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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 38
顧史 考
Scott Cook
A Trial Exploration of the Shanghai-Museum Bamboo Text “All Things Flow into Form”
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隨著郭店楚簡〈太一生水〉、上博楚簡〈恆先〉等文本的出土,中 國先秦形而上學的研究乃多有新資料及新範疇可探討。然資料仍是不 斷公布,適才出爐的《上海博物館藏戰國楚竹書(七)》中,即有題為 〈凡物流形〉的一篇(有甲、乙兩本),饒具形而上學的意義,對先秦 思想史研究的價值極其珍貴。如《楚辭•天問》所提:「遂古之初,誰傳道之?上下未形,何由考之?」等名句相類,〈凡物流形〉亦多以疑 問句成篇,如:「凡物流形,奚得而成?流形成體,奚得而不死?」等,並且處處押韻,兩書之間的關係頗饒興味。此外尚有與《莊子》、《淮 南子》等書中形而上學方面的段落相近的章節,然其間亦多有出入可 談。本文擬先就〈凡物流形〉前半篇提出若干釋讀方面的意見及約略 的解說,以供大方之家參考指正,作為學者進一步探討其形而上學意 義的基礎。
With the recent unearthing of such Warring States bamboo manuscripts as “Taiyi sheng shui” of Guodian and “Heng xian” of the Shanghai Museum corpus, thestudy of Chinese metaphysics has gained a wealth of new materials and concepts for exploration. Yet new materials continue to come forth, such as the recentlypublished Shanghai Museum v. 7 manuscript “Fan wu liu xing” (in two copies), a text rich in metaphysical significance and of tremendous value to the study ofpre-Qin intellectual history. In a form similar to the Chuci text “Tian wen,” this text is made up of a series of fundamental questions—all in rhymed stanzas—such as“By what means are all things able to take form?” or “Once things take form, by what means do they survive?” It constitutes an important early example ofmetaphysical inquiry in the Chinese tradition, with interesting similarities to and differences from major received philosophical texts from the same time period and region. This essay aims to provide a credible reading of the first half of this important new document and make a brief inquiry into its metaphysical significance.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2009 >
Issue: 38
張雪 珠
Maria Chang Hsüeh-chu
Hegel on the Cognition of God
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對黑格爾來說,上帝是「哲學的唯一對象」,意思是,哲學要在上 帝內認知一切,將一切引向祂,從祂來說明一切;因此哲學即是神學,也是對上帝的崇拜。在他的哲學裡,上帝是哲學的結果也是其預設,是其目標也是它的開始。黑格爾的思辨哲學是在與其他哲學觀點的對話中形成。對於上帝 之知,他強烈反對的是啟蒙時代的三種不可知論:沃爾夫代表的理性 主義的神學、康德的批判哲學與雅各比開始的感覺神學。理性神學的 不可知論建立於客觀觀點,批判哲學與感覺神學則是出自主觀理由否 認人認知上帝的可能性。這三種不可知論,黑格爾認為,它們的共同 點是,都是建立於知性的認知,不是真正出自理性的認知。他論述,理性不僅能夠認知上帝存在,而且能夠認知祂是什麼。
In Hegel’s philosophy God is “the sole object of philosophy”, in other words, philosophy has to attain in God the complete knowledge, to relate everything to God and to explain everything through God; thus philosophy in essence is a theology and is a worshiping of God. In the context of Hegel’s philosophy, God is considered to be both the final result and the precondition of philosophy, both its final goal and its starting point.The speculative philosophy of Hegel has been formed in the context of the dialogue between various philosophical theories. Regarding knowledge aboutGod, Hegel rejects the validity of the “three agnosticisms” of the Enlightenment: the rationalist theology of Wolff, the critical philosophy of Kant and Jacobi’stheology of feeling. The agnosticism of Wolff’s rational theology was founded on objective view, whereas Kant’s critical philosophy and Jacobi’s philosophy offeeling refuted the possibility of knowing God based on subjective standpoints. Hegel held that these three theories are all based on the faculty of intellect ratherthan on the one of reasoning. He argued that reasoning can attain knowledge not only of the existence of God but also about God Himself.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2009 >
Issue: 38
何志 青
Jih-Ching Ho
Inferential Justification and Rule-Following
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傳統知識論接受推論之證成概念:一信念的證成是藉由其他的信 念(或狀態)合理推出該信念。推論證成立即導致「無限後退」的問 題,因為具證成能力的信念(或狀態)本身亦需要被證成。本文嘗試 提出不會無限後退的推論證成。首先分析傳統推論證成理論具有三原 則:狹義推理理論,形式主義的推理概念,以及單線後退的證成方向。此三原則必須被修正,並取代之以新原則:廣義推理理論、實質主義、平衡互動的證成方向。這些原則所組成的新推論證成理論不再有無限 後退的問題。
Traditional epistemology embraces an inferential concept of justification: a belief is justified just in case it can be reasonably inferred from other beliefs. Inferential justification immediately incurs the problem of infinite regress, since the justifying beliefs themselves are in need of further justification. In this paper I will try to explicate a new idea of inferential justification that does not regress indefinitely. I will begin by analyzing the traditional notion of inferential justification as involving three principles, namely narrow inferentialism, formalism, and linear regress justification. All three principles are critically examined, and in their place, three new ones are proposed: broad inferentialism, materialism, and interactive justification. The principles constitute a new inferential approach which admits of no infinite regress.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 37
