Philosophy Today

Regress threatens throughout Lyotard’s Differend, especially where the argument appears to make normative ethical or political claims. How a term, a case or an example “links onto” a phrase serves as a way of examining how instituting can be non-regressively grounded, and with what consequences for abstract political subjectivity. The essay offers an alternative to liberal philosophical (Arendt, Nussbaum) and jurisprudential (Marbury v. Madison) schemata of political institution.

On the one hand, freedom is said to be the property of a subject. On the other, freedom only happens in the space of being-in-common. Freedom, then, is the place of a conflict between the “self” and the “with,” between independence or autonomy and dependence or sharing. Resolving this apparent antinomy requires showing how the with ontologically constitutes the self. This, in turn, allows for a rethinking of freedom beyond what liberal democracy and political economy have to offer, as the renewed opening of existence onto nothing, or onto an “outside” that the opening itself constitutes.

What does the word “value” mean? On the one hand, absolute value is an excellence that is beyond measure. On the other hand, value can also be interpreted as price, as what can be measured and exchanged. In both cases, value lies in relation and is of the same order as sense. But what is the relation between these two senses of value? And why is it so difficult to hold the two apart?

Nihilism, as the absence of sense and goal, is the most familiar climate of the world in which we live. While this absence is often denounced, such denunciations remain subject to the logic they seemingly oppose. More than exhibiting the collapse of truth, however, nihilism revives our confrontation with “nothing.” The task is henceforth not to denounce nihilism but to think it. Such thinking is guided by Nietzsche’s highest thought: How does nihilism harbor its own excess?

How should African philosophy be done in African Language? In response to this question, I engage Ngugi and Wiredu in their response to this language question in African philosophy. My aim is to appraise and extend their arguments by answering the question of “how” doing African philosophy in African language can be practically achieved. In this regard, I make a case for the creation of an indigenous cultural language that serves as a means of articulating, communicating and disseminating African philosophical ideas. I suggest the need for African scholars to develop a language culture under the auspices of African Language Network (A.L.N.) that will enable them to do philosophy and present it in an African language. I show that African philosophy done in a foreign or colonial language is like dressing Africa in a borrowed rope, and that as long as African scholars continue to overlook this, the lofty goal of restoring the lost glory of Africa, the gains and further progress in African philosophy, rather than being consolidated, may become greatly hampered. Recognizing the diversity of languages in African culture, I present Afrolingualism as the key to achieving this end. Afrolingualism is a conscientious effort by African scholars to contrive a unanimously accepted indigenous language of discourse in philosophy.

This paper highlights the shortcomings of Georges Bataille’s writings in terms of his failure to address white supremacy and blackness by critically engaging and expanding his cosmological metaphor through the figure of the black hole. The sun is a timeless figure in the history of western thought as an epistemological and ontological metaphor. Bataille offers alternative cosmological interpretations whereby luxurious excess and waste aim to transfigure the traditions of metaphysics, ethics, and political economy. This paper confronts Bataille’s cosmologies and heliotropes through an afropessimistic lens whereby blackness proves to be an ontological positionality that is not simply marginal to whiteness, but antagonistic, thus allowing for an expanded critical cosmology that incorporates the figure of the black hole.

Having elsewhere connected Walter Otto’s interpretation of Dionysus as a politically progressive deity to Huey P. Newton’s vision for the Black Panthers, I here expand this inquiry to a line of Otto-inspired scholarship. First, Alain Daniélou identifies Dionysus and Shiva as the dancing god of a democratic/decolonizing cult oppressed by tyrannical patriarchies. Arthur Evans sharpens this critique of sexism and heteronormativity, concluding that, as Dionysus’s chorus is to Greek tragedy, so Socrates’s circle is to Western philosophy. I thus call for the creation of a hybrid Dionysian-Socratic revolutionary philosophical chorus, modeled on Dionysus Lyseus (from -lysis), wielding philosophical analysis to loosen injustice’s bonds, as a vanguard of social justice. I find a handbook for this chorus’s creation in Euripides’s Bacchae, whose Dionysus is an ally of immigrant women, overthrower of Theban patriarchy, and international revolutionary. Finally, I offer a contemporary example of such a chorus that is based in my hometown in Alabama, namely, the Birmingham Philosophy Guild.

