|
1.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
61 >
Issue: 1
Irina N. Griftsova,
Natalya Yu. Kozlova
Ирина Николаевна Грифцова
Идеи философии языка Р. Карнапа в контексте концептуальной инженерии
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The past decade has seen notable development of conceptual engineering – a field of analytical philosophy that focuses on the critical evaluation of concepts. Most authors engaged with this area identify Rudolf Carnap’s ideas as its methodological framework and theoretical origin, placing particular emphasis on the philosopher’s method of explication. This article highlights the unquestionable influence Carnap’s thought had on conceptual engineering whilst by no means reducing it to the utilisation and advancement of explication within this field of analytical philosophy: indeed, conceptual engineering has incorporated – and brought to the forefront – much broader tenets of Carnap’s concept. This study draws on a series of the philosopher’s works, as well as his ‘Intellectual Autobiography’, to trace the evolution of his ideas about language and describe the fundamental elements revealing the ‘engineering perspective’ in his reflection. Most clearly, this perspective is evident in his interpretation of logic as a conceptual tool for acquiring and processing knowledge, ‘assembling’ it into a structure and refining the procedures of logic itself. It is shown that the origins of the engineering perspective trace back, on the one hand, to Carnap’s interest in the methodological framework of physics, particularly the measurement problem and its epistemological analysis, and, on the other, his fascination with interpretations of the nature of mathematical theory and the idea of unifying logicism and formalism by introducing the principle of tolerance, which adds a pragmatic dimension to methodology. The article examines in detail the idea of explication and its theoretical origins, which lie, in particular, in Carnap’s intention to exactify the notions expressing the degree of validity and probability. His idea of a link between the results of explication and its goal became the central principle of conceptual engineering, distinguishing it from mere conceptual analysis. It is concluded that, when considered together, Carnap’s two major ideas – explication and the principle of tolerance – can be placed in a broader context of a project seeking a rational reconstruction of the life of society and providing it with knowledge-based underpinnings.
В последние десять лет активно развивается концептуальная инженерия (conceptual engineering) – направление в аналитической философии, ориентированное на критическую работу с понятиями. Большинство авторов, разрабатывающих это направление, в качестве его методологической основы, теоретического истока называют идеи Р. Карнапа, делая акцент в первую очередь на его методе экспликации. В статье показывается, что влияние Карнапа на концептуальную инженерию несомненно, но оно не сводится только к использованию и развитию метода экспликации в концептуальной инженерии, а последняя во многом наследует и более широкие, «программные» установки концепции Р. Карнапа, в свою очередь, позволяя эти установки сделать более явными. На основе ряда работ и его «Интеллектуальной биографии» прослеживается эволюция взглядов Карнапа на язык, выявляются основания, позволяющие увидеть «инженерную перспективу» в его рассуждениях, которая наиболее явно проявляет себя в карнаповском понимании логики в качестве концептуального инструмента получения и обработки знания, «сборки его в структуру», а также улучшения собственных процедур. Показывается, что истоки инженерной перспективы также обнаруживаются в интересе Карнапа, с одной стороны, к методологическим основаниям физики, а именно к проблеме измерения и его эпистемологическому анализу, а с другой стороны, они видны и в его интересе к интерпретациям природы математической теории, в идее примирения логицизма и формализма за счет введения ≪принципа толерантности», позволяющего придать методологии прагматическое измерение. Подробно рассматривается идея экспликации и ее теоретические истоки, заключающиеся, в частности, в намерении Карнапа сделать «точными» понятия, выражающие степень доказательности, вероятности. Карнаповская идея связи результата проведенной экспликации с той целью, ради которой она проводилась, стала одной из главных установок концептуальной инженерии, отличающей ее от простого концептуального анализа. В заключение делается вывод, что рассмотренные вместе две главные идеи Р. Карнапа: экспликация понятий и принцип толерантности в выборе языка –могут быть помещены и в более широкий контекст проекта по рациональной реконструкции жизни общества в целом, ее переустройству на основе научного знания.
|
|
|
|
2.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
61 >
Issue: 1
Alberto Cordero
Альберто Кордеро
О структуре и накоплении реалистского содержания
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Ever since the heyday of the Vienna Circle, scientific realists have worked hard to document and clarify the structure and growth of truth content in theoretical descriptions. Today, this trait is particularly intense among “selective realists” – realists focused on theory parts with high empirical corroboration rather than whole theories. From their perspective, theories with posits systematically deployed in corroborated novel predictions are, with high probability, descriptively true or contain a proper part that is. Unlike traditional realists, selectivists acknowledge that (a) radical conceptual change is a recurring scientific phenomenon and (b) empirical theories have poor reliability records at the most profound ontological level. At the same time, they point to significant descriptive continuities at intermediate theoretical levels between successful theories and their successors – i.e., a false theory can (and often does) contain parts that succeed as correct descriptions. Selectivists seek to identify those parts. Their approaches limit ontological commitment exclusively to highly confirmed theoretical descriptions; unfortunately, the selection criteria they use seemingly support many regrettable choices. One source of trouble is that extant approaches leave unclear the ontology described by the selected parts. Historical cases and scientific practice gesture toward a functional resolution of this difficulty, but the clues could be more transparent and need elaboration. Otherwise, selectivism has improved in consistency over the last three decades. Current projects emphasize the continuity of well-established scientific content (relating to how entities and processes effectively behave within a specific regime or descriptive level) instead of just the continuity of “structure”. This paper provides some clarifications that arguably clear the road for realist commitment toward functional and effective theoretical content. The proposed functional/effective turn is checked against some plausible objections.
