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1. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
In-Rae Cho

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In the contemporary intellectual scene, one prominent question is this, what made science and its success possible? One tempting strategy for dealing with this question as a philosopher of science is to use science (or more broadly, empirical inquiry) and its methods to investigate the nature of science and its success. This strategy is what used to be called naturalism. For a philosopher of science, it amounts to naturalizing her philosophical inquiry for understanding the nature of science and its success. The project of naturalizing philosophy of science has not been without its own problems. Some of the concerns are as follows. Willphilosophy of science maintain its traditional normative character after going through the process of naturalization? If it does, what form(s) will its normative content take? Can that normative content be secured without appealing to methods other than those usually used in empirical inquiries? In this essay, I will call these issues collectively the problem of normativity. First of all, I’ll look into the two most representative attempts to naturalize philosophy of science, namely L. Laudan’s and R. Giere’s attempts, focusing on the views that could be taken as their answers to the questions constituting the problem of normativity. Then I’ll examine these views in the light of some prominent criticisms and potential problems, and argue that some of those views could be defended by developing one or other additional conceptual arsenals but still others need to be curbed down admitting the apparent weaknesses of their supporting arguments. This reevaluative process will give us a better idea about what have been achieved by the attempts to naturalize philosophy of science and what their limitations are.
2. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Mustafa M. Dagli

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Justice is an important concept in philosophy since ancient times and a key phenomenon in human life (in societies). First a judge at a court, two sides, their witnesses, Lawyer-A and Lawyer-B are considered in this quasi-essay inquiry. Then pointed out that, which lawyer better develops his/her arguments, his/her side will be advantageous. Reality conceals on the one side, truth (and rightness) stands on the other. However this will be risky in social life; it may be understood by an ordinary man (or someone who doesn’t have a proper philosophical insight) as “who - obeying the rules- better diverts reality and shows that (s)he is right, his/her side wins.” Not only knowledge, but also philosophy itself loses prestige in such a tableau. Stemming from ‘Gettier-pictures,’ a “murderingevent” is presented thereafter. By help of pseudo-philosophers Prof. Truth, Prof. Reality and E.G. (“eyeglasser”) some perspectives related to “knowledge” and “knowing” are discussed while trying to analyze the mentioned event. At the end, (reflecting in the place of me) E.G. states some features (which are important for him) concerning knowledge. In this paper, ‘subject-dependency’ and internalizability (or better, interiorizability) of knowledge will be traced somehow; in addition to a search towards ‘relevant’, ‘valuable’, ‘illicit’, and ‘proper’ kinds.
3. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Angel M. Faerna, Aurelia Di Berardino

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We begin by taking “naturalism” in the sense in which P. F. Strawson (“Scepticism, Naturalism and Transcendental Arguments”, 1985) presented Wittgenstein’s anti-sceptical arguments as “naturalistic”. According to Strawson, this naturalism connects the philosophy of Wittgenstein with that of Hume. Then, we proceed to compare Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s positions and establish a tenet common to them, which we qualify as “meta‐philosophical”: philosophy rests on a bedrock that resists our demands of justification, a contingent “so we are, so we act” that is beyond philosophical analysis. But this negative thesis leads to differentcommitments in each philosopher: a commitment with the autonomy of nature in the case of Hume, and a commitment with the autonomy of grammar in the case of Wittgenstein. Next, we analyze the epistemological implications of each commitment, particularly with reference to the status of natural science. We find a deep divergence between Hume and Wittgenstein on this point, so that the former, but not the latter, could still be labelled as “naturalist” in a positive, more substantial sense. Our central point here is the difficulty to give a naturalistic interpretation of such Wittgensteinian notions as “language game” or “form of life”. Finally, we stress that the distance between Hume and Wittgenstein is most clearly evidenced when we consider the normative (moral) implications of Hume’s concept of nature, which are completely absent from Wittgenstein’s approach, this being a feature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that remained unchanged all along his work.
4. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Gert Goeminne

