The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy

Nietzsche's fundamental vision of modern democracy includes an essential aspect which many tend to neglect given the indelible historical experience with totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. "Irresistible" democracy, precisely on account of its triumphant progress, also sets the course for, or, to use another contemporary expression, instrumentalizes the activities of its very enemies. It is, to say the least, quite striking to read such a claim made by a philosopher whose work Alfred Baeumler and Georg Lukäcs have labelled as extreme political archaism, while for a long time no serious objection was raised against this absurd verdict. We can see that Nietzsche's universalistic approach assigns a definite place to democratic systems and also specifies why these systems are of special relevance for the universal-emancipatory development of humankind. By stating the prophylactic character of the democratic system in such a decisive fashion, Nietzsche reaches the very core of his philosophy. By doing so he differs markedly and positively from several other political philosophers. The difference lies in the fact that for Nietzsche a given political system is not an ultimate value or objective, but, as already mentioned, an opportunity to realize universal human ambitions. This is why his political philosophy establishes a principled distinction between various political systems while also evaluating them according to their prophylactic potential to be utilized for the purposes of universal-emancipatory development.

In the contemporary western, liberal, constitutional and secularized state, the need is felt for a cohesionconserving force. Human rights and citizenship, assets of Enlightenment and Revolution, prove to be individualizing powers that miss the communitarian inclination of former times. With the rise of violence, crime and other ways of breaking the law the state seems less able to fulfil its role as guardian of assets like freedom and security. The call for a strong state that interferes in people's behavior is often heard nowadays. Is there a way in which the state can promote a certain degree of moral substance without becoming paternalistic or even totalitarian? In this paper it is argued that the political philosophy of John Dewey might provide us with some tools to approach this problem in a refreshing way.

In today's world the need for cultivating non-violence is becoming more pronounced. Gandhi extrapolated an ideal society based on truth and nonviolence. The Bombay Chronicle in its issue of 5th April, 1930, reported "...For the first time a nation is asked by its leader to win freedom by itself accepting all the suffering and sacrifice involved. Mahatma Gandhi's success does not, therefore, merely mean the freedom of India. It will also constitute the most important contribution that any country yet made towards the elimination of force as an arbiter between one nation and another..." For him, two cardinal principles of life, non-violence and truth, were the essence of sociopolitical good. "Satyagraha" was Gandhi's gift to the world. The word was coined by him in South Africa. In the West it was known as passive resistance. Satyagraha signified pure soul-force. Truth or Love is the very substance of the soul. To quote Gandhi in this context: "Non-violence as supreme dharma is the proof of this power of Love. Nonviolence is a dormant state. In the working state, it is Love, ruled by Love, the world goes on.... we are alive solely because of Love....we are all ourselves the proof of this..." In a centrifugal world, Gandhi's views expressed on non-violence and love are guidance to the world today more than at any other time.

Mit dem Humanismus- Begriff artikulieren sich widersprüchliche bis entgegengesetzte Positionen, ohne ihn dadurch zu zersprengen. An der Humanismus-Diskussion vor 1933 und nach 1945 in Deutschland kann beobachtet werden, wie sich Bildungshumanisten in den Nazismus hineinarbeiten, welche Wandlungen sie in den internen Zäsuren des NS durchmachen und wie sie in der Nachkriegszeit in den Kampf um kulturelle Hegemonie eingreifen. Sowohl die Optik der Nachkriegforschung, wie die Transformation des Humanismus in der Weimarer Republik die zur, Selbstgleichschaltung' der Klassische Philologie 1933 führte und die symptomatische Renaissance des Humboldtschen Ideals nach 1945 werden im Vortrag an exemplarischen Beispiele erläutert.

Der Engel der Geschichte in den Thesen von Walter Benjamin schaut zurück aus drei Gründen: Erstens, weil es epistemologisch unvermeidbar und notwendig ist, zurück zu schauen, oder: Der Engel kann nicht nach vorne sehen und muß nach hinten blicken, um seine Umgebung zu verstehen. Zweitens, weil ontologisch die Zukunft nicht existiert, da der .Fortschritt' keine Tendenz einer Annäherung an eine bessere Zukunft, sondern das Sich-Entfernen vom verlorenen Paradies ist, und weil die Zeit als etwas homogenes, das automatisch voranschreitet, nicht existiert. Drittens, weil es politisch notwendig ist, nach hinten zu schauen, weil es nicht möglich ist, dem Nationalsozialismus Einhalt zu bieten, wenn er als Ausnahmezustand, der einem unvermeidbaren Fortschritt diametral gegenübersteht, verstanden wird.

The tragic experience of the 20 century, the worst expression of which is the Holocaust, is a challenge to the fundamental values of civilized society. Many generations of thinkers will try to find a response to that challenge. The terrifying symbol of that challenge is Auschwitz, Universum Terroris, "the kingdom not of this world". Its understanding is beyond classical concepts of good and evil and cannot be described in the usual categories of crime and punishment. The entrance to this "kingdom" can be illustrated by Dante's words written at the entrance to Hell (Inferno): "Abandon hope all ye who enter". Finding no help either in God (the Almighty "has covered his face", as theologians put it) or in Reason (Reason has become madness), the shattered mind has to seek a new "measure of all things", to perceive wisdom born of despair, which we call holosophy.

