Philosophy and Theology

The traditional elimination view affirms that people with intellectual disabilities will be healed in heaven when God restores all things to what they were meant to be. Several contemporary scholars, however, have put forth a revisionist retention view claiming that people with intellectual disabilities will not be healed in heaven. While the elimination view has strong biblical and theological credentials, it faces a significant philosophical difficulty. Heaven must maintain identity so that individuals exist as the same people they were in life. But post-mortem healing appears to disrupt the identity of people with intellectual disabilities. In this paper I reject this charge. I argue that for individuals with mild or moderate intellectual disabilities heaven preserves personal identity, while for individuals with profound intellectual disabilities heaven creates personal identity. These conclusions rest on an emergentist anthropology which I describe.

An analysis of the value systems of critical social issues is difficult to carry out in any qualified sense from an unstructured basis and that attempts to do so easily result in relatively superficial discussions of particular issues. Instead, we suggest how this might be viewed from a more holistic ethical and systems theological perspective. In doing so, we review a new framework that aims to distil relevant issues regarding necessary trade-offs and how this can be done. Broadly speaking, this consists of a kind of Socratic dialogue that systematically examines the value basis of the decisions that need to be made, as well as whether the effects of the decisions become unacceptable and thus need to be modified vis-à-vis the normative system embraced by the decision-maker. We discuss the role of theologians in this and emphasise that they should take a larger place in discussions on how to deal with complex societal crises.

Thomas Williams maintains that the doctrine of analogy is unintelligible. In this paper, I scrutinize and reject Williams’s argument for that claim insofar as it applies to Thomas Aquinas’s particular version of the doctrine. After laying out Williams’s critique, I present an account of Aquinas’s conception of analogy. I identify three components of it: a semantic part, a metaphysical part, and a distinctive conception of inference. I briefly explain how all three of these components play a role in Aquinas’s philosophical theology. On the basis of these ideas, I proceed to demonstrate how Williams’s argument against analogy, understood as a set of reasons for rejecting Aquinas’s version of it, fails completely. I end by pointing out how hard it appears for anyone who rejects the doctrine of analogy to keep faith with the idea of creation ex nihilo.

In a magisterial book-length study, Professor E. Christian Brugger concludes that the canons of the Council of Trent, given the beliefs and intentions of its participants, provide “a dogmatic definition of the absolute indissolubility of marriage as a truth of divine revelation” (original italics). The present concern is whether Brugger’s arguments support this conclusion. Also subject to scrutiny are the relevance, plausibility, and consistency of the conciliar thinking on which his arguments are premised. It will be argued that Brugger’s conclusion is unwarranted, leaving the question of divorce and remarriage an open one.

Between Schelling’s Über Dante in philosophischer Beziehung (1803) and the Dantean drafts of die Weltalter (1811-1815) stand the transitional texts of his middle period, the Philosophie und Religion (1804) and Freiheitsschrift (1809). His short essay on Dante contrasts an ancient conception of the closed cosmos with the modern universe as dynamic and expanding, then claims to extract from the Divine Comedy its eternal, threefold form. This article considers these schemata as they relate to the Philosophie und Religion and the Freiheitsschrift, disclosing an enduring Dantean influence which first predicts, then persists throughout this stage of Schelling’s philosophical development.

Professor William Lane Craig argues that a particular set of concerns about the Christian doctrine of penal substitution (namely, that Jesus of Nazareth was sacrificed for the sins of humanity) can be satisfied. This article provides rebuttals to said replies in an attempt to render plausible the claim that God exists to the extent that God is perfectly just, and that divine justice requires, among other things, that God never engage in the harming of innocents, consistent with any doctrine of retributivism worthy of the name. The doctrine of God, then, must remain consistent with unqualified negative retributivism. Any theism which might suggest otherwise violates such vital considerations of justice and fairness and must be rejected.

Theology and literature, as the twentieth century progressed, increasingly treated religion not in terms of the objectifications of dogmas and devotions but as the unseen presence of the divine in an individual life. Readers and critics saw degrees of belief and modalities of sin in the novels of Graham Greene. The writer acknowledged the influence of European novelists and theologians on his narratives. Karl Rahner’s theology of human existence within an atmosphere of grace along with a presentation of the transcendental and the categorical in expressions of faith and grace recall some modern novels like Greene’s A Burnt-Out Case. Both theologian and novelist point to God’s presence as silent, varied, mysterious, and real.

Classically, Christians have professed the saving efficacy of the cross. Does Karl Rahner? Recent commentary on Foundations of Christian Faith has described Rahner as conflating “atonement” generally with penal substitutionary theories of a changing God, as ruling out the redemptive significance of Christ’s death, and as denigrating the normativity of Scripture in order to do so. This article responds to these claims, unfolding Rahner’s soteriology and arguing that he advances a theology of the cross which affirms its saving efficacy, including in the last decade of his work.

