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121. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Patrick Bondy

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122. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
T.J. Buttgereit

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123. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Robert B. Tierney

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124. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Eric Reitan

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In Hell and Divine Goodness, James Spiegel defends the surprising position that of the two dominant non-universalist Christian views on the fate of the damned—the traditionalist view that the damned suffer eternal conscious torment (ECT), and the annihilationist view that the damned are put out of existence—the annihilationist view actually posits the more severe fate from the standpoint of a punishment. I argue here that his case for this position rests on two questionable assumptions, and that even granting these assumptions there are intuitive reasons, reasons Spiegel has not addressed, for supposing that ECT is more severe.
125. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Thomas N. Metcalf

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Critics of the Fine-Tuning Argument for Theism have recently argued that even if the universe is fine-tuned for life, certain features of the universe are still surprising given theism, because God should be indifferent between those features and their contraries. In the first section of this paper, I summarize this sort of Indifference Objection to the Fine-Tuning Argument. In the second section, I explain why contrary to initial appearances, these objections fail. In the third section, I present the Argument from Compatibility, which attempts to turn the tables by arguing that the paradigmatic features are more surprising given atheism than they are given theism.
126. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Emerson R. Bodde

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127. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andrew Burnside

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This paper is a critique of Adorno’s ideas concerning jazz from his own perspective. I approach the topic from a dialectical standpoint, accounting for the historical development of jazz in the African-American context while trying to understand why Adorno found nothing of the genre redeemable; he scorned jazz as an unoriginal product of the culture industry. Drawing on the work of Eric Hobsbawm and Fumi Okiji on jazz, history, and Adorno, I try to demonstrate the internal contradiction of Adorno’s dislike of jazz and appraisal of Beethoven. Although Adorno’s critical tools of the culture industry, deconcentration, and his usage of Lukács’s idea of reification are indispensable, Adorno should have consistently applied the subtle distinction between two intrinsically tied but nevertheless separate entities: (1) an artwork and (2) the mode of production in which it is developed.
128. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andrew Russo

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129. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Andréa Daventry

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130. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 38 > Issue: 1
Audrey L. Anton

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Aristotle maintains that vicious people are blameworthy despite their moral ignorance, since becoming vicious was up to them (eph’ hemin) and whatever is up to us we are able to do or not do. However, one’s upbringing shapes one’s moral character. Together, these claims invite an objection I call the horrible childhood challenge. According to this objection, vicious adults who suffered horrible childhoods through which they were taught to adopt bad ends as though they were good should not be held accountable for their vice. Aristotle’s likely answer to this challenge reveals that, for Aristotle, a minimal degree of rationality is necessary for moral responsibility. I argue that, for Aristotle, a vicious agent is responsible for her vice only if 1) she is rational, which implies 2) she grasps a specific basic principle, thus consenting to become a certain kind of person through action. The thoroughly bad who satisfy both claims are moral idiots; those who do not may be blameless brutes.

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131. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Matti Eklund

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132. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Kenneth G. Lucey

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133. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Abigail Pfister Aguilar

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134. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Deborah K. Heikes

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135. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
J. Harrison Lee

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136. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
E.M. Dadlez

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137. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Holly Longair

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138. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
G. M. Trujillo, Jr.

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139. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Caitlin Maples

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140. Southwest Philosophy Review: Volume > 37 > Issue: 2
Justin Bell

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