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Sustainable development can be regarded as an attempt to bridge the gap between environmental concerns about the increasingly evident ecological consequences of human activities and socio-political concerns about human development issues. The idea that science is not responding adequately to the challenges of our times, and particularly, those posed by the quest for sustainable development is gaining increasing acceptance with scientists and policy-makers. Concurrently, a new kind of science is being called for. ‘Post-normal science’ and ‘Sustainability science’ are, besides others, terms used to indicate a transition towards a new method for dealing with complex and value-laden sustainability issues. In this paper we want to assess both the need and possibility for such a new kind of science. My analysis will take a transcendental perspective by interpreting Kuhn’s paradigm as a necessary condition of possibility for scientific knowledge.
5. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Nikita Golovko

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The development of string theory shows an unusual situation within the development of knowledge theory. Science achieves progress in understanding nature without direct empirical confirmation. Definitely, “an altered conception of scientific progress emerges” (R. Dawid). In our opinion, the only possibility to understand the new situation is to adopt some kind of naturalized epistemology. Naturalization viewed as declining of the a-prioriticity of philosophical knowledge, first, and reintroducing of psychology, second (P. Kitcher), gives many naturalized approaches in the realism debate field. Is it possible to extend realism heritage into the ironic science like string theory? Yes, but of course we should be bothered by the semantics issue in such a case. As Michael Devitt noted, the main question is not even the question about the connection between realism and truth, but the question about the role of semantics in general. We think that Devitt’s interpretation of the semantics role allows to extend realism even into the ironic science.
6. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Abdurrazzaq Heamifar

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The division of the soul and its perceptions are of the most important problems that attracted Ibn Sina`s interest. Ibn Sina held that there are three kinds of the soul: vegeterian, animal, and rational soul, among which only the rational one is immaterial. The main reason of its immateriality is its perception of the inteligibles. Other perceptions are somehow immaterial, that is, perception at the stage of the sense is not abstracted from the mater and its appendixes and at the stage of imagination is abstracted from the mater and not from its appendixes and at the stage of intelligence it is abstracted from both mater and itsappendixes. And so this kind of perception is completely abstracted. Among philosophers who have discussed the problem of mind body distinction, there have been few philosophers who have presented certain proofs for the abstraction of the soul. But this issue was treated in Islamic philosophy. Moslim philosophers have extended the proofs of Plato's Phaedo and the best proof theirs proofs was the simplicity of perception that has been mentioned in Ibn Sina`s works.
7. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Xiang Huang

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Epistemology of testimony’s map has been charted by identifying the basic controversy between reductionism and non-reductions. John McDowell’s article “Knowledge by Hearsay” (1993/1998) has been taken as a clear example of non-reductionism. This is, however, only partially right. It is correct that, as a non-reductionist, he defends the justifying role that the default position plays in testimonial knowledge. But, his insistence on situating the default position inside the space of reasons suggests that default position should be understood as a kind of reasoning, and that only then evidential reasons can be applied in concrete justifying procedures. This is a very different understanding of the default position from that of classical non-reductionists such as Coady (1992) and Burge (1993, 1997). If McDowell’s epistemology of testimony can be understood in this way, as this paper aims to establish, it should be considered as an attempt tosupersede the reductionist and non-reductionist dichotomy, an attempt that brings a series of reconsiderations of a satisfactory epistemology of testimony.
8. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Priyedarshi Jetli

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The inclusion of the truth condition in the definition of knowledge has been responsible for a number of paradoxes. Some epistemologists claim that in the case of knowledge justification entails truth or that belief implies truth as there is a causal relation between truth and belief. Truth hence becomes redundant in the definition of knowledge. I do not drop the truth condition for this reason because this denies the autonomy of the distinct conditions for knowledge. I argue that truth and knowledge are inseparable. However. “that p is true” should not be a necessary condition in the definiens of the definiendum “S knows that p is true.” Whereas the quest of truth is a necessary condition for knowledge. While I drop the truth condition from the definition of knowing that p is true, I do not dropthe condition that p is false from the definition of knowing that p is false. This means that though I may know something that is not true, I cannot know something that is false. This is a compromised revision of the long standing intuition of epistemologists that if I know something then I cannot be wrong. Linda Zagzebski defines knowledge as: “Knowledge is a state of true belief arising out of acts of intellectual virtue.” (Zagzebski, 1996, 271). She has hence dropped the truth condition. Intellectual virtues direct us towards truth but they do not guarantee truth. In the ideal case whatever I know will be true, but in most cases it will be true to the best of my knowledge.
9. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Kazuyoshi Kamiyama