Hope for persons with disabilities is most often associated with the possibility of cure. When cure is not achievable, there remains a dire lack in our socio-cultural imagination around and construction of hopeful disabled futurity. This paper explores Karl Rahner’s eschatology as a means of both deconstructing narrow visions of curative hope and affirming the presence of theological hope that already exists in the lives of disabled people. Ultimately, this paper argues that “crip time”—the time embodied by persons with disabilities—witnesses to a prophetic relationship with time in its openness to the life-giving possibilities of the absolute future.

The importance and influence of Karl Rahner’s theology is due in great part to the number of excellent scholars who have elucidated his thinking over the years. This article assembles considerations of Rahner’s idea of freedom as found in the rich secondary literature on Rahner. Rahner’s ethics, and indeed much of his theology, rests upon the idea of discernment, his own spiritual experience, and the Ignatian practice of discernment of spirits. Discipleship with Jesus and the love of neighbor, all undergirded by the person’s free response to God’s grace and revelation, is the horizon that embraces all of what Rahner has to say. The idea of freedom rests at the basis of Rahner’s understanding of the human person, our call to discipleship, and our fundamental choice to grow in God’s grace.

In Karl Rahner’s early writings we see that a search to understand the embodied experience of God motivated him to develop his understanding of the person as spirit-in-world. Along the way he developed a “tectonic logic” that would shape his entire theology. This early attempt to wrestle with the paradoxes of bodily graced experience offers a hermeneutical key for both understanding Rahner’s theology and thinking theologically about the body today.

Sophiology has come to the fore over the past century due in large part to the Russian sophiologists and the rise of feminist hermeneutics. Nevertheless, sophiology remains suspect in many circles due to a lack of clarity as to the status Sophia, on the one hand, and a resistance to it due to its challenge to ‘traditional’ images of God as male, on the other hand. This article takes the theological ambiguities surrounding the ontological status of Sophia, the Wisdom of God, as a context for approaching a systematic clarification that may assist a broader reception of sophiology into mainstream theology.

This article diagnoses the problem of plagiarism in academic books and articles in the disciplines of philosophy and theology. It identifies three impediments to institutional reform. They are: (1) a misplaced desire to preserve personal and institutional reputations; (2) a failure to recognize that attribution in academic writing admits of degrees; and (3) a disproportionate emphasis on the so-called “intention to plagiarize.” A detailed case study provides an illustration of the need for institutional reform in the post-publication processes in the disciplines of philosophy and theology.

Sophocles’s Oedipus Tyrannus shows that humans' problems do not appear when they listen to the gods, but when they listen to themselves imagining that they follow the gods. Instead of placing themselves in the service of the god, as Socrates does in Plato’s Apology, they only think that they follow the divinity, while they actually act according to their own understanding. If Sophocles’s play is a synopsis of this danger, Plato’s dialogue proposes a different attitude before divinity: instead of interpreting the gods and acting on this interpretation, you would need to enter into their service by studying the meaning of their communication.

The theology of the (Hebrew) Bible, as set out in the Torah’s foundational parts, answers the question “What am I?” not the question “Why is there a world?” So the principle that the Bible’s deity, God, represents, the principle of a category of being not recognized in the pagan thinking whose basic elements Greek philosophy systematizes, first enters “In the day that . . . the Lord God formed [the] man,” not “In the beginning when God created the heavens and the earth.” The admonition to place God first doesn’t therefore exclude the impersonal principles of being with which the other gods are associated, only denies their adequacy to making sense of your being and of mine, of his being and of hers.

An analysis of Scripture uncovers a new model of God’s election and predestination of souls, which fits under the umbrella of the Calvinist theologies, but where this model involves an answer to the long-standing question of why God chose some, rather than all. It will be explored how before souls were elected (or condemned), God looked at them and knew them in a pre-election state, which God used to predestine each soul in physical reality. This analysis reveals why it could be no other way but where God only would choose some, rather than all souls during the physical embodiment stage of the soul, and the vexing centuries-old Calvinist question of why God elected some not all has an answer.

According to John Hare, a “moral gap” exists between the authority of a moral demand and our inability to do the moral demand. Only the authority of the moral demander can bridge the gap, but that requires the demander experience the obligations of the demand. Christian ethics has a way to explain how to bridge of the gap. Through the doctrine of the perichoresis of triune relationships, we see how the mutual indwelling of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit incorporates the human spirit into the inner-work of the triune relations, and thereby closes the moral gap.