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Journal of Philosophical Research

Volume 37, Issue Supplement, 2012
Selected Papers from the XXII World Congress of Philosophy

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Displaying: 1-20 of 39 documents


rethinking epistemology, philosophy of science, and technology: knowledge and culture

1. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Evandro Agazzi

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Modern philosophy of science was, initially, an epistemology of science based on the logical analysis of the language of science. It was superseded by a “sociological epistemology,” according to which the acceptance of scientific statements and theories depends on conditioningscoming from the social context and powers, and this view has fueled anti-scientific attitudes.This happened because the sociological turn still expressed an epistemology of science. Science, however, is not only a system of knowledge, but also a complex human activity. Hence, ethical, political, social, religious issues appear legitimate if they concern “doing science.”Therefore, we must “rethink” philosophy of science, accepting in it also an axiology of science that could enable us to retain the cognitive value of science and at the same time to make techno-scientific activity compatible with the satisfaction of a great variety of values that inspire our societies.
2. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Jaegwon Kim

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The traditional view of science holds that science is essentially nomothetic—that is, the defining characteristic of science is that it seeks to discover and formulate laws for the phenomena in its domain, and that laws are required for explanation and prediction. This paper advances the thesis that there are no laws in the special sciences, sciences other than fundamental physics, and that this does not impugn their status as sciences. Toward this end, two arguments are presented. The first begins with Donald Davidson’s argument against psychophysical laws and develops a more perspicacious general argument against special science laws. The second is a generalized and more explicitly motivated argument based on J. J. C. Smart’s claim that biology, unlike physics, has no laws.
3. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Bertrand Saint-Sernin

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The term “Renaissance” usually applies to a period in European history during which the Greco-Latin culture was rediscovered and modern science started. We show that “the Idea of Renaissance” indicates a universal process: a community (a nation, for example), identifying needs that it does not know how to satisfy by itself, and recognising that another community already satisfies them, tries first to acclimate the external process, and then becomes a creative entity. Several interpretations of this process have already been given: we study three of them: the law of the three states by Auguste Comte, the notion of “a single revolution” in Kant’s Critic of Pure Reason and Critic of Judgement, and the notion of “scientific revolution” by A. A. Cournot. Thus conceived, Renaissance means a challenge in which all cultures are equally involved: discovering, even elsewhere, the means of satisfy needs which are related to scientific knowledge and know-how; trying to assimilate them; and making them productive and indigenous by becoming creative.

rethinking history of philosophy and comparative philosophy: traditions, critique, and dialogue

4. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Jean Greisch

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Si «penser» est d’abord un acte, «repenser» l’est aussi. On ne peut «repenser» que ce qui fut déjà pensé une fois. Ce que «repenser» veut dire, nous ne le comprenons que si nous nous demandons au préalable ce que «penser» veut dire. Pour Heidegger, cela revient à se demander ce qui nous appelle à penser, pour Kant, c’est se demander comment on peut s’orienter dans la pensée, pour Nietzsche, ce qui nous pousse à penser, à quoi j’ajouterai la question, moins connue et plus déconcertante, d’Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy dans son essai sur la «pensée dative»: «Cui cogitatur?», «À qui nos pensées sont-elles destinées?»À quoi nos pensées sont-elles dédiées?, à qui sont-elles destinées?: c’est la tension féconde entre ces deux questions qui nous met sur la voie d’une réflexion sur le sens que le verbe «repenser» peut revêtir dans la bouche d’un philosophe. À la différence de ceux qui s’imaginent que «repenser» veut dire simplement distribuer un peu différemment les cartes du savoir, les vrais «repenseurs» ne cessent de se demander à quel jeu ils jouent quand il s’efforcent de penser philosophiquement et ils cherchent à avoir une conscience plus nette des enjeux de ces jeux de la pensée.
5. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Enrique Dussel

