Roczniki Filozoficzne

The paper appreciates six conditions which, according to G.E. Hughes and M.J. Cresswell, must be respected by those formal systems which aspire to be systems of modal logic. There are few such systems. The sense of modal functors “it is necessary that,” “it is possible that,” in this type of systems is in no way made precise. The paper undermines the validity of some conditions shown by Hughes and Cresswell. It outlines the way by which to construct a system of modal logic in which the functor of logical necessity and logical possibility would be unambiguously characterised by methods of contemporary logic.

The first part of the paper characterises two new non-extensional functors: functor of counterfactual implication and functor of causal implication. The latter functor was used by Arthur W. Burks in his early considerations on the construction of a system of the logic of causal propositions, the formal inscription of conditional propositions in the colloquial language and the language of empirical sciences.The second part traces down the mutual relations between the functors of counterfactual implication, causal implication, material implication and strict implication. Special attention is paid to the fact that causal implication implies material implication (a converse relationship does not occur), and strict implication implies causal implication (a converse relationship does not occur).

Many contemporary philosophers, especially the “post-modern ones,” claim that analytical philosophy has committed self-destruction by undermining the position of cognitive realism and questioning its main pillars: theory of objective reference of expressions and correspondential theory of truth. One of such philosophers is Rorty, an indefatigable critic of the conception of “right representations,” a concept that – according to him – is “an empty compliment which we pay to helpful beliefs while realising our intentions.” In order to support his nihilistic position, Rorty many times refers to Quine. In my paper I seek to answer the question whether Rorty’s and the views of other post-modern philosophers can be supported by Quine’s philosophical conceptions. Analysing some selected trends of his philosophy, in particular the thesis about indeterminacy of reference (ontological relativity), I seek to prove that – contrary to Rorty’s claim – Quine did not devalue the idea of objective reference. I also prove that the semantic concept of truth as relativised to the model of language plays in Quine’s epistemology an equally essential role to the role of the immanent concept of truth as “disquotational.” The former is closer to the correspondential conception of truth. The conclusions which Rorty draws from the conception of Quine are rash, and sometimes they are an outcome of biased interpretation.

The aim of this article is to analyze the Philonic notion of “the city of soul” which Philo uses in his commentary on the Septuagint, and especially in his two treatises: De confusione linguarum (107-109, 196) and De posteritate Caini (52-62). First the exegetic context and allegorical method are examined, including the biblical verses (Gen. 11,1-9; Ex. 4,17) and the way Philo interprets them. It can be seen how the biblical motives are modified by him and subordinated to the external conception of the city that he probably draws from the Greek or Hellenistic notions, in particular the conception of polis understood simultaneously as an actual city and as its legal constitution. Then the structure of the psychic or moral city is analyzed, including its “buildings” (and “walls”), “habitants” and “laws,” which are allegorical presentations for the moral function of language, virtues or vices and laws or constitution of the inner city. Although Philo’s allegorical interpretation is here succeeded only to a certain degree due to his difficulties in clear distinguishing the moral components of the soul, the pattern of the city appears to be a useful exegetical tool in bringing out important aspects of moral life. In the last place, the author reconstructs Philo’s ethical views present in his allegoric commentary. The “city of soul” should be regarded mainly as its moral state, taken in its dynamic or static dimension. The moral qualification of this state exclusively depends upon soul’s attitude towards God who is the source of every good, virtue and the freedom of choice. Therefore, main virtues of sage are knowledge coming from God and piety towards him; and his internal “laws” are God’s laws. A vicious man is standing on the opposite side; he is ruled by the pride and forgets God, deprives himself of freedom and lets the irrational mob of vices master him, submitting himself to the needs of his senses and the body.

The paper seeks to give an ontological account of idea as mental content in the philosophy of John Locke. The foundation on which to place and polarise philosophical standpoints with regard to this issue is the 17th-century controversy between J. Locke and N. Malebranche with respect to the genesis of human knowledge. Showing the foundation of this controversy, as expressed in the polemic work of Locke entitled An Examination of P. Malebranche’s Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, I shall outline two possible approaches to our mental contents, namely the psychologistic and anti-psychologistic ones. In this perspective Locke is a representative of the first standpoint, whereas Malebranche of the second. In the psychologistic approach, the content of our conscious acts (or according to 17th-century Cartesian philosophy ideas) is exclusively an internal element of this consciousness. On the contrary – in the case of the anti-psychologistic characteristation, the content of our consciousness is described as ontologically antonomous, i.e. as independent from thr knowing subject. Following the analyses of An Examination, I obtain additional arguments on behalf of the psychologistic interpretation of Locke’s conception of idea (expressed, among others, by J. Yolton and M. Ayers), contrary to the anti-psychologistic approaches (claimed by, among others, T. Reid, R. McRae, and N. Jolley).

The main purpose of this paper was the trial to answer the question if norms can function as premises or conclusions in logical inferences. According to definition of logical inference, the parts of its may be only sentences (in indicative mood) which are true or false. The logic, which accepts that norms are the true and false propositions, can be named the Logic of Norms. Otherwise the logic, which reject that norms are true and false propositions, we name Deontic Logic. The last one, in order to use the logical inference, changes each of norms N into normative sentences: ‘N exists’ or ‘N exists for the sake of set of norms’. The normative sentences are sentences in indicative mood and thereby are true or false.The whole consideration about two types aforementioned logic is preceded by some remarks about variety of the meanings of the word ‘norm’, the linguistic structures of norm and the views of the truth value of norms.