This paper explores the political implications of the tension between tradition and dialogue in Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneu tics. The premise of the paper is this: Gadamer's account of human existence challenges two very influential modes of thinking within contemporary political philosophy, which are exemplified, arguably at their best, in Martin Heidegger's early thought and Jürgen Habermas's project of communicative action. In contemporary political philosophy the Enlightenment heritage has been interpreted in such a way that tradition has come to be conceived as inevitably opposed to the ideals of Enlightenment, and that the extension of one as a major constitutive element in social and political affairs implies the retraction of the other. However, this paper attempts to conceive the problem of tradition in a more articulated context, suggesting that Gadamer's work offers a useful corrective both to Habermas's project and to the relativistic implications of Heidegger's early thought. By drawing on Gadamer's work, with particular emphasis upon his notion of the fusion of horizons, as well as on the work of thinkers such as Charles Taylor and Alasdair Maclntyre, this paper attempts to articulate a hermeneutical, dialogical interpretation of tradition, which suggests that Gadamer's thought acknowledges that living traditions are the site of ongoing debates, internal revisions, and critical turns, and that the notion of a closed horizon that is supposed to enclose a culture is an abstraction. In so doing it goes beyond the caricaturised account of tradition that is bandied about both in modernist thought and in the conservative outlook.

In this paper the author examines the main features of Jürgen Habermas's cosmopolitan view of the global political order. He specifically examines the importance Habermas accords respectively to individual rights and the nationstate in such an order. After demonstrating that a global political order founded on the defence of individual human rights rather than the nation-state is an assumption that should be taken seriously, the author maintains that it would be undesirable to attribute only a secondary role to the nation-sate. In the second part of the paper, he demonstrates that the nation-state has a positive role to play in the global era, and that those who predict its imminent demise will have to revisit their positions.

This paper critically evaluates Habermas's social-philosophical exploration of the public sphere in the age of mass communication, which addresses a key question: "Is the public possible in the sociohistorical formation of the mass public sphere?" In his genealogical analysis of different public spheres from feudal to modern times, Habermas indicates that the emergence of inter-subjectivity is historically based upon the dichotomy of private / public (subjective/objective). He emphasizes the opposition of the "subjective side" of rationality to its "objective side" while dealing with the public spheres in different historical periods. Habermas points out that the notion of the public can exist only at the face-to-face level communication. It is impossible for the (impersonal) masses to construct any sense of publicness, since there are no historical and social conditions in which the masses of working class can establish an "autonomous private sphere" outside of material production and consumption, as the bourgeoisie did. In this way, Habermas ambivalently argues that the public is not possible in the mass public sphere.

La philosophic politique contemporaine est traversee par la question (ou le defi) du pluralisme. Parmi les theories les plus influentes, qui prennent ce probleme comme point de depart d'une reflexion normative sur la vie politique, on peut compter Celles de Habermas et de Rawls. La theorie discursive et le liberalisme politique, en effet, expriment d'une fagon similaire la question ä laquelle doit repondre toute theorie politique dans le cadre des societes modernes: comment l'existence d'une societe juste et libre est-elle possible sous les conditions d'un desaccord profond et permanent entre les doctrines comprehensives ou les visions du monde qui la composent? Meme si leurs reponses au defi du pluralisme divergent ä des points importants, Habermas et Rawls partagent aussi l'idee selon laquelle la legitimite d'une conception de la justice politique depend des raisons qui peuvent etre justifiees independamment du contenu normatif propre des doctrines comprehensives ou des visions du monde. Je pense que l'idee rawlsienne de la raison publique, au moins dans sa derniere etape de developpement, permet d'envisager une nouvelle reponse ä la critique habermassienne, dans la mesure oü le consensus par recoupement n'est pas simplement une convergence heureuse qui survient par hasard, mais au contraire ne peut jouer un role approprie dans la justification politique que s'il contribue ä la stabilite sociale pour des raisons correctes. La conception politique de la justice chez Rawls partage l'idee d'une democratic deliberative organisee autour d'un ideal de justification politique dont l'aspect central est le raisonnement public des citoyens. Cette justification politique ne saurait etre interpretee comme une accommodation pure et simple des doctrines comprehensives divergentes. Elle implique l'idee d'une acceptability rationnelle fondee sur le principe liberal de legitimite. Une telle interpretation nous montre que le liberalisme politique est plus proche de la theorie discursive que ces deux penseurs, pour des raisons differentes, seraient susceptibles d'admettre.

This article aims to elaborate two meanings of the category of the political in relation to the question of legitimacy in constitutional regimes: John Rawls's conception constructed on the regulative ideal of political neutrality and Carl Schmitt's notion of the political as friend-enemy distinction relying on a logic of exclusion. A comparative textual examination explicates that these two approaches imply opposed meanings to be attributed to the nature, essence, and boundary of the political, although both thinkers have the common aim of developing a theory of the political realm free of religious, metaphysical, and ideological connotations.

