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1. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Lorenzo Casini, Phyllis Mckay Illari, Federica Russo, Jon Williamson

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The Recursive Bayesian Net (RBN) formalism was originally developed for modelling nested causal relationships. In this paper we argue that the formalism can also be applied to modelling the hierarchical structure of mechanisms. The resulting network contains quantitative information about probabilities, as well as qualitative information about mechanistic structure and causal relations. Since information about probabilities, mechanisms and causal relations is vital for prediction, explanation and control respectively, an RBN can be applied to all these tasks. We show in particular how a simple two-level RBN can be used tomodel a mechanism in cancer science. The higher level of our model contains variables at the clinical level, while the lower level maps the structure of the cell’s mechanism for apoptosis.
2. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
María José García-Encinas

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Singular causation may be best understood within a dispositionalist framework. Although the details of just how a claim that this is in fact the case have not yet been fully worked out, different philosophers have made some positive contributions in this direction. In opposition to such suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions contains unresolvable flaws in its metaphysical foundations.First, I present two main constituents that I take to be necessary for any possible dispositional account of singular causation: (i) the possibility of causation without laws, which is a necessary condition for causal singularism, and (ii) a conception of dispositions as real, irreducible entities or properties. This results in aminimal dispositionalist view of singular causation. Second, I argue that, even if minimal, this view already has to face up to serious difficulties: (i) an ontological problem concerning the individuating conditions for dispositions in causal contexts, (ii) an instance of infinite regress, (iii) the loss of the relational character ofcausation and, as a corollary, (iv) the loss of the asymmetry of causation. Third, I argue that dispositionalists tend to misrepresent causal modality when proposing and solving a modal choice between Humeanism and dispositionalism that is becoming commonplace but which, I claim, is in fact a false choice. Finally, Isketch a possible picture of causality without laws and without dispositions.
3. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Mario Bacelar Valente

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Quantum electrodynamics presents intrinsic limitations in the description of physical processes that make it impossible to recover from it the type of description we have in classical electrodynamics. Hence one cannot consider classical electrodynamics as reducing to quantum electrodynamics and being recovered from it by some sort of limiting procedure. Quantum electrodynamics has to be seen not as a more fundamental theory, but as an upgrade of classical electrodynamics, which permits an extension of classical theory to the description of phenomena that, while being related to the conceptual framework of the classical theory, cannot be addressed from the classical theory.
4. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Vivette García Deister

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RESUMEN: Abir-Am ha criticado la visión estándar de que la Fundación Rockefeller (FR) jugó un papel central en el surgimiento de la biología molecular durante la década de 1960. En su opinión, la FR aceleró la molecularización de las ciencias de la vida, pero no intervino de manera directa en el surgimiento de la biología molecular como disciplina. Aquí sostengo que esta crítica tiene consecuencias mayores a las que sospechó su autora y muestro que la tesis de la centralidad de la FR en el desarrollo de la biología molecular no se puede desmantelar sin alterar también la visión de la biologia molecular como una disciplina orientada a la resolución de problemas predefinidos.ABSTRACT: Abir-Am has critiqued the standard view that the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) played a central role in the development of molecular biology during the 1960s. In her view, the RF accelerated the molecularization of the life sciences, but it did not directly contribute to building molecular biology’s disciplinary identity. Here I argue that Abir-Am’s critique has more consequences than she envisioned, and I show that the thesis of the centrality of the RF cannot be dismantled without also altering the view of molecular biology as a field oriented towards the solution of predefined problems.

book reviews

5. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Luis Fernández Moreno

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6. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Tom Roberts

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7. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Sergio F. Martinez

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8. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
José Antonio López Cerezo

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9. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Armando Menéndez Viso

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10. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Mauricio Suárez

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11. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Carlos Castrodeza

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12. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Antonio Sánchez

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13. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Marc Meléndez Schofield

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14. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1
Gerardo Bolado

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15. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1

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16. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1

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17. Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science: Volume > 26 > Issue: 1

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