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Our empirical beliefs beyond sense impressions and the memories of them cannot be justified. Logically we must be complete skeptics. This is the consequence of Hume’s skeptical argument against induction. Should we accept this conclusion or not? This is the so-called problem of induction. In this paper I propose a new solution that belongs to the 'dissolutionist’ tradition (Strawson 1952, Okasha 2001). Through criticizing the core argument in Hume’s skepticism I claim the following: Hume’s skepticism against induction does not succeed in denying the soundness of induction. We are not required to justify induction generally.
10. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Ilya Kasavin

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A certain decline of epistemology in terms of the “naturalized programmes” or the post-modernist discussions makes us think about the form, in which epistemological studies in a broad sense of the word are still possible as a sphere of philosophical analysis. Philosophy of knowledge is nowadays shaken on its throne, which it has occupied for a long time as a theoretical core of philosophy, and perhaps even dismissed from it. The partial loss of orientation by those who are professionally involved in this sphere is the consequence of this state of affairs. This also concerns social epistemology - an influential modern trend, whichnowadays is balancing between neoclassic (A. Goldman1) and non-classic (D. Bloor2), normative and descriptive, veritistic and constructionist approaches. Among all, there are two terminologically different though in fact similar proposals: naturalization and socialization. Within social epistemology, both lead to a kind of interdisciplinary imperialism reducing epistemology to a “positive science” like sociology of knowledge, social history of science, science and technology studies or social psychology of cognitive process. We shall call this attitude “strong version” of naturalism keeping in mind “strong program of Edinburgh School in the sociology of scientific knowledge” (B. Barnes, D. Bloor3). How can we save then philosophical epistemology without indulging into purely transcendentalcontemplations and at the same time securing its connections with empirical sciences? A “weak version” of naturalism is proposed, namely, an idea of social epistemology based on interdisciplinarity. Therefore a special analysis of interdisciplinarity concept is needed.
11. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Indoo Pandey Khanduri

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The present research paper focuses its objective on clarifying the arguments for establishing the Competency to use the knowledge as the intensively required criteria of knowledge in the present global scenario. For a clear and precise understanding, the present paper has three objectives. The first objective of the present paper is set to deal with definition of the competency of knowledge in general and reflect upon the theories of Competency as given in Indian and Western Philosophy. The second aim of the research paper will be to examine how far the criteria of Competency includes all vital criterion of knowledge truth like universality, certainty and necessity leading towards the objectivity fulfilling the verification and falsification criteria in the process of competent performance and use of knowledge by the performer or user. And lastly the concluding part of present research paper, we shall make an attempt to exhibit how Competency is quintessential requirement in all the field-for example narrative form of knowledge, in the process achieving higher level experience and introspection based knowledge in Yoga and Meditation.
12. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Jeong Il Kim

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In understanding Peirce's unique system of pragmatism following three theories are helpful: first, Herakleitos' saying that 'one can never step into a same river twice', second, Protagoras' saying that 'men are the measure of the world', and third, Darwin's theory of evolution. It is always the case that epistemology takes place on top the metaphysical and cosmological bases. Peirce's metaphysics and cosmology is considered to line up with above three theories. It is interesting fact that Peirce who started up his work in science ended up with such somehow unscientific cosmology. Peirce believes that the world is constantly changing. Inknowing the world Peirce says that the subject of knowing takes a part doing a certain role. Peirce says that 'to believe A', 'to think of A' and 'to think of A as true' are all same sort of mental act. Therefore, to Peirce, truth is only a kind of 'opinion'. This means that the subject of knowing has something to do with truthfulness. In this kind of knowing process 'knowing truth' can only be acquired when possibility of 'inaccuracy' and 'onesideness' are opened. Thus, Peirce's definition of knowing or truth is quite indefinite definition. According to Peirce, we only know the world partially, and moreover, even we get the total sum data about the world,the world will move on forward changing. On this ground, it might be helpful that we look in to current matters in philosophy of mind in different angle.
13. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Jennifer Lackey

