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1. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Danny Frederick

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Strawson offers three accounts of singular predication: a grammatical, a category and a mediating account. I argue that the grammatical and mediating accounts are refuted by a host of counter-examples and that the latter is worse than empty. In later works Strawson defends only the category account. This account entails that singular terms cannot be predicates; it excludes non-denoting singular terms from being logical subjects, except by means of an ad hoc analogy; it depends upon a notion of identification that is too vague; and it is unnecessarily complicated, relying on analogies where a more uniform explanation should be possible. But I show how the account can be corrected to avoid all these difficulties and to provide an accurate account of singular predication.
2. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Stamatios Gerogiorgakis

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In this paper several assumptions concerning omniscience and future contingents on the one side, and omniscience and self-reference on the other, areexamined with respect to a classical and a three-valued semantic setting (the latter pertains especially to Łukasiewicz’s, Kleene’s and Blau’s three-valued logics).Interesting features of both settings are highlighted and their basic assumptions concerning omniscience are explored. To generate a context in which the notion of omniscience does not deviate from some basic intuitions, two special futurity operators are introduced in this article: one for what will definitely take place and another one for what is indeterminate as to whether it will take place. Once these operators are introduced, some puzzles about omniscience in combination with future contingents are removed. An analogous solution to some puzzles concerning omniscience and selfreferentiality is also provided.
3. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Leopold Hess

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The paper concerns mutual relations between two metaphysical positions: “superessentialism,” claiming that all properties of every object are essential, i.e.necessary, and “necessitarianism,” claiming that everything is necessary, i.e. there is only one possible world. The theories of Spinoza and Lewis serve as examples. In section I the two positions are characterized. In section II and III interpretations of Spinoza’s and Lewis’s metaphysics are presented, and it is explained to what extent they can both be considered superessentialists and necessitarians. In section IV the two theories are compared. In section V three possible ways of arguing for superessentialism are presented. It is then shown that the premises of these arguments appear, at least implicitly, in both of the theories. In section VI additional premises are numbered which have to be further assumed to prove necessitarianism. In the final section it is shown how Lewis can claim that there are contingent facts, while being a superessentialist and a necessitarian. It is argued that his claim of contingency is a matter of semantics, not of metaphysics.
4. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Stephen Palmquist

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Part I in this two-part series employed a perspectival interpretation to argue that Kant’s epistemology serves as the philosophical grounding for modern revolutions in science. Although Einstein read Kant at an early age and immersed himself in Kant’s philosophy throughout his early adulthood, he was reluctant to admit Kant’s influence, possibly due to personal factors relating to his cultural-political situation. This sequel argues that Einstein’s early Kant-studies would have brought to his attention the problem of simultaneity and the method of solving it that eventually led to the theory of relativity. Despite Einstein’s reluctance to acknowledge his Kantian grounding, a perspectival understanding of Kant’s philosophy of science shows it is profoundly consistent with Einstein’s views on both synthetic apriority and the nature of scientific theory. Moreover, Kant and Einstein share quasi-mystical religious tendencies, relying on an unknowable absolute as the ultimate boundary of our scientific understanding of nature.
5. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Lotar Rasiński

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In this text the author draws on two contemporary accounts of power—by Michel Foucault and Ernesto Laclau—and, on the basis of thorough analysis and comparison, he argues for “the discursive account of power” (DAP) as a new concept reflecting the novel approach to the theory of power developed by these two philosophers. He opens with a broad methodological outline of contemporary concepts of power, distinguishing between the “classical” and the “modern” approaches. Basing his findings on Laclau’s and Foucault’s work, he then presents DAP as a theory characterized by decentralizing, non-normative, and conflict-based tendencies that does not exhibit many of the limitations that usually characterize both classical and modern concepts of power. In the second part of the article the author presents a detailed methodological analysis of Foucault’s and Laclau’s concepts of power, focusing on three axes: power, discourse, and the subject. The author dedicates the last section to a comparison of both approaches, concluding that DAP is an inspiring project that exceeds the limits of traditional liberal theories of power and politics.

critical notices

6. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Joseph Agassi

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7. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Renata Ziemińska

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book reviews

8. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Michael Horton

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9. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Krzysztof Kiedrowski

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10. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Piotr Sikora

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11. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Jacek Wojtysiak

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12. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński

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notes on books

13. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Marta Szabat

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14. Polish Journal of Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Jan Woleński

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