The American Journal of Semiotics

When ancient Chinese philosophy culminated in the sixth to third centuries BCE, “hundreds of flowers [intellectual schools] were blooming”, yet not many theoreticians were particularly interested in questions regarding the relationship between animal and human life — despite their profuse discussion of, and heated debates about, both “nature” and “human nature” in their writings. This indifferent attitude towards creatures lower than humans is best illustrated by Confucius (551–479 BCE), who observed: “It is impossible to associate with birds and beasts, as if they were the same as us.” Later, however, this condescending attitude of the Sage would be challenged by the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi (370 to 301 BCE), who untiringly advocates the equity of all creatures in the universe — a place where both living and fabulous organisms cohabit and co-evolve with one another, as well as with their environments. Morever, even Confucius’s descendent Mencius (c.372–289 BCE) did not endorse his mentor’s position, for the latter’s own writings are likewise inhabited by all kinds of creatures which not only serve the passive role of poetic figuration, but actually also construct their respective Umwelten, paralleled by the umwelt-construction of human beings. Recent advances in biosemiotics and ecosemiotics have enabled us to reread some of these philosophical texts, and to shed new light on this obscure aspect of Chinese thinking. This paper will draw upon the sign reflections of C. S. Peirce (1839–1914) and Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), and make use of a composite analytical method of text semiotics and dialogue studies, to examine a number of political and ethical allegories by Zhuangzi and Mencius. Acknowledging the necessarycircularity of interpretation and the homogeneity of observer and observed, the essay explores the ways in which ancient philosophical texts can be made compatible with contemporary biological and semiotic thinking.

Drawing on biosemiotic theory and the Peircean idea of ‘abduction’, I shall propose the idea of a layered structure of bio / semiotic evolution, in which humanknowledge is systemic and recursive — and thus emergent both from what is forgotten and from earlier evolutionary strata. I will argue that abductions are those processes by which we move creatively between often unacknowledged types of knowledge which are rooted in our natural and cultural evolutionary past (e.g., unconscious, preconscious, or tacit knowledge; knowledge that is experienced affectively) and the more familiar types of knowledge associated with self-conscious deductive and inductive reasoning. I shall suggest that these processes of ‘hooking back’ into the past in order to make new sense in the light of subsequent experience, are characteristic of all human inventiveness in both the arts and the sciences, and are facilitated by what Peirce called ‘The Play of Musement’.My reasons for attempting this task are that I hope to offer a semiotic and biosemiotic corrective to the widespread and culturally dominant idea that the progress ofhuman knowledge and cultural evolution depends on self rational efficiency, conceived of in terms of self-conscious deduction and induction alone — a conception which runs the risk of excluding from the account what is actually the most creative part of human knowing. Second, I will suggest that a properly semiotically informed understanding of human creativity — i.e., one which understands the Peircean semiotic as triadic and which draws on the post-Peircean theory that the semiotic drive in nature and in culture derives from the need to model the world as accurately as possible — should provide a very stern warning against the dangers of confusing the map with the territory. For creative artists and scientists (and life-livers, in general) progress, I shall suggest, inasmuch as they ignore the utilitarian dogma in practice. A biosemiotic understanding of human reasoning as an evolutionary semiotic process should thus contribute to a removal of the impediments of modernity which lie in the failure to properly grasp both what language (and semiosis in general) is, as well as the historical and prehistorical evolution that makes such semiosis possible.