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The question that will be the focus of this paper is this: what is the significance of disagreement between those who are epistemic peers? There are two answers to this question found in the recent literature. On the one hand, there are those who hold that one can continue to rationally believe that p despite the fact that one’s epistemic peer explicitly believes that not-p. I shall call those who hold this view nonconformists. In contrast, there are those who hold that one cannot continue to rationally believe that p when one is faced with an epistemic peer who explicitly believes that not-p. I shall call those who hold this view conformists. Inthis paper, I shall argue that neither nonconformism nor conformism provides a plausible account of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. I shall then develop my justificationist account of peer disagreement’s epistemic significance. Whereas current views maintain that disagreement, by itself, either simply does or does not possess epistemic power, my account holds that its epistemic power, or lack thereof, is explainable in terms of its interaction with other features,particularly the degree of justified confidence with which the belief in question is held and the presence of information that one possesses about one’s own epistemic situation.
14. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Eunjin Lee

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My aim in this paper is to show the difficulty James Pryor faces in attempting to overcome the skeptic’s challenge. According to the skeptic, we can never know anything about the external world, because of our cognitive limitation that cannot distinguish real perceptions from false ones in the skeptical scenarios. Thus, the skeptic requires us having antecedent justification to rule out all possible hypotheses. In opposition to the skeptic, Pryor argues that as long as we remain dogmatic about perception, we can have “prima facie justification” for perceptual beliefs, which does not rest on any antecedent justification. Furthermore, on thebasis of prima facie justification, Pryor goes on to justify the existence of the external world, which by itself excludes various skeptical hypotheses. However, I shall argue that since Pryor’s prima facie justification only considers perceptual justification, it cannot show whether skeptical hypotheses are true or false, and thus, fails to give a convincing solution to the skeptic. Nevertheless, I still believe that dogmatism is worthy of notice in that it offers a plausible explanation of our ordinary perceptual beliefs by the notion of “entitlement to rely.
15. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Elena Leonteva

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The concept of rationality in general suggested in given paper may be considered as the initial theoretical abstraction that could become the starting point of rationality analysis. The “abstract concept” that is free from any sort of rationality individual being, indifferent and formal towards any particular stage of its becomingness, permits to specify the key attributes and principles which determine its fundamental sense. The rationality attributes realization is going through the external characteristics acquisition that is the process of rationality actual being becoming. In this case external characteristics are axiological, praxiological,cultural‐historical, and existential attributes that “inbreathe” rationality the “vital force” which allows it to abandon the realm of total abstraction.
16. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Joungbin Lim

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In this paper, I criticize naturalized epistemology. To this end, I critically examine several versions of naturalistic epistemology (Quine, Kornblith, and Plantinga). While Quine’s epistemology eschews any kind of normativity not invoked in science, Kornblith’s and Plantinga’s views attempt to explain normativity in the light of descriptivity. I provide an argument against them. The upshot of my argument is that since we are self-conscious beings, we have reflective ability to see what we ought to believe. In other words, the fact that we are self-conscious beings requires us to find reason for our belief. I argue that naturalistic epistemology cannot capture that idea, since it is only concerned with third-person, impersonal approach. It simply shifts our thinking about justification from a subjective or first-person perspective to an objective or third-person perspective. Therefore, naturalistic epistemology, even if it is a weak version, is untenable in that it simply ignores human consciousness and its role in justification of beliefs.
17. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Hui-Min Lin