Со времен расцвета Венского кружка научные реалисты усердно работали над документированием и разъяснением структуры и роста содержания истины в теоретических описаниях. Сегодня эта черта особенно выражена среди ≪избирательных реалистов≫ – реалистов, сосредоточенных на частях теории с высоким эмпирическим подтверждением, а не на целых теориях. С их точки зрения, теории с постулатами, систематически используемыми в подтвержденных новых предсказаниях, с высокой вероятностью являются описательно истинными или содержат соответствующую часть. В отличие от традиционных реалистов, селективисты признают, что (а) радикальные концептуальные изменения являются повторяющимся научным явлением и (б) эмпирические теории имеют низкую надежность на самом глубоком онтологическом уровне. В то же время они указывают на значительную описательную преемственность на промежуточных теоретических уровнях между успешными теориями и их преемниками, т.е. ложная теория может содержать (и часто содержит) части, которые успешны в качестве правильных описаний. Селективисты стремятся идентифицировать эти части. Их подходы ограничивают онтологическую приверженность исключительно хорошо подтвержденными теоретическими описаниями. К сожалению, критерии отбора, которые они используют, по-видимому, приводят ко многим решениям, достойным сожаления. Одним из источников проблем является то, что существующие подходы оставляют неясной онтологию, описываемую выбранными частями. Исторические случаи и научная практика указывают на функциональное решение этой проблемы, но подсказки могли бы быть более прозрачными и нуждаются в доработке. В остальном за последние три десятилетия селективизм стал более последовательным. Текущие проекты подчеркивают преемственность устоявшегося научного содержания (касающегося того, как сущности и процессы ведут себя в рамках определенного режима или описательного уровня), а не просто непрерывность ≪структуры≫. В этой статье представлены некоторые разъяснения, которые, возможно, расчищают путь к реалистическому стремлению к функциональному и эффективному теоретическому содержанию. Предлагаемый функционально-эффективный поворот проверяется на предмет обоснованных возражений.
|
|
|
|
3.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
61 >
Issue: 1
Lev D. Lamberov
Лев Дмитриевич Ламберов
Принципы верификации и проверяемости
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The paper deals with the conception of logical empiricism developed by Eino Kaila. Eino Kaila, being a thinker close to the Vienna Circle, departs from some of the central ideas of logical positivism. He identifies a limited number of problems in metaphysics that are meaningful and need to be solved, but he declares the rest of metaphysics to be a logical fallacy. For Eino Kaila, it is not the principle of verification (as a criterion of meaning) but the principle of testability that plays the most important role. In addition, he revises the principle of translatability, insisting that it is impossible to translate a single sentence into the language of experience, but it is possible to translate the whole theory to which the sentence belongs. This is related to his structuralist position in the philosophy of science and his understanding of scientific theories as ‘rationalisations’ as opposed to simple inductive generalisations. The paper compares Eino Kaila’s views expressed during the period of his active interaction with the Vienna Circle be regarded as a predecessor of later critics of logical positivism (in particular, W.V.O. Quine).
В статье рассматривается концепция логического эмпиризма Эйно Кайлы. Эйно Кайла, будучи близким Венскому кружку мыслителем, отходит от ряда центральных идей логического позитивизма. Он выделяет ограниченный ряд проблем метафизики, которые являются осмысленными и требуют своего решения, однако остальная метафизика объявляется им логической ошибкой. Для Эйно Кайлы важнейшую роль играет не принцип верификации (как критерий значения), а принцип проверяемости. Кроме того, он пересматривает принцип переводимости, настаивая на том, что перевод отдельно взятого предложения на язык опыта невозможен, но возможен перевод целой теории, к которой это предложение относится. Это связано с его структуралистской позицией в философии науки и пониманием научных теорий как «рационализаций» в противовес простым индуктивным обобщениям. В статье сравниваются взгляды Эйно Кайлы, высказанные им в период его активного взаимодействия с представителями Венского кружка (до начала 1940-х гг.), с идеями представителей Венского кружка того времени, демонстрируются их идейные связи и различия, показано, что Эйно Кайлу можно в определенном смысле считать предшественником более поздних критиков логического позитивизма (в частности, У.В.О. Куайна).
|
|
|
4.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
61 >
Issue: 1
Arthur Sullivan
Артур Салливан
Витгенштейн, Карнап и Коперник
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
My point of departure is a passage in which Coffa claims: “Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s insights on the a priori belong in the same family as Kant’s... What we witness circa 1930 is a Copernican turn that, like Kant’s, bears the closest connection to the a priori; but its topic is meaning rather than experience” [Coffa, 1991, p. 263]. I draw out Kantian resonances in Wittgenstein’s and Carnap’s work on logic, grammar, and theoretical frameworks. In the end, Coffa’s remark comes out as significantly illuminating for a variety of questions, issues, and dynamic historical trends.
Моей отправной точкой является отрывок, в котором Коффа (1991) утверждает: «Взгляды Витгенштейна и Карнапа на априори принадлежат к той же семье, что и взгляды Канта… То, что мы наблюдаем примерно в 1930 г., – это коперниканский поворот, который, подобно кантовскому, имеет самую тесную связь с априори; но его темой является скорее смысл, чем опыт» [Coffa, 1991, p. 263]. Я выявляю кантианские резонансы в работах Витгенштейна и Карнапа по логике, грамматике и теоретическим основам. В конце я показываю, что замечание Коффы проливает свет на множество вопросов, проблем и динамичных исторических тенденций.
