Philosophia Christi

A key takeaway from the recent volume Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique is that no version of theistic evolution that adheres largely to consensus views in biology is a plausible option for orthodox Christians. In this paper we argue that this is false: contrary to the arguments in the volume, evolutionary theory, properly understood, is perfectly compatible with traditional Christian commitments. In addition, we argue that the lines between Intelligent Design and theistic evolution are not as sharp as most scholars have assumed, such that many who self-identify as Intelligent Design adherents would also qualify as theistic evolutionists.

What Michael J. Murray and John Ross Churchill offer as “Mere Theistic Evolution” is an intriguing proposal that should be taken seriously by Christians who are convinced of the truth of classical Christian theology while also engaged in respectful and appreciative dialogue with the natural sciences. In this essay, I argue that the main theological arguments against theistic evolution put forth in the influential volume Theistic Evolution: A Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Critique are not decisive against mere theistic evolution. The proposal raises many interesting and important issues, and it deserves further engagement.

Murray and Churchill argue correctly that theistic evolution as they define it is theologically compatible with orthodox Christian doctrines concerning divine providence, natural theology, miracles, and immaterial souls. I close with some reflections on mutual misunderstandings of Intelligent Design proponents and theistic evolutionists that arise because each sees the other as a distorted mirror image of himself.

Many Christian scholars have argued that standard versions of evolutionary theory and orthodox theological commitments can be reconciled. Some theistic evolutionists or “evolutionary creationists” have argued that evolutionary mechanisms such as random mutation and natural selection are nothing less than God’s way of creating. Though I dispute the logical coherence of these attempted reconciliations elsewhere, I argue here that there is little reason for Christians to attempt them, since an accumulating body of evidence from multiple subdisciplines of biology casts doubt on the creative power of the main evolutionary mechanisms. Thus, rather than addressing the question, “Can a meaningful doctrine of divine providence or creation be reconciled with mainstream evolutionary theory?” this essay will address the question of whether Christians should, or need to, attempt such a reconciliation at all.

In this essay we respond to the comments of Tom McCall, William Lane Craig, and Stephen C. Meyer on mere theistic evolution.

This paper seeks to demonstrate why the existence of suboptimal design in biology does not offer a reason for Christians to reject the biological case for Intelligent Design (ID). In it, I argue that Christians who critique ID based upon alleged deficiencies within biology fail to imagine the various ways in which a divine designer might bring about certain biological effects. That is, such critics presumably envision a simplistic notion of divine causation—where God either directly brings about every biological effect, or is not involved in any biological effect. Such either or thinking, I maintain, is theologically unnecessary.

Giving the impression that perichoresis solves the “threeness-oneness problem” or the “two natures–one person problem” without an explanation of how perichoresis works is problematic; as such, an explanation of perichoresis ought to be provided. I provide one way to address this problem by drawing upon the work of Eleonore Stump. In contrast to approaches that avoid the metaphysics of perichoresis I provide an account of the metaphysics of perichoresis and suggest that a Stump-inspired account of perichoresis—that is, an account that places an emphasis on the notion of sharing some aspect of the mental life—deserves serious attention by those who feel the weight of the problematic use of perichoresis.

In this paper, I argue that Plantinga maintains it is possible to come to know that Christianity is true, but only from the inside. Further, since Plantinga argues that one’s judgments about the epistemic status of Christian belief depend upon one’s prephilosophical metaphysical views, his position amounts to the claim that the Christian community has privileged access to truth and that non-Christians are ill-equipped to evaluate their beliefs. The upshot of Plantinga’s position is, I suggest, that people from different communities will disagree about the epistemic status of religious belief, and reason is simply incapable of adjudicating those disputes.

In recent decades consciousness science has become a prominent field of research. This essay analyzes the most recent book by a leading pioneer in the scientific study of consciousness. In the The Feeling of Life Itself Christof Koch presents the integrated information theory and applies it to multiple pressing topics in consciousness studies. This essay considers the philosophical basis of the theory and Koch’s application of it from neurobiology to animal ethics.