王志 輝
Zhi-Hue Wang
The Third Man Argument and Plato’s Theory of Forms
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本文的主旨在於,討論如何藉由柏拉圖自身理型論的立場,來避 免他在《巴曼尼德斯篇》所提出的「第三人論證」( Third Man Argument)的問題。根據Geogory Vlastos 的看法,這個論證乃是建 立在兩個隱藏的假定上:「自我表述」(Self-Predication)以及「非同 一性」(Non-Identity)假定。近年來,出現了許多詮釋,企圖藉由證 明「自我表述」假定並非柏拉圖理論之一部分,來避免第三人論證。 然而,本文試圖證明,第三人論證的錯誤並非在於「自我表述」假定,而是在於「非同一性」假定。換言之,我們可以藉由證明「非同一性」 假定乃是一個錯誤的、根本不會被柏拉圖理論接受的命題,來避免第 三人論證。除此以外,本文試圖指出,柏拉圖提出第三人論證,實際上並非 為了要進行某種對自身理論的批判。反之,本文認為,柏拉圖在《巴 曼尼德斯篇》132a1-b2 以及132d1-133a7 所設計的兩個第三人論證版 本,應是為了要警告一般人對其理型論中有關理型與個物關係,亦即 「分有」關係,可能產生的誤解。也就是說,如果我們錯誤地以一種 物質論的方式解釋分有關係,那麼理型論必將陷入大性逆推(Largeness Regress);另一方面。若我們將分有看成是一種現象個物與理型間的相 似關係,但將這種相似理解成一種對稱性的關係,那麼,理型論就必 將陷入「相似性逆推」(Likeness Regress)。
This article is concerned with the problem of how to avoid the Third Man Argument which Plato put forward in Parmenides. According to Gregory Vlastos, this argument is based on two tacit assumptions: the Self-Predication and the Non-Identity Assumption. In recent years there have been a number of interpretations which attempted to avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Self-Predication Assumption is not an acceptable part of Plato’s theory. However, in this article I will show that the fallacy of the Third Man Argument does not lie in the Self-Predication Assumption, but in the Non-Identity Assumption. That is, we may avoid the Third Man Argument by proving that the Non-Identity Assumption is false.Moreover, in this article I will point out that by putting forward the Third Man Argument, Plato does not really intend to raise a criticism of his own theory. Rather, the two versions of the Third Man Argument, which are set out in Parmenides 132a1-b2 and 132d1-133a7 respectively, should be considered as his warnings against the possible misunderstandings concerning the relationship between Forms and particulars, i.e. the relationship of “participation.” In other words, if we mistakenly interpret the conception of participation in a materialistic manner, the Theory of Forms will inevitably be caught in the “Largeness Regress”; and if we comprehend the relationship of participation in terms of the “likeness” between Forms and particulars, and consider the later to be a symmetrical relation, then the Theory of Forms must fall into the “Likeness Regress.”
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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2009 >
Issue: 37
鄭志 忠
Jyh-Jong Jeng
Sensus Communis and the Supersensible:The Normativity of the Judgment of Taste
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本文反對將鑑賞判斷的規範性建立在道德上。主要的進路是:藉 由鑑賞判斷的模態環節的特殊地位與功能來闡明審美規範性的獨特 性,即鑑賞判斷的規範性內容構成判斷本身的內容;藉由明辨「構成 性的」/「規約性的」的這個區分在兩個不同的脈絡之運用──即不 僅用來區分知性法則和理性原則,同時也用來區分數學性法則和力學性法則──,以便嚴格區分兩種不同的共感:純粹的和理想的共感。 「純粹的共感」是構想力與知性的自由遊戲的結果,它既是一種情 感,也是一種感受能力(鑑賞力),而且又是判斷的構成性規範與原 則。「理想的共感」則是「純粹的共感」與道德情感的先天連結,它 是構想力、知性與理性協調一致的結果。就規範性效力而言,純粹的共感類比於知性的力學性法則(例如,自然因果律);但理想的共感 對於鑑賞判斷卻只是規約性的,就如理性原則對於經驗判斷一樣。美 能夠象徵道德,正是因為美感本身是純粹的,不是反過來;否則的話,鑑賞力的自律將遭受侵犯。「理想的共感」可以用來引導鑑賞力合目的性地自我銳利與純化,以便藉此提高人性,使得一個合乎道德理想 的人文世界的建立「實用地」變得可能。本文最後,診斷康德為什麼 「彷彿」將美建立在道德上的理由,其實就在於他的批判的自然目的 論的「實用意義」中。
This paper argues against grounding the normativity of the judgment of taste on morality, and argues that the uniqueness of aesthetic normativity can beclarified through the distinctive status and function of the modality of the judgment of taste, and that the normative content of the judgment of taste constitutes the content of the judgment itself. Two distinct notions of sensus communis-pure sensus communis and ideal sensus communis—are strictly discriminated by applying the constitutive/regulative distinction, which can be seen in the following two contexts: the distinction between law of understanding and principle of reason, and the distinction between mathematical law and dynamic law. ‘Pure sensus communis’ is the effect of the free play of imagination and understanding; it is not only a feeling, but also a capacity for feeling (taste) and a constitutive norm and principle of the judgment. ‘Ideal sensus communis’ is the a priori connection between pure