|
|
|
|
5.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
61 >
Issue: 1
Petr S. Kusliy,
Andrey A. Veretennikov
Петр Сергеевич Куслий
Аналитические истины в концепции Р. Карнапа и естественном языке
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The article presents a critical semantic analysis of the so-called analytical truths as they were discussed by R. Carnap and building on some new empirical data that are not fully satisfactorily explained by Carnap’s theory. A theoretical reconstruction of Carnap’s theory of analytical truths is proposed. It is demonstrated how his understanding of analytical truths, as statements that are true in all possible worlds and amenable to a quite obvious definition on a par with the concepts of sense (meaning) and synonymy, applies exclusively to artificial languages of logic. Therefore, Carnap’s theory remains unreachable for the well-known criticism of W. Quine, who, in turn, pointed out the difficulties in defining these concepts for natural languages. A theoretical reconstruction of Carnap’s explication of the mentioned concepts in the theory of meaning for natural languages is carried out. The connection of Carnap’s approach with the perspective of contemporary formal semantics is established. Subsequently, problematic cases and the difficulties they pose for Carnap’s concept are examined. An explanation is proposed for analytical truths as containing in their logical form an (unpronounced) quantifier over possible worlds (situations).
Статья представляет собой формально-семантический анализ так называемых аналитических истин на материале их обсуждения Р. Карнапом и на основе анализа некоторых эмпирических данных, которые не вполне удовлетворительно объясняются теорией Карнапа. Предлагается теоретическая реконструкция теории аналитических истин Карнапа. Показывается, как именно его понимание аналитических истин распространяется исключительно на искусственные языки логики и поэтому оказывается защищенным от известной критики У. Куайна. Эта критика указывала на сложности определения таких понятий, как аналитичность, синонимия, смысл для естественных языков. Производится теоретическая реконструкция экспликации Карнапом упомянутых понятий теории смысла для естественных языков. Устанавливается связь подхода Карнапа с перспективой современной формальной семантики. Далее исследуются некоторые проблемные случаи, связанные с истинностью аналитических утверждений даже в тех ситуациях, когда они не должны иметь никакого истинностного значения из-за содержащегося в них провала пресуппозиции. Исследуются сложности, которые эти случаи представляют для концепции Карнапа. Предлагается объяснение аналитических истин как содержащих в своей логической форме непроизносимый квантор по возможным мирам (ситуациям). Утверждается, что данное объяснение способно решить проблему рассмотренных сложных случаев и выявить более удовлетворительное понимание логической формы аналитических истин в естественном языке.
|
|
|
|
6.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
61 >
Issue: 1
Marco Buzzoni
Марко Буззони
Карл Гемпель: мысленные эксперименты между методологическим монизмом и дихотомией открытия/обоснования
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Hempel’s account of thought experiments has been discussed only by a very few authors and, for the most part, with rather cursory remarks. Its importance, however, is not only historical, but also systematic theoretical, because it involves the distinction between discovery and justification, a main pillar of neopositivistic philosophy of science. Hempel raised the question whether thought experiments constitute a methodological component of scientific research or, on the contrary, are merely a heuristic-psychological device for obtaining and/or transmitting new ideas. While conceding a few exceptions in the natural sciences, he argued that thought experiments always have a heuristic character in the social sciences. There is however a fundamental tension in Hempel’s conception of thought experiments, between the thesis of methodological monism and the neopositivistic dichotomy discovery/justification. On the one hand, on the basis of the unity of scientific method, Hempel admits a difference only in degree between the natural and the human sciences, but on the other hand, he draws a principled distinction between thought experiments of the human sciences (which have only a greater or lesser heuristic value) and those of the natural sciences (which may have also a cognitive-justificatory value). If one assumes the unity of method in the minimal sense in which no scientific knowledge can renounce intersubjective controllability, this tension can be removed either by rejecting the discovery/justification dichotomy or by interpreting it differently. Here, following the second path, two senses of the dichotomy are distinguished, one of which must be accepted, while the other rejected. This removes the internal tension in Hempel’s conception of thought experiments and suggests the thesis that any plausible thought experiment, both in the natural and the human sciences, must already contain some justification, implicit or explicit, of the theoretical hypotheses that they formulate.
Подход Гемпеля к мысленным экспериментам обсуждался лишь очень немногими авторами и по большей части ограничивался довольно беглыми замечаниями. Однако его значение не только историческое, но и систематически теоретическое, поскольку оно включает в себя различие между открытием и обоснованием, что является основным столпом неопозитивистской философии науки. Гемпель поставил вопрос о том, являются ли мысленные эксперименты методологической составляющей научных исследований или, наоборот, являются лишь эвристически-психологическим приемом для получения и/или передачи новых идей. Допуская несколько исключений в естественных науках, он утверждал, что в социальных науках мысленные эксперименты всегда имеют эвристический характер. Однако в концепции мысленных экспериментов Гемпеля существует фундаментальное противоречие между тезисом методологического монизма и неопозитивистской дихотомией открытия/обоснования. С одной стороны, на основе единства научного метода Гемпель допускает различие лишь в степени между естественными и гуманитарными науками, но, с другой стороны, он проводит принципиальное различие между мысленными экспериментами гуманитарных наук (которые имеют лишь большую или меньшую эвристическую ценность) и естественных наук (которые могут иметь и познавательно-обосновательную ценность). Если предположить единство метода в минимальном смысле, при котором ни одно научное знание не может отказаться от интерсубъективной значимости, то это напряжение можно снять либо путем отказа от дихотомии открытия/обоснования, либо путем ее иной интерпретации. Здесь, следуя по второму пути, выделяются два смысла дихотомии, один из которых необходимо принять, а другой отвергнуть. Это снимает внутреннее напряжение в концепции мысленных экспериментов Гемпеля и предполагает тезис о том, что любой правдоподобный мысленный эксперимент, как в естественных, так и в гуманитарных науках, уже должен содержать некоторое обоснование, скрытое или явное, теоретических гипотез, которые они формулируют.
