Epistemology & Philosophy of Science

The author demonstrates the dialogic and historicity of the process of understanding, on the basis of which he comes to three conclusions that radically differ from the main points of the article under discussion: 1. the understanding is not a problem of personal and social meanings; 2. the understanding is structured like the recognition; 3. as well as recognition, the understanding is defined by positions, and therefore it is conflictual, it destroys subject-object relations. The consequence of it is the mutual transformation of the subject and the object of understanding, leaving no place for unimpaired subjectivity.

The aim of this paper is to discuss one distinct feature of linguistic communication, namely, misunderstanding. Along the general lines of the work of J. L. Austin misunderstanding treated as mistakes in communication or infelicities. The classification offered in the paper is based on the teaching practice and deals with two cases of infelicities – “total misunderstanding” and “overinterpretation”.

This paper offers a brief introduction, summary, and commentary on the cognitive science of religion (CSR), a burgeoning, interdisciplinary field of study that examines the way mental resources and predispositions facilitate religious beliefs and behavior. This presentation of CSR devotes special attention to research on teleological bias, agency detection, and counterintuitive concepts; moreover, critical discussions of mystical experience and god concepts ensue from treatments of the latter two topics. Research on teleological bias, agency detection, and counterintuitiveness supports the basic position that religious cognition is natural, although distinctive rationales are associated with each topic of investigation. While the major focus of this article is epistemological – how religious thought develops and is sustained – the conclusion briefly addresses the ontological significance of basic CSR findings.

The article dwells upon social constructionist critique of the ideal of scientific objectivity. It is shown that a number of researchers tend to replace the universal principle of objectivity that is used in science with the concept of “situated knowledge”. This concept argues that each knowledge belongs to a certain local social group and can be considered only in a narrow sociocultural context. The supporters of the “situated knowledge” concept assume that this approach should be considered as “strong objectivity” that consists in the acknowledgment of the impossibility of the existence of neutral unbiased researcher in the scientific cognition and, consequently, the impossibility of acquiring true knowledge or even building a scientific theory. Instead they suggest to give a “vote” for each of these social groups to voice their own scientific statements that will be considered as equivalent, thus realizing the democratic principle. The article demonstrates the complications of this position and shows that it does not only lead to the loss of possibility to speak of science as universal cultural institute but also to the loss of mutual understanding and the possibility of dialogue between different social groups: each group instead of using the objectivity principle and striving to seek common knowledge, will insist on the paramount value of its own local “situated” knowledge.

The mental models theory proposes that reasoning is not logical. From its point of view, people only regard possibilities that represent reality in an iconic way, and they draw conclusions by reviewing such possibilities. Obviously, a framework of this kind seems incompatible with the idea that the human mind thinks by means of logical forms. However, in this paper, the author tries to show that, if we accept the basic theses of the mental models theory, we must also assume that certain formal logical structures are equally part of the human intellectual machinery, even though its proponents explicitly reject any link between logic and thought. In particular, the author argues here that it is not possible to adopt the mental models theory without accepting, at the same time, some deontic propositions that are usually admitted in standard deontic logic.

Synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness and their in­terrelation pose interdisciplinary problems that can only be addressed by the combined means of philosophical and scien­tific theories. In the first part of the article the author briefly reviews psychological and materialistic accounts of personal identity. Historically these accounts were introduced to solve the problem of diachronic identity of persons, i.e., the problem of their persistence through time. She argues that they don’t explain how synchronic unity of consciousness, subjectively experienced as the unity of the phenomenal field, correlates with diachronic identity of persons. In the second part of the article the author reviews Tim Bayne’s “virtual phenomenalism”. In the third part of the article she formulates two questions that virtual phenomenalism has to answer in order to solve the problems that face both the psychological and the materialistic accounts of personal identity. The first question concerns some cognitive and neurobiological characteristics of consciousness that Bayne invokes in order to propose an original solution of the problem of the synchronic unity of consciousness. It might be asked whether the same characteristics can undermine Bayne’s solution of the problem of the diachronic unity of consciousness. The second question is a development of Bernard Williams’ arguments against psychological accounts of personal identity. The author suggests that similar arguments can be used against virtual phenomenalism.

The article is devoted to Miguel Servet (Michael Servetus, Spain – Miguel Serveto, also known as Miguel Servet, Miguel Serveto, Revés, or Michel de Villeneuve) – the XVI century Spanish thinker who was recognized as a heretic and burnt at the stake in Geneva in 1553.The author discusses the specifics of Servet’s philosophical system, the scientific background of his system, and his key ideas that have become a matter for auto-da-fė. The author argues that Servet’s concept was aimed to reconstruct the “pure” Christian dogma, although he was not a professional theologist. The author claims that Servet used the deep knowledge in geography, astronomy, medicine, linguistics to create his complex system which was aimed to rescue the mankind from total destruction (Apocalypse). The author claims that Servet’s system could be considered as an example of interdisciplinary approach in the pre-disciplinary epoch. Moreover, Servet’s approach to the problem of personal salvation and the transformation of the humane nature is based on empirical scientific data. Hence, it is appropriate to consider his philosophical system as a mixture of theology, natural science and humanities.

