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Essays in Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
David Heise
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2.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
Eric Smaw
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In this paper, I argue that Louis Pojman fails to justify his conception of a moderate cosmopolitan world government. I illustrate this by highlighting the fact that Pojman fails to articulate adequate justifications for his Principle of Humanity (POH) and Principle of Equality (POE). This is problematic because the POH and POE ground his conception of human rights, which, in turn, grounds his conception of a moderate cosmopolitan world government. Hence, since he fails to justify the POH and the POE, I conclude that his conception of a cosmopolitan world government ultimately fails. But, before I launch this attack on Pojman, I offer substantial philosophical analyses of Hobbes's arguments for the state of nature, human rights, and the establishment of the commonwealth. I do so because Hobbes provides the philosophical basis for Pojman's philosophy of world government. I show that by understanding the philosophical problems inherent in Hobbes we gain better understanding of the philosophical problems at the basis of Pojman.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
Michael Payne
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4.
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Essays in Philosophy:
Volume >
9 >
Issue: 2
Per Bauhn
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Justice is often viewed in terms of seeing to it that right-holders are provided with the goods that they are entitled to. Less attention is given to the other dimension of justice, namely, that of duty-holders. If persons are assigned more duties, or more burdensome duties, than fairness requires, then they are victims of injustice just as much as persons whose rights are left unfulfilled. In this essay, I will argue for certain limits to the duty to assist people in need. My argument does not intend to show that we have no positive duties, but rather that these duties, whether they are of an interpersonal or a global, institutional kind, should be guided by an idea of fairness that pertains to the relations between duty-holders as well as between them and right-holders. I will discuss structural differences between negative and positive duties, as well as formulate a Principle of Contributive Fairness.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Issue: 2
A. M. Ungar
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6.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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9 >
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Dwayne A. Tunstall
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7.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Jim Stone
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8.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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Rohit Parikh
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9.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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9 >
Issue: 2
John Schroeder
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10.
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Essays in Philosophy:
Volume >
9 >
Issue: 2
John Scott Gray
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11.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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9 >
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Anca Gheaus
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12.
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Essays in Philosophy:
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9 >
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Elmer H. Duncan
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13.
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Essays in Philosophy:
Volume >
9 >
Issue: 2
David Boersema
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14.
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Essays in Philosophy:
Volume >
9 >
Issue: 2
Christina M. Bellon
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