|
|
|
|
7.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
61 >
Issue: 1
Natalya N. Voronina
Наталия Николаевна Воронина
Страстная бесстрастность Венского кружка
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
This article represents the author’s reflections on the book by Karl Sigmund “Exact Thinking in Demented Times. The Vienna Circle and the Epic Quest for the Foundations of Science” and the fate of the Vienna Circle. Sigmund paints a vivid portrait of the Vienna Circle against the background of the difficult historical period in which its members lived and worked. The Vienna Circle established the tradition of liberating consciousness and science from metaphysics. But the participants of the Vienna Circle and their entourage did not manage to get rid of the humanistic issues, despite the declaration of strict scientific character. The author of the article draws attention to the internal contradiction between strict scientific topics and the existential-humanistic perception of this topic by the Vienna Circle’s authors and their likeminded people, and by Sigmund himself. The author concludes that it was thanks to this contradiction the Vienna Circle became not only a stage in the development of philosophical science, but also had a broad cultural influence on art, politics, architecture, museums, etc. The historical and philosophical tradition connects the activities of the Vienna Circle with the beginning of the divergence between the philosophical scientific and humanistic traditions in the understanding of philosophy, and the controversy between R. Carnap and M. Heidegger is an important point in this process. But Sigmund’s book gives the impression that this is not the divergence strictly scientific and humanistic traditions, but the difference between two humanistic traditions, one of them tends to express its thoughts strictly analytically.
Эта статья представляет собой авторские впечатления и размышления о судьбе Венского кружка и книге Карла Зигмунда «Точное мышление в безумные времена. Венский кружок и крестовый поход за основаниями науки». К. Зигмунд рисует яркий портрет Венского кружка на фоне сложного исторического периода, в который довелось жить и работать его членам. Венский кружок стал знаменем традиции, пытающейся отстаивать освобождение сознания и науки от метафизики. Однако самим участникам Венского кружка и их окружению не удалось избавиться от гуманистической проблематики, несмотря на декларацию строгой научности. В статье обращается внимание на внутреннее противоречие между строгой научной тематикой и экзистенциально-гуманистическим восприятием этой тематики авторами Венского кружка, и их единомышленниками, и самим Карлом Зигмундом. Выдвигается предположение, что именно благодаря этому противоречию Венский кружок стал не просто этапом в развитии философского науковедения, а оказал широкое культурное влияние на искусство, политику, архитектуру, музейное дело, и т.д. В истории философии с Венским кружком связывается начало расхождения философских традиций, и по книге Зигмунда создается впечатление, что это расхождение не строго научной и гуманистической традиций в понимании философии, а различие между двумя гуманистическими традициями, одной из которых свойственно выражать свои мысли строго аналитически.
|
|
|
|
8.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Jubilee of Vladimir N. Porus
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
|
|
|
|
9.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Илья Теодорович Касавин,
Владимир Натанович Порус
Ilya T. Kasavin
Philosophy of Science
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The article is dedicated to the identification and analysis of existential dimensions of science, i.e., the dependence of consciousness, activity and communication of scientists on special forms of scientific culture – life-meaning universals (existentials). The article outlines the contours of the problem field of existential challenges rooted in the real life of modern science, in the crisis of the Enlightenment idea of scientific progress, in the mismatch of the norms and ideals of scientists with everyday ideas and needs. The origins of the theoretical formulation of the existential problems of science are found in the dilemma of profession and vocation (M. Weber). This is a controversy that problematizes the relationship between the scientist’s desire for objective knowledge, on the one hand, and the human dimension of scientific activity and communication, on the other. The article singles out the particular types of existing, or boundary situations in science, in which the experiences of scientists are ordered and problematized in relation to archetypal values – freedom, objectivity, creativity, rationality, truth, success, as well as in relation to such ontological categories as space and time, which reveal their value-ladeness. The subjective dimension of science, in which a personality manifests herself as overcoming internal conflicts, a free and thinking being, qualifies as the subject of an emerging research trend – the existential philosophy of science.
The article is dedicated to the identification and analysis of existential dimensions of science, i.e., the dependence of consciousness, activity and communication of scientists on special forms of scientific culture – life-meaning universals (existentials). The article outlines the contours of the problem field of existential challenges rooted in the real life of modern science, in the crisis of the Enlightenment idea of scientific progress, in the mismatch of the norms and ideals of scientists with everyday ideas and needs. The origins of the theoretical formulation of the existential problems of science are found in the dilemma of profession and vocation (M. Weber). This is a controversy that problematizes the relationship between the scientist’s desire for objective knowledge, on the one hand, and the human dimension of scientific activity and communication, on the other. The article singles out the particular types of existing, or boundary situations in science, in which the experiences of scientists are ordered and problematized in relation to archetypal values – freedom, objectivity, creativity, rationality, truth, success, as well as in relation to such ontological categories as space and time, which reveal their value-ladeness. The subjective dimension of science, in which a personality manifests herself as overcoming internal conflicts, a free and thinking being, qualifies as the subject of an emerging research trend – the existential philosophy of science.
|
|
|
|
10.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Лада Владимировна Шиповалова
Lada V. Shipovalova
Distributed Scientific Cognition – On the Way to Diversity
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The author explores to the conditions for implementation of science as a public good and connects these conditions with the problem of epistemic injustice. She proposes the hypothesis that in order to implement science as a public good or actualize it as a source of diversity, it is necessary to focus theoretical attention on the concept of distributed scientific cognition and allow for the possibility of relevant practices. The rules of distributed scientific cognition practices can and should ensure both the epistemic constructiveness of science and its epistemic justice, legitimizing the openness of access to scientific cognition distributed outside the scientific community. The text reveals the main characteristics of the concept of distributed cognition, introduced by E. Hutchins. The author proposes additionally take into account two meanings of distributed scientific cognition – extensive and intensive. The first refers to the possibility of unlimited addition of participants in cognition with a reasonable relevance of their positions. The second opens up the perspective of working on a distribution that has not yet happened and suggests that any epistemic position can be distributed. She also demonstrates the applicability of the concept to relevant scientific practices related to both professional scientific communication and public communication of science.