Philosophers struggle to identify a conception of race in Descartes’s philosophy. Yet, Descartes was not wholly silent on matters of foreign ethnicity and identity. This paper compares Descartes’s various statements on savages and barbarians, which have never been methodically analyzed. A tensive view emerges across several texts wherein Descartes asserts that all persons are rational while simultaneously presuming the epistemic inferiority of the foreign other construed as “savage” or “barbarous.” Further examination indicates that prejudice against this foreign other is endemic to both Descartes’s epistemology and his conception of the mind-body union.

Focusing on the works of Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and particularly Werner Hamacher, this essay seeks to develop an understanding of “survival” as the medial condition of linguistic structures. In the course of the past century and beyond, the term “survival” has repeatedly been deployed in discussions around the ontological status of linguistic entities. Most prominently, Benjamin finds in “survival” the essence of what he calls “translatability.” He decidedly puts the term in quotations marks to signal its linguistic nature, which prompts Hamacher to speak of “survival in citation.” This article thus attempts to demonstrate that the term “survival” is not reducible to its biological or phenomenal implications, and reintroduces it as the fundamental concept of a renewed understanding of philology. In three sections, the essay discusses linguistic technification, translation, and irony as three modes that bring the survival of language to the fore.

This article discusses Reiner Schürmann’s notions of ontological anarché and anarchic praxis in his readings of Heidegger and Eckhart, while bringing his philosophy of anarchy into dialogue with Zen-inspired Japanese thought. I thereby hope to shed light on his thought of anarchy in terms of what I call “an-ontology.” The inspiration for this project is the fact that Schürmann himself had practiced Zen as a young adult in France and had engaged in comparative analyses of Zen and Eckhart in his earlier works. I take what Schürmann meant by the principle of anarchy as a form of praxis that precedes the theoretical bifurcation between being and non-being. A similar sort of “anarchic praxis” is recognizable in Zen and we can find comparable (an)ontological implications of such praxis in the Zen-inspired writings of the Japanese medieval thinker Dōgen and of the contemporary philosopher Nishida Kitarō.

John Cooper and Pierre Hadot suggest that contemporary philosophy can no longer be regarded as a way of life as it has become an academic discipline of study that is theoretical and abstract. According to them, for philosophy to be considered a way of life, it has to be able to shape one’s understanding of the world, guide how one should respond from moment to moment, and reach an existential level in defining one’s being. In this article, I discuss how Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist philosophy is a way of life that has been overlooked by Cooper and Hadot. I show that Sartre’s existentialism presents an interconnected perspective of human existence and human development in history, is able to guide our philosophical reasoning about our everyday decisions, and offers a practical guide to living an authentic life through assuming responsibility for our life choices and engaging with our situations.

In his seminars on the death penalty, Derrida argues that Kant’s defense of that punishment is the most rigorous and systematically philosophical. For that same reason, he says, the arguments are especially vulnerable to deconstruction. I argue, in detail, that Derrida’s deconstruction fails if Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal is respected, which Derrida’s arguments do not specifically challenge. I close with some considerations for philosophical opponents of the death penalty. Derrida seeks a condemnation of capital punishment that is, in its way, a priori, disassembling its justification at the conceptual level. I suggest that contingent and empirical condemnations of capital punishment may be sufficient.

In this article, the French philosopher Jérôme de Gramont evaluates the modes in which twentieth century philosophy and literature—from Heidegger and Derrida to Blanchot and Beckett—aim to think our being-in-the-world beyond the concept of “man” and without the genus of the human.