sensus communis and moral feeling; it is the effect of the harmony among imagination, understanding and reason. With respect to the normative force, pure sensus communis is analogous to dynamic law of understanding (for example, the law of causality); nevertheless, ideal sensus communis is regulative for the judgment of taste, just as principle of reason is regulative for empirical judgment. Beauty can symbolize morality precisely because the pleasure of taste is pure, but not vice versa; otherwise the autonomy of taste would be violated. Taste can be guided in its purposive self-sharpening and self-purifying by ideal sensus communis to enhance humanity, so that it becomes “pragmatically” possible to ground a world in concordance with moral ideal through the enhancement of humanity. In the end, this paper argues that the reason why Kant seems to ground beauty on morality lies in the pragmatic significance of his critical natural teleology.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 37
杜保 瑞
Bau-Ruei Duh
The Methodological Reflection about the Criticism to Hu Hong in The Doubt of Zhi Yan by Zhu Hsi
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本文討論《知言疑義》中朱熹對胡宏的批評意見,企圖澄清兩造 思路的差異,從而各自呈現兩家思維的特色與要點。《知言疑義》中 胡宏的文句多半是本體工夫論合構的發言,因此語多跳躍,致引朱 熹之批評。朱熹即由性善論的本體論立場批評胡宏有「性無善惡」之 說,及由存有論思路的「心統性情說」批評胡宏的心性相關語句之不 佳,以及由「未發涵養已發察識」的工夫次第思路批評胡宏並未重視 平日涵養一節。本文將藉由作者所提之「實踐哲學的解釋架構」,以 及「存有論哲學」的問題意識分析,以澄清兩造哲學問題意識的不同,因而並未形成真正的衝突,從而亦藉此說明朱熹與胡宏各自論學之 重點意旨。
The discussion in this article is about the criticism to Hu Hong in The doubt of Zhi yan Proposed by Zhu Hsi. The author is aiming to clear the dissimilar wayof thinking between the two philosophers to the effect that both their significant theory could be appeared. Hu Hong’s philosophical announcement alwaysintegrates the ontological and practical theory, which results to the ambiguity and give rise to the criticism from Zhu Hsi. Zhu Hsi possessed the position of thegoodness of nature to query Hu Hong about his no good and no evil opinion toward the theory of the human nature. In the definition of the mind and nature,master Zhu Hsi proposed the mind comprise the nature and the felling and argued with Hu Hong’s different opining. Concerning about the practical procedure theory, Zhu Hsi insist the cultivation should be built on daily life, and critic Hu Hong’s philosophy being short of this understanding. In this article the author will use the interpretational structure of the practical theory and the theory of being to analyze the different consciousness in these two systems and suggest that there exist no real conflict between them so as to explain both their philosophical thinking.
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NTU Philosophical Review:
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Issue: 37
彭文 本
Wen-Berng Pong
Self-Consciousness and Conscience -A Comparative Study of the Theories of Mou Zongsan and Fichte
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西洋哲學家通常把「自我意識」當作理論哲學問題,而把「良知」 當作實踐哲學問題,兩者分屬不同的哲學領域。中國哲學自孟子以降 的心學傳統則有一種特殊的傾向,亦即將兩個問題都放在實踐哲學領 域來處理,而當代新儒家的牟宗三(1909-1995)把這種理論傾向發揮 到極致。費希特(J.G. Fichte, 1762-1814)則是西洋少數將兩者當作實 踐問題來處理的哲學家。值得注意的是,兩人都以批判康德的「自我 意識」理論得出實踐意義的「自我」的結論。本文想要論述以下兩點: (1)兩人具有類似的「實踐自我」的理論;(2)牟宗三將「實踐自我」等 同於「良知」,而費希特則將「實踐自我」視為純智的思想,「良知」 則是道德情感,兩者並不等同。
Most of the Western philosophers regard self-consciousness as a problem of theoretical philosophy, and conscience as a problem of practical philosophy.Both of them belong to different areas of philosophy. In contrast with this, some philosophers in the tradition of Confucianism tend to ascribe both concepts topractical philosophy. This tendency reaches its highest point in the writings of Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), the most important representative of ContemporaryNeo-Confucianism. Fichte (1762-1814) is one of few Western philosophers, who regard both concepts as the problems of practical philosophy. It’s worthy tonotice that both Mou Zongsan and Fichte come to this conclusion by criticizing Kant’s theory of self-consciousness. I argue in this paper the following two points: (1) Mou Zongsan and Fichte have similar idea of practical self-consciousness. (2) Mou Zongsan identifies practical self-consciousness with conscience; on the contrary, Fichte holds them to be heterogeneous, the former is pure thinking and the latter sensible feeling.
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