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1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
José Romo

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Peter Dear ha proporcionado recientemente un análisis de la transformación que sufrió el recurso a la experiencia en la filosofía natural del siglo XVll. De la experiencia de lo cotidiano se pasa a la descripción detallada de una experiencia artificial irrepetible, localizada espacio-temporalmente y producida por instrumentos más o menos complejos. EI artículo explora dicha interpretación en referencia a la construcción de la ciencia del movimiento de Galileo, mediante un análisis dcl experimento del plano inclinado que se describe en los Discorsi y un manuscrito, y concluye que la interpretacion de Dear dificulta considerablemente la caracterización de la práctica de Galileo.Peter Dear has recently put forward an analysis of th transformation underwent by the appeal to experience in Seventeenth-Century natural philosophy. According to Dear, this transformation lies in the change from common experience to the detailed description of an unrepeatable artificial experience space temporally located and produced by more or less sophisticated instruments. This paper explores Dear’s interpretation with regard to the construction of Galileo’s science of motion, by analyzing the celebrated inclined plane experiment described in the Discorsi as well as one of Galileo's manuscripts and concludes that Dear’s interpretation makes very difficult the characterization of Galileo’s practice.
2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Alejandro Cassini

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The aim of this paper is to analyze Leibniz and Newton’s conception of space, and to point out where their agreements and disagreements lie with respect to its mode of existence. I shall offer a definite characterization of Leibniz and Newton’s conceptions of space. I will show that, according to their own concepts of substance, both Newtonian and Leibnizian spaces are not substantiva!. The reason of that consists in the fact that space is not capable of action. Moreover, there is a sense in which space is relational, because their parts are individuated only by means of their mutual relations.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Piedad Yuste

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Con la ayuda de un diagrama y aplicando la formula del agrimensor, los matemáticos de la Antigua Babilonia descubrieron un método sencillo y elegante de bisecar figuras trapezoidales. En este trabajo intentaremos demostrar, únicamente como conjetura, que en el “Problema de los Seis hermanos” - Tablilla AO 17264 - se pudo haber manejado este mismo procedimiento, aunque ampliado y generalizado.The Mathematicians of the Old Babylonian Period, with the aid of a diagram and applying the surveyor formula, discovered a simple and smart method to bisect trapezoidal figures. In this paper, we will try to demonstrate, only as a conjecture, that in the Problem of Six Brothers, Tablet AO 17264, it could be used the same procedure, although extended and generalized.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Eugenio Moya

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En el debate entre contextualistas y anticontextualistas, señala Recanati, los últimos aventajan a los primeros por un argumento atribuible a Grice. Este argumento tiene como premisa el Principio del Paralelismo que, según Recanati, convierte al argumento en circular y a la posición anticontextualista en injustificada. Si bien considero este argumento anticontcxtualista inadecuado, demostraré que no es atribuible a Grice. Grice no puede admitir el Principio del Paralelismo si se tiene en cuenta la explicación que elabora para cienos ejemplos y su teoría de las implicaturas. Grice, según esa explicación y algunas de sus propuestas, se muestra como un contextualista.Recanati holds that, in the contextualism vs. anti-contextualism debate, the latter view has received more support thant he former thanks to an argument that can be placed in some of Grice’s writings. Such argument has the Parallelism Principle as a premise, a principle that, Recanati argues, makes the argument circular and the contextualist position unjustified. Although I consider this anticontextualist argument unjustifed, I will show that it cannot be attributed to Grice. By considering his explanation of certain examples and his theory of implicatura, I will show that Grice does not admit the Parallelism principle. This reveals Grice to be a contextualist.
5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1
Patricia King Dávalos

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Tradicionalmente, las discusiones acerca del análisis correcto del concepto de justificación epistémica se han centrado en la justificación de creencias. Este artículo sugiere que hay una correlación filosóficamente interesante entre las nociones de ‘justificación epistémica’ y de ‘práctica’. Se argumenta que, con base en tres conocidos argumentos wittgensteinianos (el del regreso infinito de reglas, cl de la subdeterminación de las reglas por las regularidades observadas y contra el lenguaje privado), es posible mostrar la relevancia de las prácticas para Ja evaluación epistemica -algo que mina la utilidad dei reduccionismo tradicional para la epistemología.Traditionally the discussion concerning the correct analysis of the concept of epistemic justification has centered on the justification of beliefs. This paper suggest that there is a philosophically interesting correlation among the notions of ‘epistemic justification’ and ‘practices’. I argue that based on three well-known wittgensteinian arguments (the infinite return of rules, the subdeterminacióon of the rules by observed regularities, and against the private language) it is possible to show the relevance of practices for epistemic evaluation - something which undermines the usefulness of traditional reductionism to epistemology.

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6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 20 > Issue: 1

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