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This paper argues the following points: (1) It is necessary to affirm that humanity has always sought to address certain “core universal problems” that are present in all cultures. (2) The rational responses to these “core problems” first appear as mythical narratives. (3) The formulation of categorical philosophical discourses is a subsequent development in human rationality, which does not however negate all mythical narratives. (4) Modern European philosophy confused its economic, political, and cultural domination, and the resulting crises in other philosophical traditions, with a Eurocentric universality claim, which must be questioned. (5) There are universal aspects in which all regional philosophies coincide, and which respond to the “core problems” at an abstract level. (6) All of this impels entry into a new age of inter-philosophical dialogue, respectful of differences and open to learning from other traditions. (7) A new philosophical project must be developed that is capable of going beyond Eurocentric philosophical modernity, by shaping a global transmodern pluriverse.
6. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Hwa Yol Jung

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This paper advances the concept of transversality by drawing philosophical insights from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Calvin O. Schrag, and the Martinicuan francophone Edouard Glissant. By so doing, it attempts to deconstruct the notion of universality in modern Western philosophy. It begins with a critique of the notion of Eurocentric universality which is founded on the fallacious premise that what is particular in the West is made universal, whereas whereas what is particular in the non-West remains particular forever. Eurocentric Universality has no place in the globalization of the multicultural world. It simply ignores the reality of interlacing of multiple life-worlds. The concept of transversality, whose icon is the Maitreyan Middle Way, is proposed to replace universality. It not only reduced ethnocentric particularism but also fosters a hybridity that in fact dissolves the binary opposition between particularism and universalism. In short, transversality is conceived of as a radically new paradigm in philosophical conceptualization or world philosophy.
7. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Tomonobu Imamichi

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The numbers of unfortunate deaths in the twentieth century were the highest compared with any previous century. Such an increase obviates any excuses The idea of technological possibility itself is one of the most basic causes of the destruction of nature in our new human milieu today, the technological conjuncture. But we human beings are also a part of nature. Therefore, without a new ethics understood as eco-ethica nature itself cannot fulfill the necessary conditions for the survival of human beings. For the first time owing to the technological conjuncture human beings bear full responsibility for all human beings tomorrow, for the future of humanity. Nature is no longer just a means to be exploited for the development of human civilization but also a model for how human civilization is to survive. The two great humanistic traditions, Western and Eastern, have developed the same content at the same level. People in the two worlds are really preparing a new cosmopolitanism.

conflict and tolerance

8. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Jean Grondin

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In a world allegedly lacking a moral compass, tolerance has become the major virtue of our time. All profess to be tolerant, but how tolerant are we in reality? As a case in point, how tolerant are philosophers themselves? A short overview of philosophy seems to suggest that they are less tolerant than one might imagine. A few reasons for this are provided : on the one hand, their commitment to issues of truth, logic and argument makes them perhaps intolerant of what they view as blatantly absurd or flawed views; on the other hand, the often very ideological nature of philosophy itself does its part to make philosophers less open to differing or opposite points of view.
9. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Aloyse-Raymond Ndiaye

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L’intolérance religieuse qui alimente de nos jours de nombreux conflits contemporains nous conduit à repenser notre conception moderne de la tolérance, née des débats théologiques et philosophiques, qui ont accompagné ou qui ont été provoqués par les controverses doctrinales et les guerres politico-religieuses des XVIème et XVIIème siècles. Elle se définit par le respect des ordres distincts: celui de la conscience et celui de la loi, du privé et du public, celui de la foi et de la raison. Elle porte la marque de son origine, du religieux et du théologique, et renvoie à l’idée de dignité humaine à laquelle la doctrine de l’autonomie de Kant, au XVIIIème siècle, a apporté son fondement éthique. L’actualité nous apprend qu’aujourd’hui encore on tue, on persécute au nom de la foi, au nom de Dieu, au nom de la religion, pour avoir une opinion ou une croyance différente. Si la tolérance, fille des Lumières et de la raison critique, ne s’est pas imposée définitivement dans un monde rationnel et technique, il y a lieu de se demander si ce n’est pas pour avoir négligé la foi. Il ne suffit pas de déclarer la mort de Dieu pour faire disparaître la religion. Conclure de la distinction de la raison et de la foi à leur antagonisme n’a pas conduit à déraciner l’intolérance de l’esprit humain. Aurions-nous oublié que la paix est aussi l’affaire du religieux? Que faut-il attendre, que faut-il espérer du dialogue inter-religieux? La foi serait-elle l’antidote à l’intolérance? Que peut faire la foi?
10. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
David M. Rasmussen