One of the major political problems the world faces at the moment of its so-called globalization concerns the possibilities of maintaining, transforming, and expanding democracy. Globalization, as the extension of neo-liberal markets, the formation of multi-national, non-democratic economic powers, and the ubiquitous use of teletechnologies, threatens the modus vivendi of older democracies in ways that call for the reinvention of an old idea. Inasmuch as teletechnical globalization transforms space and time so as to put into question their very presence, and inasmuch as deconstruction has always sought to rethink the constitution as well as deconstitution of the metaphysics of presence, I will here examine the concept of democracy that Jacques Derrida developed over the last few years of his life.

Poststructuralist theories of identity have been accused of restricting the political efficacy of the subject. However, it could be argued that poststructuralist theory, as a philosophical method that insists upon a critical resignification of the traditional understanding of agency and critique, may actually enlarge the scope for activism.

The subject of this paper is the new theory of political liberalism, developed by people like jJohn Rawls and Charles Larmore. This is a quite specific subject and it should not be confused with another and more usual meaning attached to the same expression. This more conventional meaning of political liberalism is primarily a form of liberalism which stresses the political sphere - the state - as opposed to the economic sphere - the marketplace. However, the new theory of political liberalism is not in opposition to economic liberalism in this way. Instead, the adjective political refers to the fact that this recent defence of liberalism avoids reliance on comprehensive and controversial religious, metaphysical, epistemological, and moral views. In this sense, political liberalism is a theory of argumentative restraint regarding the defence of liberal justice.

By the late twentieth century, the liberal definition of a citizen as an individual with equal rights under the protection of the law has failed to respond to the demands of the members of contemporary plural societies. The recent discussions in political philosophy between Kantian liberal approaches and their communitarian and republican critics are relevant to this challenge. These criticisms are, in one way or another, related to the main principles of Western liberal thought. The communitarians take a stand against the priority of rights over conceptions of the good in liberal politics. They also criticize the ontological assumption of the individual as an "unencumbered" self. The absence of a substantive common good and the separation of politics and morality are the shortcomings of liberalism that are stressed by both communitarians and republicans. In contrast to liberals' emphasis on rights, republicans underline the role of duties and active participation as the constitutive elements of citizenship. In fact, they reverse the relation between rights and politics as it is understood in liberalism: they regard rights as the products of the political process, rather than its presuppositions.

The subject of this paper is modern representative democracy. Instead of discussing the many theories which strive to define and describe the essence of democracy, such as the classic, the competitive, the structural, the participatory, the concessionary, etc., it is our aim to present the various practical approaches to "democracy in action" in the post-Communist period, i.e., to characterize the various notions of the axiological and philosophical assumptions that provide the cornerstone of democracy.

In his book, The Logic of Democracy, T.L. Thor son has published a chapter entitled "Majority Rule and Minority Rights". In this paper he has pointed out a controversy which has arisen between "natural rights democrats" and "majority rule democrats." In this paper I argue that elected representatives represent the majority and their rule can be called the rule of the majority so long they can protect the rights of individuals. This is why the natural rights of man are more fundamental and essential than majority rule. In conclusion, I insist that neither "natural rights" nor "majority rule" can be called the elements of democracy. If the former and the latter could have been understood as the end of democracy and the means to achieve the end, respectively, then the controversy would not have arisen.

The paper develops a theory of human rights under three main headings: that ways of acting or of being treated require effective normative justification, that they must have authoritative political endorsement or acknowledgement, and that they must be maintained by conforming conduct and, where need be, by governmental enforcement. The paper, then, applies this notion of human rights to two main cases: as constitutional rights within individual states (the case primarily contemplated within the UN's Universal Declaration), and as international human rights maintained by confederations of states or by looser international coalitions.

"Justice" has been, since Plato and Aristotle, a concept of central importance in European philosophy. It is also a concept in everyday speech and in political discourse. As an inter-discursive concept, its value is not culturally limited, so that it seems particularly apt for use in discussions about achieving "globalization with a human face" (as one might say). For such processes of communication it is, however, necessary to reflect on the different uses made of this concept, which is claimed by very different, even contrasting political-ethical projects.

The Paleolithic paintings and drawings found on cave walls at sites in France and Spain, such as Lascaux, Altamira and Vallon-Pont-D'Arc, have profound effects on those who see them. In addition to their historical interest, they are prized for their aesthetic and spiritual qualities, which have had an important influence on modern art. But the caves are small and the paintings are fragile. Access to them has been sharply limited: some caves have been closed to protect the paintings from the damage caused by human respiration; access to others is limited to those who negotiate a daunting reservation scheme. Despite being the heritage of humanity as a whole, the cave paintings are, and must be, restricted to a very few. Not everyone who wants to see the paintings can do so if they are to survive.