The author explores to the conditions for implementation of science as a public good and connects these conditions with the problem of epistemic injustice. She proposes the hypothesis that in order to implement science as a public good or actualize it as a source of diversity, it is necessary to focus theoretical attention on the concept of distributed scientific cognition and allow for the possibility of relevant practices. The rules of distributed scientific cognition practices can and should ensure both the epistemic constructiveness of science and its epistemic justice, legitimizing the openness of access to scientific cognition distributed outside the scientific community. The text reveals the main characteristics of the concept of distributed cognition, introduced by E. Hutchins. The author proposes additionally take into account two meanings of distributed scientific cognition – extensive and intensive. The first refers to the possibility of unlimited addition of participants in cognition with a reasonable relevance of their positions. The second opens up the perspective of working on a distribution that has not yet happened and suggests that any epistemic position can be distributed. She also demonstrates the applicability of the concept to relevant scientific practices related to both professional scientific communication and public communication of science.
|
|
|
11.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Александр Юрьевич Антоновский,
Раиса Эдуардовна Бараш
Alexander Yu. Antonovski
The Data Won’t Collect Itself?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
While recognizing the general fruitfulness of the concept of distributed scientific knowledge and the importance of the study of science from the point of view of epistemic (in)justice, we would like to present a number of doubts about the rationale for this synthesis. Of course, it is difficult to argue with the fact that the informant in ethnographic research can act as a co-author and at the same time as an object of research, “giving change”. Here we are obviously faced with a diversity of epistemic positions and the resulting distributed knowledge. The only question is to what extent this exotic example allows generalization within the framework of social cognition, not to mention the natural sciences and mathematics. Can we expect a special kind of mathematics or natural scientific generalizations from the natives? That they are willing to share the accumulated data about native nature, which they understand better than visiting white researchers, is beyond doubt, but is not this inferior function of the provider of scientific data rather a vestige of the colonial worldview?
While recognizing the general fruitfulness of the concept of distributed scientific knowledge and the importance of the study of science from the point of view of epistemic (in)justice, we would like to present a number of doubts about the rationale for this synthesis. Of course, it is difficult to argue with the fact that the informant in ethnographic research can act as a co-author and at the same time as an object of research, “giving change”. Here we are obviously faced with a diversity of epistemic positions and the resulting distributed knowledge. The only question is to what extent this exotic example allows generalization within the framework of social cognition, not to mention the natural sciences and mathematics. Can we expect a special kind of mathematics or natural scientific generalizations from the natives? That they are willing to share the accumulated data about native nature, which they understand better than visiting white researchers, is beyond doubt, but is not this inferior function of the provider of scientific data rather a vestige of the colonial worldview?
|
|
|
12.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Евгений Валерьевич Масланов
Evgeniy V. Maslanov
Unification as a Method of Producing Cognitive Diversity
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The article analyzes the possibility of producing cognitive diversity through the unification of scientific knowledge. In the article under discussion, L.V. Shipovalova notes that the production of diversity is the most important task of science. It can be solved by constructing distributed cognition practices that can bridge the epistemic gap between scientists and lay people. In contrast to this position, it is shown that within the framework of modern technoscience, one of the mechanisms for the production of diversity can be the unification of scientific knowledge. Before the formation of technoscience, it was assumed that the search for fundamental laws was the key task of scientific research. At the same time, a special role was assigned to the disciplinary structure of science. Only within the framework of a particular scientific discipline could these laws be found. As a result, one of the main mechanisms of “unification” could become scientific imperialism, which implies a large-scale use of ontological assumptions, methods and metaphors of one discipline in another. In this case, the unification of knowledge reduces its diversity. In modern technoscience, the solution of applied problems and the design of research equipment plays a key role. The result can be achieved only in the process of complex interdisciplinary research involving the interaction of scientists from various disciplines and other actors interested in the scientific result. In the process of joint work, an interdisciplinary synthesis of knowledge can be formed. Such unification leads to an increase in cognitive diversity.
The article analyzes the possibility of producing cognitive diversity through the unification of scientific knowledge. In the article under discussion, L.V. Shipovalova notes that the production of diversity is the most important task of science. It can be solved by constructing distributed cognition practices that can bridge the epistemic gap between scientists and lay people. In contrast to this position, it is shown that within the framework of modern technoscience, one of the mechanisms for the production of diversity can be the unification of scientific knowledge. Before the formation of technoscience, it was assumed that the search for fundamental laws was the key task of scientific research. At the same time, a special role was assigned to the disciplinary structure of science. Only within the framework of a particular scientific discipline could these laws be found. As a result, one of the main mechanisms of “unification” could become scientific imperialism, which implies a large-scale use of ontological assumptions, methods and metaphors of one discipline in another. In this case, the unification of knowledge reduces its diversity. In modern technoscience, the solution of applied problems and the design of research equipment plays a key role. The result can be achieved only in the process of complex interdisciplinary research involving the interaction of scientists from various disciplines and other actors interested in the scientific result. In the process of joint work, an interdisciplinary synthesis of knowledge can be formed. Such unification leads to an increase in cognitive diversity.
|
|
|
13.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Олеся Игоревна Соколова
Olesya I. Sokolova
Distributed Cognition In a Situation of Risk – Rejection of Consensus?
