices that do not primarily operate within the bounds of logocentrism and speech as the foundational principles of meaning, or that rely upon conceptual, analytical, and instrumental thinking, mobilizing instead the somatic, affective, and sensual dimensions of existence. In this article, I am primary concerned with the sense-making effected by the aesthetic as an instance of deep silence. Specifically, I focus on the image- and ritual-centered photographic documentaries of Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, which, I suggest, challenge the hegemonic normativity of modern/colonial aesthetics, introducing the reader to other sensibilities wherein the distinction between theory and practice has no purchase and the multiplicity of creative expressions is recognized.

The emergence of ecology as a fundamental horizon not only of politics, but also of contemporary philosophy, pushes us to rethink the relationship that currents of thought such as Kuturkritik and phenomenology, especially the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, can maintain with it. After a preliminary consideration of post-structuralist and postmodern positions from this perspective, the essay focuses on the French philosopher, and in particular on his courses on Nature and on his elaboration of the Husserlian concept of Stiftung. This results in Merleau-Ponty’s original position on the Kultur – Civilization alternative: critique of unlimited productivism, respect for the environment, and, at the same time, defense of the variety of cultures and traditions from a homogenizing globalization are valuable tools that his philosophy offers to the debates of our time.

Using Octavia Butler’s Kindred as both ground and frame, this paper develops a notion of mangrove time as a way to think through how blackness is lived in the violent temporality of anti-blackness. Specifically, I want to suggest that, through the frame of mangrove time, an errant relationship between lived blackness and its black past inserts temporal possibility in and beyond the inertia of white supremacy’s violently anti-black temporality. In other words, contrary to Fanon’s proclamation that only black abjection is to be found in a return to the past of lived blackness, I show that, out of a mangroved conception of temporality, linkages to a black past becomes more than the ontological weight at the core of Fanon’s notion of a historico-racial schema. In foregrounding his own linkage to the past, Fanon’s historico-racial schema determines the past as fixed under the weight of an anti-black time. However, mangrove time recalls what is perhaps hastily forgotten under this schema, which is that, even as lived blackness arrives on the scene of an anti-black imaginary “too late”, it is still able to ‘time travel’ – to zigzag between present and past in a way that rescues lived blackness from the structural determination of its past. As mangroved, this temporality is still one of pain, amputation and fragmentation. But it is also one that opens up this temporality to “imaginative variability”.

This article examines Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ontological investigation of language in his recently published course notes Sur le problème de la parole of 1954. In the course notes, Merleau-Ponty approaches the relation between being and language: if our ontological thinking is thoroughly conditioned by the means of expression provided by our proper language, how are we then to understand its claims of universality? The article argues that the course notes elucidate the linguistic turn in Merleau-Ponty’s later ontology. In particular, this article stresses that the course notes show that Merleau-Ponty undertakes an ontological inquiry into language before his investment into Heidegger’s philosophy. Furthermore, the course notes elucidate the continuity between Merleau-Ponty’s earlier investigations into expression and the ontological inquiry into language in his later texts.

Much work has been done, recently, on the harms and benefits of shaming. One may argue, for example, that feeling shamed inherently alienates and forecloses, and thus quite harmful to a compulsorily social and futurally oriented creature. This does not, however, preclude the argument that shame is ethically useful, providing, at a very basic, felt level, the absolute prohibitions such a social, futural, creature requires. This paper does not claim to finally evaluate shame itself. Instead I look to Merleau-Ponty, seeking the fleshly and felt structures of the social world – of our innate proximity and intimacy, as well as our isolation and alienation – within the embodied phenomenon of being ashamed. From the contours of this spontaneous, yet admittedly dangerous, corporeo-social phenomenon, there is comes an intimation of an ethics of the flesh: one which compels us to at least attempt to heed the often opaque, even mysterious powers of our bodies, not only for the good of our intimate others, but for the good of entire peoples.

According to Merleau-Ponty, psychologism, sociologism, and historicism, all of which describe human consciousness as “conditioned”, would be incompatible with any claim to knowledge. However, the reason why knowledge would require a postulate of the autonomy of consciousness remains little explored in the specialized literature. Therefore, in our work we try to separate different aspects of the skeptical problem analyzed by Merleau-Ponty and show that the conditioning of thought is associated, successively, with the possible opaque character of the foundations of our own grasp of the position; the possible ephemeral character of the objects of knowledge; and, finally, of the possible relativity of knowledge to our historical period. In other words, we see that Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, far from being monolithic, calls for three different solutions concerning the “crisis” of knowledge and that, in turn, the very problem that these are trying to solve is described by the phenomenologist in three different ways. We will also see that Merleau-Ponty’s own position during this period can be described as an internalist and universalist position.