Logos & Episteme

<< additional functions

debate
1.	Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4 John Turri Preempting Paradox abstract \| view \| rights & permissions \| cited by Charlie Pelling has recently argued that two leading accounts of the norm of assertion, the truth account and a version of the knowledge account, invite paradoxand so must be false. Pelling’s arguments assume that an isolated utterance of the sentence “This assertion is improper” counts as making an assertion. I argue that this assumption is questionable.	SHARE

reviews
2.	Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4 Corina Daba-Buzoianu Ian Evans, Nicholas D. Smith, Knowledge view \| rights & permissions \| cited by	SHARE


3.	Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4 Notes on the Contributors view \| rights & permissions \| cited by	SHARE


4.	Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4 Logos & Episteme. Aims and Scope view \| rights & permissions \| cited by	SHARE


5.	Logos & Episteme: Volume > 3 > Issue: 4 Notes to Contributors view \| rights & permissions \| cited by	SHARE