Philosophia Christi

Keith Ward’s Christ and the Cosmos is a bold and creative attempt to solve real Trinitarian and Christological difficulties. I object that it is not, as advertised a “reformulation” of any prior Trinity doctrine, and that it contradicts the New Testament in denying the identity of Jesus with the Son, and in denying the identity of the Father with the one God.

My paper addresses the possibility of Jews and Christians becoming theologically closer than in the past, given Ward’s Trinity. I address the question of whether Ward’s version of the Trinity necessarily clashes with Jewish tradition. I contend that it does not so clash, especially because for Ward Jesus is only a contingent instantiation of the Word. A Jew could accept the purely logical implications of the Wardian Trinity. I then present a new Jewish theology of Jesus, one that is sympathetic to Jesus, but which denies his divinity. The result is a moving closer of Jewish and Christian theology.

This paper explores the “rationality” of the Christian faith, focusing on the capacity of the Christian “big picture” to colligate and coordinate personal experience and observations of the world. To illustrate this, C. S. Lewis’s famous “argument from desire” is framed within the parameters of two significant philosophies of explanation: C. S. Peirce’s abductive approach, and “inference to the best explanation” (Gilbert Harman; Peter Lipton). It is argued that the Christian faith offers a “metarationality,” which affirms the ultimate rationality of mysteries such as the doctrine of the Trinity while also accounting for the way we make sense of the everyday world.

We argue that the secular cannot offer a materialist response to “The Problem of Too Many Thinkers” that makes autonomy possible. The materialist can accommodate what truths about respecting personal freedom and autonomy only by accepting a counterintuitive sparse ontology. Immaterial accounts of the person look good by comparison. However, those immaterialist theories that don’t posit a divinely created soul suffer from certain metaphysical puzzles avoided by those who do claim divine creation. A soul that requires divine creation strongly suggests that such immaterial beings were made for a purpose. Such purposeful creation makes theistic ethics seem far more plausible.

Theism and naturalism are rival worldviews. Both seek to explain the nature of reality, but often give radically different explanations. One of the most important areas of conflict is the differing accounts for the existence of the world in which we live. Why is the actual world the one that has been instantiated instead of any other of the apparently infinite number of other possible worlds? In this paper I argue that whereas theism has a puzzle as to why God actualized this particular world, naturalism has a major problem as why any ordered world exists.

Furthering our project of applying Plantinga’s epistemology to different world religions, we do a comparative study of Mormonism and Vaiśeṣika Hinduism and analyze whether they can utilize Plantinga’s epistemology in order to claim that their beliefs about God if true are probably warranted. Specifically, we argue that they cannot, as ultimately they are unable to account for the preconditions needed to make for an intelligible cognitive design plan, due to either affirming an infinite regress when it comes to the designers of our cognitive faculties or affirming an infinite number of cosmological cycles in which our faculties are formed.

The principle of alternate possibilities states that a person cannot be morally responsible for what he has done, unless he had the “ability” to do otherwise. Incompatibilists typically add that determinism removes such ability, thereby excluding moral responsibility. In response, compatibilists have often affirmed something close, only interpreting the ability in question to be conditional, counterfactual, and hence compatible with determinism. This conditional analysis has been (loudly) criticized for being question-begging, unnecessary, and insufficient. This paper aims to refute these three objections, to uphold the coherence of the conditional analysis, along with (it is hoped) the integrity of its proponents.

Morris and Menzel’s view that God is the Creator of abstract as well as concrete objects is variously referred to by the labels “absolute creation” and “theistic activism.” To use these labels synonymously, however, exhibits a lack of discrimination. Theistic activism is the project of grounding modality in God, particularly in the divine will. Absolute creationism is a nonmodal project which regards abstract objects as created by God. The synonymous use of these terms results in confusion in debates over divine aseity and sovereignty. Philosophical discussion will benefit if we adopt a uniform terminology discriminating between these different views.

This review article examines the late agnostic New Testament scholar Maurice Casey’s criticisms of the so-called mythicist position, which argues that Jesus did not exist. Casey’s volume Jesus: Evidence and Argument or Mythicist Myths? is viewed along with Bart Ehrman’s critique of similar ideas in his text Did Jesus Exist? We will highlight important objections raised by these agnostic scholars against those in the mythicist movement, including topics such as various idiosyncrasies leading to historically deficient methods, egregiously latedating the canonical Gospels, claiming inspiration from earlier mystery religions, and positing textual interpolations.