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
In this remark to the article by L.V. Shipovalova, doubts are expressed about the thesis about the insolvency of consensus in the conditions of distributed cognition. According to the author, distributed cognition does not imply rejection of consensus, but complements it. Using the example of the problems of technology management and their assessment, as well as the risk situations accompanying them, a more generalized interpretation of consensus is proposed that goes beyond communication in science. In this interpretation, consensus is a dialogue between science and non-science and involves a large number of participants in the absence of a predetermined order or degree of significance of evaluating their arguments. The need to appeal to consensus is justified by the fact that the assessment of consequences and risks is carried out in a situation of epistemological uncertainty. Technology management is lagging, i.e. it is reactive, not projective. It is noted that following the principles of consensus allows you to include a significant amount of available knowledge in the discussion field and prevent undesirable consequences when making decisions. The author emphasizes the normative nature of consensus, which is a requirement for collective decision-making when assessing the consequences of technologies.
In this remark to the article by L.V. Shipovalova, doubts are expressed about the thesis about the insolvency of consensus in the conditions of distributed cognition. According to the author, distributed cognition does not imply rejection of consensus, but complements it. Using the example of the problems of technology management and their assessment, as well as the risk situations accompanying them, a more generalized interpretation of consensus is proposed that goes beyond communication in science. In this interpretation, consensus is a dialogue between science and non-science and involves a large number of participants in the absence of a predetermined order or degree of significance of evaluating their arguments. The need to appeal to consensus is justified by the fact that the assessment of consequences and risks is carried out in a situation of epistemological uncertainty. Technology management is lagging, i.e. it is reactive, not projective. It is noted that following the principles of consensus allows you to include a significant amount of available knowledge in the discussion field and prevent undesirable consequences when making decisions. The author emphasizes the normative nature of consensus, which is a requirement for collective decision-making when assessing the consequences of technologies.
|
|
|
14.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Татьяна Дмитриевна Соколова
Tatiana D. Sokolova
Distributed Scientific Cognition Within the Academy and Beyond
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
In the article, I consider the problem of distributed scientific knowledge in two aspects: (1) from the point of view of distributed cognition as one of the ways for scientists to obtain scientific knowledge; (2) from the point of view of recruiting scientific personnel to the academy. I believe that in both the cases the problem of epistemic injustice in relation to new participants in the cognitive process remains. The concept of distributed cognition, in my opinion, is not able by itself to solve the problem of epistemic injustice and unequal access to both the results of scientific research and the status of their participants, that is, to make a transition from epistemic asymmetry to epistemic balance or parity of the parties. The most productive implication of the concept of distributed cognition is that its application to scientific practice highlights situations of epistemic injustice, each time on an ever-increasing scale. Finally, I return to the concept of science as a public good and consider some of its implications from the perspective of the classical understanding of science and the possibilities for redressing epistemic injustice.
In the article, I consider the problem of distributed scientific knowledge in two aspects: (1) from the point of view of distributed cognition as one of the ways for scientists to obtain scientific knowledge; (2) from the point of view of recruiting scientific personnel to the academy. I believe that in both the cases the problem of epistemic injustice in relation to new participants in the cognitive process remains. The concept of distributed cognition, in my opinion, is not able by itself to solve the problem of epistemic injustice and unequal access to both the results of scientific research and the status of their participants, that is, to make a transition from epistemic asymmetry to epistemic balance or parity of the parties. The most productive implication of the concept of distributed cognition is that its application to scientific practice highlights situations of epistemic injustice, each time on an ever-increasing scale. Finally, I return to the concept of science as a public good and consider some of its implications from the perspective of the classical understanding of science and the possibilities for redressing epistemic injustice.
|
|
|
15.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Лада Владимировна Шиповалова
Lada V. Shipovalova
Distributed Scientific Cognition – From Unity to the Binding of Diversity: Reply to Critics
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The author consider critical remarks of opponents about the idea of distributed scientific cognition, its connection with the concept of science as a source of epistemic diversity. She notes the importance of the concept of consensus and unification of scientific disciplines, and emphasizes relevance the distribution of scientific cognition binding the diverse in situations of problematic unity.
The author consider critical remarks of opponents about the idea of distributed scientific cognition, its connection with the concept of science as a source of epistemic diversity. She notes the importance of the concept of consensus and unification of scientific disciplines, and emphasizes relevance the distribution of scientific cognition binding the diverse in situations of problematic unity.
|
|
|
|
16.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Александр Андреевич Гусев
Alexander A. Gusev
Representationalism and the Nature of Mental States
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The paper explores representationalist theories of mind in the context of the mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness. The mind-body problem is related to the substantial dualism, according to which there are two independent types of objects – physical and mental. For a materialistically oriented metaphysics, such a dualism was unacceptable. In the second half of the twentieth century. a new version of dualism appeared – the dualism of properties. Its essence lies in the fact that it is not the existence of mental substances that is affirmed, but the existence of phenomenal properties of experience that are irreducible to physical and functional properties. The dualism of properties is associated with the hard problem of consciousness – why are certain neurophysiological processes accompanied by a qualitative experience? The problem of a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenal characteristics of experience has become a new threat to naturalistic metaphysics. The first part of the work analyzes the philosophical context of the formation of cognitive science. It is shown how functionalism and representationalism became the two main philosophical positions that underlie this discipline. The second part deals with an attempt to solve the mind-body problem through the naturalization of intentionality. It is shown that teleosemantic representationalism, within the framework of which this naturalistic project was implemented, is not able to explain the phenomenon of misrepresentation, which plays a crucial role for the idea of representation as such. The final part of the study evaluates an attempt to answer the hard problem of consciousness by reducing the phenomenal character of experience to representational content. The author demonstrates that such a reduction leads to an ontology with non-instantiated properties and non-existent objects, which is an undesirable consequence for a physicalism.
