Chôra

In his 1906 book The problem of becoming and the notion of matter in Greek philosophy from its origins till Theophrastus, Albert Rivaud puts forward an entirely original (and nowadays largely forgotten) interpretation of the receptacle or chôra in Plato’s Timaeus. On his reading, Timaeus’ introduction of chôra signals the limits of the possibility to explain the formation of the cosmos by means of the opposition between the intelligible and the sensible. Opposing Aristotle and others in his wake, Rivaud firmly rejects the understanding of chôra as matter, without however identifying it as space in the sense of a system of intra‑cosmic coordinates. Instead, he sees the receptacle as a notion borrowed from a philosophical system otherwise alien to Plato’s thought, namely the atomism of Leucippus and Democritus. Neither the atomistic void nor chôra are like the modern space ; rather, in virtue of evoking “the unchanging theater of all changes”, they are “like the chaos, immense, gaping, populated by the infinite crowd of forms”. Rivaud concludes that, by introducing chora as a notion irreducible to the concept of becoming, Plato recognizes that the cosmogonic processes cannot be fully explained either on the basis of the relation of the cosmos to its intelligible model or through the logic of opposites that governs all change in the sensible realm. At the same time, the introduction of chôra (described through a variety of mostly biological metaphors) marks the limits of the artisanal model preeminent in the Timaeus, a model that endows the cosmogonic story with a new transparency and ensures the teleological dimension of the fully formed universe. The aim of the article is to re‑evaluate Rivaud’s audacious reading of the Timaeus with an eye to larger issues pertinent to a variety of ancient cosmogonies.

Cet article vise à faire ressortir les fils hétérogènes de la pensée sur les émotions qui traversent la littérature philosophique et médicale grecque des cinquième et quatrième siècles avant J.‑C., contribuant à l’émergence de la sphère des passions en tant que territoire autonome pour l’exploration des faits mentaux. Nous examinons d’abord le modèle psychologique homérique dans le but de mettre en évidence son influence sur la littérature philosophique et non philosophique grecque des siècles suivants. Les auteurs hippocratiques, en particulier, se révèlent redevables du monisme «materialiste» d’Homère, mais on retrouve également des traces du modèle épique chez les penseurs qui, par la suite, se sont intéressés à la relation entre le corps et l’entité‑âme. Nous reconstituons ensuite l’évolution au cours de laquelle, d’Héraclite à Démocrite, de Platon à Aristote et au Péripatos, une notion du pathos en tant qu’emotion finit par émerger, prête à être acceptée et bien sûr précisée autant que retravaillée par les philosophies des âges hellénistique et romain.

Plutarch’s Dialogue on Love (Erōtikos), certainly one of his most sublime and intriguing masterpieces, has for a long time puzzled many readers and commentators, concerning both its attitude towards Plato and its precise political and metaphysical scope. At a first level, some have argued that the main theme of the dialogue, from beginning to end, is the praise of conjugal love, and that Plutarch’s revolutionary conception of marriage departs from Plato’s one. At a second level, some have objected that the main point is rather the central praise of the god of Love, which ensures the possibility for true human love, by rekindling the Thespian tradition of the Erōtideia. As regards politics and religion, Plutarch seems therefore to distance himself from Plato. Still, at a third level, many have noticed the great literary and philosophical debt of the Chaeronean towards his acknowledged model, for the dialogue is constantly borrowing from the Symposium and the Phaedrus. Whilst the reference to the latter is clearer, the influence of the former is much more problematic. All scholars have then struggled with the extraordinary absence in the text of the well‑known Erōs‑Daimōn, especially since Plutarch makes direct use of and explicit allusions to Diotima’s speech. How can we plainly explain such an enigmatic absence ? And does it necessarily mean any departure from the essence of Platonic philosophy ? We propose an entirely new reading of the Dialogue on Love based upon the general hypothesis that it dramatically and symbolically represents the birth through the text of the Erōs‑Daimōn. The whole dialogue reveals itself as being a staging of the locus classicus of Plato’s Symposium, the familial triad Plutarch‑Timoxena‑Autoboulos reflecting the philosophical triad Socrates‑Diotima‑Erōs‑Daimōn, which is further supported by the harmonization of the Egyptian triad Osiris‑Isis‑Horus with the Platonic triad Poros‑Penia‑Erōs in the Isis and Osiris. Thus, the birth of the philosophical love in the soul of the reader is finally happening.