The author argues that scientific and technological progress opens the new possibilities and creates the new threats for the humanity. In 21st century, the civilization will progress fantastically. As the result, the world around us and all spheres of society will be radically transformed. She discusses the following problem: what to expect from the future – whether our best utopian dreams come true or the worst dystopian scenarios become a reality? In accordance with the first position, science is a power, and the new technological solutions will be found for each emerging problem. According to the other one, technological progress without the development of humans is a source of danger for future. The author discusses an alternative view on the problem. She claims that it is necessary to develop social mechanisms and practices for making scientific progress and social changes manageable. The future depends on the current social practice. Every person today can participate in the planning of future. Technologies provide us with the effective means for dealing with social reality, including those means which are not quite expectable and taken seriously – such as games and gamification techniques. The author disputes with the ideas of Yuval Harari’s “Homo Deus: a Brief History of Tomorrow”. She considers some preconditions for realization of alternative scenarios of future. She concludes that in the future the more people could use better the opportunities and resources of super technological society.

This article discusses the philosophical status of the methodological agnosticism principle established in religious studies. Elaborated by Ninian Smart in the early 70s, it is commonly interpreted as a convenient principle for research in comparative religion, since it doesn’t presuppose any strong ontological commitments concerning the truth or falsity of religious belief. Since religious studies in academia have everything to do with the situation of religious pluralism, it is rationally imprudent to take either atheism or theism as a sufficient requirement to religious research, so the agnostic attitude is the only viable position. The situation provokes the question: can, and should, methodological agnosticism be grounded and justified by philosophical means? The status and function of the philosophy of religion in Smart’s project of religious studies is emphasized, as well as rationality as its central element. Among the possible solutions to the problem of rationality and religion depicted by Smart, it is the linguistic philosophy approach, which he calls the Language Game Thesis, that is of special interest. Smart rejected its applicability in religious studies primarily because of the restrictions determined by its inevitable religious, i.e. Christian, spirit. This assumption rests on Smart’s conception of the language rule in religion as autonomous and independent, while this understanding of game and rules is, at the least, not common to all of linguistic philosophy. Yet, it is possible to interpret methodological agnosticism according to the Language Game Thesis while not losing the pluralistic principle. Certain elements in arguing for agnosticism, especially the elaboration of “parables”, show that rationality here corresponds to that of everyday language, as the only possible space for the combination of different rules. While arguments for atheism stress the incompatibility of religious and scientific rationalities, and theism stresses the independence of the former, agnosticism proclaims their mutual meaningfulness. The essential question here arises: is it at all possible to treat agnosticism in any other way than in ordinary language?

Author considers the foundations of Niklas Luhmann’s communicative theory in application to the problem of rationality in law. She argues that one of the most important advantages of Luhmann’s approach is the rejection of the subject-centric interpretation of rationality. This sort of rejection makes it possible to consider rationality as an integral property of the legal system which reflects system’s sensitivity to some of incoming agitations. The author analyzes the concepts of “normative closure” and “cognitive openness” and their role in legal rationality justification. The author discusses the positive meaning of paradoxes in law and considers them as a consequence of the law’s open structure.

The article starts with the brief review of the history of the creation of actor-network theory (ANT), followed by the explanation of its basic notions. The author observes the difficulties of understanding and translation of the main ANT terms “actor” and “network”. In the main part of the article the author considers a famous episode from the history of giant airships known as “Miracle at Echterdingen” – that is a sudden revelation of the national spirit of German Empire as the result of the flight and catastrophe of zeppelin LZ4 in august 1908. She discusses methodological limits of the historical reconstructions of “Miracle at Echterdingen” in Douglas Botting’s “The Giant Airships” (1980) and Peter Fritzche’s “Nation of Fliers” (1992). It is demonstrated that ANT allows to overcome not only the obvious weakness of the linear narrative that Botting followed, but also the oxydenthalism of Peter Fritsche’s approach and to confirm Latour’s thesis that “modernism’s accounts of itself may have no relation to what has actually happened to it”. As the result of the implementation of ANT, the network of forces which circulated in German society and lead to the Echterdingen phenomenon, is revealed.

This paper is an introduction to “Auguste Comte and the Positivism” by William Whewell. The author claim that the Comte’s ideas were considered in Whewell’s essay only as an excuse to declare general protest against critical attitude in its relation to scientific and social life, and also both to the evolution of nature and science, and to the development of the social order. This work could be considered as the last manifesto of the so-called “old European semantics” with the doctrine of “truth perfectionism”, which presumes an achievement of final stage of scientific development and an approval of ultimate scientific truths.

The article is the last philosophical essay by William Whewell published after his death in 1866. Here the philosopher and historian of science criticizes the most popular explanatory theory of scientific and disciplinary development of his time proposed by Auguste Comte. He also critically investigates the influence of Comte’s ideas on the ideas of John Stewart Mill, his main opponent, providing counter-examples from the history of science.

This is a review of the book “Poiski ponimaniya. Izbrannye trudy po istorii i filosofii nauki” by N. F. Ovchinnikov. The author argues that the main topic of the reviewed book is the problem of knowledge. She pays special attention to the idea of invariance in its connection with the phenomena of scientific revolutions. The author also discusses the relationships between fundamental science and science as social technology.

This article represents the review of the collective monograph “Social Philosophy of Science. Russian Prospects” (ed. by I. T. Kasavin). The article deals with the crisis in philosophy of science by the end of the XX century which has become prerequisite for the emergence of the project of social philosophy of science. The author analyzes this project and proves the necessity of its implementation in connection with the realities of the global world. The author also analyzes the structure of the book and discusses a number of key issues (attitude of knowledge and sociality, role of science in society, methodological aspects of case-study, etc.).