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features

1. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Judith Roche

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2. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jacob Metcalf

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Using grizzly-human encounters as a case study, this paper argues for a rethinking of the differences between humans and animals within environmental ethics. A diffractive approach that understands such differences as an effect of specific material and discursive arrangements (rather than as pre-settled and oppositional) would see ethics as an interrogation of which arrangements enable flourishing, or living and dying well. The paper draws on a wide variety of human-grizzly encounters in order to describe the species as co-constitutive and challenges perspectives that treat bears and other animals as oppositional and nonagential outsides to humans.
3. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Cheryl Lousley

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The essay discusses the significance of narrative for environmental ethics by attending to the conventions of autobiography in Farley Mowat’s anti-whaling text, A Whale for the Killing. A tension emerges in environmental nonfiction narrative between the desire to transcend the self and its expression in autobiographical form, which necessarily places the self at the centre of the narrative. I trace the construction of the narrator’s and whale’s ethical personae to argue that even as Mowat’s narration of a subject-to-subject encounter challenges the ontological and ethical divide between “human” and “animal,” it nevertheless reconstructs a liberal-humanist notion of subjectivity.
4. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Daniela Elza

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5. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2

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book reviews

6. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Timothy M. Costelloe

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7. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Scott Samuelson

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8. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jason Wirth

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9. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Kirsten Jacobson

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10. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Keith Peterson

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11. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Jami Weinstein

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12. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 2
Robert Chapman

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contents

13. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Kenneth Maly

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features

14. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Stephanie Mills

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Stephanie Mills presented the following as the keynote address at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the International Association for Environmental Philosophy in Chicago. Mills addresses the readers of this journal in her role as a bioregional author and social critic. Adopting a narrative style rather than the typical format of the “philosophical essay,” she raises questions that are always and still at the core of our philosophical dialogue: What is nature? How do we humans perceive our relationship with nature? And how may the blind spots of academic philosophy be discerned in traditional approaches to issues such as “nature versus humans,” the wilderness debate, and the possibility and limits of technology?
15. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Wendy Lynn Lee

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Environmental pragmatism is rightly described as “cynical” if good reasons exist to worry its advocates would endorse oppressive measures to achieve its goals. Given the history of human chauvinism, moreover, this worry is not far-fetched. It is, however, misguided: conflation not-withstanding, human chauvinism and human-centeredness (anthropocentrism) are not the same thing. “Chauvinism” describes an objectionable but alterable course of human history; anthropocentrism is an indigenous feature of the experiential conditions of Homo sapiens from which no particular course of human history necessarily follows. Properly understood, I argue, human-centeredness is an ally in the quest for environmental responsibility—not its foe.
16. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Eleanor D. Helms

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There is a sense in which poetry can re-inscribe humans in their natural surroundings, but language—even poetic language—is also always problematic. In conversation with and in response to recent works by David Abram, I will delineate at least two ways in which poetic language separates and distinguishes humans from nature. I also argue for the importance of what is implicit or invisible (as opposed to tangible and sensuous). Language is a mode of human responsibility for the world, not just a sign or result of being part of it.
17. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Adam Konopka

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This essay argues that phenomenology is uniquely suited to critique naturalism without lapsing into a romantic, anti-scientific, or dystopian view of modern science. This argument situates Husserl’s retrieval of the environmental relation in the Vienna Lecture between two alternative tendencies in contemporary ecological phenomenology: 1) the rejection of or indifference to the positive sciences, and 2) the adoption of naturalism in phenomenological methodology. On the one hand, the claim is that the phenomenological return to the environment should not imply a rejection of methodological naturalism. On the other hand, while an ecological phenomenology is consistent with naturalistic investigation, there is nevertheless a heterogeneity between the two. In short, phenomenology need not become naturalized in order for it to be ecological.
18. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Lester Embree

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To establish a starting point for a phenomenological theory of the science of primate ethology, this essay first reviews how the phenomenological philosophers Aron Gurwitsch and Maurice Merleau-Ponty made use of the Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler’s description of chimpanzee consciousness and its objects and then considers primate ethology in light of the theory of the cultural sciences in the work of Gurwitsch in addition to that of Alfred Schutz.
19. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
Jessica Pierce

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Empathy refers to a whole class or “cluster” of behaviors based in emotional linkage between individuals. The capacity for empathy is not unique to humans, but has evolved in a range of mammals that live in complex social groups. There is good evidence for empathy in primates, pachyderms, cetaceans, social carnivores, and rodents. Because empathy is grounded in the same neurological architecture as other prosocial behaviors such as trust, reciprocity, cooperation, and fairness, it seems likely that a whole suite of interlinked moral behaviors have coevolved in social mammals. This essay explores the concept of empathy, reviews the scientific evidence for empathy in several species of social mammals, and suggests why empathy is adaptive. The paper concludeswith a discussion of what, if anything, the discovery of empathy in other animals suggests for how we treat them and how we think about our own morality.

book reviews

20. Environmental Philosophy: Volume > 5 > Issue: 1
David Kolb

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