Philosophy and Theology

This paper explores the question of whether there is a conceptual distinction between romantic love and friendship and whether such a distinction would support the normative conclusion that friends should not be lovers. Laurence Thomas has argued that, given an egalitarian conception of romantic love, there is no such distinction between romantic love and friendship. This paper shows that equally egalitarian alternatives to Thomas’s conceptions of love and friendship do suggest that friends should not be lovers. Moreover, the alternative view of romantic love defended in the paper supports a link between romantic love and sexual exclusivity.

The term “patriotism” has had different meanings, deriving from different historical circumstances. In its predominant modern sense it has been condemned as vicious, extolled as virtuous, and judged to be a quality potentially virtuous, but only in moderation. It is argued that, as most commonly understood by writers in this century, neither unrestricted patriotism, nor even moderate patriotism, is a virtue, but it is a socially pernicious vice, the more virulent for being associared with virtue.

Liberalism is no longer defensible as a strategy for coping with conflicts in a pluralistic society, but is itself one of the pluralities in conflict. Hence its strategy for coping with plurality---tolerant suspension or privatization of the deep commitments that are the roots of conflict, coupled with rational discussion to form a public consensus not connected to the plurality of commitments---can no longer serve as a common sense approach for all citizens. In this paper I explore as a solution the continuation of discussion toward shared public policy, but now discussion openly tied to underlying commitments. Truth in this context is pursued not as a matter of argument, but as fruitful consequences of action.

ln a number of recent essays, Hendrik Hart has elaborated an account of the nature and function of religious belief that, he believes, is post-modern in inspiration and anti-foundationalist in character. ln this paper, I reconstruct what I take to be Hart’s central claims. While Hart does remind us of some important aspects of the nature of religious belief---aspects often overlooked by many critics---l suggest that there are several problems in the account he provides, that there are tensions between his view of religious belief and his claims about how it can function, and that it is not clear that he ultimately avoids adopting a variant of the foundationalism he explicitly rejects.