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Obviously, “To know” is different to “be informed”. For “to know”, we have a motivation to reach certain proposition we thought is meaningful to us; however, for “be informed”, we just passively receive propositions or we gain certain propositions without much deliberation in which these propositions may be useful to us. The proposition “Wang collected 19 wins in both MLB 2006 and 2007” seems information but not knowledge to us, in the sense that we just be given this proposition and we exploited it to entertain our friends around us. However, in the case of I am a sport agent; “Wang collected 19 wins in both MLB 2006 and 2007” is surely knowledge but not just information for me, in the sense that I have a motivation to reach this proposition to do my work best. I “know” thatWang collected 19 and “inform” the team to consider his contribution to the New York Yankee. The Yankee of course “knows” Wang’s performance, I the sport agent “inform” the Yankee the fact of 19 just push the Yankee to reconsider this information seriously or tell them the significance of this information. What I want to tell them or remind them is what we said knowledge, not just information. Knowledge then has more elements than information does in our daily usage. It is less direct that there exists a distinction between the proposition of knowledge and that of information. The content of the two may be totally the same, the difference of the two may be vague; but the distinction of the two is necessary, at least they have different meanings in our daily usage. I think the epistemic reliabilism or externalism is not capable to bring out that point. The result leads to reliabilism any proposition that is just the information be qualified as the knowledge. But we think intuitively that the value of knowledge is more than the value of information, therefore, we need a better account of the knowledge which we are favorable.
18. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Chintamani Malviya

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Problem of truth and reality is age old in the field of philosophy as well as in the field of science. People very often confuse between ‘Truth’ and ‘Reality’ Most people think them to be one and the same, but there are differences. Whatever exist is real, reality and existence are interchangeable words. We can say truth, which is unchangeable and reality, which exist but change. False, which is not exist at all. People have suggested various taste to decide the truth falsity of our description of reality. Some suggested Pragmatic theory and some other have suggested Coherence as a test of truth. Realism is also an ontological theory and has been probably the most ancient one. According to ancient man, real is that which perceived. Latter on, due to religious impact the knower became more important then the knowing object. Barkeley developed an extreme position that the objective material world does not exist at all. Dewey has developed the position called Instrumentalism. Halt, Perry, Marvin, Pitkin are the chief advocates of this position. Philosophers such as Darke, Lovejoy, Cellars, and Santayana held a position of Critical Realism. These people hold that mind does not see the object directly as they are but only through their representatives, as regards the object of knowledge is concerned, the Neo Realist are monist while Critical Realist are dualist. Indian rationalist philosopher Dr. D.D. Bandiste introduces a new concept of reality Radical Realism. He proved that knowledge change the knower not the object. to him every new knowledge make some change or other inthe knowing person. Epistemological position of john Dewey called instrumentalism. According to him knowledge is an instrument of action and a meaningful action is always of a problem-solving type. Every knowledge is an instrument to serve some need or other, neither is any knowledge final, nor is any truth final. Not only everything in the world is changing, their mutual relations also change. Knowledge is not a goal, but only a instrument to achieve this or that goal. In my paper I haves discussed various theories regarding whether knowledge change the object known. In this contest I have discussed varieties of realism, Idealismand so on, but importantly I have also discussed a new theory Radical Realism.
19. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Andrey N. Pavlenko

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To analyze some sсeptical arguments was build the epistemological model about only one perceiving subject “Enarch”: he is one (ἐνᾴϛ) and has beginning (ἀρχῄ) in itself. This model was applyed for critical analysis of Husserl’s and Putnam’s attempts to overcome scepticism (i) by using “the intersubjective program” in a first case and (ii) argument “brains in a vat” in a second one. To justify the equivalence of the “intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness” Husserl suggested the existence of transcendental Community . The main goal of the paper is to show that intersubjective epistemology faces the difficulty: the equivalence of the“intersubjectiveness” and “objectiveness” is not feasible. Developing Putnam’s model “brains in a vat” about boundaries of scepticism has been formulated the argument about “back of the head”. It showed that skepticism is much more strictly doctrine than it was suggested by Putnam.
20. Proceedings of the XXII World Congress of Philosophy: Volume > 53
Baron Reed

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Any theory of knowledge that is fallibilist—i.e., that allows for one to have knowledge that could have been false or accidentally true—faces the lottery paradox. The paradox arises from the combination of two plausible claims: first, no one can know that one’s lottery ticket will lose prior to learning that it in fact has lost, and, second, the justification one has for the belief that one’s ticket will lose is just as good as the justification one has for paradigmatic instances of knowledge. In thispaper, I offer a solution to the lottery paradox that is grounded in a thorough-going acceptance of fallibilism.