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Social Philosophy Today

Volume 29, 2013
Civic Virtues, Divided Societies, and Democratic Dilemmas

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Displaying: 1-17 of 17 documents


part 3: knowledge, truth, and justice

1. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 29
William C. Pamerleau

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Political impasse largely turns on convictions that one’s own position is right while one’s opponent’s position is wrong. When we examine how partisans defend their views, it’s clear that political divisions are not merely due to differences in strategies or priorities but to more fundamental differences in how persons perceive the world and what they think is true.In fact, the very nature of how we view “the truth” is such that most of the time we are inclined not to acknowledge our views as contingent, relative, or fallible. At least, that’s how Heidegger understands us. According to Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis, particularly in his early works, the nature of how we reveal facts and events simultaneously conceals other interpretations. Moreover, the very means of revealing a particular truth makes it difficult to notice that it is our act of revealing it which makes it true in the first place. That is, our natural tendency is to be in “error” about the very fact that it is through us that particular things obtain their character. However, Heidegger’s notion of authenticity, whereby we do acknowledge the role we play in revealing what we find true, suggests a way forward.
2. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 29
Kyle Johannsen

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G. A. Cohen is well known within contemporary political philosophy for claiming that the scope of principles of justice extends beyond the design of institutions to citizens’ personal choices. More recently, he’s also received attention for claiming that principles of justice are normatively ultimate, i.e., that they’re necessary for the justification of action guiding principles (regulatory rules) but are unsuitable to guide political practice themselves. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between these claims as they’re applied in criticism of John Rawls. It argues that ascribing normative ultimacy to justice entails its application to personal choice. However, it also argues that if Cohen is right about Rawls’s difference principle being regulatory rather than ultimate, then his earlier claim that Rawls must extend it to personal choice on pain of inconsistency is refuted.

part 4: nassp book award

3. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 29
Wendy Lynne Lee

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In this review I argue that while Berger makes out a good argument that the language of civic engagement covers too much (and hence too little) and that education plays a vital role in developing civic-minded sensibilities, I am less sanguine that the strategies for the reform of our “attention deficit democracy” will achieve the desired effect in a political society dominated by the corrupting influence of corporations who actively seek to undermine just such sensibilities as anathema to their objectives. As corporate objectives become more and more wedded to the state, so too reform becomes less and less likely to be successful. An excellent example of this is the power wielded by the current incarnation of the fossil fuel empire and it’s influence over law-making concerning hydraulic fracturing in Pennsylvania. While I applaud Berger’s objectives, I am no longer convinced that pragmatism and not a more revolutionary approach can fulfill Berger’s—and my own—democratic ideals.
4. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 29
Christopher Lowry

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This article critically discusses of Ben Berger’s , making two main claims. First, I argue that his conceptual distinctions ought to be further developed in order to be able to distinguish between, on the one hand, politically legitimate moral ends (i.e., ones that are suitable objects of political engagement) and, on the other hand, other moral ends that ought to be pursued only through social engagement. To help with this task I consider the significance of the difference between what I refer to as ethical reasoning and justice reasoning, and I sketch a fourfold distinction between types of justice. Second, I argue that Berger does not give adequate emphasis to the government side of the task of making political engagement more efficacious. In addition to his worthwhile recommendations for increasing the social capital of the many, we should also be concerned to determine how best to limit, or, better, remove, the now massive political influence of the financial capital of America’s wealthiest.
5. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 29
Andrew F. Smith

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Ben Berger seeks to provide a number of “modest proposals” intended to prevent widespread and radical political disengagement among citizens. This is the most adverse manifestation of citizens’ invariable “attention deficit,” or their incapacity to maintain the focus and energy necessary to remain deeply and perpetually politically engaged. While attention deficit cannot be overcome, its worst effects can be kept enduringly in check, Berger argues. This is a necessary condition for the maintenance of a functional democracy. Yet I argue that democracy in America, which is Berger’s particular focus, has not endured and for reasons that relate only indirectly to attention deficit. While certain of his prescriptions are worthy of endorsement, how to implement them must be put into a context that more accurately reflects the current character of the political landscape.
6. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 29
Ben Berger

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7. Social Philosophy Today: Volume > 29

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