Pourquoi l’essence réelle des choses n’est‑elle pas accessible à la science ? La science, affirme Aristote, est incapable de nous dire pourquoi la nature se conforme à des ratios donnés. Nous sommes donc privés d’un concept reconnaissable de l’idéal, du monde en soi. La tâche du scientifique consiste, par conséquent, à rendre le monde intelligible à l’intérieur d’un domaine conceptuel qui exclurait l’idéal. D’où l’approche non réaliste du monde d’Aristote. Dès lors, la «réalité» des êtres naturels et des objets se reflète dans nos engagements créatifs dans cette réalité afin d’en délimiter les instants.

This essay strives to illustrate the unusual philosophical category of exaiphnēs (“sudden ; instant”) which is testified in Damascius’ De principiis ; Damascius is the last diadochus of Neoplatonic Academy. It will be illustrated how Damascius takes up a rare idea contained in Plato’s Parmenides on the sudden, rigorously adjusting this notion to describe the irreducible transcendence of the ineffable principle with respect to the One, just like the sudden bursts into time without belonging to it. It will therefore be shown how this specificity of exaiphnēs appears to be taken up and enhanced in a Christological key about the Incarnation by Dionysius ps.‑Areopagite, turning somehow the theoretical reflection of the contemporary pagan philosopher Damascius into a Christian one.

In the work of the Cistercian Garnerio de Rochefort, active in the second half of the 12th century, we find the formulation of a psychological doctrine based on the interweaving of the Augustinian model of videre and the Neoplatonic principle of a scalar order of the faculties of the soul. The idea of a visual‑cognitive ascent of the soul is used in the direction of an overtly mystical approach, typical of monastic spiritual theology. For Garnerio, the process of man’s inner refinement towards ecstatic‑cognitive assimilation to the divine coincides with a movement of psycho‑gnoseological progression from sense to intelligence, from the external sight of the sensible world to the spiritual one. The culmination is a direct intuition of the gaze with which God sees and understands all things, reachable only by intelligence. Of course, this vision will only be fully realised in the state of future bliss. However, during their earthly life, some men have been made capable, by divine gift, of approaching this summit of knowledge in an episodic and always imperfect way. For Garnerio, man’s turning to God is therefore conceivable only through the joint concurrence of grace and a perfective movement of the soul requiring an entry into himself in order to go supra se, to a place where he will be with God and in God.

This article proposes a follow up of Fazzo’s contributions on the stemma codicum of Aristotle’s Metaphysics – including her Chora 2015 paper, its completion in the 2017 Revue d’Histoire des Textes and, most recently, a contribution on the text of Zeta 17 in Aristotelica 1 2022. All of these are summarized and framed here in the context of today’s lively debate. We then introduce the data of Marco Ghione’s collation and comparison of the readings of the two oldest manuscripts J and E : J, the Vind. phil. gr. 100, early 9th century – the so‑called “Aristotle of Vienna” – is thus extensively compared with E, Paris. gr. 1853, early 10th century, with selected reference to the earliest hands at work (J, J2, E1). Based on Paul Maas’ theory of errors, we are now in condition to face the crucial issue : does the latter depend on the former ? This helps resolving the one residual opacity or incertitude concerning the upper part of the Metaphysics’ stemma.

Au f. 266r du manuscrit Vienne, ÖNB, 4497 un large colophon témoigne d’un épisode dramatique concernant une vague épidémique d’une violence particulière qui a eu un impact conséquent sur les activités de l’Universite de Vienne. Johannes Grössel, l’auteur de cette note, raconte comment en 1436 les cours ont été suspendus, les étudiants renvoyés chez eux, et qu’en une seule journée 70 étudiants et professeurs ont péri à cause de la peste. Le jeune étudiant Grössel a dû suspendre sa lecture des Sentences et déplorer la perte de trois de ses magistères illustres : Petrus Richter de Pirchenwart, Conradus de Herbst, Urbanus de Mellico et Johannes Straddler. L’article propose en annexe une transcription de ce colophon ainsi qu’une image de l’ecriture autographe de Johannes Grössel.