Environmental Ethics

Much anthropocentric environmental argument is limited by a narrow conception of how humans can benefit from nature. E. O. Wilson defends a more robust anthropocentric environmentalism based on a broader understanding of these benefits. At the center of his argument is the biophilia hypothesis according to which humans have an evolutionarily crafted, aesthetic and spiritual affinity for nature. However,the “biophilia hypothesis” covers a variety of claims, some modest and some more extreme. Insofar as we have significant evidence for biophilia, it favors modest versions which do not support a particularly robust anthropocentric environmental ethic. A significantly more robust environmental ethic requires the most extreme version of the biophilia hypothesis, for which there is the least evidence.

The concepts dao and de in the Daodejing may be evoked to support a distinctive and plausible account of environmental holism. Dao refers to the totality of particulars, including the relations that hold between them, and the respective roles and functions of each within the whole. De refers to the distinctiveness of each particular, realized meaningfully only within the context of its interdependence with others, and its situatedness within the whole. Together, dao and de provide support for an ethical holism that avoids sacrificing individuals for the sake of the whole. The integrity and stability of the whole are important not because the whole is an end-in-itself but because those conditions assist in preserving the well-being of the constituent parts. In other words, the ethical holism supported in the Daodejing does not present individuals and wholes in mutually exclusive terms, but sees them in symbiotic relation, allowing for events to be mutually beneficial, or mutually obstructive, to both. In addition, two other Daoist concepts, wuwei (non-action) and ziran (spontaneity), provide further support for this construction of holism. If the distinctiveness of particular individuals is valued, then unilateral or reductive norms which obliterate such individuality are inappropriate. In this regard, the methodology of wuwei allows for the idea of individuals developing spontaneously in relation to others. According to this view of holism,individuals manifest and realize their integrity in relation to others in the environmental context, achieving an outcome that is maximally co-possible within those limits, rather than one that is maximally beneficial only for particular individuals.

There are theoretical difficulties involving the intentions of anglers that must be faced by anyone who wants to argue that sport fishing is ethically impermissible. Recent arguments have focused on what might be called the sadistic argument. This argument is fatally flawed because sport fishing is not a sadistic activity.

If virtue ethics are to provide a legitimate alternative for reasoning about environmental issues, they must meet the same conditions of adequacy as any other environmental ethic. One such condition that most environmental ethicists insist upon is that an adequate environmental ethic provides a theoretical platform for consistent and justified critique of environmentally unsustainable practices and policies. The external goods approach seeks to establish that any genuinely virtuous agent will be disposed to promote ecosystem sustainability on the grounds that ecosystem sustainability is a necessary external good for cultivating the virtues and/or human flourishing. At most the external goods approach is able to provide an environmental ethic that in most contexts will require that any genuinely virtuous agent will have the goal of promoting a weak environmental sustainability. A better approach may be the substantive approach, which incorporates environmental concern and practice into the substance of the virtues, rather than as a boundary condition for any prospective virtue.

Environmental activism, like all great activisms, is fundamentally normative, its principal beliefs contestable, its most powerful arguments rebuttable on the grounds that they are subjective. Environmental activists, as political tacticians with complex goals, have become skilled at presenting objectified versions of their own motivations when trying to broaden support for specific policies or take advantage of regulatory or legal opportunities. While instrumentally tempting and often expedient, this practice of objectifying moral arguments is in some respects disingenuous, and its successes as well as its failures bring with them characteristic risks, short-term and long-term.

Many problems in environmental ethics are what have been called “global systemic problems,” problems in which what happens in one part of the world affects preservationist efforts elsewhere. Restoration of the Everglades is one such example. If global warming continues, the Everglades may well be flooded within the next quarter to half century and all restoration efforts will be for naught. Yet, the United States government is both pursuing restorationist efforts and withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol on emissions of greenhouse gases. One aspect of global systemic problems concerns whether there are interconnections between the preservationist obligations of the locals and the duties of others. There are three main lines of arguments for concluding that there are, indeed, interconnected obligations in such cases. First, the consequentialist case for imposing duties on locals assumes that others do not have inconsistent consequentialist obligations. In addition, a related consequentialist case can be made that when problems are systemic, others have positive supportive duties. Second, a weak principle of reciprocity supports the interconnectedness of obligations. Insistence that someone has an obligation that benefits you implies the duty not to act to undermine the efforts of that person to fulfill that obligation. Third, a weak principle of fairness—that it is only fair to expect one person to bear the burdens of producinga collective good if others have obligations to do their cooperative part—supports interconnected obligations with regard to global systemic problems. Because all three arguments point to the same conclusion, there is a very strong case for interconnected obligations as part of the solution to global systemic problems—problems that are all too prevalent in our world today.

Classical philosophical Daoism and ecofeminism converge on key points. Ecofeminism’s critique of Western dualistic metaphysics finds support in Daoism’s nondualistic, particularist, cosmological framework, which distinguishes pairs of complementary opposites within a process of dynamic transformation without committing itself to a binary, essentialist position as regards sex and gender. Daoism’s epistemological implications suggest a link to ecofeminism’s alignment with a situational and provisional model of knowledge. As a transformative philosophy, the cluster of concepts that give specificity to the Daoist notion of transformation offers content and direction for the notion of transformation central to many ecofeminist philosophies. These affinities offer possibilities for developing the relevance of both philosophies to bear upon a theoretical understanding of how we can live in a respectful and sustainable relationship with our natural environment.

Philosophers such as Eric Katz and Robert Elliot have argued against ecological restoration on the grounds that restored landscapes are no longer natural. Katz calls them “artifacts,” but the sharp distinction between nature and artifact doesn’t hold up. Why should the products of one particular natural species be seen as somehow escaping nature? Katz’s account identifies an artifact too tightly with the intentions of its creator: artifacts always have more to them than what their creators intended, and furthermore the intention behind some artifacts might explicitly be to allow things to happen unpredictably. Indeed, to build any artifact is to employ forces that go beyond the builder: in this sense all artifacts are natural. Recognizing the naturalness of artifacts can help encourage the key environmental virtues of self-knowledge and humility.