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This paper will begin by clarifying the kind of context, which requires toleration. My point of departure is a characterization of modernity that both departs from the classical modern theory of secularization and draws from the current research on multiple modernities. Because of the more or less recent resurgence of religion we can no longer characterize toleration on the basis of a theory of secularization. This will lead to the definition of conflict and tolerance within the confines of a post-secular society. The philosophical component of the concept of toleration will be taken from both Aristotle and Kant in the sense that toleration is not only a necessary virtue in modern society, it is also a normative notion based on respect for the law. Finally, the paper concludes that toleration must be conceived of as a principle of justice in a society that requires respect not only for the rights of others but for their cultures as well.
11. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Ruben Apressyan

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As a moral principle toleration is universal, but only in the sense that potentially it is addressed to every rational and moral agent. The question is whether this principle is appropriate in all situations and what are those moral agents who recognize its practical actuality for them? Toleration is not an absolute ethical principle, but one among others in the context of a particular moral system. It should be given a proper place in the hierarchy of principles. Understanding toleration as the absolute or even overriding principle may lead in the face of obvious and directly threatening wrong to its use as an umbrella for adoptive or escapist behavior. The limits to toleration are given by basic and minimal ethical task to resist evil. The principle of active opposition to evil by all possible means is prior to the principle of toleration.

globalization and cosmopolitanism

12. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Alexander N. Chumakov

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Globalization and cosmopolitanism, on the one hand, and autarchy and nationalism, on the other, are two extremes between which humankind is destined to balance constantly, due to diversity and the natural confrontation of various cultural and civilizational systems by which it is represented. At the same time, globalization and cosmopolitanism are natural phenomena and are the most important characteristics of social development. That is why we should not put obstacles in the way of their dissemination and rooting in social life, but to aim at deeper understanding of their essence and what is hidden behind them in order, preventing ourselves from rash evaluations and one-sided conclusions, to contribute to the formation of a stable and just global world.
13. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Cyrille B. Koné

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Rather than unifying the peoples in the world, globalization divides them into zones: either developed and prosperous, or underdeveloped and ravaged by poverty. How, then, can one imagine economic and financial globalization as a current implementation of cosmopolitanism, which abolishes the old fratricidal strife and seals the reunion between men across national borders? And how can we not doubt the cosmopolitan order facing the proliferation of identity claims, the rise of competitors due to globalization? Are we condemned to live in a world ever more unequal, more “hard” for the losers, the weak? What space is there in philosophy to think the new solidarity? This paper sketches some answers to these questions.
14. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Peter McCormick

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This paper focuses on four brief points only: first, the general character of today’s understandings of globalization; then, one substantive danger that arises from this general understanding of globalization; third, by contrast, the universal character of just one of the most important traditional understandings of cosmopolitanism; and, finally, on what might bring together a certain globalization and a certain cosmopolitanism into something more than either just a so-called European or African “anthropocentric ethics.” The key conceptual resource highlighted is that of friendship.
15. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Francis Cheneval

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Globalization stands for systemic integration, mainly economical and technological. It is related to the expansion of the free market economy, trade, and the global integration of systems of communication and information technology. As such, globalization co-exists with strong cultural affirmations of individual and collective difference and with political fragmentation. Cosmopolitanism needs to take into consideration cultural and political conditions of human existence. The cosmopolitan imperative to form a political community beyond the nation state is a process-guiding principle or regulative ideal, not an institutional blueprint. Cosmopolitanism needs to stress the voluntary character of integration among self-governed peoples who are willing to enhance the transnational rights and freedoms of their citizens while accepting institutional constraints.