The paper explores representationalist theories of mind in the context of the mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness. The mind-body problem is related to the substantial dualism, according to which there are two independent types of objects – physical and mental. For a materialistically oriented metaphysics, such a dualism was unacceptable. In the second half of the twentieth century. a new version of dualism appeared – the dualism of properties. Its essence lies in the fact that it is not the existence of mental substances that is affirmed, but the existence of phenomenal properties of experience that are irreducible to physical and functional properties. The dualism of properties is associated with the hard problem of consciousness – why are certain neurophysiological processes accompanied by a qualitative experience? The problem of a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenal characteristics of experience has become a new threat to naturalistic metaphysics. The first part of the work analyzes the philosophical context of the formation of cognitive science. It is shown how functionalism and representationalism became the two main philosophical positions that underlie this discipline. The second part deals with an attempt to solve the mind-body problem through the naturalization of intentionality. It is shown that teleosemantic representationalism, within the framework of which this naturalistic project was implemented, is not able to explain the phenomenon of misrepresentation, which plays a crucial role for the idea of representation as such. The final part of the study evaluates an attempt to answer the hard problem of consciousness by reducing the phenomenal character of experience to representational content. The author demonstrates that such a reduction leads to an ontology with non-instantiated properties and non-existent objects, which is an undesirable consequence for a physicalism.
|
|
|
|
17.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Иван Александрович Соболев
Ivan A. Sobolev
Criteria for Distinguishing Presuppositions and Conventional Implicatures
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
This article explores conventional implicatures and presuppusitions as the main parts of utterance’s content expressing its implied meaning. The article considers a discussion around taxonomy of meaning types, which is an important problem for the philosophy of language. The main shared properties of these semantic components are examined on various examples: projection, conventionality, and non-cancellability. The article provides a criteria for differentiation of these parts od meaning: implicatures are speaker-oriented. This unique semantic property is explained within the epistemic approach using the concepts of common knowledge and agent’s beliefs. At the end, the logical explanation of the differences between conventional implicatures and presuppositions is compared with the theory of impositions and formal discursive approach.
This article explores conventional implicatures and presuppusitions as the main parts of utterance’s content expressing its implied meaning. The article considers a discussion around taxonomy of meaning types, which is an important problem for the philosophy of language. The main shared properties of these semantic components are examined on various examples: projection, conventionality, and non-cancellability. The article provides a criteria for differentiation of these parts of meaning: implicatures are speaker-oriented. This unique semantic property is explained within the epistemic approach using the concepts of common knowledge and agent’s beliefs. At the end, the logical explanation of the differences between conventional implicatures and presuppositions is compared with the theory of impositions and formal discursive approach.
|
|
|
|
18.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Ирина Алексеевна Герасимова
Irina A. Gerasimova
Science as Human Capital and Resource
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
Social philosophy of science views science as a public good in cognitive, political-economic and moral terms, and as a humanistic project. The author attempts to combine the economics of science and the social philosophy of science into a single exchange zone. The article discusses this problem in relation to technoscience with an emphasis on pragmatically oriented resource-efficient issues. The author transfers the experience of economics, management, engineering and industry to the level of philosophical reflections of science and technology. Innovative activity in technoscience can be imagined using Aristotle's universal scheme of underlying causes. Science as a cognitive resource is involved in socio-cultural construction using material and cultural resources. The author poses the problem of resource efficiency, which means a balanced interconnected set of resources of social practices. The installation of resource efficiency in the engineering environment is thought as the basis of material culture. Economists identify five main types of resources – material, financial, labor, temporary, information. Information and communication resources play a key role in the digital society. Analyzing the problems of technoscience as a public good leads to the allocation of cognitive resources and moral resources. Cognitive resources in science are associated with the intellectual potential of teams of researchers, individual scientists and engineers. The author poses the problem of moral resources in the aspect of the ethics of science, the role of responsibility for the formation of ideas and projects, research and their consequences. The problem of material, financial, labor, temporary, information and communication, cognitive and moral resources in the field of science has a socio-philosophical dimension. The article discusses the criteria for effectively engaging the potential of a cognitive resource in science in social practices. The author considers the problem of cognitive resources using examples of cooperation between scientists and representatives of the tradition, the movement of scientific volunteers.
Social philosophy of science views science as a public good in cognitive, political-economic and moral terms, and as a humanistic project. The author attempts to combine the economics of science and the social philosophy of science into a single exchange zone. The article discusses this problem in relation to technoscience with an emphasis on pragmatically oriented resource-efficient issues. The author transfers the experience of economics, management, engineering and industry to the level of philosophical reflections of science and technology. Innovative activity in technoscience can be imagined using Aristotle's universal scheme of underlying causes. Science as a cognitive resource is involved in socio-cultural construction using material and cultural resources. The author poses the problem of resource efficiency, which means a balanced interconnected set of resources of social practices. The installation of resource efficiency in the engineering environment is thought as the basis of material culture. Economists identify five main types of resources – material, financial, labor, temporary, information. Information and communication resources play a key role in the digital society. Analyzing the problems of technoscience as a public good leads to the allocation of cognitive resources and moral resources. Cognitive resources in science are associated with the intellectual potential of teams of researchers, individual scientists and engineers. The author poses the problem of moral resources in the aspect of the ethics of science, the role of responsibility for the formation of ideas and projects, research and their consequences. The problem of material, financial, labor, temporary, information and communication, cognitive and moral resources in the field of science has a socio-philosophical dimension. The article discusses the criteria for effectively engaging the potential of a cognitive resource in science in social practices. The author considers the problem of cognitive resources using examples of cooperation between scientists and representatives of the tradition, the movement of scientific volunteers.