bioethics, environmental ethics, and future generations

16. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Jean-Yves Goffi

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On se propose de fédérer les questions relevant de la bioéthique, des générations futures et de l’éthique environnementale autour du thème de la communauté morale. On examinera certains problèmes théoriques posés par l’élargissement de celle-ci. On soutiendra qu’il n’est possible d’y faire face qu’en se ralliant à une forme d’anthropocentrisme. Toutefois, il s’agit d’un anthropocentrisme méta-axiologique, pas d’un anthropocentrisme normatif: il ne saurait être question de soutenir que les intérêts des être humains ont, toujours et partout, priorité sur les intérêts des autres créatures.
17. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Vittorio Hösle

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This essay discusses the challenges that the problem of environmental destruction represents for both ethics and political philosophy. It defends universalism as the only ethical theory capable of dealing adequately with the issue, but recognizes three limitations of it: First, its strong anthropocentrism (as in Kant); second, the meta-ethics of rational egoism (Spinoza and Hobbes); and, third, the reduction of ethics to symmetric relations in the mores of modernity. With regard to political philosophy, universalism rejects the idea that consensus is a necessary and sufficient condition for morality; it points out that democratic rule is rule by majority, only rarely by unanimous consensus, and insists on the fact that even a unanimous consensus does not guarantee justice if the people affected by a decision are not identical with those entitled to make it. The latter is the case in issues of intergenerational justice. The essay ends by opposing a formalist and proceduralist concept of democracy with one that understands democracy as one reasonable tool for achieving a substantive concept of justice.
18. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Marie-Hélène Parizeau

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The hypothesis I develop involves that we have been witnessing, during the last ten years or so, an interpenetration in the area of applied ethics of certain concepts originally belonging to different areas of ethics, namely bioethics, environmental ethics, and also business ethics. Certain concepts such as “future generations,” “consent,” “precautionary principle,” “intrinsic value,” “global governance,” “sustainable development,” or “scientific uncertainty” are becoming “thick ethical concepts,” in the terminology of metaethics; or in the terminology of American pragmatism: “living beliefs.” They are now charged with strong moral contents that unfolds a new horizon of meaning at the heart of Western Modernity, a horizon largely defined by science and technical actions. Nevertheless, is this conceptual convergence in the area of applied ethics the sign of the coming of a new ethic of technique? I will discuss this topic taking as an example the case of nanotechnology.

tradition, modernity, and post-modernity: eastern and western perspectives

19. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Bengt Kristensson Uggla

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This paper presents a critical reflection on the attempts to determine the historical meaning of the present situation as a philosophical topic. To determine the specific interpretative character of the diagnostics of our contemporary situation—beyond both absolute knowledge and arbitrary thinking—this paper argues that “now” and “here” need to be defined in accordance with the concepts of “historical time” and “inhabited space.” This has been made possible as a result of the recent metamorphosis within the hermeneutical tradition.
20. Journal of Philosophical Research: Volume > 37 > Issue: Supplement
Elmar Holenstein

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A symposium with the title “Tradition, Modernity and Postmodernity: Eastern and Western Perspectives” is in need of a subtitle auch as “Overcoming Dichotomies.” Societies, as well as historical epochs, are complex and overlapping phenomena. A clash between complex civilizations will naturally be a complex encounter. The conflicting parties will always find kindred souls on the other side, motivated by converging interests and values. Modernity and secularism are not inseparable, and tradionality and secularism are not incompatible (see Confucian politology). Two main philosophical reasons for the complexity of civilizations are the heterarchical structure of the human value system and the creative potential of human individuals. These highest values cannot be optimally realized at the same time. The potential for self-fulfillment that every human being has, thanks to his mental structures, excedes the potential for self-fulfillment a singular culture can provide.