|
|
|
|
19.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Евгений Геннадьевич Цуркан
Evgenii G. Tsurkan
Online Interactions in Every Day Life
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The article analyzes the possibility of applying E. Goffman's microsociological frame analysis to everyday online interaction and the difficulties associated with this application. The article criticizes empirically unjustified and methodologically unproductive guiding distinctions: real/virtual and authentic/medial. Online interactions and digital technologies do not create a virtual reality separate from everyday life, do not make communication more mediated or less authentic, but are embedded in the existing everyday reality and provide alternative tools for impression management, impose specific technical constraints and provide specific opportunities. The rich tools of E. Hoffman's frame analysis can be effectively applied to the study of online interaction, provided that two assumptions are reconsidered: the special status of face-to-face interaction and blindness to things. In place of these positions, we propose a symmetrical description of face-to-face and online interaction, as well as an increased attention to the logic of technical and interface couplings of digital media. We conclude that revisiting these provisions will not destroy the conceptual core of E. Goffman's theory, but rather will allow us to apply frame analysis to the study of online interaction rituals. The microsociology of everyday life can complement the theoretical constructs of the Science and technology studies and Actor-network theory, which leave everyday interactions, the grammar of the interaction order, and the “Lebenswelt” on the periphery of research.
The article analyzes the possibility of applying E. Goffman's microsociological frame analysis to everyday online interaction and the difficulties associated with this application. The article criticizes empirically unjustified and methodologically unproductive guiding distinctions: real/virtual and authentic/medial. Online interactions and digital technologies do not create a virtual reality separate from everyday life, do not make communication more mediated or less authentic, but are embedded in the existing everyday reality and provide alternative tools for impression management, impose specific technical constraints and provide specific opportunities. The rich tools of E. Hoffman's frame analysis can be effectively applied to the study of online interaction, provided that two assumptions are reconsidered: the special status of face-to-face interaction and blindness to things. In place of these positions, we propose a symmetrical description of face-to-face and online interaction, as well as an increased attention to the logic of technical and interface couplings of digital media. We conclude that revisiting these provisions will not destroy the conceptual core of E. Goffman's theory, but rather will allow us to apply frame analysis to the study of online interaction rituals. The microsociology of everyday life can complement the theoretical constructs of the Science and technology studies and Actor-network theory, which leave everyday interactions, the grammar of the interaction order, and the “Lebenswelt” on the periphery of research.
|
|
|
20.
|
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science:
Volume >
60 >
Issue: 4
Елена Эдуардовна Чеботарева
Elena Е. Chebotareva
Global Scientific Projects
abstract |
view |
rights & permissions
| cited by
The article examines a set of scientific projects referred to the study of the prehistoric period of the Earth and the resurrection of extinct animal species using the characteristics of a global scientific project developed by I.T. Kasavin. The author reveals the unobvious connections between scientific and extra-scientific factors (such as media, utopianism, the influence of cultural paradigms, etc.), in particular, the influence of such scientific and cultural trends as posthumanism and global evolutionism was shown. The paradoxical nature of this set of projects is reflected by prospects and advantages associated with its implementation, what can be explained by the significant ideological and psychological component in its composition. The author considers the Pleistocene park in Yakutia awaiting its settlement by “resurrected” mammoths, as a Russian example of a global scientific project belonging to this direction. In addition to the identified by I.T. Kasavin characteristics the author proposes such a property of the global scientific and engineering project as the scientific and sociotechnical imaginary. The author briefly discusses a concept of the sociotechnical imaginaries in the context of the works by Sh. Jasanoff. As well the author consideres the scientific imagination (the concept of which is still based on Jasanoff’s ideas) and its role in science diplomacy using the work of S. Robinson. Finally the article concludes about the problematic points of using the concept of imaginaries in the study of science and technology (vagueness, inconsistency, lack of elaboration, if any possible) and makes a comparison of this concept with the idea of a global scientific project.
The article examines a set of scientific projects referred to the study of the prehistoric period of the Earth and the resurrection of extinct animal species using the characteristics of a global scientific project developed by I.T. Kasavin. The author reveals the unobvious connections between scientific and extra-scientific factors (such as media, utopianism, the influence of cultural paradigms, etc.), in particular, the influence of such scientific and cultural trends as posthumanism and global evolutionism was shown. The paradoxical nature of this set of projects is reflected by prospects and advantages associated with its implementation, what can be explained by the significant ideological and psychological component in its composition. The author considers the Pleistocene park in Yakutia awaiting its settlement by “resurrected” mammoths, as a Russian example of a global scientific project belonging to this direction. In addition to the identified by I.T. Kasavin characteristics the author proposes such a property of the global scientific and engineering project as the scientific and sociotechnical imaginary. The author briefly discusses a concept of the sociotechnical imaginaries in the context of the works by Sh. Jasanoff. As well the author consideres the scientific imagination (the concept of which is still based on Jasanoff’s ideas) and its role in science diplomacy using the work of S. Robinson. Finally the article concludes about the problematic points of using the concept of imaginaries in the study of science and technology (vagueness, inconsistency, lack of elaboration, if any possible) and makes a comparison of this concept with the idea of a global scientific project.
|
|
|